

CLEARING THE GROUND

By "LUMBER-MAN"



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CLEARING THE GROUND

European War
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CLEARING THE GROUND


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THIS BOOK
IS ADDRESSED TO
ALL WHO WOULD INFLUENCE
THE FUTURE

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PREFACE

THE records which have been collected, and the remarks which are made in this book, may assist some of those who would see Great Britain secure from attack and in the best position for developing her resources and for improving the lives of her citizens.

The greater the dangers and the difficulties ahead, in the voyage of the ship of state, the more it is necessary to take soundings, and to enter them in the log—the pages of a book.

The lead-line used may be faulty, the lead or plummet too light, the leadsman inexperienced, or the position of affairs to-day too complex to permit a full entry to be made. Yet any help whereby the depths and the shallows may be gauged is better than none to those who would advance the voyage and bring the vessel in safety to her next port.

Each on board to-day can take his spell, and by conning the log prevent the mistakes of the past being renewed in the days to come; but let none forget that, great as such help may be, each must keep a close look-out and scan the broad horizon; whilst, by chart and reckoning, those on the bridge can lessen the voyage-time and increase the voyage-success.

Into more distant harbours other hands will take our craft, rougher yet may the waters be through which the ship of state must sail, but, with the crew more closely watching, and those who have been passengers doing their best to aid, all should be well.

Christmas Eve, 1917.

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CLEARING THE GROUND

PRE-WAR

*"Some people say you need not go back on the old ground now ;
"everybody knows it ! You cannot go back on it too often. It
"affects the conditions of Peace."*

Viscount (formerly Sir Edward) GREY, at the Hotel Cecil,
Foreign Press Association Meeting, 24th October, 1916.

*That the things, which were done,
Could be done, beats all understanding ;
A nation and Empire in peril—
Whose the unhanding ?*

Unreadiness and internal strife bring war : the nation—unwarned,
unarmed—pays the price.

GENERAL—1911 TO 1914

OVER and over again in world-history the importance of understanding what has happened in the past, in order to guard and guide the future, has been proved. Time after time the withholding of knowledge from the people has resulted in danger and too often in disaster.

The object of this book is to bring together some of the facts which should be clear in the minds of all who wish to see Great Britain and the Empire free and prosperous, under wise rulers who shall realize that ample safeguard against attack is the only sure foundation on which to build the future of a nation, and that frank disclosure of the truth to the public is the only sound basis on which a democracy can hope to survive.

To seek for the best possible future without giving sufficient thought to the past is like attempting to continue a journey when the traveller knows not where he has arrived, whither he must start once more, nor how those responsible for his guidance have brought him to the place in which he is.

The journey of our nation had been a long one until, in a moment, at the beginning of August 1914, we found ourselves at war; the direction, method and condition of our travel had varied; the rulers responsible, from time to time, for guiding the route taken had been many; but no sufficient warning of possible disaster had been given, nor had any adequate preparations for such a contingency been made.

In obtaining a reasonable view, before we make our fresh start after the war, it seems unnecessary to consider where we might have been had the nation chosen other guides, or had the guides, who were not chosen, warned us with greater persistence that those who had been selected to power were blindfolding the eyes of the people to menace from without. Further, in seeking a true perspective as to the future, any temptation to analyze what was done by those who were out of power is lessened by the hope that, in the days to come, party politics—the “Opposition” against the “Government”—will be ended.

It is true also that many of those who were not chosen to rule the nation did warn it of the growing peril. Indeed, some, in the cold shades of opposition, were condemned by those in power, for suggesting what should be guarded against. Mr. P. H. Illingworth, M.P., at Windhill on 7th January, 1910, in respect of the attempt of one who was not in office to warn the nation of its peril, said: “Mr. Balfour, by giving the stamp of his approval to the infamous suggestion that war between this country and Germany was inevitable, had furnished ample reason for keeping the Tory party out of power for the next hundred years.”

In addition to this, many of the unselected have, since the disaster occurred, expressed regret that they had not urged more strenuously than they did, that, until the nation was amply safeguarded, all promises of social and other improvements in the lives of the people must prove to be in vain and but pie-crust which the aggressor would break.

As to those in power to-day, it is a good rule to leave the driver to pull through with the horses he has, unless the horses show signs of lying down, the driver of going to sleep,

or those responsible for the journey of making terms with brigands. For these reasons, the Government of December 1916 to 1917 is but little referred to in these pages, except to express the hope that its non-party character may be maintained during its tenure of office, which commenced after more than twenty-eight months of war.

In recalling events of the past in order to aid the handling of the future, it is hoped that none will infer bias or party prejudice because the facts dealt with refer principally to the eight years preceding the outbreak of war and to the twenty-eight months which followed.

Meanwhile, to return to the simile of the journey, there in 1906 was the coach; holding the reins were the rulers who continued to control until December 1916; on the front seats near the drivers were those who had not been chosen and were in opposition, according to the party system. Outside and inside the coach were the nation. Those inside had to take the journey on trust, and the few outside were given but limited glimpses of the route over which our rulers were leading the nation.

The land in the far distance which the passengers were told by the drivers they were approaching—the rich and happy country to be reached—absorbed the thoughts of those who journeyed, so far as they had any time to spare after labouring to live their lives, providing for the expenses of the nation, remunerating those who ruled, and supplying the pensions and allowances for those who had ceased to be in authority over them.

The drivers were chiefly occupied in expounding to all and sundry what a wonderful journey they would make, and what a marvellous future was in store for those who had trusted them and for those who had not.

Such of the ruling caste as were on the front seats in opposition, laid it down from time to time that the future anticipated and promised by the drivers would be “dead sea fruit”; that the alleged view was a mirage, and the so-called delightful country non-existent on the route taken. They repeated over and over again that the road by which they

wished to take the passengers, if they had the reins, would lead to a real future worth attaining and a real land of happiness.

Neither the drivers nor those in opposition ever made the passengers see that between the coach and any better condition of affairs lay many dangers from within and from without—hostile influences, bandit bands preparing to attack, and such-like—and that, with the coach lumbering along, first in one direction and then in another, pulled here and there by reason of the drivers permitting those with divergent interests to interfere with the handling of the reins, it was almost certain that the bones of many of the travellers would lie bleached along the tortuous course pursued ere any goal was reached.

On occasion a small group of passengers would compel the drivers to turn the coach in its track—sometimes within forty-eight hours—and do exactly the reverse of what the drivers had assured the rest of the passengers was to be done; reminiscent of that farcical episode in *Three Men in a Boat* when, for a consideration, the driver of the “Exeter Mail” at Waterloo made it the Kingston-local, from which station our up-river friends wished to start their holiday.

Often the vagaries of the drivers, and of those whose support they wooed, bewildered even themselves, whilst always there was a continuous clamour and argument going on between the two rival parties on the front seats, with frequent snatches from behind, by one small group or another, at the arm of whoever happened to be the driver of the day.

Occasionally some of the drivers would go amongst the passengers using sonorous words or catchy phrases as to the advantageous manner in which the journey was being conducted, only to be followed by their opponents coming down to assure the travellers that everything was just as bad as it could be and must remain so until they were selected for the driving-seat. No wonder, to change for a moment our illustration, and to quote the Bellman in the *Hunting of the Snark*, that “the bowsprit got mixed with the rudder sometimes.”

The journey of the nation had been difficult enough to pursue when there were two clear-cut parties—the drivers and the opposition. When the two parties, and particularly that

which held the reins from 1906 onwards, resolved into conglomerations of conflicting interests, confusion became worse confounded. Each interest strove to pull the reins in such a manner as to obtain its particular end or aim first, and on the top of this, batches of passengers behind the front seats, belonging to neither of the main parties, kept grabbing at the reins to compel the driver to diverge to some point which they wished to pass. In the end the coach was on the edge of the ditch of civil war when the despoilers were encouraged to attack.

Throughout the lurching, haphazard wanderings of the coach which preceded the final disasters in July 1914, certain tendencies had developed amongst those who were concerned in deciding the direction of the route. The sonorous words and catchy phrases had been found so successful in inducing the passengers to support any one who by that means held the public ear, that office and remuneration were given to those who acquired the knack of producing such things. The fact was ignored that "it is not the hen that cackles the most that lays the largest eggs," and that however clever a man may be at speaking on a subject, or in making an opponent look foolish, or in playing off one group or interest against another, it does not necessarily follow that such an one is wise in counsel or sound in execution.

It became more and more the fashion to assume that a statement constantly repeated should be accepted as correct, as though, to quote the Bellman again—

"Just the place for a Snark! I have said it twice :
That alone should encourage the crew.
Just the place for a Snark! I have said it thrice :
What I tell you thrée times is true,"

forgetful of the fact that, under such conditions as existed, the "Snark" is always a "Boojum," and then—"they will softly and suddenly vanish away and never be met with again."

It was under such conditions, with the broad lines of the party system merged in government by incongruous groups with ends and aims incompatible one with another, yet holding

together, under one party or the other, in the hope of obtaining what they wanted, that the nation was left unprepared for war, and aggression was encouraged.

Similarly it may be that the nation will be insufficiently prepared for peace, and will fail to attain the best in the days to come unless these methods of the past are changed, and unless those in power, or those seeking to attain power, are prevented, as the years pass by, from reproducing the party system and group-spirit under which so many disasters have befallen the nation in peace and in war.

In looking back, in order that the passengers may be better able to insist on the future route and method of travel, it is necessary to recall, with a little detail, how things were permitted to proceed to the pass they reached in pre-war days. It is well to try and appreciate the point of view and trend of mind of those who held the reins. In that way it will be more easily seen what has to be guarded against in the future, and what were some of the tendencies of the system which has been found wanting, and to which so many hope no return will be allowed.

It seems to have been present in our rulers' minds that if things went wrong and the nation was found unarmed and unprepared, the fault must be with the people who were governed and not with the rulers who governed them. Lord Haldane put this point clearly in his article in the *Nation* of the 7th August, 1915. In this article he censures the public because they "did not insist that the unrest of Europe should be the foremost subject of political consideration" during the years preceding the war, and he accuses the democracy of "suffering from an indisposition to reflect, and, in consequence," that it "was not inclined to listen to the few who preached" of danger in pre-war days.

If the public and the democracy had in fact been to blame, it must still be dangerous to acquiesce even tacitly in anything approaching the above doctrine in the state that is to be.

Surely it should always be the pride of rulers who attain to power, and consequently have sources of knowledge not available to others, to recognize to the utmost their great responsibilities and to err on the side of being too critical as

to what they may do or may fail in doing, instead of blaming those not so favourably situated as themselves.

However commendable it is that those who wish to help to better things should welcome censure or blame—for thereby faults can be seen and improvements made—it is useless for the people to accept the condemnation meted out to them by their rulers without carefully considering whether the reproof is just.

Looking at the facts from this point of view, it appears that the reason why the people did not insist upon the unrest of Europe being the foremost subject of political consideration, and did not feel inclined to listen to the few who preached of danger, was because our rulers had dinned into the ears of the public that the German menace did not exist, and that, instead of adding to our armaments, they would take, and could safely continue to take, every possible opportunity of reducing them at home and abroad.

So lately as the 15th January, 1914, Lord Haldane was telling us “that there was a far greater prospect of peace than ever there was before. No one wanted war.”

On the same day his colleague, Mr. Herbert Samuel, M.P., said: “The inevitable war is happily receding into the past of erroneous prophecy, and we live on terms of peace and goodwill with the great Empire across the North Sea.”

Just over a fortnight later Mr. J. W. Gulland, M.P., said on the 3rd February, 1914: “As long as a wise Liberal Government was in power there was very little chance of war between this country and any foreign nation.” This was but a paraphrase of what Mr. Runciman, M.P., had told us on the 5th December, 1905: “With sober men at our head there was no reason why we should be entangled in Continental discord.” In the same speech he said that “in the Army vote he wanted a reduction, not of thousands, but of millions. That was only possible by encouraging the Volunteers and reducing the Regulars. We required a Regular Army only for the Frontier of India.”

So lately as the 19th May, 1914, Mr. J. A. Pease, M.P., had informed the public that “we have never had peace broken between Great Britain and Germany. And I see no reason

why it ever should be broken. In my lifetime the relations with Germany were never more cordial than they are to-day."

From 1913 onwards the democracy had before them the words of the Earl of Loreburn (a Lord Chancellor in Mr. Asquith's pre-war Cabinet), which appeared in the introduction to *The German Panic*, published by the Cobden Club: "Time will show that Germans have no aggressive designs against us, nor we against them; and then foolish people will cease to talk of a future war between us which will never take place."

Many books would be required to set forth all the utterances by our rulers, whereby they sought to make the people believe that the German menace was non-existent, and that it was a vain or wicked misrepresentation of fools or rogues, but those selected above from the collection in the *Potsdam Diaries* and the *National Review* seem sufficient, though others follow.

It is recorded that Mr. Winston Churchill, M.P., both in letter and by speech affirmed that there was no profound or real "antagonism of interests between the British and German nations," and that the two peoples had "nothing whatever to fight about and nowhere to fight in"; whilst Mr. Reginald McKenna, M.P., Mr. Runciman, M.P., Mr. P. H. Illingworth, M.P., and Mr. Masterman, amongst others, were particularly derisive of the "few who preached" that the "great and friendly Power," as Mr. McKenna called Germany, was a real danger to our nation.

It is hardly "cricket," or even in accord with the humblest code of honour, for any one to blame others for believing what he tells them is true. Yet our rulers, having led the nation to believe that the peril was but a phantasy of fools or a sinister imagining of prejudiced persons, turned round upon the people, after the trouble came, and held them culpable for accepting the assurances of peace which our rulers had so often reiterated.

Prejudicial as such things would be were the people to permit them in the future, it is still more disquieting to find that our rulers knew all along that the preachers, whom they sought to discredit, were speaking the truth and that what our rulers

said was, to say the least of it, not "the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth."

Lord Haldane has told the public in an interview; which took place in March 1915, that after his visit to Berlin early in 1912 he "came away feeling uneasy. Germany was piling up armaments. She showed no disposition to restrict her naval development." At the National Liberal Club in July 1915 Lord Haldane confessed that he had made friendly speeches in pre-war days because "he knew something of Germany; he knew the perils of the situation—where the powder magazine was."

Mr. Asquith has gone even further, both in his pre-war assurances of German friendship and fair dealing, and in his post-war disclosure of the real truth. On the 25th July, 1912, he told us that "our relations with the German Empire are at this moment, and I feel sure are likely to remain, relations of amity and goodwill. Lord Haldane paid a visit to Berlin early in the year" (this was the visit from which we now know that Lord Haldane "came away feeling uneasy"); "he entered upon conversation and an interchange of views which have been continued since in the spirit of perfect frankness and friendship both on the one side and the other."

This assurance in pre-war days by Mr. Asquith to the public and the democracy must be compared with what he revealed in his speech at Cardiff since the outbreak of war, on the 2nd October, 1914, that "they" (Germany early in 1912) "asked us—to put it plainly—they asked us for a free hand so far as we were concerned if, and when, they selected the opportunity to over-bear, to dominate the European world." Mr. Asquith added that the German "scheme against the liberties of Europe" was "long prepared and well organized."

Sir John Simon at Manchester on the 23rd March, 1915, confirmed the last-mentioned fact as well known to our rulers when (in pointing out that "there is no indication whatever at the moment that Germany contemplates peace on terms which would involve the defeat of the objects for which she went to war") he supported his argument by saying that those who think otherwise "misunderstand the energy of the German

people; they minimize the deliberate precision with which she timed her blow; they forget the years and years of preparation during which she has been considering how she should conduct her campaign."

Mr. Winston Churchill was still more emphatic in stating that our rulers, whilst assuring us in pre-war days of peace, knew that Germany was preparing for war. On the 21st September, 1914, at Liverpool, he said: "Every detail of the German scheme proved that it was meant for us—for our exclusive benefit. . . . We have been made the subject in the last eight or nine years just in the same way as France was before 1870, and Austria was before 1866, and Denmark was before 1864, of careful, deliberate, scientific military reconnaissance. Well, we knew all about it."

Mr. Winston Churchill further added to our knowledge of what our rulers knew in the seven pre-war years by saying at Dundee on the 5th June, 1915, whilst testifying in favour of Lord Haldane, that "there never had been an occasion in the Cabinets of the last seven years in which I have sat that as the need arose Lord Haldane has not, from his great knowledge of the German governmental system, warned us to be on guard against the dangerous side of their nature."

It is somewhat staggering to find it claimed as meritorious by our rulers that they knew and warned each other of the peril, and then went forth and led the people to believe that it was non-existent; but our rulers all seem to stand or fall together. From both sides of party politics it is asserted that the people, who were not told the truth, are to bear the blame.

So recently as the 5th July, 1915, Mr. Asquith, in a public letter of that date, writes: "Lord Haldane" (who is responsible for defining the public-blame doctrine) "is the oldest personal and political friend that I have in the world. . . . We have worked together and fought side by side through many vicissitudes of fortune in the pursuit of what we have believed to be great and worthy causes without (so far as I can recollect) more than a passing shadow of difference in opinion and always with the same ideals in view."

Sir Edward Grey has since added in the House of Commons,

on the 11th November, 1915, the following words: "I much regret that there has been no opportunity recently of making use of the services of Lord Haldane, in connection with the Foreign Office. . . . If Lord Haldane's services were available for any work for which I was responsible, I should consider it in the public interest that they should be used."

Mr. Balfour has joined in the support of these rulers and the public-blame doctrine by saying to the House of Commons on the 12th July, 1917: "This House asks with an air of enormous virtue why the country was not in a perfect state of preparedness for any emergency, however great and unexpected; but propose to the same House the necessary expenditure for those preparations and you are turned out of office. I am convinced that if any Government had proposed the sort of expenditure which is now seen to have been necessary they would have failed absolutely to induce the tax-payers to make the sacrifice demanded."

The politicians seem to miss the point. Can it be right that the drivers, as our then-rulers were, should drive the coach into a morass or over a cliff or endanger its safety at night by economizing in necessary maps, lamps or horses because the passengers (not knowing of the danger or that the journey necessitated the crossing of a perilous moorland in the dark) did not insist on the precautions—the duty of the drivers to take—being taken?

Surely the answer is clear, and still more is this the case when it is remembered that these drivers assured the passengers that the hazards did not exist and that they might safely doze as comfortably as they could in the coach, whilst our rulers promised to reduce expenditure on safeguards and to spend the saving on more pillows of better quality to ease the jolts of the journey, until "rare and refreshing fruits" were served to the travellers at the end of the stage.

As though to show that there is no limit to these curious pre-war happenings and that the people must probe matters to the bottom, if they would guard the future, Lord Robert Cecil, who was in the Coalition Cabinet of Mr. Asquith, disclosed to the House of Commons on the 22nd March 1917 that

“an extremely able memorandum was drawn up by Sir Eyre Crowe and submitted to the Secretary of State” (Sir Edward Grey) “on January 1, 1907, dealing with German policy and the grave dangers with which it threatened this country.”

It is unnecessary here to surmise what was in Sir Eyre Crowe's memorandum, or what were the other facts and warnings given to, but not yet disclosed by, our rulers, or what was the additional knowledge which they had, and hid, of the world-menace; but, in considering the danger, which resulted from withholding the truth from the public, and the disaster which inevitably followed the representations to the democracy that there was peace instead of peril, it is necessary to mention explanations which our rulers have put forward.

Lord Haldane on the 1st January, 1915, is reported as saying, “he once had a dog which one day disappeared, and the next morning he was told it had worried eleven sheep. That was a sudden outbreak in an otherwise blameless career. And what was true of him was true of Germany. Many people in Germany had desired peace, but the military party had got the upper hand, and had made the country mad.”

Mr. Winston Churchill on the 9th July, 1916, in the *Sunday Pictorial*, somewhat inconsistently with his words previously quoted, lays it down that “it was very hard to tell beforehand whether this thing would come or not. Very wise men, with full knowledge of all the facts, came to the wrong conclusion; and very foolish men, giving rein to their prejudices, came to the right conclusion, and are entitled to boast of it for ever.”

A later explanation appeared in September 1916, in Mr. Harold Begbie's book, *The Vindication of Great Britain*, which the author himself defined, in a letter to *The Times* of the 4th September, 1917, as being “inspired as much by anger at the unchivalrous silence of his” (Lord Haldane's) “political friends (whose necks his preparations at the War Office had certainly saved from the lamppost) as by contempt for the wild verbiage of his political enemies.”

The words referred to appear on page 175, and read: “Germany, it is probable, would never have risked an attack on Russia and France if she had been perfectly certain that Britain

would fight. She took the risk of that attack, believing that Britain was so entangled in Irish affairs as to be incompetent of fulfilling her obligations abroad."

Close was the watch which Germany kept upon the manœuvres of our rulers in their party politics, and glad she must have been to see these manœuvres setting one against another, our classes, our Churches, our Houses of Parliament, and even the nations which constituted our United Kingdom, so that the "cry of civil war was on lips of the most responsible and sober-minded"; but surely the ill-effects of party politics as encouraging Germany to aggress cannot be properly used as an excuse by our rulers, or by those who would clear them from responsibility.

Various other explanations have been from time to time attempted, including a series in the *Manchester Guardian* in the summer of 1917, but they seem self-destructive or impossible to harmonize one with another, or with what our rulers represented in pre-war days as the truth, or with what they have since told us that they knew to be the truth. None of these explanations lessen, indeed each increases, the vital importance, if the future is to be guarded, of every one studying the facts.

However, be these things as they may in respect of the spoken or written words of our rulers, there are a long series of acts of commission and omission by them which must be looked at from three points of view.

Firstly, these acts constituted the strongest evidence to the nation that the German intention to dominate the world must indeed have been a mirage and absolutely non-existent, unless our rulers, in Mr. Asquith's words to the House of Commons on the 16th March, 1909, were "sacrificing that vital consideration" (the safety of the Empire) "to questions of temporary expediency of parliamentary tactics," which he added, "would be well deserving of the condemnation which history always pronounces upon those who are false to a great public trust."

Secondly, these acts invited war by leaving us unprepared, and, when war came, caused huge and unnecessary loss of life and money.

Thirdly, unless understood, remembered and made impossible

in the future, similar acts may again bring about, in the days to be, like disasters to those which they produced, or helped to produce, in the days which are passing.

In respect of the Army, Lord Haldane so early as the 19th March, 1908, was claiming merit for having "brought the Army down close to where it was just before the Boer War." He had in pre-war years so reduced the establishment and output of Government and private armament and munition factories as to make it impossible for us, when war came, to meet rapidly the deficiencies resulting; moreover, his policy supplied Germany with exceptionally qualified workmen from Woolwich Arsenal, whereby Krupps were enabled better to prepare for "The Day."

The actual decrease in the "effective cost" of the Army as between 1905-6 and 1914-15 was officially estimated at two and a half millions per annum—see statement in the *Morning Post* of the 14th July, 1916, with detailed figures. This was done by our rulers notwithstanding, as pointed out by the *Daily Mail* on the 5th March, 1913, that "if a Territorial Force of 313,000 men was required in 1907, when the armies of Europe were 40 per cent. weaker than to-day" (1913), "when our naval preponderance as against Germany's was twice as great as it is at this hour, can it be pretended for a moment that we are safe with a Territorial Force of 240,000 men? That is the question which the British Government have to answer. The manly course would be to introduce National Service. But, if the Government can suggest any alternative, let them adopt it. Theirs is the responsibility—the grave responsibility—to see that the Empire suffers no hurt in this new age of iron which is opening so darkly for Europe."

As to the Indian Army, which even Mr. Runciman admitted was required (see p. 7), we know to-day from the Report of the Mesopotamia Commission that, in the words of the *Daily Chronicle* of the 27th June, 1917: "Everything—staff, plans, guns, munitionment, wireless, aerial, transport, and medical equipments, and system for providing drafts—was lacking when the war broke out; and it seems to have subsequently been the aim of both the India Office and the Indian Govern-

ment, until the crash came, not to make up India's military deficiencies and enable her to pull her weight in the world-struggle, but to keep her out of the war."

As to the Navy, our rulers withdrew from the fixed standard of a minimum strength equal to that of the next two strongest Powers, and urged Parliament to accept the Declaration of London with its hampering of our sea-power. There were constantly recurring agitations (including that of 1914) worked up by some of them and by many of their supporters for reductions in the Navy Estimates. When unavoidable increases were made, well below the minimum required to make good necessities which had been long neglected, bitter feelings were engendered, and fresh campaigns for reductions were started for political purposes.

How grave was the state of affairs has since been in part disclosed by Mr. A. J. Balfour, whilst he was First Lord of the Admiralty in Mr. Asquith's Coalition Cabinet. The disclosure was made in the House of Commons on the 8th March, 1916, when he said: "The Admiralty responsible for that Fleet" (on the outbreak of war, 1914) "had not got at that time a single naval base upon the whole east coast of the British Isles which would save them from submarine attack, and . . . the immense trade routes of the world were being most imperfectly policed by fast cruisers."

On the above question of a safe and adequate naval base Mr. McKenna had, in pre-war days, with a quite convincing irony, gone so far on the 8th July, 1908, as to reply in the House to the question by Major Anstruther Grey: "Can the right hon. gentleman, who says Rosyth Dockyard will not be made for seven years, guarantee that we have peace for that time?", with the answer, "Yes, sir." Great laughter is reported to have followed this retort by Mr. McKenna, and the average man was once more led to believe that we should have peace in our time, and that our rulers were right in reducing the expenditure on Army and Navy.

Lastly, the vast future requirements, and urgent necessity, for the immediate development of the new fighting and protective forces in the air were side-tracked in pre-war days by

our rulers, as appears in the pages of Hansard; whilst as to production and storage of corn and other essential food requirements, as to key industries and vital manufactures, and as to banking, finance and other matters so necessary for the safeguarding of a nation in war, our rulers' acts were only consistent with a definite and uncontrovertible knowledge that peace was assured for two or three generations at least.

Perhaps of all the acts which led the public and the democracy to believe that the war would never be, the most impressive to the mass of the people was that whereby our rulers brought about the transfer of some thousands of our highly skilled men from Great Britain's arsenals to armament works in Germany. Whether it be true or not that our rulers provided money for the cost of transferring these men from Woolwich to Krupps, it is difficult to imagine anything better calculated to make the public believe that war with Germany was out of the question. How could there be any danger, the average man in these pre-war years would say, "when our rulers are not only reducing our power of output of the requisites of war, but are actually causing our skilled men to go to Germany?" Such a deed as this was more convincing than any words or any acts of parsimony, or niggardliness in respect of safeguards and preparation against attack, for it not only weakened us but at the same time strengthened Germany.

In the face of what has gone before it seems that it was not a case of the "blind leading the blind," though both fell into the ditch, but of rulers, who saw, misleading the people whom they had blinded. Still, however difficult it is to reconcile what our rulers did with what they knew or with any recognized moral basis, or however necessary it would appear to be for the people to make such things impossible in the future, no fair-minded man would wish to leave the evidence, which is furnished by the words and deeds of our rulers, without trying to find out whether our rulers had not some good end in view.

Some have tried to believe that our rulers did not tell us the truth about the German peril because, had they done so, it would have precipitated the war. Unfortunately, as appears

in the next few pages which deal with the German moves in 1911, 1912 and 1913, the fact is that Germany commenced to strike more than once, but, even with Great Britain unprepared, she withdrew from her machinations, summer after summer, rather than fight until she persuaded herself, as she did in 1914, that all the conditions were in her favour.

Others have sought to assure themselves that had our rulers increased our armaments Germany would at once have declared war. The facts with regard to what happened during the period in question negative this also. In any case, what could have been the reason for our rulers actually going so far as to cut down our men and munitions and scrap Government and private manufacturing plant and staffs, whilst forcing so many skilled men out of the realm in the way they did? No nation can complain of another nation keeping up its resources to a standard already attained, particularly when Germany was continually increasing her men, munitions and plant.

There have also been suggestions that had our rulers disclosed the existence of the German menace we should not have found ourselves grouped with so many allies. The facts negative this also; Russia and France were with us in 1911, and Italy, as the following pages show, was on the side of peace in 1913, whilst Japan, as events have proved, fully recognised her alliance with us. Portugal, as our Ally in days long passed, could always be reckoned upon, and Serbia, Belgium, Montenegro, and any other small nation threatened by Germany, must necessarily seek our support, however much our rulers might have weakened the strength which the British people have always desired to throw on the side of the under dog unless prevented by their rulers.

It seems a somewhat hopeless enterprise to spend time in seeking excuses for the way in which our rulers left us unprotected, and at the same time misled the public and the democracy and then sought to blame them for what they—our rulers—had done. There is, however, one admission which can be made by some at least of the few who preached, and by many of those who felt that the German people would be at our throats if we, whilst unprepared, stood in the way of their

dominating Europe. This admission is that those referred to did not expect the outbreak by Germany until a later year than that in which it occurred.

On the other hand, many of those who warned our rulers did not expect the Great War ever to take place at all if we were fully prepared and stood firmly with France and Russia whenever Germany threatened; her rulers would, they believed, under those conditions always restrain the German people, ready as that people were for a victorious war as each summer arrived.

Indeed, if our rulers had told the public and the democracy the truth, prepared the nation and stood firmly with France and Russia, we need not now be seeking excuses for them, nor even if, in spite of all, war had come, need we be considering the past in order to prevent like dangers in the future.

GERMAN MOVES IN 1911, 1912 AND 1913

In the summer of 1911 Germany had attempted a coup against France at Agadir—stopped, at least in part, by Mr. Lloyd George, as the spokesman chosen by our rulers to make it clear that Great Britain stood firm with France and Russia against the “Mailed Fist” of Germany.

His words, spoken at the Mansion House on the 21st July, 1911, include the following: “I am also bound to say this—that I believe it is essential in the highest interests, not merely of this country but of the world, that Britain should at all hazards maintain her place and prestige amongst the Great Powers of the world. Her potent influence has many a time been in the past, and may yet be in the future, invaluable to the cause of human liberty. It has more than once in the past redeemed Continental nations, who are sometimes too apt to forget that service, from overwhelming disaster and even from national extinction. I would make great sacrifices to preserve peace. I conceive that nothing would justify a disturbance of international goodwill except questions of the gravest national

moment. But if a situation were to be forced upon us in which peace could only be preserved by the surrender of the great and beneficent position Britain has won by centuries of heroism and achievement, by allowing Britain to be treated where her interests were vitally affected as if she were of no account in the cabinet of nations, then I say emphatically that peace at that price would be a humiliation intolerable for a great country like ours to endure."

It being made plain beyond pretence to the German people that Great Britain would fight on the side of France if Germany persisted, she gave way.

Next year in 1912, as our rulers have disclosed since the war begun, Germany asked them to agree that Great Britain should be neutral, or, to use Mr. Asquith's words of the 2nd October, 1914, already referred to, "They" (Germany early in 1912) "asked us—to put it plainly—they asked us for a free hand so far as we were concerned if, and when, they selected the opportunity to overbear, to dominate the European world."

If it had not been Mr. Asquith himself who has thus told us, since war began, of this proposal by Germany in 1912 that we should remain neutral in any event, it would be almost impossible to believe that such a request could have been made. The insult to Great Britain was gross, implying as it did that Germany believed our rulers were ready to keep our people neutral, and to make them stand by whilst friendly nations were attacked.

The proposal made to our rulers was not accepted, but the honour of Great Britain was in their hands, and it was clear beyond controversy that the attitude of the nation had been settled in the preceding year (1911) in accord with the view of the public and the democracy, which was then declared to be to prevent aggression and support liberty.

How, then, had it come about that the indignity of a proposal for neutrality in any event was put upon us, and that our rulers asked Germany to accept an assurance that we had not been, and that we never would be, a party to any hostile design against her? True that this offer by our rulers to Germany

of a somewhat extensive commitment, encouraging to her and embarrassing to us, was not accepted by Germany, but this does not clear up her manœuvres, nor does it explain why the public and the democracy were kept in ignorance, by our rulers, of these moves whereby Germany sought to alter the position adopted by Great Britain in 1911, and to cause us to be kept neutral if she attacked France, Russia or other nations. Nor does it explain why the people were over and over again made by our rulers to believe that all was well and likely to remain so.

Quite apart, however, from the facts already referred to, other evidence, official and unofficial, continued to accumulate in our rulers' hands throughout the years which followed 1911, and indeed right up to the crisis of July 1914, that Germany still meant to carry out her long-planned aggression in respect of Russia and France, provided she had the support of Austria and if possible of Italy, whilst making certain that Great Britain would be kept neutral so long as she required that neutrality to be maintained by our rulers.

In the summer of 1913 Germany again sought to feel her way and test, this time by means of an Austro-Serbian imbroglio, whether the right moment had come for fresh menace and aggression. The British people only learnt after the outbreak of war of these trial moves in 1913, and their frustration by Italy, from the publication of the words of Signor Giolitti to the Italian Chamber of Deputies on the 5th December, 1914. "During the Balkan War, on the 9th August, 1913, about a year before the present war broke out, during my absence from Rome, I received from my hon. colleague, Signor di San Giuliano, the following telegram: 'Austria has communicated to us and to Germany her intention of taking action against Servia, and defines such action as defensive, hoping to bring into operation the *casus fœderis* of the Triple Alliance, which, on the contrary, I believe to be inapplicable. I am endeavouring to arrange for a combined effort with Germany to prevent such action on the part of Austria, but it may become necessary to state clearly that we do not consider such action, if it should be taken, as defensive, and that, there-

fore, we do not consider that the *casus fœderis* arises. Please telegraph to me at Rome if you approve.”

To this Signor Giolitti replied: “If Austria intervenes against Servia it is clear that a *casus fœderis* cannot be established. It is a step she is taking on her own account, since there is no question of defence, inasmuch as no one is thinking of attacking her. It is necessary that a declaration to this effect should be made to Austria in the most formal manner, and we must hope for action on the part of Germany to dissuade Austria from this most perilous adventure.”

It is material to note that Italy had so firmly refused in the summer of 1913 to acquiesce in the German plan for aggression as to cause Germany to leave Italy in the dark in 1914, and to concentrate upon getting Great Britain kept neutral by her rulers.

In this third (1914) manœuvre Germany, for the second year in succession, favoured an attack by Austria upon Serbia as the excuse out of which war against Russia and France could be engineered. Thereby she had some ground, as will be seen later, for believing that our rulers would be placed in the most favourable position for keeping Great Britain neutral—at least until France was overrun and Russia driven back.

JANUARY TO 16TH JULY, 1914

So far as our rulers were concerned, the year 1914 opened with a series of pronouncements by them to the people that peace prevailed and would prevail, that the war was “happily receding into the past of erroneous prophecy,” and that as long as our rulers were in power there was very little chance of war between this country and any foreign nation. (See previous quotations from a few of our rulers’ utterances.)

Whilst this “assurance of peace” propaganda was continued by our rulers, it is now known that Germany was causing many things to happen which no rulers should ignore. She called up reservists from distant countries, and discounted bills on

London and sold securities on the Stock Exchange, on a vast scale. She worked day and night in our Press and in other ways to undermine any movement the British people (did they awake from the sleep induced by our rulers and realize the truth) might make to compel their rulers to declare that Great Britain would support France and Russia against German aggression.

Some of these points are conveniently summarized in a letter of the late Reverend Professor H. M. Gwatkin, to a Swedish clergyman, under date September 1916, Cambridge, published in the *Nation* of the 14th October, 1916, in which he says: "Now look at Germany. Take a few facts out of many: May 1914, reservists called up from Far East; early June, arms for cruisers sent out to Buenos Ayres; June 15th, contracts in America for coaling cruisers at sea at specified places and dates in August and September; June, late, reservists called up from Natal (on my personal knowledge). Last instalment due of the great War Loan; July, bills on London far in excess of trade requirements drawn by Germans, such bills falling due after August 1st."

Mr. Gwatkin adds later in his letter: "Is all this innocent precaution? Do not all the items converge on the certainty of war early in August? A month earlier nothing would have been ready; a month later the reservists would have been idle, and the bills would have had to be paid. Now how could they" (Germany) "have known that date before May if they were not themselves planning the attack?"

It must never be forgotten by any who would aid our future that fact after fact continues to be disclosed to the public, each tending to the one conclusion, namely, that to those in official positions, and to those who were dealing with foreign policy and Continental affairs, the evidence was overwhelming that Germany intended to aggress and that it was part of her scheme that we should be kept neutral by our rulers. Furthermore, it was Germany's aim that if our people, in spite of all precautions, did realize the truth and refuse to be fettered by our rulers, whilst France was being blotted out and Russia turned into a satrapy under German rule, our councils would

be divided, our forces unprepared and unequipped, our finance and exchange so embarrassed and unprotected as to create economic disaster in the City of London and throughout the country (see p. 62), and our intervention "too late."

THE CRISIS OF THE TWENTY DAYS

The collected diplomatic documents disclosed by our rulers, in an official Red Book published since the outbreak of war, show that the crisis, which commenced on the 16th July, 1914, and ended at midnight 4th August, 1914, when Great Britain was at war with Germany, occupied twenty days.

The piecing together of the whole story of these twenty days must be a labour of years; many books will be written to tell the tale. The task attempted in the next 35 pages is far simpler. Though principally limited to our rulers' diplomatic despatches, the information is sufficient for that consideration of the future, which cannot be postponed. It is ample to enable Great Britain to decide, for the years to come, the journey to be embarked upon, the route to be selected, the method of transport to adopt and the guides to be chosen.

The first despatch produced is that of the 20th July, 1914, from Sir Edward Grey to the British Chargé d'Affaires at Berlin, but, on page 115 of the Red Book, Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, in making his report to Sir Edward Grey after his return to this country, points out that Count Berchtold, Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs, gave him no indication "of the impending storm." Sir M. de Bunsen adds: "It was from a private source that I received on the 15th July the forecast of what was about to happen, which I telegraphed to you the following day."

The words of this direct official telegraphic warning from our Ambassador in Vienna to Sir Edward Grey as to what was about to happen, are not disclosed. This, the first direct official warning so far revealed, had, however, come to our rulers on or about the 16th July, 1914. The other danger signals within

the knowledge of the Foreign Office and other Government departments were many, whilst Lord Haldane, Mr. Asquith and Mr. Winston Churchill have since given the impression that they knew all there was to know. Under these circumstances it seems impossible to understand why our rulers, who knew, left Mr. Lloyd George to say at the Mansion House on the 17th July, 1914, "I think, now that we are entering into a quieter period, it is well for us to dwell upon the enormous industrial expansion which we have witnessed during the last few years, whilst we are taking a period of rest, before we reach even higher things."

With Germany closely watching the result of each move initiated by her to bring about in 1914 what Italy deterred her from doing in 1913, namely, by means of an Austrian attack on Serbia embroiling Russia and France, it was very encouraging to her to find our rulers leaving Mr. Lloyd George at the Mansion House, the scene of his previous speech of 1911, to lay down that we were "entering into a quieter period."

Turning next to the first despatch disclosed in the Red Book, we find it to be three days later than the 17th July, being dated the 20th July, 1914. Therein Sir Edward Grey reports to Sir H. Rumbold, the British Chargé d'Affaires at Berlin, his conversation with the German Ambassador, in which he (Sir Edward Grey) said, "I hated the idea of a war between any of the Great Powers, and that any of them should be dragged into a war by Serbia would be detestable."

On the 23rd July, 1914, Sir Edward Grey in a despatch to Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, states that he had said to Count Mensdorff, the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador in London: "The possible consequences of the present situation were terrible. If as many as four Great Powers of Europe—let us say, Austria, France, Russia and Germany—were engaged in war, it seemed to me that it must involve the expenditure of so vast a sum of money and such an interference with trade, that a war would be accompanied or followed by a complete collapse of European credit and industry. In these days, in great industrial States, this would mean a state of things

worse than that of 1848, and, irrespective of who were victors in the war, many things might be completely swept away."

In spite of this realization by our rulers that "the possible consequences of the present situation were terrible," Mr. Lloyd George was again left to say on the 23rd July, 1914, in answer to a speech of Mr. Austen Chamberlain, "He" (Mr. Austen Chamberlain) "also not merely assumed, but stated that you" (the House of Commons) "could not depend upon any economy in armaments. I think that is not so. I think he will find that next year there will be substantial economy without interfering in the slightest degree with the efficiency of the Navy. The expenditure of the last few years has been very largely for the purpose of meeting what is recognized to be a temporary emergency."

This was the 23rd July, 1914, five days before Austria declared war on Serbia, eleven days before hostilities were commenced between Germany and France, and only twelve days before Germany and Great Britain were at war.

The history disclosed in the diplomatic despatches of our rulers in the Red Book referred to is of absorbing interest to all who are concerned in the future welfare and sound Government of Great Britain. Even to any one not so concerned, that which appears in the despatches must always remain a fascinating study.

In dealing with the despatches, however, the aim in this book has been to marshal the material portions in a simple manner under three main heads—the first head is, What did our rulers say to Serbia; secondly, to Germany, and thirdly, to France?

OUR RULERS AND SERBIA

First, as to Serbia: Sir Edward Grey has already said that he "hated the idea of a war between any of the Great Powers, and that any of them should be dragged into a war by Serbia would be detestable." Our rulers use the word "Servia," no "Serbia"—the slaves, not the Serbs—throughout.

Sir Edward Grey followed this up by saying on the 24th July, 1914, to Count Mensdorff the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador in London: "I had never before seen one State address to another independent State a document of so formidable a character. Demand No. 5 would be hardly consistent with the maintenance of Servia's independent sovereignty if it were to mean, as it seemed that it might, that Austro-Hungary was to be invested with a right to appoint officials who would have authority within the frontiers of Servia. I added that I felt great apprehension, and that I should concern myself with the matter simply and solely from the point of view of the peace of Europe. The merits of the dispute between Austria and Servia were not the concern of His Majesty's Government, and such comments as I had made were not made in order to discuss these merits."

Again on the same date, 24th July, 1914, Sir Edward Grey expressed the following views to the British Chargé d'Affaires at Belgrade: "Servia ought to promise that, if it is proved that Servian officials, however subordinate they may be, were accomplices in the murder of the Archduke at Serajevo, she will give Austria the fullest satisfaction. She certainly ought to express concern and regret. For the rest, Servian Government must reply to Austrian demands as they consider best in Servian interests."

"It is impossible to say whether military action by Austria when time limit expires can be averted by anything but unconditional acceptance of her demands, but only chance appears to lie in avoiding an absolute refusal and replying favourably to as many points as the time limit allows."

"Servian Minister here has begged that His Majesty's Government will express their views, but I cannot undertake responsibility of saying more than I have said above, and I do not like to say even that without knowing what is being said at Belgrade by French and Russian Governments."

In the foregoing remarks, and, indeed, in other passages of the Government Red Book, the general attitude disclosed above is confirmed, and, although it seems to have been admitted by our rulers that the demands by Austria on Serbia were unreason-

able in some particulars at least, and presented in an unheard-of manner, our rulers neither assisted Serbia with advice nor recognized that the attack on her was a mere excuse to commit Austria to an embroilment with Russia, and so enable Germany to overrun France when the latter came to Russia's aid according to her treaties.

Our rulers—whilst refusing the appeal of Serbia—seemed also to overlook the fact that, in selecting an Austro-Serbian incident to bring about her long-planned aggression, Germany was choosing, as our rulers' despatches show, an issue on which our rulers could more easily than on any other keep Great Britain neutral.

Lastly, our rulers seemed to have shut their eyes to the fact that this issue of the summer of 1914 was but a repetition of that which Italy had so promptly scotched in the summer of 1913.

Harassed Serbia did the best she could unaided, but in spite of her giving way on almost every point, formidable as Austria's demands were, no delay was permitted by Germany, and Austria declared war on Serbia on the 28th July, 1914.

Since the above words were written the shiver which went down the backs of Englishmen when they realized the attitude of our rulers to this small nation—the scapegoat or excuse for the vast aggression so often postponed by Germany—has given place to the glow produced by the sentences of Mr. Lloyd George reported in *The Times* of the 9th August, 1917.

The tribute paid by him to Serbia includes the following: "I felt that I could not let this opportunity pass without coming here to say that my heart is with Serbia. . . . It was through his" (the Serbian Prime Minister's) "action—and he is far too wise a man not to have known what his action involved, in suffering for himself and for his country—that the great challenge was accepted by civilization from the barbarism of Prussia. . . . I came here to say that, however long this war may last, British honour is involved in seeing that Serbian independence is completely restored. It is not merely a matter of honour. It is a matter of the security of civilization. What is true about Belgium, the warden of the gateway in the west,

is equally true about Serbia in the east. She is the guardian of the gate, and faithfully has she stood to her trust."

Lord Robert Cecil on the same occasion said: "The whole war began by an unprovoked and brutal assault on Serbia. The celebrated ultimatum to her was so constructed as to make it impossible for her to accept it. Yet Serbia accepted all its demands, except those which were absolutely inconsistent with her sovereignty and independence. We all know now that even if she had accepted the whole of the demands it would have made no difference to the policy of the Central Empires, for they were determined to invade and crush her in order to strike a blow at the Slav nation. Through all the trials of the war the spirit of Serbia was never defeated. Her gallantry was past praise, and it had placed on her Allies a sacred obligation, not less than that which rested on them in the case of Belgium, to secure for her full restoration and reparation."

Others have confirmed all this, which many knew—for the diplomatic methods of the Central European Powers were throughout somewhat obvious—but every one in helping to protect the future can judge for himself whether what our rulers did, or refused to do, for Serbia in the pre-war crisis is what the British nation should ever again permit any of their rulers to do, or not to do, in the years to come.

INTERMEDIATE DESPATCHES

So much for our rulers and Serbia; but before passing on to what our rulers said to Germany, it will be convenient to clear up the general position as further disclosed by the despatches between Friday the 24th and Tuesday the 28th July, 1914.

On the 24th July, 1914, Sir G. Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. Petersburg, sent a telegram to Sir Edward Grey, saying: "I had a telephone message this morning from M. Sazonof" (Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs) "to the effect that the text of the Austrian ultimatum had just reached him.

"His Excellency added that a reply within forty-eight hours was demanded, and he begged me to meet him at the

French Embassy to discuss matters, as Austrian step clearly meant that war was imminent.

"Minister for Foreign Affairs said that Austria's conduct was both provocative and immoral; she would never have taken such action unless Germany had first been consulted; some of her demands were quite impossible of acceptance. He hoped that His Majesty's Government would not fail to proclaim their solidarity with Russia and France.

"The French Ambassador gave me to understand that France would fulfil all the obligations entailed by her alliance with Russia, if necessity arose, besides supporting Russia strongly in any diplomatic negotiations. . . ."

So far this telegram seems to contain the position in a nutshell, and to make it clear once more that France would not desert Russia. Later portions of the same telegram indicate the only policy to be adopted if a great war was to be averted, and include a prophecy of what must happen if our rulers did not at once make common cause with Russia and France, in other words, if they altered the policy adopted by Great Britain in 1911.

The words of our Ambassador in Russia to Sir Edward Grey run on: "I said that it seemed to me that the important point was to induce Austria to extend the time limit, and that the first thing to do was to bring an influence to bear on Austria with that end in view; French Ambassador, however, thought that either Austria had made up her mind to act at once or that she was bluffing. Whichever it might be, our only chance of averting war was for us to adopt a firm and united attitude. He did not think there was time to carry out my suggestion. . . . French Ambassador and M. Sazonof" (Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs) "both continued to press me for a declaration of complete solidarity of His Majesty's Government with French and Russian Governments. . . . Mr. Sazonof answered that we would sooner or later be dragged into war if it did break out; we should have rendered war more likely if we did not from the outset make common cause with his country and with France; at any rate, he hoped His Majesty's Government would express strong reprobation of the action taken by Austria.

"President of French Republic and President of the Council cannot reach France on their return from Russia for four or five days, and it looks as though Austria purposely chose this moment to present their ultimatum.

"It seems to me, from the language held by French Ambassador, that, even if we decline to join them, France and Russia are determined to make a strong stand."

Our rulers had received yet another warning of the imminent danger, for on the same day, the 24th July, 1914, Sir Edward Grey sent a despatch to Sir F. Bertie, the British Ambassador at Paris, in which Sir Edward reports M. Cambon, the French Ambassador in London, as saying to him "when two days were over, Austria would march into Servia, for the Servians could not possibly accept the Austrian demand. Russia would be compelled by her public opinion to take action as soon as Austria attacked Servia, and therefore, once the Austrians had attacked Servia, it would be too late for any mediation."

To this Sir Edward Grey replied: "I said" (to M. Cambon) "that I had not contemplated anything being said in St. Petersburg until after it was clear that there must be trouble between Austria and Russia. I had thought that if Austria did move into Servia, and Russia then mobilized, it would be possible for the four Powers to urge Austria to stop her advance, and Russia also to stop hers, pending mediation. But it would be essential for any chance of success for such a step that Germany should participate in it.

"M. Cambon said it would be too late after Austria had once moved against Servia."

Again on the next day, the 25th July, 1914, a meeting took place, at which Sir Edward Grey explains that he said to the German Ambassador: "Apparently we should now soon be face to face with the mobilization of Austria and Russia. The only chance of peace, if this did happen, would be for Germany, France and Russia" (should be Italy) "and ourselves to keep together, and to join in asking Austria and Russia not to cross the frontier till we had had time to try and arrange matters between them. . . .

"I impressed upon the Ambassador that, in the event of

Russian and Austrian mobilization, the participation of Germany would be essential to any diplomatic action for peace. Alone we could do nothing."

Meanwhile on the same day, the 25th July, 1914, Sir G. Buchanan reported to Sir Edward Grey from St. Petersburg that the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs (M. Sazonof) had said: "If we" (Great Britain) "took our stand firmly with France and Russia there would be no war. If we failed them now rivers of blood would flow, and we would in the end be dragged into war."


Next day any doubt our rulers might have been in as to whether Germany was at the bottom of the trouble must have been cleared up by an apposite despatch which came in to Sir Edward Grey on the 26th July, 1914, from Sir M. de Bunsen in Vienna, containing word that the German Ambassador in Vienna had said, "Germany knew very well what she was about in backing up Austro-Hungary in this matter."

On the same day, the 26th July, 1914, Sir H. Rumbold from Berlin advised Sir Edward Grey: "Emperor returns suddenly to-night and Under-Secretary of State says that Foreign Office regret this step, which was taken on His Majesty's own initiative. They fear that His Majesty's sudden return may cause speculation and excitement."

Also on the 26th July, 1914, Sir M. de Bunsen telegraphed to Sir Edward Grey from Vienna: "Russian Ambassador just returned from leave. Thinks that Austro-Hungarian Government are determined on war, and that it is impossible for Russia to remain indifferent."

On the 27th July, 1914, Sir Edward Grey telegraphed to Sir G. Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. Petersburg, as follows: "I have been told by the Russian Ambassador that in German and Austrian circles impression prevails that in any event we would stand aside. His Excellency deplored the effect that such an impression must produce.

"This impression ought, as I have pointed out, to be dispelled by the orders we have given to the First Fleet, which is concentrated, as it happens, at Portland, not to disperse for manœuvre leave. But I explained to the Russian Ambassador



that my reference to it must not be taken to mean that anything more than diplomatic action was promised."

At this date our rulers seem to have been still trying to believe that the only "chance of success" was "for Germany, France, Italy and Great Britain to keep together and ask Russia and Austria not to cross the frontier until the four Powers had time to try and arrange matters." This reliance on mediation appeared to be hopeless. Sir Edward Grey had said on the 25th July, 1914, to the German Ambassador, "the participation of Germany would be essential to any diplomatic action for peace," and that "alone we could do nothing"; whilst it was always obvious that, as in 1911, 1912 and 1913, Germany was behind the trouble and pulling the strings to bring about the war, which she wanted against France and Russia, under the conditions which she desired, namely, with Great Britain kept neutral.

Meantime, as the last despatch, quoted above, shows, our rulers had stopped the First Fleet dispersing for manœuvre leave, but they specifically qualified the effect of this action by the statement to the Russian Ambassador that it "must not be taken to mean that anything more than diplomatic action was promised."

Even this "diplomatic action" was discounted by various things which our rulers were permitting to take place, including a speech by their Attorney-General, Sir John Simon, at Manchester, when, on the 25th July, 1914, he said that they must "resolve that whatever may be the difficulties and dangers which threaten the peaceful relations in Europe, the part which this country plays shall from beginning to end be the part of a mediator simply desirous of promoting better and more peaceful relations."

In considering these happenings with a view to protecting our future, it is necessary to look at their effect on Germany. It is clear that her belief that our rulers would keep Great Britain neutral was thereby increased. It is true she must have recognized that, in the end, when they got at the truth, the people of Great Britain would insist upon giving support to France and Russia; but the indications, as Germany viewed

them, were that action by our nation would, owing to our rulers' actions and the German machinations in our Press and elsewhere, come "too late" to save the country, the Empire and those who are to-day our Allies, as well as the rest of the world, from the long-planned aggression of Germany.

Certainly it must have seemed worth while to Germany to let the next move take place, for, as already stated, on the 28th July, 1914, Austria declared war on Serbia. As matters then were, and if the worst came to the worst, from Germany's point of view, owing to the people of Great Britain realizing in time what our rulers were doing and insisting upon France and Russia being supported as in 1911, Germany could close up the Austro-Serbian trouble as in 1913 and there would be no war.

If, on the other hand, we were kept neutral by our rulers, even for a short time, Germany would have had only France and Russia to fight, and we "isolated and disgraced," to use Sir Edward Grey's phrase, when referring in 1916 to this period, would later on, unfriended and unmourned, have been dealt with by Germany.

OUR RULERS AND GERMANY

These being the dangers, it is now convenient to quote what our rulers said to Germany.

On the 29th July, 1914, Sir Edward Grey, in a despatch to Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, reported: "After speaking to the German Ambassador this afternoon about the European situation, I said that I wished to say to him, in a quite private and friendly way, something that was on my mind. The situation was very grave. While it was restricted to the issues at present actually involved, we had no thought of interfering in it. But if Germany became involved in it, and then France, the issue might be so great that it would involve all European interests; and I did not wish him to be misled by the friendly tone of our conversation—which I hoped would continue—into thinking that we should stand aside.

"He said that he quite understood this, but he" (the German Ambassador) "asked whether I meant that we should under certain circumstances intervene?"

"I replied that I did not wish to say that, or to use anything that was like a threat or an attempt to apply pressure by saying that, if things became worse, we should intervene. There would be no question of our intervening if Germany was not involved, or even if France was not involved. But we knew very well, that if the issue did become such that we thought British interests required us to intervene, we must intervene at once, and the decision would have to be very rapid, just as the decisions of other Powers had to be."

It was somewhat late in the day for our rulers to leave the attitude of Great Britain in the least degree indefinite. Nebulous words encourage an intending aggressor, who seeks to read them, and make his people believe them, according to that construction which suits his ends. But our rulers' words went further than mere indefiniteness. They seemed, contrary to the policy last approved by the public and the democracy, to hold out to Germany that Russia would be left to her fate as our rulers had left Serbia to hers, and that our rulers might leave France unaided unless they thought British interests required them to intervene.

On the 31st July, 1914, Sir Edward Grey reported to Sir E. Goschen at Berlin: "I said to German Ambassador this morning that if Germany could get any reasonable proposal put forward which made it clear that Germany and Austria were striving to preserve European peace, and that Russia and France would be unreasonable if they rejected it, I would support it at St. Petersburg and Paris, and go to the length of saying that if Russia and France would not accept it, His Majesty's Government would have nothing more to do with the consequences; but, otherwise, I told the German Ambassador that if France became involved we should be drawn in."

This remark of Sir Edward Grey to the German Ambassador "that if France became involved we should be drawn in," confirms that our rulers knew that Great Britain would in the end, whatever they might do, insist upon fighting if France

had to fight. Unfortunately, it was also capable of an interpretation by Germany to the effect that if our rulers could not keep us neutral we should at least not come in until "too late" to prevent her having a sufficient start in her war on Russia and France to ensure to her a victorious campaign.

The next despatch, when read in conjunction with the two preceding despatches, seems to disclose the mind of our rulers.

In this despatch Sir Edward Grey reports an interview he had with the German Ambassador in London on the 1st August, 1914, the following words being used by him: "I told the German Ambassador to-day that the reply" (quoted later) "of the German Government with regard to the neutrality of Belgium was a matter of very great regret, because the neutrality of Belgium affected feeling in this country. If Germany could see her way to give the same assurance as that which had been given by France, it would materially contribute to relieve anxiety and tension here. On the other hand, if there were a violation of the neutrality of Belgium by one combatant while the other respected it, it would be extremely difficult to restrain public feeling in this country. I said that we had been discussing this question at a Cabinet meeting, and as I was authorized to tell him this I gave him a memorandum of it.

"He asked me whether, if Germany gave a promise not to violate Belgian neutrality we would engage to remain neutral.

"I replied that I could not say that; our hands were still free, and we were considering what our attitude should be. All I could say was that our attitude would be determined largely by public opinion here, and that the neutrality of Belgium would appeal very strongly to public opinion here. I did not think that we could give a promise of neutrality on that condition alone.

"The Ambassador pressed me as to whether I could not formulate conditions on which we would remain neutral. He even suggested that the integrity of France and her colonies might be guaranteed.

"I said that I felt obliged to refuse definitely any promise to remain neutral on similar terms, and I could only say that we must keep our hands free."

The position of Germany, then, seems to have been that, whilst our rulers would not promise that Great Britain should remain neutral, they (our rulers) were avoiding any definite pronouncement. Even in the case of Belgium, they only said that it would be extremely difficult to restrain public feeling in this country, if there were a violation of the neutrality of Belgium by one combatant whilst the other respected it. So far as Russia was concerned our rulers seemed to adhere to the interview with the German Ambassador in London of the 29th July, 1914, which implied that an attack on Russia would not bring Great Britain in, whilst, as therein stated, an attack on France would only cause our rulers to intervene if they thought British interests required them to do so.

Germany apparently relied on our rulers restraining public feeling in Great Britain (as they had often done before) even if she violated the neutrality of Belgium. This is confirmed by Germany's reply to the despatch of Sir Edward Grey, which was telegraphed on the 31st July, 1914, to our Ambassadors at Paris and Berlin as follows: "I still trust that situation is not irretrievable, but in view of prospect of mobilization in Germany it becomes essential to His Majesty's Government, in view of existing treaties, to ask whether French (German) Government are prepared to engage to respect neutrality of Belgium so long as no other Power violates it.

"A similar request is being addressed to German (French) Government. It is important to have an early answer."

In reply France gave the required undertaking to respect the neutrality of Belgium, but Germany, through her Secretary of State, intimated at once that probably no answer would be given, as "he thought any reply they might give could not but disclose a certain amount of their plan of campaign, in the event of war ensuing." No answer, beyond this reply, was, in fact, given by Germany.

Throughout the critical days under review all possible offers of conferences, arbitrations and other devices to prevent war, were being made from all quarters to Germany and laid, most humbly, at her feet. She tossed all aside, refused any delay,

and our rulers had on this the 1st August, 1914, seemingly but two courses left to them. Either, (1) they could, on the one hand, leave Russia unaided, as indicated by Sir Edward Grey's report of his conversation with the German Ambassador on the 29th July, 1914, and allow France to be "aggressed" by Germany, as implied by that conversation and confirmed by that of the 1st August, 1914, quoted on page 35, whilst hoping that "public feeling in this country" would be restrained, even if Belgium were violated by one combatant only; or (2) they could, on the other hand, declare boldly, as in 1911, that Great Britain stood with France and Russia against any aggression by Germany.

The former course of "our neutrality in any event," which our rulers were so perilously indicating to Germany, was being more and more strenuously pressed by some leading organs of the ministerial Press.

The *Manchester Guardian* of the 28th July, 1914, said: "Not only are we neutral now, but we could and ought to remain neutral throughout the whole course of the war," and again, "We want peace in Europe, but we want England to be and remain at peace even more."

The *Daily News* of the 1st August, 1914, wrote: "If war follows upon the threat of war, food will go up to famine prices. Within a few days of England launching into this struggle, the streets of every English town will be filled with starving men, women and children, who either have no money because there is no work or whose wages under the blast of famine can no longer keep body and soul together."

The *Nation* of the 1st August, 1914, urged: "The suggestion conveyed in the articles of *The Times* and the *Morning Post*, and even in certain dangerous and ill-advised naval precautions that the appalling contingency of a general war might make a case for our armed action, is the language of sheer insanity." Whilst on the 3rd August, 1914, the *Daily News* exclaimed: "This country must preserve her neutrality. Any other policy would be treason to Liberal principles."

With the question of "our neutrality in any event" thus handled in ministerial newspapers and by our rulers, it can

easily be imagined what other assurances, that we would remain neutral, were being given to Germany by the influential and wealthy Pacifists, pro-Germans, naturalized Germans, and Germans themselves in our midst, too many of whom permeated our centres of political and financial life and were intimate with some of our rulers, their families or connections.

The lesson for the future will in part be lost unless we compare what was being done as above by the Press, the colleagues and other connections associated with our rulers, with what Sir Edward (then Viscount) Grey, when speaking at the Hôtel Cecil, on the 23rd October, 1916, has since told us. His words were: "If nations had been united in such an agreement" (to prevent a war like this), "and prompt and resolute to insist in July 1914 that the dispute must be referred to a conference or to the Hague, and that the Belgian Treaty must be observed, there would have been no war."

These words of Sir Edward Grey referred to an agreement between nations, but the situation in July–August 1914 could have been, in all material respects, as easily met by our rulers had they been "prompt and resolute to insist" to Germany that the dispute must be referred and the Belgian Treaty observed.

If our rulers made this perfectly clear to Germany, every one will agree with Sir Edward Grey's disclosure of October 1916. She would not have faced the 700,000,000 of people—nearly half the population of the world—who would then have stood in the way against any aggression by her and by such confederates as she might tempt, or force, to join with her in breaking the peace if favourable conditions were assured. Germany would, as in 1911 and 1913, have given up her attempt, and this time the giving up might possibly have been for ever.

Instead of promptly and resolutely insisting, it is clear from the despatches quoted above that our rulers not only refrained from taking up any plain and straightforward position, but they also refused to join with France and Russia, whilst they emphasized to Germany that their difficulty was the fear that public opinion would be extremely difficult to restrain if she violated Belgium. At the same time they talked of "mediation" and "neutrality."

This attitude of our rulers, so encouraging to German aggression and so discouraging to the efforts for peace of France and Russia, was still more accentuated by what our rulers said to France.

OUR RULERS AND FRANCE

On the 29th July, 1914, Sir Edward Grey telegraphed to Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris, a despatch in which the following appears: "If Germany became involved and France became involved, we had not made up our minds what we should do; it was a case that we should have to consider. France would then have been drawn into a quarrel which was not hers, but in which, owing to her alliance, her honour and interest obliged her to engage. We were free from engagements, and we should have to decide what British interests required us to do."

On the 30th July, 1914, Sir F. Bertie telegraphed to Sir Edward Grey as follows: "He" (the French President) "is convinced that peace between the Powers is in the hands of Great Britain. If His Majesty's Government announced that England would come to the aid of France in the event of a conflict between France and Germany as a result of the present differences between Austria and Servia, there would be no war, for Germany would at once modify her attitude."

"I explained to him how difficult it would be for His Majesty's Government to make such an announcement, but he said that he must maintain that it would be in the interests of peace. France, he said, is pacific. She does not desire war, and all that she has done at present is to make preparations for mobilization so as not to be taken unawares. The French Government will keep His Majesty's Government informed of everything that may be done in that way. They have reliable information that the German troops are concentrated round Thionville and Metz ready for war. If there was a general war on the Continent it would inevitably draw England into it for the protection of her vital interests. A declaration

now of her intention to support France, whose desire it is that peace should be maintained, would almost certainly prevent Germany from going to war."

No plainer or truer words could have been used, and yet Sir Edward Grey had only the day before—the 29th July, 1914—telegraphed to our French Ambassador showing that our rulers had not made up their minds what to do.

In his next despatch to our Ambassador Sir Edward Grey on the 31st July, 1914, definitely refused to give any pledge "at the present moment," but adds the remark that our rulers "will certainly consider the situation again directly there is a new development."

This despatch was sent only four days before the outbreak of war between Great Britain and Germany, and it is worded as follows: "I have received your telegram of yesterday's date. Nobody here feels that in this dispute, so far as it has yet gone, British treaties or obligations are involved. Feeling is quite different from what it was during the Morocco question. That crisis involved a dispute directly involving France, whereas in this case France is being drawn into a dispute which is not hers. I believe it to be quite untrue that our attitude has been a decisive factor in situation. German Government do not expect our neutrality. We cannot undertake a definite pledge to intervene in a war. I have so told the French Ambassador, who has urged His Majesty's Government to reconsider this decision. I have told him that we should not be justified in giving any pledge at the present moment, but that we will certainly consider the situation again directly there is a new development."

It had been made clear both by the 1911 Agadir and 1913 Austro-Serbian crises that it was not the particular "dispute" which mattered, but the object involved. On each occasion the evidence was conclusive that Germany was the real aggressor; the precise pretext used by the prime-mover was nothing; to treat the position otherwise savours of special pleading, but the point has to be mentioned here because this method of refusing to face realities will be found constantly to govern nearly everything which our rulers said

to France. Attention is also drawn to this characteristic of our rulers' communications to France, because of its effect on Germany's hopes that Great Britain would be kept neutral, and because it should be an axiom in the future that rulers must make up their minds and be definite or they will again drift into war or cause once more other grave harm to the nation.

On the same day, the 31st July, 1914, Sir F. Bertie telegraphed to Sir Edward Grey: "At 7 o'clock this evening I was sent for by Minister for Foreign Affairs. When I arrived the German Ambassador was leaving His Excellency.

"German Ambassador had informed His Excellency that in view of the fact that orders had been given for the total mobilization of Russian Army and Fleet, German Government have in an ultimatum which they have addressed to the Russian Government required that Russian forces should be demobilized."

It must be noted that the mobilization news started in Berlin, not Petrograd. Further it was, and is, well known that Germany does many things, at home and all over the world, before "mobilization," as the term is used by Russia, France and Great Britain, which the latter countries only do after they mobilize (see p. 22). Furthermore, Germany was, as on previous occasions, planning to make the world believe that those whom she intended to attack were the aggressors. *The Times* of the 7th August, 1917, states: "As the outcome of a trick more dastardly than Bismarck's alteration of the Ems telegram, at the instance of the German authorities, a sham edition of the Berlin semi-official *Lokalanzeiger* was issued declaring that Germany had ordered a general mobilization. The Russian Ambassador instantly telegraphed the news to Petrograd. The edition of the newspaper was then withdrawn and a contradiction was published. The Russian Ambassador at once telegraphed the contradiction, but his second telegram was intentionally held up for twelve hours in Berlin, until after the Tsar had decreed what was believed to be a counter-mobilization. Germany meant to force Russia to mobilize, she achieved her foul purpose, and she pretends to rest her whole case upon it."

To return to our Ambassador's telegram of the 31st July, 1914, from Paris to Sir Edward Grey, which proceeded : " The German Government will consider it necessary to order the total mobilization of the German Army on the Russian and French frontiers if within twelve hours the Russian Government do not give an undertaking to comply with German demand.

" The Minister for Foreign Affairs asks me to communicate this to you and inquires what, in these circumstances, will be the attitude of England.

" German Ambassador could not say when the twelve hours terminates. He is going to call at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs to-morrow (Saturday) at 1 p.m. in order to receive the French Government's answer as to the attitude they will adopt in the circumstances.

" He intimated the possibility of his requiring his passports.

" I am informed by the Russian Ambassador that he is not aware of any general mobilization of the Russian forces having taken place."

Also on the 31st July, 1914, Sir Edward Grey reported to Sir F. Bertie his conversation with M. Cambon, the French Ambassador : " M. Cambon referred to-day to a telegram " (this telegram is not produced) " that had been shown to Sir Arthur Nicholson this morning from the French Ambassador in Berlin; saying that it was the uncertainty with regard to whether we would intervene which was the encouraging element in Berlin, and that, if we would only declare definitely on the side of Russia and France, it would decide the German attitude in favour of peace.

" I said that it was quite wrong to suppose that we had left Germany under the impression that we would not intervene. I had refused overtures to promise that we should remain neutral. I had not only definitely declined to say that we would remain neutral, I had even gone so far this morning as to say to the German Ambassador that if France and Germany became involved in war we should be drawn into it. That, of course, was not the same thing as taking an engagement to France, and I told M. Cambon of it only to show that we had

not left Germany under the impression that we would stand aside."

This version by Sir Edward Grey, of what he said to the German Ambassador on the 31st July, 1914, must be compared with Sir Edward Grey's fuller report of the conversation, which is quoted on page 34, in order to obtain the true view of how Germany had been encouraged by that and the other interviews already referred to, as having taken place with our rulers.

However, to continue with what passed on the 31st July, 1914, between Sir Edward Grey and M. Cambon : " M. Cambon then asked me for my reply to what he had said yesterday." (M. Cambon's question yesterday had been : What would Great Britain do if there were an aggression by Germany on France?) " I said that we had come to the conclusion, in the Cabinet to-day, that we could not give any pledge at the present time. Though we should have to put our policy before parliament, we could not pledge Parliament in advance. Up to the present moment, we did not feel, and public opinion did not feel, that any treaties or obligations of this country were involved. Further developments might alter this situation and cause the Government and Parliament to take the view that intervention was justified. The preservation of the neutrality of Belgium might be, I would not say a decisive, but an important factor, in determining our attitude. Whether we proposed to Parliament to intervene or not to intervene in a war, Parliament would wish to know how we stood with regard to the neutrality of Belgium, and it might be that I should ask both France and Germany whether each was prepared to undertake an engagement that she would not be the first to violate the neutrality of Belgium."

This attempt of our rulers to excuse themselves from a decision on the ground that Parliament must have the policy put before them and decide, was contrary to the practice of our rulers. Their disregard of Parliament in this particular was well established, and so lately as the 7th October, 1916, they have confirmed that this was so by stating with regard to Greece, that the responsibility rests not with Parliament but

with themselves, saying in the words of Lord Robert Cecil in the House of Commons whilst a member of Mr. Asquith's Coalition Cabinet: "We" (the Government) "cannot share responsibility" (as to Foreign Affairs) "with the House of Commons or any one else."

The rest of the interview between Sir Edward Grey and M. Cambon on the 31st July, 1914, is still more enlightening: "M. Cambon repeated his question whether we would help France if Germany made an attack on her. I said that I could only adhere to the answer that as far as things had gone at present, we could not take any engagement.

"M. Cambon urged that Germany had from the beginning rejected proposals that might have been made for peace. It could not be to England's interest that France should be crushed by Germany. We should then be in a very diminished position with regard to Germany. In 1870 we had made a great mistake in allowing an enormous increase of German strength, and we should now be repeating the mistake. He asked me whether I could not submit his question to the Cabinet again.

"I said that the Cabinet would certainly be summoned as soon as there was some new development, but at the present moment the only answer I could give was that we could not undertake any definite engagement."

All this was but four days before Great Britain was at war, and was said to France. Compare with this what our rulers were saying to Germany (see pp. 34 and 35). There was no mention there that they (our rulers) "could not pledge Parliament in advance." Categorical and definite was the offer that our rulers made to Germany, to support any reasonable proposal she might make. They even promised "to go to the length of saying that if Russia and France would not accept it" (the proposal) "His Majesty's Government would have nothing more to do with the consequences;" in other words, that they of their own power—regardless of Parliament—would leave France and Russia to be aggressed.

Meanwhile the whole point of France was that, unless our rulers could make up their minds, they would be "too late," and in the end a world-war would result.

All else having failed, to get our rulers to declare that we stood with France and Russia, as the people had approved in 1911, there came on the night of the 31st July, 1914, a personal appeal by M. Poincaré, the President of the French Republic, direct to His Majesty, our King, in which the vital paragraph is : " From all the information which reaches us it would seem that war would be inevitable if Germany were convinced that the British Government would not intervene in a conflict in which France might be engaged ; if, on the other hand, Germany were convinced that the *entente cordiale* would be affirmed, in case of need, even to the extent of taking the field side by side, there would be the greatest chance that peace would remain unbroken."

Under date, the next day, Saturday, the 1st August, 1914, the answer permitted by our rulers sums up, in the last paragraph of the reply in His Majesty's name to the President, their persistence, only three days before we were at war, in a policy of " wait and see." The paragraph runs : " As to the attitude of my country, events are changing so rapidly that it is difficult to forecast future developments ; but you may be assured that my Government will continue to discuss freely and frankly any point which might arise of interest to our two nations with M. Cambon."

It must not be overlooked that M. Cambon was the French Ambassador in London, whose failure to get anything satisfactory or even definite from our rulers with which to convince Germany that Great Britain would fight if France and Russia were attacked, had caused the President to appeal direct to His Majesty the King, as a last resource for peace. Yet all our rulers would permit to be said to the head of the French nation (in response to his personal appeal) was that they would " continue to discuss freely and frankly any point which might arise of interest to our two nations, with M. Cambon." This was three days before we were at war.

Looking back over these despatches between our rulers and France, as a signpost for the days to come, one question must be asked. Why should they treat Germany, who would do nothing for peace, with so much deference, and France, who was striving

so hard for a peaceful solution, as they did? All must realize how these despatches, and those previously quoted, must have inspired Germany with the hope that our rulers would keep Great Britain neutral, whilst France and Russia must have been depressed and embarrassed in their efforts to avoid war.

Be the effect on Germany, France and Russia what it may, we cannot judge matters with a view to the future without testing whether there was not some scheme of policy in our rulers' minds when they refrained from making it clear to Germany that she could not attack France and Russia without Great Britain intervening, or to France and Russia that they could as before rely on Great Britain supporting them against the aggression so long planned by Germany.

Some might say that our rulers may have believed in July-August 1914 that they could best keep the peace by disheartening our friends and appearing to favour those who were working against us. Unfortunately for this theory in support of our rulers' actions Sir Edward Grey realized at the outset that "the participation of Germany would be essential to any diplomatic action for peace" and that "alone we could do nothing." The evidence was overwhelming that Germany was prepared for war against France and Russia, and, as Sir Edward Grey has shown us (see p. 38), the way to prevent the war happening was to be prompt and resolute to insist on the dispute being referred and the Belgian Treaty observed. Our rulers did neither, and the only explanation left is that contained in the next paragraph.

Our rulers had in eight years created a parlous position for themselves and for Great Britain. Although they knew the danger, they year after year failed to safeguard the nation, crying peace where there was no peace. They had civil war looming in at least one direction. They had divided councils; some of their colleagues were undiluted Pacifists and would not consent to war on any terms; others considered it a crime that Great Britain should even contemplate the sending of a single soldier to support our friends on the Continent; others had committed themselves to the task of keeping Great Britain neutral, or, at the most, mediating between belligerents.

Probably if our rulers had faced the position and been "prompt and resolute to insist" the greater number of the Cabinet would have accepted the decision and remained in office as in the end they did, even when war came. At this date, however, three days before we were at war, our rulers still sat on the fence and continued to encourage Germany and to discourage France and Russia.

The peril in which our rulers were placing Great Britain by refusing to decide to stand by our friends has since been defined by Mr. Asquith at Cardiff on the 2nd October, 1914. The words he used were as follows: "If we here in Great Britain had abstained and remained neutral, forsworn our word, deserted our friends, faltered and compromised with the plain dictates of our duty—nay, if we had not shown ourselves ready to strike with all our forces at the common enemy of civilization and freedom, there would have been nothing left for us and for our country but to veil her face in shame, and to be ready in her turn—for her time would have to come—to be ready in her turn to share the doom which she would have richly deserved and go down after centuries of glorious life, go down to her grave, unwept, unhonoured and unsung."

Under this head it seems permissible to add another quotation from the book already referred to, written by Mr. Harold Begbie. On page 167 the following words appear: "France was to be knocked senseless and left bleeding in a week or two, and then, swinging eastward, the disorderly Russian legions, the legions of the Slav peril, were to be scattered like sheep before the drilled cohorts of the Prussian war lord. With Russia humbled, shattered and cowed, the war lord could breathe again; and, as for France, who would certainly never forgive England, she would not soon disturb his dreams again. His blow there was to fall like a cataract. . . . Austria would be his vassal, Bulgaria was already in his pocket, and Turkey could be had for the asking. . . . There were those behind the war party who dreamed wilder dreams than these, but I am convinced that for the great multitude of the German nation this is how war presented itself."

Equally clear are the words of Sir Edward (then Viscount)

Grey of the 24th October, 1916, showing the jeopardy in which our rulers were placing us in the days preceding the war. His words are : " What was the German plan ? I saw some statement in the Press the other day that a German officer had recognized that Germany had failed this time, but that in ten years she was going to succeed. What was the plan ? what was the failure ? It was to be a short successful war. There was a time-table—so long to get to Paris ; so long to defeat France ; so long afterwards to defeat Russia—and, as to England, the plan was that England should be kept out of the war, but if England did enter the war it was not thought that the Expeditionary Force we had available would be enough to upset the enemy's plans. People who are militarists, whose ideas and thoughts run solely on military considerations, wholly material, forget to estimate and cannot estimate the spirit and the soul which exists in nations when they are attacked and are fighting for their lives. The plan was that France and Russia were to be defeated, England was to be isolated—and disgraced."

It seems, in face of the above quotations, no exaggeration to say that the policy our rulers appeared to support of keeping Great Britain neutral, was imperilling the honour and endangering the future of the nation. Fortunately the public and the democracy began to realize what was happening, and they quickly showed that they were not assenting parties to what our rulers were doing.

OUR RULERS AND THE PEOPLE

The truth had begun to leak out. The attitude of the British people was very different to that of our rulers. The instinct and judgment of the people were extraordinarily sound in spite of the truth having been so long withheld from them, and continued assurances, not reconcilable with the truth, having been so persistently given to them.

The people did not, for a moment, even think of leaving a

friend in the lurch, nor of "deserting a pal," nor of hesitating or faltering when loyal and prompt support, promised or implied, might, and, on weighty opinions given, would, save the friend, the lives of millions, the honour of the nation, its own and the Empire's future and the freedom of the world.

The Dominions and the Empire, with unswerving loyalty to our cause and that of France and Russia, against the German menace, were offering their resources; yet leading organs of the Ministerial Press, whilst adding to their non-intervention utterances, pressed the advantages of neutrality on the one hand and the pains of war on the other.

The *Daily News* of the 4th August, 1914, said: "Sir Edward Grey suggested that so far as the economic consequences are concerned there is no appreciable difference between the loss we should suffer if we remained neutral and the loss we should suffer by entering into the war. Sir Edward Grey is not well versed in economics, and we fear he has greatly misapprehended this matter. If we remain neutral we should be, from the commercial point of view, in precisely the same position as the United States. We should be able to trade with all the belligerents (so far as the war allows of trade with them); we should be able to capture the bulk of their trade in neutral markets; we should keep our expenditure down; we should keep out of debt; we should have healthy finances."

The *Manchester Guardian* on the same date stated: "Sir Edward Grey has forgotten apparently that if we go to war it is probable that we shall soon be spending something like a million pounds a day, and, with a diminished trade and constantly increasing unemployment we shall be increasing our taxes and loading ourselves with debt. Is it to be supposed that British commerce will not suffer under these conditions more than it would do if we remained at peace with the whole world, as we did in 1870-1?"

The falterings and hesitations of our rulers continued and were, with the doctrine of "wait and see" in an extreme phase, threatening a national, and drifting towards an imperial and, indeed, a world-wide, disaster, when, discovering that the honour and safety of the nation were still being risked by our

rulers, the largest political party in the House of Commons held an emergency meeting of those of its leaders who were available.

The outcome of the meeting was a decision—prompt and resolute—by those who spoke not only for the largest party in the House, but also for a majority of the English constituencies. In consequence of this decision the following letter was delivered to Mr. Asquith on the morning of Sunday, the 2nd August, 1914—

“DEAR MR. ASQUITH,

“Lord Lansdowne and I feel it our duty to inform you that in our opinion, as well as in that of all the colleagues whom we have been able to consult, it would be fatal to the honour and security of the United Kingdom to hesitate in supporting France and Russia at the present juncture; and we offer our unhesitating support to the Government in any measures they may consider necessary for that object.

“Yours very truly,

“A. BONAR LAW.”

Notwithstanding this confirmation of the people's desire to stand, as in 1911, by France and Russia against German aggression, all that our rulers could make up their minds to say at the Cabinet Meeting which followed on the 2nd August, 1914, two days before we were at war, was that disclosed by Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris, to whom he said: “After the Cabinet this morning I gave M. Cambon, (French Ambassador in London) the following memorandum:—

“I am authorized to give an assurance that, if the German fleet comes into the Channel or through the North Sea to undertake hostile operations against French coasts or shipping, the British fleet will give all the protection in its power.

“This assurance is, of course, subject to the policy of His Majesty's Government receiving the support of Parliament, and must not be taken as binding His Majesty's Government to take any action until the above contingency of action by the German fleet takes place.”

War had begun between Germany and Russia the day before, Saturday, the 1st August, 1914. France had made it clear beyond question to Sir Edward Grey that she must, in honour and for her existence, support her ally Russia. Consequently, war between Germany and France was certain, unless our rulers would make up their minds and even at this, the very last minute, come down with a run on the right side of the fence by making it clear to Germany without any possible doubt whatever, that war with France meant war with us. Yet all our rulers could agree upon, amongst themselves, was to promise that, only when the German fleet was out at sea with the object of attacking the French, the British fleet would then give all the protection in its power.

This decision of our rulers involved the German fleet being out for attack on the French coasts or shipping *before* Great Britain would intervene, and assured to Germany that her fleet could be at sea and on our ocean routes, with the certainty that, even if public feeling were not restrained, war with us would only come after she had obtained this incalculable advantage.

The rest of Sir Edward Grey's despatch of the 2nd August, 1914, to Paris, sheds more light on this subject: "I pointed out to M. Cambon" (the French Ambassador in London) "that we had very large questions and most difficult issues to consider, and that Government felt that they could not bind themselves to declare war upon Germany necessarily if war broke out between France and Germany to-morrow, but it was essential to the French Government, whose fleet had long been concentrated in the Mediterranean to know how to make their dispositions with their north coast entirely undefended. We therefore thought it necessary to give them this assurance. It did not bind us to go to war with Germany unless the German fleet took the action indicated, but it did give a security to France that would enable her to settle the disposition of her own Mediterranean fleet.

"M. Cambon asked me about the violation of Luxemburg. I told him the doctrine on that point laid down by Lord Derby and Lord Clarendon in 1867. He asked me what we should

say about the violation of the neutrality of Belgium. I said that was a much more important matter; we were considering what statements we should make in Parliament to-morrow—in effect, whether we should declare violation of Belgium neutrality to be a *casus belli*. I told him what had been said to the German Ambassador on this point.”

Sir Edward Grey's two leading remarks to the German Ambassador on the preceding day, the 1st August, 1914, only three days before the outbreak of war, were that any violation of the neutrality of Belgium “was a matter of very great regret because the neutrality of Belgium affected feeling in this country,” and that “if there were a violation of the neutrality of Belgium by one combatant whilst the other respected it, it would be extremely difficult to restrain public feeling in this country.”

Our rulers' trouble still apparently was not that of leaving Russia or France single-handed to meet German aggression, but whether public feeling “in this country” would, to use Sir Edward Grey's words, be restrained if it became affected by the actual violation of Belgium by one combatant, the other respecting it.

THE END OF PEACE

The crisis had come. The agony of suspense was twofold. Would our rulers change their methods, become prompt and resolute and declare that they stood firmly by France and Russia as at Agadir in 1911, and so, possibly even at this late date, prevent war or at least save our honour? Or would they continue neutral until “too late” to join with France and Russia in order to hold at the outset the German menace against us, against the Dominions, against the Empire, and indeed, against the United States of America and the whole civilized world as we know it?

The suspense culminated during Saturday, Sunday and Monday (Bank Holiday), the 1st, 2nd and 3rd August, 1914. Few knew what our rulers were doing, or failing to do, in the

much-abused name of the British people, but those who did were aware of some of the machinations in progress under the auspices of Pacifists, pro-Germans, naturalized Germans and Germans themselves, who, as already stated, permeated our centres of political and financial life and were intimate with some of our rulers, their families or connections.

War, as mentioned, had been started against Serbia on the 28th July, 1914, and had begun between Germany and Russia on Saturday, the 1st August, 1914. Very early on Sunday, the 2nd August, 1914, the German troops entered Luxemburg, and on Monday, the 3rd August, 1914, they invaded Belgium. Following up her ultimatum, delivered in Paris about seven o'clock on the evening of the 31st July, 1914, Germany declared war on France at 6.45 p.m. on Monday the 3rd August, 1914.

These events found our rulers even yet debating in their Cabinet. It was not until Tuesday, the 4th August, 1914, that Sir Edward Grey telegraphed to Sir Edward Goschen, the British Ambassador at Berlin (*inter alia*): "His Majesty's Government are bound to protest against this violation of a treaty to which Germany is a party in common with themselves, and must request an assurance that the demand made upon Belgium will not be proceeded with, and that her neutrality will be respected by Germany. You should ask for an immediate reply."

Germany may well have nevertheless continued to feel hopeful that public feeling would be restrained, and that our rulers would keep us neutral notwithstanding "a violation of the neutrality of Belgium by one combatant while the other respected it," for it was so far back as the 31st July, 1914, that she had officially told our rulers: "He" (the German Secretary of State) "thought any reply they might give" (as to observing the neutrality of Belgium) "could not but disclose a certain amount of their plan of campaign in the event of war ensuing." And in the face of this and notwithstanding the attacks on our friends Serbia, Russia and France, all our rulers were asking for was "an assurance" (from Germany) "that the demand made upon Belgium will not be proceeded with."

The will of the people, the Dominions and the Empire, had,

however (as gradually the truth became more fully known), been rapidly gathering strength to save our honour, our civilization and the world from the menace of German force, education and "Kultur," and within a few hours our rulers could no longer avoid sending an ultimatum.

THE ULTIMATUM

Later in the same day, Tuesday, the 4th August, 1914, Sir Edward Grey telegraphed to Sir Edward Goschen at Berlin: "We hear that Germany has addressed note to Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs stating that German Government will be compelled to carry out, if necessary, by force of arms, the measures considered indispensable.

"We are also informed that Belgian territory has been violated at Gemmenich.

"In these circumstances, and in view of the fact that Germany declined to give the same assurance respecting Belgium as France gave last week in reply Paris, we must repeat that request" (dated 31st July) "and ask that a satisfactory reply to it and to my telegram of this morning be received here by 12 o'clock to-night. If not, you are instructed to ask for your passports, and to say that His Majesty's Government feel bound to take all steps in their power to uphold the neutrality of Belgium and the observance of a treaty to which Germany is as much a party as ourselves."

No reply was received, and at midnight of the same day, Tuesday, the 4th August, 1914, our rulers were, by reason of the Belgian issue, at war with Germany.

Our rulers had failed to be "prompt and resolute to insist" upon, or even definitely to indicate, anything until they sent this ultimatum; it was then "too late" for Germany to draw back as she did in 1911 and 1913, and the war, which they said was never to be, had come. Yet, unprepared as the public and the democracy were, and though blamed later by our rulers for being unprepared, they instantly rallied with one accord to fight on the side of France and Russia against the

great conspiracy of the German race to dominate the world in disregard of humanity, honour, treaties, and all that makes for civilization on our ideal that "right not might" and truth and fair dealing shall be the law of nations as of man.

LEST WE FORGET

The old ground has been gone back on not only because, in the words of Lord Grey of Falloden, "you cannot go back on it too often; it affects the conditions of peace," but also because it affects the whole future of the nation. Unless the lessons to be learned are studied in detail they are in danger of being lost.

The public and the democracy must surely "promptly and resolutely insist" that rulers do not in the years to come carry on a foreign policy contrary to the last expressed wishes of the nation, hide the change from the people and leave them unwarned, unprepared and unarmed in respect of that which must inevitably follow, whilst telling them that dangers which had arisen did not exist.

War resulted, and the precautions which should have been taken in peace had to be carried out in war at an enormous expense in life and money.

It is a true saying that "he who sups with the devil must have a long spoon," and it is no less true that "the way to hell is paved with good intentions." Our rulers' spoon seems to have been too short for any meal with Germany, and their intentions have led to a hell on earth. It was only by the violation of Belgium by Germany that Great Britain was saved from even worse things—loss of honour, isolation and disgrace—for, as Mr. Lloyd George has very frankly told us in an interview published in *Pearson's Magazine* for March, 1915: "If Germany had been wise she would not have set foot on Belgian soil. The Liberal Government, then, would not have intervened. Germany made a grave mistake."

None can deny that this point as to the intentions of our then rulers is a serious matter when such a paper as the *Nation* (see

p. 163) can return, after more than three years—nearly thirty-eight months—of war, to such a text as that embodied in its first leader of 22nd September, 1917, wherein it is said: "In accents of varying clearness and sincerity, Germany, speaking, as we in similar stress should speak, through her Parliament, has all but notified her surrender of the Belgian soil. Now this may not be a great matter to France or Italy or Russia. But it is undeniably a great thing for us. Britain came into the war to save Belgium, as she did not come in to save Serbia. It was not a British concern whether Serbia remained under Russia's influence or reverted to Austria's. The existing British Cabinet" (that of July 1914) "would never have pledged the country to such an issue, and never did. But Germany's conduct to Belgium created the test that drew a divided Government and a hesitating nation into the strife."

It is unnecessary to refute the assertion that our people hesitated to support any nation against German aggression. Our rulers' own despatches confirm that the nation could not be restrained.

But in face of such facts as those above stated we must be prepared in the days to come to find Germany seeking to persuade the world that she was not to blame for the Great War. Already from the All Highest down to the very lowest the Germans have screamed "treachery" against us for coming into the war.

Fortunately two wrongs do not make a right, and, whatever may have been said, done or permitted to be done by our rulers, Germany's own signature was on the Belgian Treaty. If our rulers had actually consented to the Treaty being torn up, which none suggest, Germany could not thereby have justified the wrong that she committed in respect of her guarantee of Belgian territory. In truth she did not, at first, attempt exculpation.

Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador in Berlin, in his report of August 8th, 1914, to Sir Edward Grey, has told us: "He" (Dr. von Bethmann-Hollweg) "said that the step taken by His Majesty's Government was terrible to a degree; just for a word—'neutrality,' a word which in war-time had so

often been disregarded—just for a scrap of paper, Great Britain was going to make war on a kindred nation who desired nothing better than to be friends with her.”

Germany alone was armed to the teeth with all her plans and schemes complete in all parts of the world. She alone was prepared to make every treaty and law scraps of paper to be torn up in order to crush France out of existence, paralyze Russia and consolidate the Empire she had worked for from the North Sea to the Persian Gulf and India.

The best-laid schemes, even of criminals, “gang aft agley,” but the too-early entry of Great Britain into the war, from Germany’s point of view, has produced another variation of the arguments used by those who, knowingly or unknowingly, serve Germany and help in the attempt to hold her free from the crime of deliberately planning and committing breaches of the peace.

These apologists for Germany attempt a distinguishment between her rulers and her people. They argue that the latter did not desire war and were wedded to the ways of peace. The truth, however, appears beyond question to be, and the diplomatic despatches referred to confirm it, that the German rulers knew that they had the German people behind them not only in the summer of 1914, but in the summers of 1911, 1912 and 1913, if they could manœuvre for such conditions as would ensure to Germany a “victorious war.”

Both the rulers and the people well knew that such a war could only be possible if Great Britain were kept neutral. Hence such of the German rulers—and they appear to have been in the minority—who wanted “war in any event” took every possible means to cause the despatches and other communications from our rulers and from the sources of German influence in Great Britain, including the pro-German Press, to be so framed as to enable them to impress upon their colleagues in the German Government that war would be limited at that time (August 1914) to that which had been long planned against France and Russia, that our public opinion would be restrained, and that Great Britain would be kept neutral.

Thus it was that the German people were enthusiastic for

the war. To excuse them because they would have been against war had they known the people of Great Britain would have compelled our rulers to join France and Russia before it was "too late," is as insincere and unjustified as it would be to say that, because a burglar would not have broken in to steal had he known that the master of the house was at home and well armed, the criminal must be treated as an innocent man.

That our then rulers would not have warred against Germany had she not violated Belgium, or that, judging from their despatches, they might not have intervened even to support the neutrality of Belgium if public feeling in Great Britain had been restrained, cannot be rightly used by Germany, or by those who aid her, as a well-founded defence of her crime of long-planned aggression.

There was never a moment's hesitation on the part of the people of Great Britain and of the Empire in recognizing the fact that, only by throwing in their lot—rulers or no rulers, prepared or unprepared—with France and Russia, could the free nations of all the continents, and on all the seas, remain free and avoid worse than slavery under German world-rule.

Only by knowing the truth can a Nation guard its future.

THE WAR

*Let the betrayers of world-peace be judged ;
Punished for horrors ; violations met
By retribution, fearless and resolved.
No other aims our efforts should distract
Until full victory be well assured.*

Every direct or indirect encouragement to the enemy murders men and destroys treasure.

Promptitude, courage and concentration in Rulers against the enemy at home and abroad are vital in war—delay, fearfulness and diffusion waste lives and money.

GENERAL

THE world-war had come and all trusted our rulers to take stock, to learn from the past, to be clear and frank in the present, to neglect no effort to win the war quickly, to do nought to the prejudice of Great Britain or the encouragement of Germany, and last, but not least, to prepare for the future in such a manner as would show the German people that by fighting on they were adding to their post-war trouble, and that, if they put in force their doctrine of frightfulness, they would be still further increasing the burden which they would have to bear in the years to come.

Our rulers had the whole nation behind them, in spite of the fact that the foundations, on which they had for more than eight years told the nation they had been building, were in course of destruction by that very German menace, which our rulers had assured the people existed only in the imagination of fools or rogues.

Never did a Government start with so free a hand, backed by a world-empire, whilst most generous Allies were ready, without retrospection, to make our cause theirs—come weal or woe.

All was well if our rulers led the nation as it desired to

be led, straightforwardly and wholeheartedly, without fears, reservations or manœuvrings, personal or party, in the fight to free the Empire and the Allies, in war and peace, from the menace created by the acquiescence of the German people in the Prussian military system, by that people's adoption in their private and commercial life of the Prussian moral code, and by their support of the so-called "peaceful penetration" of our own and other countries by means of diplomatists, social lions, journalists, financiers, bankers, merchants, professors, restaurant keepers, hotel proprietors, shopkeepers, clerks, waiters, chauffeurs and other spies, naturalized or not naturalized—many with ample funds beyond their honest resources, and all governed by their fetish of "Germany over all."

The dangers at home were in truth greater than those abroad. Besides, to deal with the latter it was obvious that much time must elapse. Armies and equipment cannot be made in a day, nor can the plant, machinery and organization, out of which both grow, be created in a night. Long-continued neglect and actual scrapping of men and machinery by our rulers had to be paid for in precious lives, in record-work and in a huge expenditure of hard-earned money, whilst on the part of our rulers relentless energy and personal sacrifice were called for.

Not a moment need have passed before our rulers grappled with the danger at home. The German influence in our midst could have been rooted out; the penetration of our national life, in all its phrases, by a treacherous enemy, stayed; and the country purged of his presence as a free citizen, with privileges, in some cases, beyond those of the native-born.

Every other possible step could have been taken to encourage our friends, and to discourage the enemy, in connection with the war and with the future. This well done, or arranged for, the preparations to withstand a war of at least three years could have been energetically pressed forward.

Our rulers' power was practically absolute; the public and the democracy were behind them; every party, and most of the groups, had handed in allegiance to the Prime Minister

and the Government; no questions were asked and there was no one to say our rulers nay, so long as they left no step untaken to win the war.

It is an object of this book that a broad view should be obtained of what happened. For this purpose it is desirable to consider the facts contained in the preceding part, those set forth in the following words on "The War," and to appreciate that which is mentioned in the pages on "The Peace."

The attempt made is not to record minor events, or even party manœuvres, but to set down such incidents as may help each citizen to gain a true perspective for the future, when all the episodes are grouped together in his mind. It is for him to judge whether the perils which we are escaping from to-day are ruler-produced, people-produced, or otherwise brought about, so that he can join in making impossible, in the post-war period, any return to such things as have been, or are about to be, mentioned.

The first head to be dealt with is the peril in our land which has arisen from the Germans, pro-Germans, and other friends of our enemies who were left at liberty in our midst.

This grievous ill had, in spite of the warnings of the "few who preached," been growing for years, not only without hindrance from our rulers, but with encouragement from many of them, and with complaisance on the part of all of them.

A yet heavier responsibility was on our rulers, to prevent Germany gaining advantage because influential and wealthy Pacifists, pro-Germans, naturalized Germans and Germans themselves were permeating our political, financial and social life.

This being the position of affairs at the outbreak of war, we pass to the first item under this head—the naturalization of alien enemies present in Great Britain at the outbreak of war. For convenience the items are numbered.

NATURALIZATION OF ALIEN ENEMIES

(1) As though to emphasize to what a length the "peaceful penetration" by Germany had gone even in the City of London

—the centre of world finance—our rulers at once naturalized Rudolf Bruno Schröder, of Messrs. J. Henry Schröder & Co., Merchant Bankers, of 145, Leadenhall Street, London, E.C. Eventually in the House of Commons the following words passed on the 26th November, 1914—

“MR. MCKENNA : I do not think it needs a very extensive knowledge of city affairs to understand, that if the doors of Messrs. Schröder had not opened on the morning after Baron Schröder was naturalized” (7th August, 1914), “as they would not have opened if he had not been naturalized, there would have been very serious consequences in the City of London.

“SIR F. BANBURY : What about his partner?

“MR. MCKENNA : That would not do it. I went into the question and I was informed, and I believe it to be a fact, that if he had not been naturalized the doors of his firm would have remained closed.

“MR. CHAMBERLAIN : This matter has excited a great deal of attention. Could not the case have been dealt with in the same way as the foreign banks were dealt with?

“MR. MCKENNA : The foreign banks were closed.

“MR. CHAMBERLAIN : They were licensed.

“MR. MCKENNA : They were licensed afterwards.”

The partner of Baron Bruno von Schröder referred to was an Englishman and a director of the Bank of England, yet our rulers contended that—moratorium or no moratorium, licences or no licences—they were compelled, in order to avoid serious consequences in the city of London, to naturalize this German baron, who, so recently as the 30th January, 1914, had with other German residents in London, caused a telegram to be sent to the German Emperor : “The Germans resident in London, assembled in unusually large numbers to celebrate your Majesty’s birthday, wish me to convey an expression of their heartfelt and enduring attachment to your Majesty and to the German Empire.”

(2) Next our rulers proceeded to naturalize other enemy subjects, as to which it was said in the House of Commons on the 25th November, 1914—

“MR. HUNT asked the Home Secretary why the un-naturalized German chauffeurs of the Lord Chief Justice” (Lord Reading) “and of the Secretary of State for the Colonies” (Mr. Harcourt) “were given naturalization certificates just after war broke out, and why the chauffeur of the Lord Chief Justice had since been allowed to leave the country. Were these naturalization certificates granted, as in the case of Baron Bruno Schröder, because it was in the public advantage?”

“MR. McKENNA: The general principle upon which I have proceeded since the war began, in granting certificates of naturalization to the small number of Germans and Austrians who have received them, is that there should be clear grounds of advantage to the State, or special circumstances which would justify the grant. In the cases referred to in the questions, I was satisfied that they came within the general principle which I have just stated. . . .

“THE EARL OF RONALDSHAY (Hornsey): Is the right hon. gentleman aware that since the outbreak of war the first person mentioned in the question has openly spoken of his sympathy with Germany, and of his hostility to the cause of this country?”

“MR. McKENNA: I don't know to which particular person the noble lord refers.

“THE EARL OF RONALDSHAY: The chauffeur of the Lord Chief Justice.

“MR. McKENNA: No, sir, I am not aware of any circumstances of this sort.

“MR. HUNT: Will the right hon. gentleman say why the chauffeur of the Lord Chief Justice has since been allowed to leave this country?”

“MR. McKENNA: He has left temporarily, but I can answer nothing further than that.

"MR. HUNT : Why was he allowed to leave ?

"MR. McKENNA : Because he was entitled to.

"SEVERAL HON. MEMBERS : Where has he gone ?

"MR. McKENNA : To Switzerland."

The preceding two House of Commons references are quoted here as giving examples of Germans—one at the top and two at the bottom of the social scale—who had so penetrated into our national life as to necessitate naturalization to prevent, in the case of the banker, "very serious consequences in the City of London," or, in the cases of the chauffeurs of our rulers, for "clear grounds of advantage to the State, or special circumstances which would justify the grant."

MAGNA CHARTA

(3) Magna Charta, so wisely worded as to treatment of enemies in our midst, was set on one side by our rulers in respect of its provision that : "All merchants shall have safe conduct to go and come out of and into England, and to stay in and travel through England by land and water for purchase or sale, without maltolt, by ancient and just customs, except in time of War or if they belong to a country at War with Us. And if any such be found in Our dominions at the outbreak of War, they shall be attached, without injury to their persons or goods, until it be known to Us or Our Chief Justiciary, after what sort Our merchants are treated who shall be found to be at that time in the country at War with Us, and if they be safe there then these shall be so also with Us."

The above clause is simplicity itself. Germany either overlooked it, or relied upon our rulers evading it, for she promptly proceeded to destroy the businesses of our merchants and others in Germany and to imprison them in camps—the horrors, and callous and cowardly brutality of which shocked and sickened the world.

In doing this, Germany was wonderfully accurate in reading our rulers, for, in spite of what she did, these rulers naturalized

some Germans, left many free to carry on their avocations, and allowed those interned to live in comfort, luxury and licence, entirely contrary to the doctrine laid down by the great Charter, extracted by our aristocracy from King John, and the foundation of our rights and liberties.

The people complained and agitated, but Germany was right in believing that our rulers would restrain them.

(4) The story of the German banks which comes under the same clause of Magna Charta must also be considered.

These banks in pre-war days had been aided by the policy of our rulers and by advantages denied to our own people. The history of how our rulers handled these banks was partially disclosed, after two years of war, by Mr. McKenna's answers to continuous and reiterated questions by various members in the House of Commons.

It appeared that two years had passed without our rulers (in spite of extreme pressure from Press, Parliament and People) selling the palatial premises, removing the imposing name-plates, or stopping, or discrediting, any advertisement abroad that these German banks in London were still open.

Notwithstanding all pressure and protests their managers still moved about the City and its money markets. Their powers were such that, even so lately as November 1916, they briefed counsel to support exemption of clerks in their employ, as stated in *The Times* of the 29th November: "A week ago yesterday the Chancellor of the Exchequer said directions have already been given for the sale of the Deutsche Bank premises. Similar steps will shortly be taken in regard to the Dresdner Bank and the Disconto-Gesellschaft. Nothing of these directions has been heard since, and the city was yesterday amazed to learn that application was being made to the City Tribunal for the exemption of four employees of the Dresdner Bank in spite of Mr. McKenna's promise that its premises were to be sold shortly. Moreover, it appeared from the application that the Controller had exercised no control in this matter, the cases having to be adjourned for a week to obtain Sir William Plender's recommendation; the German bank did not seem to have even consulted him on the subject."

It would take a book by itself to trace out the effect of the procedure of our rulers in respect of these German banks. Germany must have been assisted and world-wide results produced to our detriment by this power given by our rulers to Germans in our midst notwithstanding our being at war, and by the other things that happened as above; but other points must be mentioned.

The liabilities and assets of the London branches of the five enemy banks prior to the outbreak of war were as follows :—

	<i>Liabilities.</i>	<i>Assets.</i>
	£	£
Deutsche Bank	8,819,928	8,956,712
Dresdner Bank	6,132,026	5,404,353
Disconto-Gesellschaft	6,012,175	4,929,786
Laenderbank	3,838,008	2,319,378
Anglo-Austrian Bank	3,678,870	1,763,265
Aggregate	<u>28,481,007</u>	<u>23,373,494</u>

(Official Report, Cd. 8430.)

The total cash receipts of the five banks during the war were :—

	£
1914—Aug. to 30th Sept.	4,531,620
Three months to 31st Dec.	9,325,803
1915— „ „ to 31st Mar.	2,051,055
„ „ to 30th June	1,075,905
„ „ to 30th Sept.	860,229
„ „ to 31st Dec.	1,236,613
1916— „ „ to 31st Mar.	595,007
„ „ to 30th June	875,802
„ „ to 30th Sept.	2,908,551
Total	<u>23,460,585</u>

(Official Report.)

Had our rulers wished to remove these tentacles of the German octopus from the City of London they could have taken the whole liquidation over, and the German banks (save as represented by the British Government) would have ceased to exist; they would not have been in a position to advertise nor to have their managers going about our great money markets. The risk, if risk there were, was trivial even as money was viewed in pre-war days, and the impression was unavoidable

that our rulers did not wish drastic steps to be taken nor to close up these German connections. Thereby were those at home discouraged, neutrals were left wondering and doubtful, and Germany enormously assisted with her people and others.

The riddle might be put—when is an enemy-interest in a business not to be cleared out, or when is an enemy business not to be wound up or disposed of? The answer apparently would be—when the enemy interest permeates the City of London, or the business is that of an enemy bank. In either case the offices must be continued and the association with the City maintained so long as there are any assets, however trivial, to be collected. One law for the enemy—another, less favourable, for us.

Any attempted explanation of the reasons for the advantages permitted to the German banks and other German interests, in pre-war days and in war, must be carefully scrutinized and analyzed; some day the pre-war advantages given to German banks, often from that which should have been for the British, as well as the protection enjoyed by these banks during the war, will no doubt be thoroughly investigated, but the important point in war was to sever the connection, sell the premises and make the advertising ineffective, whilst taking away the freedom of any alien enemy.

It is only fair to add that it would appear to be not the dilatoriness of accountants, but the decisions or policy of our rulers which left these German financial centres intact, in the heart of the City, under a policy of “carry on,” instead of “wind up” and “root out” the whole connection.

(5) Meanwhile, cases were occurring in our courts with enemies as parties, wherein the acts committed or omitted by our rulers in respect of the declarations or proclamations they enacted, or the policy they were supporting in many directions, resulted in advantages for such enemy parties, encouragement of Germany, and prejudice to our people.

In the years to come the things done by our rulers in trade and finance to the injury of the community in its war with Germany and its position thereafter, will give material for much inquiry; but it must suffice here to refer to our rulers’

proclamations, whereby the Germans in our midst were aided in obtaining, in spite of war, the privileges and rights of the British-born.

The history of the "Continental Tyre" case and the part played therein by our rulers and their associates—so beneficial to Germany, so adverse to us—must also be remembered, together with our rulers' celebrated proclamation, whereunder "branches of enemy firms in this country and in neutral countries outside Europe were not to be considered as enemies."

Many think that much of the prejudice to Great Britain which resulted from these proclamations by our rulers, and the decisions in the courts which followed, arose in part from the impropriety of a judge being anything but a judge—a point which is emphasized by the *Jewish Chronicle*, wherein these words appear: "Equally impossible is it to say what truth there is in the various rumours as to the composition of the new Government; as to whether, for instance, Viscount Reading" (the Lord Chief Justice, formerly Sir Rufus Isaacs, and Attorney-General in Mr. Asquith's Cabinet) "is to leave his present exalted office in order to occupy the Woolsack. But we may say at once that we hope he will not do so. For, honouring as it would be to Anglo-Jewry for a member of the community to become Lord Chancellor, we do not think it desirable that one who has chosen to occupy high judicial office should revert to a political position, however distinguished and however essentially judicial in its nature. The precedent would mean that judges on the bench would not be looked upon so absolutely and entirely above and apart from political influence as they are to-day, and have been in this country for so long. There would always be attaching to them the possibility that political advancement was not altogether from their thoughts. It is, indeed, for this reason that we have regretted to see Viscount Reading undertaking, from time to time, financial service for the Government, brilliant and useful as that service has been notwithstanding. The judiciary of a country should be a thing apart from its administration."—*The Jewish Chronicle*, December 8th, 1916.

The responsibility for permitting the double or treble rôle which resulted from what our rulers did rests with them, but the plurality seems to have been conducive to prejudice and uncertainty in many directions, with consequent loss of life and money.

(6) As to protecting the realm, our Navy on the seas, and our Army abroad, from any machinations and betrayals by the naturalized or non-naturalized Germans left free amongst us, no excuse—if excuse there could ever be—for refraining from drastic and all-embracing action was left to our rulers after a comparatively early date. On December 8th, 1914, Herr Ahler, ex-German Consul at Sunderland in his evidence at his trial for High Treason, said: “Though I am a naturalized British subject, I am a German at heart. You would not consider me a sport if I said otherwise. If you had lived in Germany for twenty years you would still be a Briton.”

Yet, though a naturalized German surely knows best, Mr. Asquith still persisted in an opposite view in saying in the House of Commons, 13th May, 1915: “If a man is a British subject, the *prima facie* presumption is that he is going to perform his duty.”

As to enemy subjects not naturalized, it was only by the utmost pressure of the Press and the public, including actual riots, that the internment arrangements were made somewhat less loose. So lately as June 1916, it was stated that there were no less than 4294 alien enemies living in prohibited areas, and that in the city of London and suburbs there were 14,000 or 15,000 of them (see Report, Cannon Street Hotel Meeting, held 8th February, 1917).

Under this head it is interesting to note a judicial pronouncement, by Mr. Justice Bailhache, in refusing Habeas Corpus to an interned alien, on September 6th, 1915. His words are: “This war is not being carried on by naval and military forces only. Reports, rumours, intrigues, play a large part. Methods of communication with the enemy have been entirely altered and largely used. I need only refer to wireless telegraphy, signalling by lights, and the employment, on a scale hitherto unknown, of carrier pigeons. Spying has become

a hall-mark of German Kultur. In these circumstances a German civilian in this country may be a danger in promoting unrest, suspicion, doubts of a victory, in communicating intelligence, in assisting in a movement of submarines and Zeppelins, a far greater danger, indeed, than a German soldier or sailor."

In despite of what naturalized Germans said, or did, or of what judges laid down, instance after instance continued to arise where the German-born were given facilities to the prejudice of our British-bred citizens.

None can deny that events have happened at home, abroad, on the seas and in the air, difficult to explain, except on the basis that naturalized and non-naturalized Germans too often betray our country, whose hospitality our rulers insisted upon their continuing to receive in spite of the war.

This is confirmed by the words of the *Daily Telegraph*, June 10th, 1916, as follows: "Lord Kitchener's intention to visit Russia was known in Germany. Evidence in support of this statement appears in the *Leipzig Neuste Nachrichten* of Wednesday morning (7th June), which appended the news of Lord Kitchener's death with an elaborate review of the Field-Marshal's life, and a note stating that this article had been especially written a few days previously, on receipt of information that Kitchener was going to Russia."

In connection with this may be quoted the words of Count Reventlow, in the *Deutsche Tageszeitung*, set out in the *Daily News*, June 9th, 1916, wherein it was said: "If a German submarine did indeed cause the death of Lord Kitchener, we must offer the commander our heartiest congratulations, for he has rid us of a most loathsome personality."

(7) Still, our rulers fought the points raised against the German-born more strenuously than they assisted to revise points which were adverse to us and favourable to Germany. Men of enemy origin were maintained in, or appointed to, consular and other offices at vital ports and commercial or other centres by our rulers in spite of strenuous public opposition. The rights of German-born privy councillors were defended in our courts at the expense of the nation, and by the law officers, when our rulers were preaching economy and

the law officers should have been overworked in protecting the nation in this great war.

(8) The German-born were permitted to change their names, and when, after more than two years of war, our rulers after much pressure moved a bill in Parliament to deal with the matter, ridicule of its farcical and incomplete nature caused it to be at once withdrawn.

In closing the instances under this head of acts or arrangements by our rulers, whereby Germany was favoured and Great Britain, the Empire and the Allies prejudiced, it must be remembered that this is no exhaustive list, but a mere attempt to see some of the things that our rulers did, in order that such things may be made impossible in the future. It is also the fact that our rulers failed to pass simple Acts of Parliament to right these and many other matters which too often, by reason of our rulers' own acts, or the acts of those for whom they were responsible, unduly favoured the enemy.

No material expenditure of time or money would have been incurred in righting these wrongs, protecting the realm or giving to our people justice and security against our enemies, yet these things were left undone and thereby Germany was helped and encouraged to fight on.

GOODS AND MEN FOR THE ENEMY

With such a record as that set forth in the eight instances above, of comfort given by our rulers to the enemy in respect of those of them who were in our midst, and of others who were abroad, it seems permissible to turn to another matter where our rulers ordered acts to be done in favour of Germany and adverse to ourselves and to those fighting for us.

The question arises with regard to our sea-power, and the prevention thereby of Germany recruiting men or receiving supplies by the ocean routes.

(9) As our rulers ultimately admitted they had directed our Navy to let German and Austrian reservists through to the

enemy. The Press discovered the order, and the outcry which resulted culminated at the end of October and beginning of November 1914.

On the 17th November, 1914, Mr. Asquith said in the House of Commons when speaking of this question of enemy reservists : " In view of the action taken by the German forces in Belgium and France, where they have arrested and removed as prisoners of war all male inhabitants of military age, His Majesty's Government have found it necessary to give instructions that all enemy subjects liable to military service who may be found on board neutral vessels shall be made prisoners of war."

These words of the then Prime Minister must leave a sense of utter bewilderment in the minds of many. Why should our rulers seek to excuse themselves for at last allowing our Navy to stop this flow from all over the world of German reservists, which, as we have seen, started at least so far back as May 1914? (See p. 22.)

The episode must leave every Briton aghast, but let us pass on to the next series of steps whereby our rulers enabled vital supplies of death-dealing materials and of food-giving commodities to reach our enemies.

(10) In pre-war days our rulers' policy seems to have been to reduce the war-work and war-use of the Navy as much as possible, so that they could justify their desire to reduce the Navy itself. Out of this policy seems to have come our rulers' invention and support of the Declaration of London. Germany welcomed it, our rulers supported it to fanaticism, but Parliament even in pre-war days rejected it as too utterly one-sided in favour of such an inland Power as Germany, with neutral seaboards for supply, as against an island kingdom like Great Britain. Besides, it was too vitally dangerous to our sea-power—the bulwark of the freedom of the world.

On the outbreak of war it was brought into force with variations, by our rulers, behind the back of Parliament. Yet it was only after nearly two years of war, and of pressure by the Press and by the public, that our rulers withdrew their enactment of this device so hampering to our Navy.

(11) Cotton, an essential in all " propulsive " ammunition,

from cartridges for rifles up to shells for the biggest guns, was allowed by our rulers to go into Germany month after month. Sir Edward Grey said to the American Ambassador on the 7th January, 1915: "His Majesty's Government have never put cotton on the list of contraband; they have throughout the war kept it on the free list, and on every occasion when questioned on the point they have stated their intention of adhering to this practice."

Later, on the 23rd of July, 1915, Sir Edward Grey also said: "We are not detaining goods on the sole ground that they are the property of an enemy."

The growers, merchants, brokers and others concerned in the sale and export of cotton and other goods from the United States and the remaining neutral nations, had naturally expected that Great Britain at the outbreak of war (the Declaration of London not then being in force) would have declared everything possible contraband, and prevented a single bale or item of enemy-goods, or goods intended for the enemy, arriving by the sea-routes.

Had cotton and all possible commodities been made contraband and all enemy-goods seized from the outset, the neutral merchants and others concerned would, as all business men can when the conditions of business are known, have dealt with the situation. They would have been content with lower prices, extended the existing markets left to them, and explored fresh markets, with the result that, although our rulers would have acted on our strict rights in order to end the war, neutrals could not have seriously complained nor would they have been so embarrassed as they were later when our rulers were forced by public pressure to try and restore the rights of which they had dispossessed us by their persistence in enacting the Declaration of London, and taking, or failing to take, other steps whereby our rights at sea were prejudiced.

The course our rulers took showed to neutrals that cotton and many other vital things were to be allowed to pass to the enemy, and that other conditions favourable to Germany were permitted by our rulers. Neutral growers, merchants, and others made their arrangements accordingly. Large commit-

ments were entered into by them, huge sums were insured in respect of ships and cargoes, and many other things resulted—on the basis that cotton and other commodities were not to be declared contraband nor seized by our rulers, or, if seized, such articles might not be dealt with strictly under the law of nations.

In other words, conditions and provisions which would have been recognized by the neutrals as quite reasonable, and indeed as elementary precautions to hasten the ending of the war, if laid down by our rulers at the outset, became difficult to enact, because the neutrals relied upon what our rulers had done, or not done, as showing what was to be permitted, or not permitted, in respect of business or trade directly or indirectly with the enemy.

From this cause have arisen many of the technical difficulties and “judicial niceties” by reference to which our rulers have sought to excuse themselves from using our full naval power to the detriment of Germany. Thereby also has much neutral shipping been diverted to serving the enemy instead of our people and our Allies. Thereby also freights were forced up and enhanced prices paid by us.

Many other things were done by our rulers which prevented an effective blockade of Germany, including the appointment of a committee to override the jurisdiction of our ancient Prize Court, in respect of the condemnation, on judicial precedents, of ships and cargoes sent in by our Navy for adjudication.

Many were the official and other statements, presented in different and often in inconsistent forms and guises, and by various methods and in devious ways, to prevent the pressure of the Press and public stopping the continuance by our rulers of so murderous an action as allowing Germany, in the slightest preventable degree, to replenish her rapidly decreasing stocks of ammunition or other vital commodities.

It is strange to think of the masses of imports permitted to reach Germany over the sea-routes, which, under the Law of Nations, our Navy was entitled to stop, and could have stopped but for the restrictions our rulers placed upon our sailors.

At last, seven months after the war began, Mr. Asquith

assured Parliament on the 1st March, 1915, that "the German Declaration substitutes indiscriminate destruction for regulated capture. Germany is adopting these methods against peaceful traders and non-combatant crews with the avowed object of preventing commodities of all kinds, including food for the civil population, from reaching or leaving the British Isles or Northern France.

"Her opponents are therefore driven to frame retaliatory measures in order in their turn to prevent commodities of any kind from reaching or leaving the German Empire."

Still, much reached Germany, which our Navy—but for our rulers—could have stopped. Each set of figures when discovered continued to show that our rulers did not permit Germany to be dealt with as she dealt with the men, women and children in Paris in 1870, nor would our rulers use our full sea-power so that she would be starved as she tried, from the start, to starve us—boasting throughout that she would eventually succeed.

Our rulers tried to make the people confident that all was being done to carry out Mr. Asquith's assurance, but, once more, the truth as disclosed by the Press was too strong for our rulers, and again it became clear beyond question that large supplies were still passing through our Navy, by order of our rulers, and reaching Germany.

Eventually our rulers sought to excuse themselves in the words of Sir Edward Grey, spoken to the House of Commons on the 26th January, 1916, when, more than sixteen months after the outbreak of war, and nearly a year after the words of Mr. Asquith, he was still being pressed to let our Navy make their full power felt. His words were as follows: "If we had gone, or attempted to go, as far as that, I think the war possibly might be over by now, but it would have been over because the whole world would have risen against us, and we and our Allies, too, would have collapsed under the general resentment of the whole world."

Wonderingly one asks, who were the neutrals who would or who, if they would, could, have risen against us and caused the collapse of the Allies and ourselves?

Many had been our rulers' denials and excuses, during the previous sixteen months of war, as to vital supplies passing, by their order, through our Navy and reaching Germany. Hard pressed were our rulers in their tangle of inconsistent statements and explanations, but why should they excuse themselves by blaming the neutrals?

If our rulers had frankly admitted that they had been from the commencement of the war seeking to carry out their pre-war policy so adverse to our naval supremacy and so favourable to Germany, and that they had thereby gratuitously given the neutrals to understand that they could continue to trade in many ways with the enemy, the British people, with their well-known generosity to those who confess error, would no doubt have once more placed themselves solidly behind our rulers. Unfortunately, they preferred to shift the blame on to the neutrals, thereby raising two questions—one, whether the neutrals could, the other, if they could whether they would, in the above words of Sir Edward Grey, rise against us and cause the collapse of ourselves and our Allies.

Our rulers seemed to expect us to forget that the nations then in arms (1916) against Germany had a population amounting to nearly 800,000,000 souls, or approximately one-half the population of the world, whilst the neutrals, exclusive of China, were less than one-eighth of its inhabitants. They also expected us apparently to overlook other material facts.

The neutral nations adjacent to the Central Powers numbered populations aggregating 20,000,000, and they were being terrorized by Germany. For all practical purposes they as well as China were altogether outside the calculation involved. Exclusive of the United States, China, and the nations last referred to, there would be but some 77,000,000 of neutral populations left, or, excluding Mexico, but 61,000,000—seven nations in all, with small populations scattered all over the world, and mostly far removed from the seat of contest. In many cases the population of each neutral amounted to so few people per square mile as to make it impossible to mobilize rapidly or to spare an army to attack us—even the United States had but 30 inhabitants per square mile, as compared

to over 600 per square mile in England and 380 per square mile in the United Kingdom.

Our rulers had the population figures as between the Allies, the Central Powers and the neutrals open to them in the *Statesman's Year Book*. The figures for 1911 or thereabouts were approximately as follows:—

POPULATIONS IN ROUND FIGURES.

BELLIGERENTS		NEUTRALS	
THE ALLIES—		Spain . . .	20,000,000
British Empire .	400,000,000	Brazil . . .	21,000,000
French Empire .	95,000,000	Mexico . . .	16,000,000
Japanese Empire .	55,000,000	Argentine Republic .	7,000,000
Russian Empire .	165,000,000	Sweden . . .	5,500,000
Italy . . .	35,000,000	Netherlands . . .	6,000,000
Belgium . . .	7,500,000	Switzerland . . .	3,800,000
Portugal . . .	6,000,000	Greece . . .	2,700,000
Servia . . .	3,000,000	Chile . . .	3,300,000
Roumania . . .	7,000,000	Peru . . .	5,000,000
Montenegro . . .	250,000	Denmark . . .	2,600,000
Total Allies . .	<u>773,750,000</u>	Norway . . .	2,400,000
		Uruguay . . .	1,150,000
		Paraguay . . .	800,000
THE CENTRAL POWERS—			
Germany . . .	65,000,000		
Austria-Hungary .	50,000,000		
Turkey . . .	29,000,000		
Bulgaria . . .	4,500,000		
Total Central Powers	<u>148,500,000</u>	Total Neutrals, exclu-	
Total Belligerents .	<u>922,250,000</u>	sive of China and	
		United States .	<u>97,250,000</u>

Total Neutrals, exclusive of China and United States 97,250,000

Add—United States—

Coloured or Negroes .	9,827,763
Indians, etc. .	412,546
Foreign-born Whites—	
Germans .	2,501,181
Austria-Hungarians .	1,670,524
Other Countries .	9,173,840
Native-born Whites .	<u>68,386,412</u>

91,972,266

Total Neutrals, exclusive of China 189,222,266

How could our rulers seek to make us believe that the United States would (if we exercised our undoubted rights in order to save life and end the war) intervene in entire disregard of her history and her ideals, so well stated, long before she joined the Allies, in the *New York Tribune*, and quoted by the *Daily Chronicle* on the 13th December, 1916? A portion of the article runs as below.

"The Great Parallel.—There were not lacking in 1864 European statesmen and sovereigns eager to intervene. There were not lacking humanitarians at home and abroad who argued for peace and appealed to their Governments to proffer their good services. What is happening here now happened in Britain and in France in 1864. Had Abraham Lincoln been defeated, peace would have come as the result of foreign influence, but the American people perceived this, and Abraham Lincoln was re-elected.

"The German Idea marches still.—We Americans must remember our own history to-day. With the same clarity, the same vision which the great crisis in our history revealed half a century ago, the people of France and of Britain, the mothers and the fathers of those who are dying in Flanders and Picardy, are envisaging the future. Their spirits, their will, their determination are what ours were; equal suffering has developed equal constancy, courage, inspiration.

"Let us not forget what we escaped because our fathers and our mothers had the courage and the vision to suffer and endure. We are one country, with a single destiny and free from all the perils of frontiers and quarrels, because the war was fought to its finish and the question of session was abolished for all time. Let us not forget that for democratic Europe our example is a precious example and an inspiring parallel.

"Let us not forget, also, that peace now in Europe would be precisely the thing peace in 1864 would have been in America. Now, as then, the war is approaching its decision, but now, as then, the great question is not decided. Nor should any man or woman ever forget the great question. It was posed the hour in which Germany invaded Belgium. It was raised yesterday when German masters in Belgium adopted the methods of the

ancient Pharaohs and drove a people before them into slavery. It was raised by the *Lusitania*; it is being raised in the plains of Rumania, where new reports of German barbarities reveal the fact that the German idea lives and marches still.

“*Kaiser's Aim, World Domination.*—We have no interest in the question of frontiers; we have no stake in the matter of the possession of Constantinople or the partition of Asia Minor. We are as little concerned with some of the incidental issues of the Great War as was Europe with some phases of the Civil War. But we are interested in the preservation of humanity, of civilization and of law from the assault which the Germans' idea would have for them.

“The German has elevated the German interest and the German purpose above all that civilization has acquired in the centuries. He has proclaimed in advance of the present war that German necessity was above law, and he has practised this doctrine on all the fields of battle. Wherever German armies have gone there have been atrocities and brutalities, not those of war merely, but those organized, carefully and scientifically planned butcheries which are the lasting expression in blood of the meaning of Germanism in the world to-day.

“The German method and the German ideal are old. Frederick the Great did in Silesia what William II is doing in Belgium. At the end of the war he kept Silesia, and this encouraged his successors to new acts of equal immorality. For nearly two centuries the German idea, first Prussian, has marched from one war to another to accomplish the purpose of all Germans, the domination of Europe and the mastery of the world.”

How could those responsible in the United States ever forget that when their ancestors—the descendants of our Colonists—by their great war caused vast populations in Lancashire to starve through lack of cotton—the staple of their industry—the British people understood?

The Allies in fighting this great war for civilization had made the United States richer than ever. Surely our rulers had no right to try and excuse themselves in January 1916 by saying that if they had drawn the cordon tight round Germany to end

the war, the United States of America would have joined in a rising against us and caused the Allies to collapse.

Indeed, since the above was written and within a few weeks of these rulers of ours, referred to above, ceasing to hold the reins of office, the United States of America came into the war.

One of the first things this new Ally, in its direct and democratic way, tackled was the leakage through to Germany of so many things which had enabled her to regain her breath time after time, and carry on the war into years instead of months.

Even had there ever been any danger of the United States forgoing her ideals and true historic spirit, there was still no foundation, in fact, for this far-fetched attempt by our rulers to excuse themselves for having made it possible for Germany to continue to draw in such vast supplies of war material and other commodities from overseas during nearly eighteen months of war. Neutrals, who had refrained from fighting, or even seriously protesting against Germany in respect of her cruelties and crimes on defenceless men, women, and children, including those of their own nations, or for her breaches of treaties and of the laws of nations and of humanity, were not going to "rise against" or cause the collapse of Great Britain and the Allies, who were fighting not only for their own 800,000,000 souls, but for that civilization and those ideals which the neutrals themselves "stood for," and to prevent German domination over all the world.

In truth the neutrals never would have acted in a manner to justify this effort by our rulers to excuse themselves for helping Germany, and thereby driving neutrals to support or to give in to Germany because our rulers, having the right and the power, would not use either.

Yet if there had been the slightest chance of the neutrals being tempted by our rulers to try coercion upon us, none of those nations, nor all in combination, could have fought the Allied combination, stretching from Great Britain, across Europe and Asia, southwards through Africa, and, with Japan, Australasia and Canada, back again to our own shores, all welded together in defence of right and of civilization, as

opposed to wrong, slavery, frightfulness and "Kultur" as the ideal of the German rulers and people.

Many have been the excuses of our rulers, but this new excuse of theirs, nearly eighteen months after the outbreak of war, is a strange one indeed for Great Britain to accept from our rulers for permitting Germany, month after month, to receive warlike and other vital imports despite our Navy's admitted power and right, under the Law of Nations, to prevent this succour of our enemies and the resultant incalculable waste of our life and treasure.

FOREIGN POLICY

Whilst in our domestic sphere and at sea the enemy was being so favoured by our rulers, what did our rulers do in connection with foreign policy?

Both before and since the outbreak of war, our rulers appear to have found it best suited their policy, or personal views, neither to support our friends nor to be firm and determined with those who were against us.

It is curious that Great Britain should have had rulers whose action consistently affected adversely their own nation and its friends, whilst favouring those who, as these rulers should have known, were, in truth, but enemies in disguise, desirous of striking our friends first and ourselves afterwards.

Still more curious is it to find that, when our rulers could no longer avoid supporting one or other of our friends, they had never provided for a sufficient force, and our support became a curse instead of a blessing. Antwerp and Belgium, the Dardanelles, Kut and Mesopotamia, Serbia and Salonica, all tell the same tale of a strange and halting policy.

Why did our rulers' foreign policy break down, result in the Great War and prove so unfortunate therein? The answer is not far to seek.

As to smaller nations, our rulers seem to have made up their minds that their cue in pre-war days was to leave Germany a free hand and give her all they dared, trusting that public

opinion might be "restrained," and that Great Britain would be kept neutral. Yet when the war came, and after our rulers refused to help Serbia, even with advice in July 1914 (see p. 26), they still managed to persuade themselves that Turkey, Bulgaria and Greece would all be with us, though to each of them the pre-war procedure of our rulers, and many of their actions in war, had ear-marked Germany as the coming Great Power and Great Britain as her satellite. As the happenings which occurred gradually reach the light of publicity, what our rulers did both before and since the outbreak of war with regard to the lesser nations seems almost incredible, but their course of action in respect of the main trend of Germany's menace to civilization and to ourselves is still more difficult to understand.

From 1911-12 onwards our rulers were reaching the culminating point of their policy. At home it involved a Navy, which if war came our rulers were, even in pre-war days, striving to hamper by legal niceties. Meanwhile it was kept short in many material components and was grudgingly supported by money; whilst the Army was to consist of a regular Army "only for the Frontier of India" (see Mr. Runciman on p. 7), or at most of a small Expeditionary Force, and a citizen defence organization terribly undermanned, not to fight without six months' notice, and a further unlimited time for the production of its equipment, which was practically non-existent—even the depleted regular Army being woefully short of the resources which save life and assist to victory.

Abroad our rulers' policy strengthened the influence of Germany, whilst it weakened the power of Great Britain and the Empire.

Having adopted a policy so greatly favourable to German aggression throughout the world, our rulers and their followers assured the people, even after Lord Haldane's visit to Berlin at the beginning of 1912, that all was well; the great Teuton race, they vociferated, was approaching complete harmony with us; nothing was to be feared; everything was as it should be.

The Germans, naturalized Germans, pro-Germans and

Pacifists in our midst were honoured, not to say spoilt, guests of our rulers; titles, honours and emoluments were placed at their disposal; Society's doors were opened to them, and in diplomacy and finance every conceivable advantage was manœuvred in their interest—the Hague Convention, the Declaration of London, and facilities favourable to Germany obtaining "the corridor" from the North Sea and the Baltic through Austro-Hungary, Serbia, Bulgaria, Turkey, Mesopotamia and Persia to the Persian Gulf, and so, in the end, to India, by land and sea.

These actions of our rulers were in every way adverse to Great Britain and the Empire, and utterly opposed to the interests of the natural Allies of the British people—Russia and France, who with ourselves constituted the great hope for the consummation of civilization on the basis of fair-dealing for all in the nations of the world and of the freedom of the individual.

There is always something elusive, intangible and impossible to explain in the policy of our rulers. Why did they do what they did in peace and war to encourage the German menace and Teuton aggression? Why were so many things done to the advantage of Germany and so much done to the disadvantage of the people of Great Britain and the friendly nations? Some day, by actual disclosures or on circumstantial evidence, the truth may be discovered, but, at present, it must suffice to remind ourselves how utterly contrary our rulers' acts were to all the teachings of history in respect of European politics, how favourable to conquest by Germany, and how derisive of the nation's decision, emphasized in 1911, to stand by France and Russia if aggression came.

What was Germany's real policy? Surely it was obvious to our rulers, throughout the vital years before the war and the twenty-eight months of war which followed, that Germany was persuaded in the words of Mr. Herbert Thurston, in the *Month*, December 1916, that "she constituted a chosen race, entrusted by heaven with a mission to drill and uplift their benighted fellow-creatures throughout the world; it was easy for them to believe that whatever happened had been arranged by

Providence in the fitness of things to enable them to fulfil their destiny, even if need be through *Sturm und Drang*."

Taking the simple explanation, worked out by the above writer, and following many other clear, succinct and plain definitions, any one can understand Germany's manifest and consistent policy against which our rulers kept us defenceless, and in which they so greatly aided Germany, though they have admitted that they knew, during the years preceding the war, what its intention was and what its outcome must be unless promptly and resolutely opposed, so that the aggressor dared not risk war.

Germany having concluded a series of aggrandizements against her neighbours, which included her brutal treatment of France in 1870-1, was preparing for fresh aggression.

Gradually Germany found herself in the position that the people of Great Britain would no longer, as they did in 1870-1, stand aside and see any other nation destroyed. The final illustration of this was when the people of Great Britain and the Empire, on learning the truth, stood by France and Russia in 1914; but our people had adopted an equally clear position in 1911 in respect of Germany's attempted coup at Agadir.

In 1913 Italy had shown that she would not be dragged at the chariot wheels of Germany in respect of the Austro-Serbian embroilment during that year. Germany was also in doubt whether even Austro-Hungary would support her aggressive policy.

Hence, in 1914 Germany seized upon the excuse of the Sarajevo assassination to inveigle Austria into such a position with Serbia as would inevitably bring Russia into antagonism with Austria.

In the German world-policy, this was but a step and might have been left by her to serve its purpose of heartening up Austro-Hungary and weakening Russia and Russia's alliance with France.

Unfortunately our rulers had been doing so many things in favour of Germany and to the detriment of our friends, Russia and France, and indeed of our own nation, in respect of foreign affairs, and of the permeation of our country by German traders,

bankers, financiers and others, that she was tempted to test the position a little further.

In addition, towards the end of July 1914, the crisis in Ireland was growing more and more threatening; our rulers had attempted to put battleships and army corps in motion against our fellow-citizens. The religious and other contentious measures which were introduced by our rulers, in maintaining their Parliamentary majority, also helped Germany to believe that, even if they would, our rulers could not venture to support France and Russia.

Following all this came the series of diplomatic meetings and commitments by our rulers in favour of Germany and adverse to France and Russia, which are set forth in the "Pre-War" pages of this book. Thereby Germany must have felt assured almost beyond question that our rulers would "restrain" Great Britain and her Empire so that they stood on one side as neutrals, or, if they came in, would do so "too late" to prevent the complete conquest of France by Germany, or the reduction of Russia to such a state as would cause that country to remain for years in subservience to Germany.

The people of Great Britain, the Dominions and the Empire intervened and caused the programme of Germany to miscarry—our rulers being forced, at the last minute, into giving an ultimatum to Germany.

Germany would not, except under unexpectedly favourable conditions, have attempted her whole scheme of aggrandizement at one time, but what had passed caused her, at the last minute, to believe that she could safely make "one bite at the cherry."

The German rulers, the German people, the German Press, and all classes, including the children in the schools, knew what they were aiming at, and why they were trying to attain their ends. Clearly their objects were to carry their great "corridor" of Empire from the North Sea and the Baltic to the Persian Gulf, linking up all the nations, through whose territory it ran, under the supreme suzerainty of Germany as tributary States or kingdoms in bondage; and to control, if not to possess, the North Sea ports of Belgium and France. Later would have

followed a spring at Great Britain from behind the veil of friendship with our rulers. Still wider developments were glibly talked of—the conquest of the United States and of Canada, and the ultimate enslavement of China and Japan.

Herr Harden about November 1914, in the *Die Zukunft*, wrote: “Let us drop our miserable attempts to excuse Germany’s action. Let us have done with paltry abuse of the enemy. Not against our will, and as a nation taken by surprise, did we hurl ourselves into this gigantic venture. We willed it; we had to will it. We do not stand before the judgment-seat of Europe; we acknowledge no such jurisdiction. Our might shall create a new law in Europe. It is Germany that strikes. When she has conquered new domains for her genius then the priesthoods of all the gods will praise the good war.” This was the spirit of the German people, yet, with all this at stake, our rulers, until they lost office in December 1916, still continued, in face of this world-peril, to deal by words where actions were required, and to encourage neutrals to make difficulties where a little firmness on our rulers’ part, well within our rights, would have created plain sailing, and removed the doubt as to whether our rulers were not preparing the way to return to their pre-war policy of subservience to the German at home and abroad.

ESSENTIALS

Turning from the foreign policy of our rulers, let us pass again to matters at home.

It is admittedly the first responsibility of any rulers to provide materials of war, men, money and food. These essentials are in time of peace, or of war, the foundation of all else.

(1) *Munitions*

- As to materials, it has already been seen that our rulers had not only limited or reduced our stores of munitions, artillery, machine-guns, uniforms and all else that go to make a fighting force effective, but had also disbanded the stores and the means

of production of these essentials to such an extent that even the Expeditionary Force was, at the commencement of the war, working on a perilously small margin in respect of that inadequate scale of equipment adopted by our rulers.

In truth, judging from the defence the apologists for our rulers then put forward, their policy seems to have been, that if the people could not be restrained from a war to defend the right, or, as many said it would be, to save our very existence, time would be obtained to make good the pre-war deficiencies of our rulers by sacrificing the one hundred thousand—our little army—with such equipment as might exist.

The war came, and all the pre-war oratory of these rulers as to our Reserves and Territorials, due notice of war, six months for training and preparation, and such-like, were as nought, for men, without materials, cannot avail.

Gradually it became clear to the public that the rapidly increasing Army was short of all requirements. Still more gradually, and in spite of the censorship, the news circulated that even our soldiers in the fighting-line were in lack of munitions and other necessities.

By the 1st March, 1915, the *Manchester Guardian* was saying: "We have men in abundance, it is the equipment and munitions that are lacking. In Germany they are not lacking. With her everything was prepared; with not one of the Allies was this the case. Had it been the case Mr. Lloyd George doubts whether the German challenge would ever have been thrown down. Thus it comes to pass that though the potential forces of the Allies are vast and fully adequate, they cannot be brought to bear, because the huge and complicated machinery of war had not been got ready beforehand, and because it cannot be rapidly improvised."

Whilst Earl Kitchener, War Minister, said in the House of Lords on the 15th March, 1915: "I can say that the supply of war materials at the present moment and for the next two or three months is causing me very serious anxiety."

Yet even so late as the 29th April, 1915, Mr. Asquith persisted in his speech at Newcastle-on-Tyne in assuring the public that things were not as they were. His words included the follow-

ing: "I saw a statement the other day that the operations not only of our Army but of our Allies were being crippled, or at any rate hampered, by our failure to provide the necessary ammunition. There is not a word of truth in that statement."

Even had those words of Mr. Asquith been true—and the loss of thousands of lives and hundreds of millions of money witness to the contrary—all must admit that, before the war and for too many months afterwards, anything approaching a bare minimum of factories, machinery, organization and workers, for even an ordinary war, was conspicuous only by its absence. Indeed it was "History," known to some before the war, that our rulers had reduced our facilities for output below the requirements of even the Boer War.

Great was the sacrifice of precious lives and hard-earned treasure through this past default of our rulers and through their persistent hiding of the truth, but immediately the truth was out the people and all others available were prompt in the work of making good these deficiencies which our rulers had brought about.

(2) *Men*

As to men for our fighting forces, our rulers formulated the doctrine, contrary to history, common law and common-sense, that National Service could only be enacted "by consent of all," hence their continuation of a so-called Voluntary System which was neither "voluntary" nor a "system," which contained all the worst features of compulsion, and produced many bad results not appertaining to National Service for all. A shortage of skilled labour, particularly in agriculture and ship-building, was created, together with a feeling of unfairness and uncertainty and a general embarrassment of the working and fighting possibilities of the nation.

An immense encouragement resulted to the enemy, and the neutrals were thereby further confirmed in the belief that we did not mean business—no one backs the half-hearted in a fight, nor rulers who fail to face a free people with the truth.

Our rulers had even gone so far, in assuring the people before

the war that National Service for all was unnecessary, as to say in the words of the Rt. Hon. T. McKinnon Wood, M.P., Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, afterwards Secretary for Scotland, at Retford, on April 23rd, 1909: "The Chairman had reminded them of the proverb that one Englishman was worth three Germans, and he might remind them of another, that one volunteer was worth two pressed men."

Even in the days of war, on the 21st November, 1914, Sir John Simon said: "One volunteer was worth three pressed men, and the Kaiser already knew it."

It was repugnant that any of our rulers should thus counsel the people that a volunteer not being a "pressed" man was worth two or three (or is it six, or nine?) Germans. It was un-British to run down the bravery of others, and must have been a poor salve even for our rulers' own consciences for having available an Expeditionary Force of but some 100,000 men and only three or four (or was it two or three?) times that number of Territorials and others, without adequate training or equipment, sufficient supplies, or the works, machinery or organization essential for rapidly making good even a part of the huge pre-war deficiencies, or a fraction of those still greater which war inevitably entails.

After sixteen months of war, our rulers appeared to have composed their internal differences on this vital question of men, by various formulæ and words, which rendered to a great extent nugatory what they then claimed they were enacting.

Although the decision to accept National Service had at last been taken our rulers' actions continued to be half-hearted. Sir John Simon, who left the Cabinet in opposition to this issue, thereafter disclosed his belief, in the following words to the House of Commons on the 5th January, 1916, on the first reading of the Military Service Bill: "I believe there are sitting on the front bench now gentlemen who hold opinions about compulsion which are indistinguishable from my own."

This statement and the power of those he left behind him, to frustrate the best effects of National Service, were borne out in many ways, but it is well to remember the fact that our rulers, having come to a decision, proceeded to help towards

its nullification by encouraging the so-called "indispensable" and inventing "the conscientious objector."

Our faults may be many, but it is not one of them to consider ourselves "indispensable." Certainly we do not stand by, "too good to fight," whilst small nations are oppressed, women outraged, children tortured and killed and slaves made. Despite our rulers' suggestion, such conduct was foreign to the British conscience.

The result of this invitation by our rulers to those cursed with weak minds, that they might contemplate, and perhaps succeed in, leaving to others not only the fight for world-freedom, but even the lesser task of protecting their own homes, sisters, sweethearts, wives and little children from worse than befell Belgium at the hands of the Germans, has made many ashamed of the inclusion in our nation of these conscientious objectors created by the devices of our rulers. In truth, those who were tempted to take advantage of this loophole, when even Quakers felt called upon to serve against a world tyranny, may yet become objects of pity, as having been too weak to resist the temptation glibly worded and presented to them by our rulers, who in this procedure sought to include, with themselves, many British Radicals and Liberals whose sympathies were certainly not with the conscientious objectors who were seeking to take all and to give nothing.

Be this as it may, justice and fair dealing were set on one side by creating and encouraging this privileged class, who pleaded conscience but yet were not, when tested, ready to go through as much as their fellow-countrymen who were risking life and suffering all the horrors of war and the cruel hardships of the trenches and the front.

Until the loss of life and the discomforts of the conscientious objectors equalled that loss and discomfort which those who fought were bearing, wailings were unjustified.

If no complaints had been permitted until the objectors had suffered more loss and endured more hardships than those in the fight had done, this class would never have exceeded its true proportions; probably it would have ceased to exist save in the case of the few who always think it worth

while to be "martyred" for the sake of what follows therefrom—travestying those who, in past days, "by death witnessed to the truth," and who gloried in, not whined to their Press about, the supreme sacrifice.

Meanwhile these conscientious objectors, supported by our rulers, were as to many of them doing all they could to make trouble. In this they were encouraged by the Pacifists and pro-Germans and that portion of the Press which finds something wicked in every British trait, and supports every anti-British craze or sinister device of those who are against us.

Meanwhile, also, these objectors were refusing to defend those whom they should have held most dear against such atrocities as were illustrated and emphasized by the following summary of the words of German women, by Mr. Gustave Roeder, of the *New York World*, as reproduced in the *Daily Telegraph* of the 20th April, 1915: "'Talk about your so-called atrocities, which our men are said to have committed in Belgium,' they said to me, 'in the first place, they did not occur, but, supposing all that has been written about this were true, it would be nothing in comparison with what our men would do in England, and we women want to be there too, and we will show them what German women, once they are thoroughly aroused, are capable of doing.'"

Still, the encouragement of the "indispensable" and the conscientious objectors and the embarrassment of National Service continued—to the prejudice of vital industries and the Army. Those who had opposed the defence of the nation by all for all in the past still sought to make it impossible in the present, and to saddle it with blame for the very shirking and shuffling, and for that labour dislocation in town and country which the so-called "Voluntary System" had in fact produced.

(3) Money

As to money, those who, literally, "spin" money for the community by enterprise at home and abroad, by service (shipping and insurance), and by finance, were hampered by Government departments, committees, red tape, and other

utterly unbelievable entanglements, whereby our rulers produced the conviction in many quarters that for some reason they wished to make business impossible—indeed, most ordinary operations and ventures for the future supply, and later the enrichment of the country, were simply declared by our rulers to be *Verboten*, or were made subject to approval by one of our rulers' departments, which merely meant the same negative result after months of effort and a huge waste of time, money and brain-power on the part of the nation and of the bureaucracy.

Thus the delicate but powerful " money-making " machinery, and those accustomed to its direction and handling, were left almost unused or so trammelled as to be powerless.

In respect of the future, all were utterly discouraged, as our rulers had created the utmost uncertainty, leaving no bottom or basis for business decisions or enterprise, and a general feeling that any one who tried to help the country to pay the vast sums expended, or to bring in the commodities required by the community was a traitor to some policy of our rulers—still undisclosed.

In our national finance our rulers failed, as in other things, to learn the lesson which Lord Kitchener had set them, that at least a three years' war must be provided for.

Instead of taking a long view, our rulers adopted more and more the irresponsible method of short-term borrowings. Eventually they passed over, to be handled by the new Government at the end of December 1916, short-term debt amounting to nearly £2,000,000,000, as compared to only about £1,200,000,000 of long-term debt, including the remnant of pre-war debt. Both classes of debt had been borrowed under all sorts of methods, from (in the short-term debt) nearly £150,000,000 of " ways and means " advances and Treasury Bills for over £1,000,000,000 up to two-, three- and five-year notes and four-year Exchequer Bonds, some fourteen different securities in all; whilst as to the long-term borrowing, including the remnant of pre-war debt, there were six different descriptions of securities, running from $2\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. up to $4\frac{1}{2}$ per cent.

Our rulers granted privileges applicable in some cases and not

in others, whilst they allowed a return at a comparatively early period of the war, which worked out at approximately 7 per cent. per annum on one big loan, on the joint security of France and Great Britain—the finest security in the world. Later they started putting out Exchequer Bonds at 6 per cent. per annum in this country, and were proceeding to do the like in the United States, when the Federal Reserve Board in that country caused the operation to be withdrawn. Shortly afterwards our rulers ceased to hold office.

How many principles of sound finance were ignored by our rulers in the above mass of inconsistent and embarrassing operations it would be tedious to enumerate, but it must be obvious to all that it can be neither sound borrowing nor sound market-arrangement to have huge masses of hand-to-mouth short loans, and constantly to postpone the withdrawal of such by long-dated issues in which the right to redeem at an earlier date, or without a premium, would be reserved.

Each favourable opportunity which occurred of regularizing the position was passed by to the detriment of the world-finance which was still in our hands; whilst, to the prejudice of the community, inflation of prices necessarily followed the creation of such enormous temporary credits. Obviously, also, even the most patriotic, finding our rulers paying 6 per cent., and to some an equivalent of 7 per cent. per annum, would expect higher rates for their money, and thus, in a vicious circle, the price to be paid by the Government was forced up by reason of these acts of our rulers, and the value of the nation's pre-war wealth in securities and such-like was depreciated.

To the inflation, produced by the undue amount of temporary credits and other causes mentioned, was added that arising from our rulers permitting a great injustice to be done by the under-paying of skilled labour and over-payment of the amateur, the unskilled and the work-shy. The mass were given huge remuneration, the skilled men suffered, and the bulk of the new workers started buying anything and everything, with the inevitable result that prices soared up, transport was unnecessarily used, and ultimate hardship to all was made certain.

The remedy against this reckless waste might have been

found to some extent in Premium Bonds. Our rulers, however, refused this opportunity of bringing home to these receivers of extravagant pay the habit of saving. The rich man investing his thousands and tens of thousands obtains substantial cheques for interest and the chance of nice sums from the rise of the market, but the working man was not permitted the equivalent attraction such as a long-dated series of Premium Bond issues, always available, would have been to him. Therefrom, had our rulers allowed it, he could have had his harmless chance of drawing a prize and thereout materially improving the future of his family, whilst he would have been certain of the return of his money, which he had invested, with a little interest added—enough to make a gambler thrifty.

On the top of all else some of the new taxes which were imposed helped to force up prices and to encourage waste and extravagance all over the world, whilst production, enterprise and saving were penalized.

At the same time our rulers failed to reduce or keep down prices, by causing a lessened demand in the present, or to conserve our resources by encouraging reserve-funds and accumulation of capital for the future.

What could more discourage enterprise and hamper trade than for the Government to take, in Excess Profit Tax, the greater part of any profits made by extra risk and exertion? The continuous rise in cost, partly caused by the tax itself, made business difficult and expensive, whilst prejudicing the provision of supplies urgently required by the people.

Other grave harm was done to those who extended their work under the conditions of this tax. If the business turned out well the Government seized most of the profits, whilst, if there was a loss, the business might be impoverished and weakened. It was a case of "heads" the Government won and "tails" the business lost.

What working man or labourer would put forth special exertion and take additional risk of loss if most of his extra wages were going to the Government, whilst, if things turned out badly, he might lose even his pre-war rate of pay. Many business men could not, others would not, extend their work

under such an economic nightmare as this tax quickly proved itself to be.

Surely a carefully adjusted and wisely planned increasing Income Tax as the higher profits were reached and received, would have met the case, prevented the loss and prejudice occasioned and saved the waste of the large sums of money involved in establishing and collecting a new tax, and in re-organizing accounts to comply with the bureaucratic requirements resulting. Such a method of increasing the existing basis of taxation would have left the trader with a reasonable inducement for extending his business and protecting it by accumulating capital ready for the future.

No one objects to suffer for patriotism, but it is a financial impossibility to run the risk of extra work done and money paid out, when so unreasoning and confiscatory a tax as this is brought into existence by rulers.

Adverse as all these things were to the prosecution of the war, and serious as the effects arising therefrom must be, for years to come, on the comfort and happiness of the people and the wealth of the kingdom, there was yet another business-breach open for all to see. One Government department competed with another for materials and for men, and the Government itself advertised that it was making purchases on its own account of vital commodities, whereby neutrals were encouraged to demand still higher prices and our own merchants and buyers were compelled, in defence of their customers, to enter into the insane competition which our rulers had caused.

Finance is a jealous mistress, with her laws of economy and trade and with her nice adjustment of wages, salaries, fees, interest, insurance, freights, railway rates and fares, currency and taxation, to those prices which make life possible for the growers, producers, labourers and workmen, on the one hand, and for the consumers on the other hand.

Yet, not content with that dislocation which war must bring amongst the servants of finance, our rulers seem to have decided to flout both mistress and servants.

If crops of difficulties were desired by our rulers when critical times came, it would have been hard to devise any better methods

to attain that result. But, if no stone was to be left unturned to win the war as quickly and effectively as possible, and to guard the future, surely all the financial, commercial and trade machinery, and those experienced in its handling, should have been utilized. Any other course was bound in the end to bring grievous loss and great hardship upon the nation, and to ensure serious prejudice to its future as well as to its present.

(4) *Food*

As to food. First and most immediately under the influence of our rulers was home-grown wheat. The urgency for the increase of our home production had been vehemently pressed by that great patriot Lord Roberts, and was admitted by many. It had fallen in 1913 under our rulers' policy to 4,564,000 quarters, or less than one-eighth of our yearly requirements, or, say, only sufficient for six weeks' consumption. Yet it was not until after more than ten months of war, and after the formation of the Coalition Government, that our rulers took their usual first step when anything was forced upon them—they selected and appointed a committee.

Our rulers appointed this committee on the 17th June, 1915. It recognized the extreme urgency of the situation and reported unanimously within one month, namely, on the 17th July, 1915, as to the steps which it considered were required to increase the home production to many more weeks' supply than the six of 1913.

The evidence of all the witnesses examined was unanimous, yet our rulers had not even in December 1916, nearly eighteen months afterwards, or twenty-eight months since the outbreak of war, given the guarantee, as recommended by the committee, that the farmers should receive 45s. a quarter on all wheat produced for the next four years.

The position had daily become more urgent, and the adoption of some method of obtaining supplies more and more vital, yet our rulers neither carried out the advice of their own committee nor adopted the alternative of a bonus on breaking up grass-land; nor did our rulers, by promptly enacting National

Service, adjust the labour difficulties which had arisen from the Voluntary Enlistment system.

The other expedients of granaries and storage to forestall shortage were not put on a safe basis by our rulers.

Food-control was continually postponed, whilst sugar supplies from Jamaica and fish supplies from Newfoundland, both available with assistance from our rulers, were cold-shouldered, as were other sources of food supply obviously necessary if everything was to be done to win the war.

Meantime seed-time after seed-time passed, for nature would not wait, while our rulers stayed action until they found time to devise a formula or compromise, on which the old beliefs, or traditional or personal idiosyncrasies, of their dissentient members might be even temporarily overcome and thereafter the urgent necessity of the people dealt with, or until some still undisclosed policy of our rulers attained its end.

These failures by our rulers to take urgent steps caused sea-transport to become a more vital question than ever. In spite of innumerable warnings from those who knew, voiced in the Press and privately, our rulers insisted on handling the complicated problem involved in this highly specialized industry.

How could our rulers hope to understand shipping and all that it involved all over the world, through Government departments, or to learn off-hand in those departments the conditions of so vast a trade?

The result was that immense quantities of tonnage made voyages which were useless so far as assisting us to win the war was concerned. Neutral ships were permitted to carry cargoes obviously intended for our enemies. Delays occurred at our ports, where ship after ship lay idle for weeks waiting to discharge and get away, and chaos reigned in every direction as to the best handling of our huge sea-transport with the sole object of winning the war.

Action was paralyzed by red tape, and impracticable methods; shipbuilding was discouraged, and steps to increase transport facilities were neglected.

Whilst food and supplies were getting into such a state, and

transport was becoming more and more disorganized and mishandled by our rulers, they were dealing with the drink problem on lines which could hardly be called well-considered or statesmanlike.

Every one would have loyally acquiesced in anything, however far-reaching or drastic, provided that it applied equally to all, including our rulers. Even prohibition would have been accepted as long as our rulers made it as effective in the palaces, houses, and flats occupied by them, as in the poor man's life.

Yet our rulers kept their own cellars, the Houses of Parliament and Ireland free from restriction, but decreed that the vast majority of the British people could only obtain alcoholic refreshment by each paying for what each consumed at the public-houses within shortened hours, or by buying at inconvenient and limited times, and in larger quantities than were required for use in their homes.

The utterly different treatment accorded by our rulers to themselves, compared with that which they decreed for others, would have upset any nation not so loyal to its cause in a great war as the British. All acquiesced in the decrees of our rulers, notwithstanding the injustices and inconveniences involved thereby, but leaving these on one side, even our rulers must admit that they missed a great opportunity not only for rationalizing the consumption of beer and other alcoholic refreshment, but of putting themselves and the community on equal terms.

MATTERS OF MOMENT

Following the same principle, our rulers limited the powers of their economy committee so that, though it could recommend a reduction of £50,000 per annum by closing the British Museum, it was debarred from suggesting a mass of saving which might affect party questions.

In these and many other matters our rulers ignored the necessity in war of setting an example in their own persons,

and of sacrificing their personal views; nor did they insist that remuneration, salaries and wages must be reduced rather than increased, and that every inconvenience and loss must be put up with at home so that the great end of victory at the front could be most quickly attained with the utmost economy in life and treasure.

They seemed to disregard the fact that every moment of time or atom of money wasted, every duty neglected and every bit of encouragement given to Germany, meant an increase in the loss of life and of money and a lengthening of the war.

On the question of our prisoners in Germany, our rulers cried up Germany and decried our people, delaying their admission of error after it had been pointed out to them.

In respect of relief to our fighting-men disabled by the war, pensions and such-like, economy and cheese-paring prevailed, and everything under these heads was made as impracticable, inconvenient and distressful as possible.

The vast question of news-publicity was long neglected, and later was prejudiced by methods reminiscent of pre-war days—disregardful of the great efforts required effectively to counteract the German propaganda in every part of the world, including Great Britain and Ireland.

According to our rulers, it always seemed that action adverse to Germany was on some ground or other impracticable, or required consents to be obtained from the Allies, the neutrals or our working classes; whereas action which would be to the advantage of Germany could be, and often was, promptly carried out, though certainly contrary to the wishes of the people, apparently against the desires of the Allies, and clearly no concern of the neutrals.

Even in so vital a matter as that of refraining to encourage the German people as to after-the-war conditions, Mr. Asquith in the House of Commons on the 2nd August, 1916, after some two years of war, said: "The war has opened our eyes to the full meaning and the manifold implications of the German system of economic penetration and commercial and financial control of vitally important industries, and the use to which vantage ground gained by this system can be put in war. It is

difficult, indeed I think it is impossible, to believe that Germany would not continue to be animated by the same spirit and policy when the war is over; she will start, be it observed, with certain very obvious and considerable advantages. In the invaded territories, both in Belgium and in France, she has destroyed works and factories, and she has carried off large quantities of plant and of raw material—not to mention people—which have been sent to the industrial centres of Germany and of Austria. She has a large merchant fleet—for the time being safely interned in her own ports or in the ports of neutral countries. It is evident from the German trade papers that the Germans are counting on these factors to impede the industrial and commercial recovery of the Allies. They are already organizing their industries, and—do not let us be blind to this—for an attack on our Allied markets, and for a vigorous and if possible victorious competition in neutral markets. It is, then, in our view—when I say in our view I mean in the view of all the Allied Powers—necessary to make thorough preparation for the coming of peace, and the Paris Conference and the resolutions passed there represent the attempt of the Allies to decide the general lines on which that preparation should proceed.”

Others followed this lead, notably Sir John Simon and the *Nation* (see pp. 158 and 159), but it would be difficult to imagine words more hopeful and helpful to Germany than those which Mr. Asquith uttered; apparently she was to be allowed to fight on in the war, and commit every atrocity and crime, and yet retain the ill-gotten advantages mentioned by him. Thereafter our only defence against her “possible victorious competition in neutral markets” was to be the resolutions of the Paris Conference, the reference to which by the then Prime Minister seems to be somewhat ironical when the attitude of our rulers with regard thereto is remembered.

The above encouraging pronouncement, from Germany’s point of view, after two years of atrocious acts by her people, still stands so far as Mr. Asquith is concerned; but he has gone further (to quote from the *Manchester Guardian* report of the House of Commons proceedings of the 8th November,

1916). The episode is as follows: "Ship for Ship.—Mr. Asquith (Prime Minister), in reply to Mr. T. Wing (L., Houghton le-Spring) and Sir H. Dalziel, said 'that the question of demanding from our enemies ship for ship and ton for ton in replacement of ships sunk in contravention of the well-known laws and usages of naval warfare was one which must be considered in concert with our Allies.' "

Again, on the 23rd November, 1916, it is reported that "answering Colonel P. H. Croft (U., Christchurch), Mr. Asquith said the 'Government were in consultation with our Allies on the subject of a "ton for ton" policy.' "

This is yet another instance of the strange fact that on occasion after occasion these rulers throughout the twenty-eight months of war, when they were in power, were prompt and categorical, and untrammelled by having to consult the Allies, if the point they had to decide was in favour of Germany, but if it were against her, then "it must be considered and decided in concert with our Allies," or otherwise deferred to the dim and distant future.

If in all matters the real policy of our rulers was to make everybody believe ultimately that the war must be ended on any terms, and the German permeation of this country must be resumed in the years to come, then almost everything that our rulers did becomes consistent and plain to any one; but if our rulers were seeking to carry out the mandate of the people to discourage the Germans and their rulers, to prevent German permeation in the present and in the future, and to win the war by every means in the power of our rulers, within the limits of the laws of nations, of civilization and of humanity, then almost everything our rulers did, or did not do, awaits inquiry.

It is necessary, if the future is to be guarded, to go a little more closely into these matters, for inquiries hereafter may be "too late," unless the public and the democracy now try to recognize whatever the explanation of these happenings may be.

Some say that what our rulers did, or did not do, was pure perversity—they had the power, they meant to keep it, and they considered it presumption for any one to interfere.

Others say that what our rulers did was only a continuation of the system already referred to, whereby they combined divergent groups and kept them together with words and phrases, hiding the real truth from the people, whilst blaming the public and the democracy—and latterly the patriotic Press—for anything that went wrong.

Others contend that our rulers were opportunists, recognizing but one aim—the retention of office by themselves, and looking upon all else as subsidiary thereto.

There are friends of theirs who say, as explained later, that our rulers were indispensable, and that only by keeping them in power at whatever cost, was it possible to ensure support at home for our fighting forces abroad. Whilst others seek to explain everything by referring to the way in which, from the Premier downwards, each Minister, friend or supporter of our rulers was held to be sacrosanct from criticism, and much more from blame or penalty, whatever losses or dangers he might cause to the nation. Some called this “loyalty” and acclaimed it, especially in the way in which the Prime Minister backed up those who were with him; others called it “self-preservation,” and stigmatized it as a sacrifice of those national interests which should be paramount and neither jeopardized, however remotely, nor prejudiced, however slightly, in order to support or to protect any party, clique or individual.

Possibly it was mere *laissez-faire*, or slackness, combined with a failure to sink their personal views and differences for the good of all; but other friends of our rulers—Pacifists, pro-Germans and such-like—were confirming that our rulers’ procedure was to lead up to an early peace.

It is indeed not difficult to imagine the resonant periods in which our rulers might sooner or later tell the nation that, much as they desired to overthrow the Prussian spirit and ensure a lasting peace to the world, they could not see us starve, nor let us continue the sacrifice of life when peace could be obtained. Even on the facts already referred to, such words as these were actually bidding fair in 1916 soon to sound plausible, and later, if our rulers’ methods had been permitted to continue, they must have become convincing.

In its first-page leader of Saturday the 9th December, 1916, *Common Sense*, a paper edited by Mr. F. W. Hirst, until recently the editor of the *Economist*, throws a sidelight on the reality of this danger. The words used are as follows: "Unluckily for us all, at the very moment when more sensible views were beginning to prevail, 'the Asylum Party'—to borrow a nickname from the *Spectator*—has broken up the Cabinet. But for Mr. Lloyd George and his friends we might have had an armistice at Christmas and an honourable peace on a firm basis before the end of the winter."

Further confirmation of this terrible danger of a "German peace" to be manœuvred by these rulers appeared in the *Nation* of the 10th March, 1917: "We on our side had our hour of moderation. It came as the last phase of the Asquith Government. Important men were behind a policy, not of surrender—that was never thought of—but of amelioration. They failed, and 'the fight to finish' statesmanship and its supporting Press came into power."

It is welcome news that "surrender" was never thought of, but only "amelioration," yet the above two disclosures show the peril.

There are others who say that our rulers never gave way on a point to Germany's detriment until public opinion forced them so to do. Others, with the same views, add that our rulers seldom gave way in such matters until it was clear that, unless they acted adversely to German interests, they would lose office—a thing said to be abhorrent to Germany.

Be the truth what it may, the facts speak for themselves, and each must judge for himself by closely considering all the facts appearing herein and many others which should come out in the end.

Our rulers certainly continued in war, as in peace, their system of combining divergent interests and their production of phrases. Their oratory also continued.

Mr. Asquith, in his famous rhetorical sentence, told the world: "We shall not sheath the sword which we have not lightly drawn until Belgium recovers in full measure all and more than all that she has sacrificed; until France is adequately secured against the menace of aggression; until the rights of the

smaller nationalities of Europe are placed upon an unassailable foundation; until the military domination of Prussia is fully and finally destroyed."

In another famous speech Mr. Asquith said: "Is right or is force to dominate mankind? Comfort, prosperity, luxury, a well-fed and securely-sheltered existence, not without the embellishments and concentrations of art and literature, and perhaps some conventional type of religion—all these we can purchase at a price, but at what a price? At the sacrifice of what makes life, national or personal, alone worth living. We are not going to make that sacrifice. Rather than make it, we shall fight to the end, to the last farthing of our money, to the last ounce of our strength, to the last drop of our blood."

In a third utterance Mr. Asquith assured us: "I am determined—I stick at nothing—I am determined that we shall win this war. Sooner than not win the war, I shall come down without the faintest hesitation or doubt to all my friends, those who like myself are what I call strong supporters of the Voluntary System, and say, We have done what we could, we have not obtained the results we hoped for. We must do what is still necessary by other means."

We may even add to the above, Mr. Asquith's reference to Captain Fryatt that "this atrocious crime against the laws of nations and the usages of war shall be brought home to the criminals, whoever they may be and whatever their position."

Yet all these phrases and denunciations must obviously have left the German people cold as long as they saw so many points being decided by our rulers in their favour, and our rulers, after two years of war, holding out the retention of so many advantages by them in the days of peace to come, including "a vigorous and, if possible, victorious competition in neutral markets."

Words break no bones, nor do they win wars, particularly when coupled with such holdings out of advantages to Germany as those referred to by Mr. Asquith on page 100, and with so many acts so helpful to Germany as those previously mentioned.

Under such circumstances, the oratorical periods just quoted would leave the German people untouched as to their misdeeds

and imbued with a conviction that they would attain their end in peace if they failed in war.

Killing with the mouth seems to-day as useless as the methods of the Chinese warrior who was said to go into battle with a din of clashing shields, and with face contortions to strike fear into the heart of his opponent. In neither case can these methods prevail unless the acts and deeds are there too, and every advantage is pressed relentlessly at home, as well as abroad, against the enemy, without fear or favour to friend or foe, until the end be attained and the future is made secure.

He who cries "wolf" against the enemy and yet does so many things which must inevitably help the foe, earns a reputation like the boy in the fable and carries no conviction by his words to any one who remembers.

There seems but one thing to do in war with regard to the enemy, namely, to fight him in every way permissible according to the rules, whilst refraining from giving any encouragement to him and not failing to heap every legitimate discomfort upon him at home and abroad.

When a free nation like Great Britain is engaged in war, nothing can be secure until the public and the democracy know the truth, particularly when, as in the instances given above, so many think that thereby the war has been unnecessarily prolonged at a huge waste of life and of treasure.

All know that the British people if they are given the truth do not grudge the price, when the freedom of the nation, the Empire and the world is at stake.

After this recalling of various matters which are within the recollection of many as having befallen us during the first twenty-eight months of war, it is convenient to turn to the changes in Government which took place during that period.

From time to time those members of Mr. Asquith's Cabinets who would not bring themselves to go even as far as he did with regard to embarking upon and conducting a war, on however limited a basis, were falling out—some quickly, some slowly; but the first important effort to attain to something approaching a Cabinet for war purposes was the Coalition, which is next dealt with.

THE COALITION

In the spring of 1915, Mr. Asquith was assuring the House of Commons that there would be no Coalition. Yet within a few days what was already known to have happened caused Mr. Asquith to announce that a Coalition was being formed.

The strictest of strict party lines were adopted in its formation, and it was recruited only from the politicians, whilst the time absorbed in giving the Coalition birth was staggering to those who realized that precious lives and untold treasure are in a great war the penalties of procrastination.

After the new Ministry was formed, so little did our Coalition-rulers do to help us or our friends, and so much did they do which helped our enemies, that it was only by the introduction of the doctrine (almost immediately invented) of the "indispensability" of Mr. Asquith and his friends that the Coalition continued in power.

This doctrine was strongly voiced in many quarters. In October 1916 an article appeared in the *Fortnightly Review* on the "Indispensable Premier," whilst some ministerial organs continued in this strain until the end of Mr. Asquith's Government. Even on the 4th December, 1916, the *Daily News* stated: "No Coalition Government can succeed if this" (Mr. Asquith's) "fails. Is a Conservative or a Liberal Government possible? We know they are not. Is a Government of 'strong men' without the backing of any party in the House or the country, nominated by Lord Northcliffe and the *Morning Post*, and living on their sufferance—is that possible? It would have the country in a blaze in a week, and would have passed into anarchy and a military dictatorship in a month."

Meanwhile, in October 1915, Sir Edward Carson had resigned office. On the 20th December, 1915, Mr. Lloyd George had made a characteristic outburst in the House of Commons: "I wonder whether it will not be too late. Ah! fatal words on this occasion. Too late in moving here, too late in moving there, too late in coming to this decision, too late in starting with enterprises, too late in preparing. In this war the footsteps of the Allied Forces have been dogged by the mocking

spectre of 'Too Late,' and unless we quicken our movements damnation will fall on the sacred cause for which so much gallant blood has flowed, and I beg employers and workmen not to have 'Too Late' inscribed upon the portals of their workshops, at any rate, and that is my appeal."

These words were reminiscent of a somewhat similar position created by rulers of our nation, more than thirty years before, which was voiced by Lord Randolph Churchill when speaking on the Gladstonian-Gordon policy in 1884: "The Opposition cannot but move a vote of censure upon the Government whose motto is 'Too Late.' The Liberals should be chary of giving support to a Government whose motto is 'Too Late,' and the people of this country will undoubtedly repudiate a Government whose motto is invariably 'Too Late.'"

Gradually the people, whilst fighting and working for the nation, began to find out the truth, and became impatient of our rulers' hesitation, dilatoriness or worse, their phrases such as "Government by consent," "We are still a party," "The reproduction after the war of everything as it was before the war," and their attempt to continue in war and protect thereafter that imaginary world in which they appeared to wish to live out their lives and complete their careers on lines and conditions similar, so far as they were concerned, to those between 1905 and 1910—the heyday of their triumph in words and party manoeuvres.

Short of a referendum, the people did all they could to stay the terrible losses which were resulting under our rulers' system, or want of system. In the end the break-up and new life came from within the circle of those who were in office.

In the months leading up to October and November 1916 the whole nation was murmuring. The revolt began to take shape at the end of November 1916, when on the 29th November, 1916, two such different papers as *The Times* and the *Daily Chronicle* came out on the same day with, in the one case six, and in the other seven, urgent cases of indecision on the part of our rulers.

Referring to the "man-power" question *The Times* pointed out that it had hardly advanced a stage, though the whole future

of next year's campaign (1917) depended on its settlement; whilst the *Daily Chronicle* remarked that the "man-power" Board had been appointed ten weeks back, and that many weeks ago Parliament was promised an early day to debate its Report. The Report and the debate were still not forthcoming—not because the Board did not submit a prompt Report, but because the Government could not make up its mind what to do with it.

With regard to the Air Board crisis both papers referred to matters being at a standstill.

With regard to the production of food at home and agricultural policy, the same two papers bewailed that our Ministers were still without any policy worth mentioning, that nothing definite had been announced, nor anything practical begun.

With regard to food-control, they pointed out that a fortnight had passed since Mr. Runciman had announced that a Food-Controller would be appointed, and had led the world to believe that complete and well-considered functions would be performed; yet so far no appointment had been made nor any scheme produced.

The Times' references included the point that the Admiralty reorganization was hanging fire, and that the submarine and destroyer campaign against us was going steadily forward, whilst insistent questions remained undealt with.

The *Daily Chronicle* referred to three more sets of delays and the serious effects thereof, mentioning the Pensions Bill, Ireland, and black labour.

These two leading newspapers, differing on almost everything except patriotism and courage, had stated between them not only six or seven grievous cases of neglect or delay, but some nine grave and urgent factors in the war, the handling of which was still postponed month after month by our rulers to the grievous hurt of the nation and the Allies.

The additions which could be made to this list are innumerable. Even the *Manchester Guardian* on the 28th November, 1916, preceding in fact the independent outburst of *The Times* and that equally independent of the *Daily Chronicle*, stated: "There has often enough been occasion of late to comment on

the surrender of the House of Commons to the mesmerism of a Coalition Government. It had begun to seem as though the country must look to the Lords in this war for clear and independent thinking."

On the 29th November, 1916, the *Manchester Guardian* also said: "This despotism of the executive was a grave enough evil in peace. In war every man can judge it by its fruits—blunders in every department of affairs."

Other ministerial organs were speaking in the same key. Whilst *Punch*, the shrewd friend of all, was printing characteristic sentences, including that of the 13th December, 1916: "'The Government,' said Lord Crewe, 'now feel that the whole question'" (as to Greece) "'must be considered with regard to naval and military considerations.'" It seems almost a pity that they did not arrive at that rather obvious conclusion long ago; or, again, on the same day in *Punch*: "A non-party mandate—John Bull: 'I don't care who leads the country so long as he leads it to victory.'"

Such was the chaos that so authoritative a paper as the *Statist* had said, as far back as its issue of the 16th September, 1916—

"On the other hand, if there are reasonable grounds for thinking that the war will last throughout next year, and possibly longer, it seems safe to predict that specie payments cannot be maintained to the end. If any reader asks, granting that all honourable persons desire to fulfil their contracts in the spirit as well as in the letter, and, granting further, that common-sense dictates that after a certain time, if experience convinces us that specie payments cannot be maintained, will very grave and injurious consequences follow? The consequences will be simply that British credit will decline; that the value of the pound will not remain what it has been; that it will fall. In plain English, if we cannot pay in gold, we shall have to pay in either Bank of England notes, or in Government notes, or in some kind of undertaking by the Government that the payments shall be met."

The doctrine of our rulers that they were "indispensable," and their personal or party objection to help us in many matters (including our food supply by guaranteeing or other-

wise assisting our farmers in respect of home production, and the prompt carrying out of the Paris Resolutions as to trade and blockade), were depressing all and leading many to fear that our rulers would soon be supporting some overture from Germany for an illusive and delusive peace.

THE REVOLUTION OF THE SEVEN DAYS

At last, in the week-end of 1st to 4th December, 1916, Mr. Lloyd George and others approached the Prime Minister for reorganization of the Government. Notwithstanding that they proposed to retain the services of Mr. Asquith, Mr. McKenna, Mr. Runciman and other leading members of the pre-war Cabinet of Mr. Asquith, the arrangements offered were ultimately refused by Mr. Asquith and his friends. During the following week Mr. Lloyd George became Prime Minister.

He formed a new Government, acclaimed by all, except the few whose views were voiced by Mr. Asquith at a "Party Meeting" at the Reform Club on the 8th December, 1916—

"We are here to-day because I felt it my duty to resign, not the leadership of our party, though I am quite prepared to do that if I am asked, but I have been compelled to resign the headship of the Government. . . . It is impossible to isolate the events of the last week from what was going on before. There has been a *well-organized, carefully engineered conspiracy*" (the italics are inserted for emphasis), "not, I believe, let me say at once, countenanced in any quarter of the Liberal party, but directed against members of the Cabinet, and directed, it is true, in part against some of my late Unionist colleagues, but in the main, I think, against my noble friend Lord Grey and myself. He and I are the two men who are mainly responsible for the part which this country took before the outbreak of the war, and since then up to the present time. I hope he will say a few words presently, but I know that both he and I from the first treated these attacks with indifference so long as we felt we could carry on our work, remain at our posts, and do what we could for the prosecution

of the task which has occupied us day and night now for two and a half years in the interests of the country.

“Those attacks were grounded upon some alleged slackness, want of energy, or sometimes even alleged want of heart, in the prosecution of the war. I am not aware of any foundation for those charges.”

Refrainment from accusing others, admission of some possibility of fault and an acceptance of the new order of things would have disarmed criticism. The adoption of the contrary course raises some serious questions for the future.

If the things already referred to had in fact happened, and the disasters next mentioned had befallen us in the first twenty-eight months of war, and both are generally admitted, what, in the face of Mr. Asquith's words, really does entitle the public and the democracy, in the eyes of the politician, to demand that the reins of power be handed over to other rulers? What will bring about introspection on the part of politicians and cause them to recognise that they should sometimes make good their shortcomings or give way to others and retire with grace?

Surely it should be one of the first duties of those who claim to rule a democracy to discover for themselves that deep and long-continued dissatisfaction exists with what they had done, with what they intended to do and with what had resulted, or must result, therefrom.

When he finds things going wrong year after year, dilatoriness and doubt prevailing and no end in sight, even the most hide-bound man of business or of affairs, in a position of great responsibility, has some sense of shortcomings, amends his ways or gives place to others. In the latter case he takes the lesson to heart, finds some new outlet for his energies and seeks to make good in other directions where his failings will do less harm. Certainly he does not shut his eyes to facts and to the opinion of many and declare the very faults so many see in him to be non-existent whilst attacking those who seek to get him, or, him failing, others to save the business.

On the other hand, those who criticise must, if they would assure the future, make as certain as may be that the criticisms are well founded and what the remedy should be.

It must be remembered that for the greater part of the ten years preceding December 1916, Mr. Asquith had been in a position with regard to the nation similar to that not only of the chairman of a company, but also of a managing director. Furthermore, to continue the simile, it was he who selected his colleagues on the Board, and it was he whose words were final as to what experts, consultants and heads of departments should be appointed to protect the shareholders' property—the property of the nation—and to obtain the best results from its development.

What would any meeting of shareholders in a company say if it turned out that for years the chairman and managing director with such absolute power, and working with his clique, had compelled the company's servants and experts to carry out economies far below the danger point, to disregard most ordinary requirements of sound business, and to hide from the shareholders that their whole property, and the lives of many of them and of their workmen, and the freedom of all, were being jeopardized? Yet this is what the politicians on the Board, under the presidency and control of the chairman and managing director, did in respect of the nation's future.

Wholesale resignations by the experts and servants of the nation would seem to have been the only method of staying what was going on. The meetings of shareholders—the general elections—were few and far between, and the politicians made the issues at such elections to turn upon matters other than the protection of the shareholders' property and its most effective development for the good of all.

Loyalty to those who ruled, or other considerations—including dismissal, retirement or transfer, which lay in the chairman's hands—prevented resignations by the experts and others, and, as every year went by the politicians' policy of economy, delay and drift on vital matters, and their concentration of public thought on less material issues, brought about a habit of mind throughout the whole organization which resulted in efficiency being made subservient to the cutting down of essential expenditure—naval, military and aerial—and in aims destructive to the betterment, under all due safe-

guards and precautions, of the lives and property entrusted to these rulers.

It has been proved by experience that "the man becomes like his master," or, at least, is outwardly governed by the principles the master adopts. It is good law also that "he who does things through another must take the responsibility for what results." Gradually, as the facts came out, that which followed from what our politicians did becomes more and more clear, but it is essential, as the unnecessary waste of so many valuable lives and of such huge amounts of money is disclosed, to look closely into what had preceded each disaster and wherein lay the real root of the evil.

Care must be taken not to permit blame to fall on those who failed because for years the politicians had done the things which they did, nor because the doing of the things which the politicians required was an impossibility, or became impossible, through want of adequate support or preparation.

The attempt to throw all the blame on others and claim to go scot free oneself is always unpleasant to a Briton, but to adopt that line when one has been a principal throughout should be repugnant to any one.

At the time of Mr. Asquith's speech at the Reform Club a sufficiency of disastrous events had taken place, under conditions which were gradually becoming known to many, to enable all to consider the position which had arisen and to suffice for a test being made of Mr. Asquith's words.

Quite independently of the matters previously dealt with, there had been a series of disasters which many attributed to the defects produced by these rulers in pre-war days and in time of war. Omitting Coronel, with respect to which the public still awaits a full disclosure, there had been the affair at Antwerp, where our rulers intervened with untrained and insufficiently equipped troops. So close was this to home that nearly all heard of it with a good deal of detail which can never be forgotten. However much any one may desire to save rulers from blame, it did not seem a valid excuse to say that other calls prevented the provision of the equipment—for sources of supply had been closed down and insuffi-

ciency of stores prevailed; nor can the presence of a Minister palliate the throwing away of raw men, for ample reserves should have been trained in pre-war days, nor can the launching of such an adventure at all, under the circumstances which existed, do aught but invite failure.

DARDANELLES AND GALLIPOLI

From Coroneel and Antwerp to the Dardanelles and Gallipoli is a far cry. But any proposed steps, involving the risking of masses of battleships and sailors, and the subsequent throwing away of hundreds of thousands of soldiers' lives so far from the vital points nearer home, strikes even a layman as requiring the utmost checking by every available expert—naval, military and aerial—the closest, most open, honest and aboveboard discussions and the most thorough and frank consultations *before* risking so much or weakening in the slightest degree the power to engage the real enemy—Germany—at the historic gateway to England, which joins the fields of Flanders, whilst completing at other points the encirclement and isolation of the German nation.

The spirit in, and the methods by, which this vast responsibility of bombarding and taking the Peninsula with Constantinople as the objective was conceived and attempted to be carried out, is no longer a matter of surmise. What our rulers did up to the withdrawal from Gallipoli, and what, early in December 1916, when Mr. Asquith spoke, they knew about the origin and inception of this affair has now been, in part, disclosed to the public.

In the first Report of the Dardanelles Commission dated the 12th February, 1917, the latter points are dealt with. The commission was appointed on the 17th August, 1916. The Report speaks for itself, and the following extracts are made therefrom :—

“From the commencement of the war until 25th November, 1914—that is to say, for a period of nearly four months—no change was made in the machinery for the superior conduct of naval and military opera-

tions. That machinery consisted, as we have already mentioned, of the Cabinet, assisted by the Committee of Imperial Defence, with the War Office and the Admiralty acting as its executive agents. The Cabinet at that time consisted of twenty-two members. It must have been obvious from the first that it was far too numerous to control effectively the conduct of the war, more especially by reason of the fact that many of the Ministers presided over departments which, in some cases, were very slightly, and in others were in no degree, concerned with warlike operations. It is to be regretted that this rudimentary fact was not recognized immediately after the outbreak of war. Thus, for four months, during which time events of the utmost importance were occurring, the machinery employed for designing and controlling the higher operations of the war was both clumsy and inefficient. . . ."

"The main responsibility rested on three members of the Council—namely, the Prime Minister, the Secretary of State for War (Lord Kitchener), and the First Lord of the Admiralty (Mr. Winston Churchill). The latter, in the course of his evidence, said: 'In the early stages the war was carried on by the Prime Minister, and Lord Kitchener and me, I think, in the next place, but I was on a rather different plane. I had not the same weight or authority as those two Ministers, nor the same power, and if they said, "This is to be done or not to be done," that settled it.' We believe this description of the actual working of the machine to be substantially correct, save that Mr. Winston Churchill probably assigned to himself a more unobtrusive part than that which he actually played. . . ."

"It is thus abundantly clear that, although no formal and official change was made, the spirit in which the business of the Admiralty was conducted underwent a great transformation immediately after the outbreak of the war. The Board of Admiralty sank into insignificance, its place being taken by the War Staff group. The Board was, even to a less extent than previously, able to assume any 'collective responsibility' for the general conduct of affairs. The individual members of the Board were not kept well informed of passing events. They were not consulted before the naval attack on the Dardanelles was made. It is clear that Mr. Asquith was ill informed as regards the methods under which Admiralty business was conducted when he stated to the Commission that the members of the War Council 'were entitled to assume' that any view laid before them by the First 'Lord of the Admiralty' was the considered opinion of the Board of Admiralty as a whole. . . ."

"It is impossible to read all the evidence, or to study the voluminous papers which have been submitted to us, without being struck with the atmosphere of vagueness and want of precision which seems to have characterized the proceedings of the War Council. . . ."

"It is to be observed that the Memorandum addressed by Lord Fisher to the Prime Minister on 25th January was not in the hands of the War Council when this meeting took place, neither were they informed of the conversation between the Prime Minister, Lord Fisher and Mr. Churchill which immediately preceded the meeting. The result, coupled with Lord Fisher's silence, was that the members of the War Council, although they may have had some rather vague idea that Lord Fisher was not in agreement with the First Lord, were by no means well informed of his views. Lord Fisher has explained to us the reasons of his silence. He 'did not want to have an altercation with his chief at the Council.' Mr. Churchill, he said, 'was my chief, and it was silence or resignation.' . . ."

"Further, we are very clearly of opinion that the other members of the Council, and more especially the Chairman, should have encouraged the experts present to give their opinion, and, indeed, should have

insisted upon their doing so; and, moreover, that if the latter had expressed any doubts a short adjournment should have taken place, in order to allow the matter to be further considered, possibly by the light of what other experts, not having seats on the Council, might have to say. It was common knowledge that naval opinion generally condemned the attack on forts by ships unaided by any military force. The Prime Minister was himself aware of this fact. Such being the case, it would appear that special care should have been taken to elicit a full expression of the opinions entertained by the experts, and that they should have been urged to state them in their own way. What actually happened was that the stress laid upon the unquestionable advantages which would accrue from success was so great that the disadvantage which would arise in the not improbable case of failure were insufficiently considered. . . ."

"After the meeting of 28th January, the objective of the British Government remained the same, but the views entertained as to the means of realizing it underwent a gradual but profound change. The necessity for employing a large military force became daily more apparent. The idea of a purely naval operation was gradually dropped. The prestige argument grew in importance. It does not appear that either the Cabinet or the War Council ever definitely discussed and deliberately changed the policy. General Callwell says that it would be very difficult to assign any date at which the change took place. 'We drifted,' he said, 'into the big military attack.' . . ."

"From the time the decision of 16th February (1915) was taken, there were really only two alternatives which were thoroughly defensible. One was to accept the view that by reason of our existing commitments elsewhere an adequate force could not be made available for expeditionary action in the Eastern Mediterranean; to face the possible loss of prestige which would have been involved in an acknowledgment of partial failure, and to have fallen back on the original plan of abandoning the naval attack on the Dardanelles, when once it became apparent that military operations on a large scale would be necessary. The other was to have boldly faced the risks which would have been involved elsewhere, and at once to have made a determined effort to force the passage of the Dardanelles by a rapid and well-organized combined attack in great strength. Unfortunately, the Government adopted neither of these courses. Time, as Mr. Asquith very truly said to us, was all-important. Yet for at least three weeks the Government vacillated and came to no definite decision in one sense or the other. The natural result ensued. The favourable moment for action was allowed to lapse. Time was given to the Turks, with the help of German officers, to strengthen their position, so that eventually the opposition to be encountered became of a far more formidable character than was originally to have been anticipated. Moreover, even when the decision was taken, it was by no means thorough. . . ."

"There was no meeting of the War Council between 19th March and 14th May. Meanwhile important land operations were undertaken. We think that before such operations were commenced the War Council should have carefully reconsidered the whole position. In our opinion the Prime Minister ought to have summoned a meeting of the War Council for that purpose, and if not summoned, the other members of the War Council should have pressed for such a meeting. We think this was a serious omission."

In completing these extracts from the Report of the Dardanelles Commission it is desirable to remember that in addition

to the failure by our rulers to bring out, and thrash out, the views and opinions of the experts, before committing the nation to such huge losses—there was an episode referred to by Mr. Roch in his Separate Memorandum which bears on that side of the question. His words are :—

“ During the next few days ” (after 4th January, 1915) “ the following telegrams were exchanged between Mr. Churchill and Admiral Carden, who was then in command of the Mediterranean Fleet.

“(1) 3rd January. From Mr. Churchill to Admiral Carden. ‘Are you of opinion that it is practicable to force the Dardanelles by the use of ships alone? It is assumed that older battleships would be employed, that they would be furnished with mine-sweepers, and that they would be preceded by colliers or other merchant vessels as sweepers, and the importance of the results would justify severe losses. Let me know what your views are.’

“(2) 5th January. From Admiral Carden to Mr. Churchill. ‘I do not think that the Dardanelles can be rushed, but they might be forced by extended operations with a large number of ships.’

“(3) 6th January. From Mr. Churchill to Admiral Carden. ‘High authorities here concur in your opinion. Forward detailed particulars showing what force would be required for extended operations. How do you think it should be employed, and what results can be gained?’

“Admiral Oliver, though doubtful if he saw this last telegram, did concur with it. Lord Fisher did not see it. Sir Henry Jackson did not remember whether he was consulted with regard to it or not. Mr. Churchill explained that by ‘high authorities’ he did not include Lord Fisher, and that he meant Sir Henry Jackson and Admiral Oliver. Admiral Carden understood Mr. Churchill to include either Lord Fisher or Sir Henry Jackson or both.”

Even these extracts as to what has been called the Gamble of Gallipoli, fail to disclose the whole series of disasters which resulted in this terrible business from the want of method in inception and drift in execution. Every one should read the report (Cd. 8490), and judge for himself, but the extracts are given here, in addition to all that has gone before, to enable each to decide the issue which cannot be avoided after Mr. Asquith’s Reform Club speech alleging that “there had been a well-organized, carefully engineered conspiracy,” on the one hand, and, on the other, that he “was not aware of any foundation for the charges” of “slackness, want of energy, or sometimes even want of heart, in the prosecution of the war.”

It is piteous to read what is recorded above, but happenings not less heartbreaking follow.

MESOPOTAMIA

For fear that some may still feel, in spite of what precedes, that Mr. Asquith had some justification for his complaints at his party meeting, it is necessary to turn to the facts as to the Mesopotamia Expedition.

Though the sphere of operations in Mesopotamia was still further away than either Antwerp or the Dardanelles, the facts must have been well known to Mr. Asquith at the time of his speech on the 8th December, 1916. These facts disclosed sources of the greatest possible danger, a horribly unnecessary loss of life and hideous suffering, to say nothing of the difficulty of providing in time the requisite reserves and additional forces, owing to long years throughout which our rulers had cut down expenses, and owing to the lack of transport and other facilities which was accentuated by the same cause.

In the case of Mesopotamia, as in that of the Dardanelles, a Government document—the Report of the Mesopotamia Commission (appointed 17th August, 1916)—has since disclosed to the public what really had happened by the 8th December, 1916, when Mr. Asquith made his speech at the Reform Club.

Again letting the Report speak for itself, the following extracts are quoted :—

“ For some years previous to the war a strong economy campaign had been carried on in India by the Indian and Home Governments, especially in connection with military expenditure. . . . The proportion of field-guns per division was cut down to a very low point, and of guns of a large calibre there was practically none, as no increase to existing expenditure was to be sanctioned, while the number of divisions available for immediate mobilization was reduced from nine to seven. There was a considerable exchange of opinions between the Home and Indian Governments upon these reductions, and the last of a series of despatches relating to the help which, in view of the economies effected, India would henceforward be able to afford the Empire in war time, was only written by the Government of India on 30th July, one day before the outbreak of war. An aircraft establishment had been started a few months before, but its scope was very limited. . . . ”

“ But the Imperial Government, in initiating this expedition ” (in October 1914) “ apparently did not fully realize that such an expedition, if once started, might require reinforcement and enlargement beyond the one division suggested, and was sure to provoke violent opposition from the Turks, who, under German supervision and control, would make strenuous efforts to drive the British forces out of Mesopotamia. . . . ”

“ On 4th October, General Barrow, the Military Secretary, India Office, had written a memorandum in which he expressed the opinion

that to attempt to go to Baghdad with the present force was to incur unjustifiable risk.

"On 6th October, the General Staff, in a Memorandum, stated that to hold Baghdad, except with forces very much larger than at present with Sir John Nixon, and with proportionately increased river transport, would be to court disasters. Sixty thousand Turks could be assembled and conveyed within a few weeks to Baghdad, and to withdraw from Baghdad after occupation would have a most unfortunate effect.

"On 14th October, another paper was drawn up by the General Staff on the question of occupying Baghdad. They estimated that if Baghdad was to be taken and occupied, General Nixon must have reinforcements of two Indian divisions. On the 19th the joint Naval and Military General Staff further considered the question, and came to the conclusion that if there were very strong political objections to a withdrawal from Baghdad, then its occupation should not be attempted.

"On 16th October, General Barrow, the Military Secretary, India Office, modified his previous proposals, by stating that if he had a firm promise of two divisions, he was entirely in favour of going to Baghdad.

"Expert opinion was therefore unanimous on the point that to attempt to take and occupy Baghdad with the existing force would be an unjustifiable risk, and that for the task of holding Baghdad, General Nixon should have a reinforcement of two divisions. There was, however, a concurrence of expert opinion that Nixon's existing force was sufficient in the first instance to take Baghdad. . . ."

The Viceroy had previously advised the Secretary of State that

"all communications with Baghdad would have to be by water, and Baghdad is about 500 miles up the river from Basra and 570 from the Gulf. It would not be possible to entrust this long line of communications to the Arabs, since, if they failed, a disaster must result. To avoid undue risk, it would, in the opinion of the Commander-in-Chief, have been necessary to have a whole division in Baghdad and another on the line of communications, to keep them open in the first instance and also to reinforce Baghdad if attacked."

So far everything seemed to point, at home, to a refusal to permit the adoption of the offensive and the making of advance to Baghdad. Then came the next step—

"The Prime Minister summoned a special Inter-Departmental Committee, composed of members of the India Office, the War Office, the Admiralty and the Foreign Office, to which he submitted certain questions on the subject of the strategical situation in Mesopotamia."

After criticizing the defects in the constitution of this body, the Mesopotamia Report continues—

"During their discussions the question of transport, as we ascertained from Sir Thomas Holderness, became quite a subsidiary subject. There were three communications from Mesopotamia—one contained in a despatch and memorandum, dated 10th July, 1915, and two in telegrams, dated respectively 25th September, 1915, and 9th October, 1915, which unmistakably expressed the inadequacy of the river transport even for the wants of the existing force of two divisions. These documents, though

received at the India Office, were either unknown to the Committee or, if they were brought before them, were not seriously considered. . . ."

"It was the promise of reinforcements that alone induced this Committee to advocate an advance to Baghdad, but, as in the case of the other authorities consulted, they apparently passed over the all-important problem of how these reinforcements, after arrival at Basra, were to be conveyed as fighting units to the front, a distance of some 500 miles. . . ."

"Even amongst the General Staff at Whitehall, the idea prevailed that the difficulty was not to get to Baghdad but to remain there. The retreating Turks were supposed to be thoroughly demoralized, and insufficient attention was paid to the warnings of the War Office Intelligence Department that a very large number of Turkish reinforcements would shortly be concentrated at Baghdad. It might also have been surmised that these reinforcements under Marshal von der Goltz would be disciplined and trained under German officers and armed with the most modern equipment. . . ."

"All the previous advances had been justified and advocated as defensive measures for the protection and consolidation of our existing position. The move on Baghdad was strictly offensive, and those authorizing it, both civilians and military, do not seem to have realized sufficiently the change thus made in the character of the expedition, nor the increased necessity of associating with that change the enlargement of the subsidiary services. Moreover, from its position at the head of the navigable tide-way, it was inevitable that Basra should remain the base of the expedition, and little, if anything, had been up to this date done to increase the discharging facilities of the port."

This being the position, Mr. Asquith spoke in the House of Commons on the 2nd November, 1915, as follows: "After a brilliant series, and an absolutely unchequered series of land and river operations, the Turks were driven back both up the Euphrates and up the Tigris. In July their final positions on both rivers were captured, with heavy casualties, and General Nixon's force is now within a measurable distance of Baghdad. I do not think that in the whole course of the war there has been a series of operations more carefully contrived, more brilliantly conducted, and with a better prospect of final success."

These words, uttered on the 2nd November, 1915, are difficult to reconcile with what had resulted from years of parsimony, including the consequent transport and other defects and the deficiencies in respect of adequate additional forces which must endanger ultimate success, and were threatening to bring about the definite disaster, which followed within a month of Mr. Asquith's words.

The offensive proceeded, and the sequel is shown in the following further extracts from the Report of the Commission—

"On 3rd December, the troops, greatly exhausted, arrived at Kut-el-Amara. Our losses at and since the battle of Ctesiphon amounted to more than 690 killed and 3800 wounded, a loss of over 30 per cent. of the total advancing force.

"It has been alleged that the failure to reach Baghdad was in part due to the delays caused by the lengthy discussions as to whether the advance should take place or not. This may have been partly so; but if these discussions had been shorter than they were, the state of the transport would have prevented General Townshend from advancing much sooner than he did. After his victory at Kut-el-Amara, on 28th September, six weeks were spent in bringing up reinforcements and supplies, and his original plan of a rapid pursuit and following close on his enemies' heels into Baghdad soon proved impracticable. . . ."

"After full consideration Sir John Nixon and General Townshend agreed that Kut should be held by General Townshend, and that his relief should be effected as quickly as was possible with the reinforcements on the way from France and elsewhere. This decision received the assent both of Simla and Whitehall. The sick, wounded, and prisoners were evacuated and sent downstream to Basra. On the 6th December the cavalry brigade left Kut, and on the 7th the Turkish investment of that place was complete. . . ."

"Kut managed to hold out for another week; then the inevitable happened, and it surrendered, after a most determined defence, on 29th April (1916). . . ."

"The whole influence of the Home Government was thrown in the direction of restriction rather than expansion of military preparation in India. . . ."

"We can quite understand that officers, bred up to resist fresh and new expenditure, would hesitate, when an advance was suggested, to insist at once upon the outlay necessary to ensure success and diminish risk. 'Risk and economy' rather than 'safety and expenditure' would be the natural bent of their past training and orders. . . ."

"In Mesopotamia, if the offensive was pushed beyond a certain point, its success or failure was almost entirely governed by the extent to which the capacity of the port of Basra, and of the communications with it, were simultaneously developed.

"This self-evident necessity was never realized either by the India Office at home or the Government at Simla until it was too late. . . ."

"The advance to Baghdad under the conditions existing in October 1915 was an offensive movement based upon political and military miscalculations, and attempted with tired and insufficient forces and inadequate preparation. It resulted in the surrender of more than a division of our finest fighting troops, and the casualties incurred in the ineffective attempts to relieve Kut amounted to some 23,000 men. The loss of prestige associated with these military failures was less than might have been anticipated, owing to the deep impression made, throughout and beyond the localities where the combats occurred, by the splendid fighting power of the British and Indian forces engaged.

"Various authorities and high officials are connected with the sanction given to this untoward advance. Each and all, in our judgment, according to their relative and respective positions, must be made responsible for the errors in judgment to which they were parties, and which formed the basis of their advice or orders. . . ."

"The general armament and equipment were on a scale intended for an Indian frontier expedition, were not up to the standard of modern European warfare, and were quite insufficient to meet the needs of the Mesopotamia Expedition. These shortcomings were the natural result of the policy of indiscriminate retrenchment pursued for some years before

the war by the Indian Government under instructions from the Home Government, by which the Army was to be prepared and maintained for frontier and internal use. . . ."

"As regards reinforcements, we find that up to the occupation of Kut in September 1915 the Mesopotamia Expedition was, in fact, numerically strong enough to cope with the Turkish forces brought against it. The arrangements for drafts and reinforcements had, however, from the first, been lacking in co-ordination as between the Indian and Home authorities, and this want of co-ordination led to the failure to supply effective reinforcements in connection with the advance on Baghdad and the operations for the relief of Kut. . . ."

"Looking at the facts, which from the first must have been apparent to any administrator, military or civilian, who gave but a few minutes' consideration to the map and to the conditions in Mesopotamia, the want of foresight and provision for the most fundamental needs of the expedition reflects discredit upon the organizing aptitude of all the authorities concerned."

In attempting to get at the point of view or perspective of the politicians in order that the people may be in a position to prevent similar ills in the future, it is necessary to refer to the 13th July, 1917, when Mr. Asquith in the House of Commons, in supporting the change made in October 1915 from the defensive to the offensive in Mesopotamia, spoke the following words: "What would have been said by fair-minded and well-instructed critics like the members of this Commission? They would have said, and said with irresistible force and justice and truth: 'Here at a most critical moment in the war, when a golden opportunity presented itself, when you were advised by every authority that Baghdad was within your grasp, that it could not only be taken, but it could be held, you, a set of timorous, pigeon-livered politicians—I know the vocabulary very well—here at home, cowardly, pusillanimous, fearful to take risks, thinking only of your own skin—you imposed your veto, robbed your gallant Army of the crown of its campaign, and you refused to strike what would have been a fatal blow at the prestige and the power of the Turk.' Then what answer should we have had? None whatever. Talk about impeachment! Is there not something quite grotesque in the use of that word?"

In reading these words all must remember that no one had attacked the Government for withdrawing the naval attack on the Dardanelles nor for the greater withdrawal after the military were co-operating in Gallipoli. The gravamen of the charges with regard to Antwerp, the Dardanelles, Gallipoli and Mesopotamia was, in each case, that our rulers launched

naval and military ventures without sufficient care and inquiry, whilst ignoring the weakness resulting from the years during which they had failed sufficiently to strengthen our fighting forces. It is these things in respect of which the average man requires a clear and straightforward answer before any justification of Mr. Asquith's Reform Club speech can be understood.

Other politicians, having to meet an adverse decision by the Commission which Mr. Asquith and themselves had set up, adopted the tactics of those who mob the umpire at a cricket-match, or the referee on the football field, and they attacked the Commission itself.

Lord George Hamilton, the Chairman of the Commission, has replied to those who went so far as this. He writes in a letter to *The Times* in July 1917: "It was with great reluctance that Lord Cromer and I undertook the chairmanship of these two Commissions. We doubted the policy of such inquiries during the war, but we accepted the posts because we were told that, unless these Commissions were appointed, Mr. Asquith's Government would be beaten in the House of Commons and a political crisis created. . . . Our investigations showed that never had the rank and file of the British and Indian Armies fought better than in Mesopotamia. On the other hand it was difficult to exaggerate the incompetence shown in the management of their transport, supplies and medical services. We might have limited our findings by attributing blame only to those at the bottom of the scale of authority. We declined to pillory soldiers, who only executed orders, and to leave those above them in authority immune from blame; and it is because we have included the latter that there is amongst those so impugned such an outcry.

"There is a common expression in the mouths of public men when they speak of warlike operations carried on by this country: 'We muddle through at last.' That 'muddling through' means the needless loss—and in this case the loss of many thousands—of the best fighting men in the Expeditionary Force. It is the splendid regimental fighting capacity of the British and Indian Armies which has carried Great Britain successfully through many a campaign, in spite of the want of prescience and preparation of those in authority above them.

How long is this to go without protest? The unnecessary loss of life in Mesopotamia was very heavy; the avoidable suffering to the wounded was awful."

Major Rowland Hunt, M.P., puts the matter shortly in a letter of the 16th July, 1917, to the Press. His words include the following: "The politicians, as usual, are trying to shield themselves and make scapegoats of other people. The soldiers have already been deprived of their commands, and the members of the Commission, whom the politicians appointed themselves, are attacked because they exposed the neglected state of the Army and the horrors in Mesopotamia, and dared to blame the politicians, who now try to make out that it is really the members of the Commission are on their trial.

"Years of pinching, indiscriminate economy, depriving the Indian Army of vital necessities, put Mr. Chamberlain into a most difficult position, and he certainly appears to have struggled to do what he could. The conduct of the officers and men of all ranks was admittedly magnificent, but in the supply of the necessities of war the Indian Army had been deliberately starved, and the responsibility must rest with the late Liberal Government at home, as the Indian Government were afraid or thought it useless to protest. The case against the ex-Ministers is overwhelming, the policy of Mr. Asquith for about eight years made disasters inevitable if war came."

One of the most startling sidelights from the point of view of the future is shed by Mr. Asquith's peroration to his speech, on the Mesopotamia Report, in the House of Commons on the 13th July, 1917. He closes with these words: "An unknown correspondent sent me a few days ago a passage from Burke's speech to the electors of Bristol in 1780, which seems to me to be so apposite that I will conclude by reading it to the House. Burke said: 'It is not to be imagined how much of service is lost from spirits full of activity and full of energy who are pressing, who are rushing forward to great and capital objects when you oblige them to be continually looking back. Whilst they are defending one service they defraud you of a hundred. Applaud us when we run, console us when we fall, cheer us when we recover; but let us pass on. For God's sake, let us pass on.'"

What in 1780 had preceded these words of Mr. Burke is a matter of history, and the disasters which followed them are well known. What had preceded Mr. Asquith's "wind-up" quotation of July 1917, and what had preceded his Reform Club speech of 8th December, 1916, included the operations of Antwerp, Coronel, Dardanelles, Gallipoli and Mesopotamia and many other disastrous happenings at home, some of which are mentioned in earlier pages of this book. Surely merely to "pass on" was to invite further disaster.

The lesson, at least in the case of Mesopotamia, was there, and many must agree with Mr. Punch who, under his leading cartoon of the 4th July, 1917, represents himself as saying to the then Prime Minister, Mr. Lloyd George: "If you must wash dirty linen in public during the war, for God's sake, sir, wash it clean."

The parsimony of pre-war days and the ignoring of facts and conditions resulting therefrom in war seem to have been the real origin of the dreadful things which are proved by the Report to have occurred in Mesopotamia, but even were the Antwerp, Gallipoli and Mesopotamia undertakings, each of them, matters which Mr. Asquith, when making his speech at the Reform Club on the 8th December, 1916, was entitled to forget, he could hardly have forgotten what had taken place in Ireland.

The Royal Commission, appointed on the 10th May, 1916, on the recommendation of our rulers, found—limited as our rulers had made the scope of the then inquiry—a general conclusion that the main cause of the rebellion "appears to be that lawlessness was allowed to grow up unchecked, and that Ireland for several years past had been administered on the principle that it was safer and more expedient to leave law in abeyance if collision with any faction of the Irish people could thereby be avoided. Such a policy is the negation of that cardinal rule of Government which demands that the enforcement of law and the preservation of order should always be independent of political expediency."

Whatever view any one may take of the grievous things disclosed by the Commissions, which Mr. Asquith and his colleagues set up, nearly every essential factor for which rulers

are responsible in war was under the gravest suspicion, and in addition the fear was steadily gaining ground, at the time of the Reform Club speech, that, unless a change of rulers was made and made quickly, the nation would find itself committed to an inconclusive peace in the same way that it had found itself, unprepared, in a great war.

With such facts for all to read, it is not easy for the public and the democracy to appreciate why our late rulers were complaining at being no longer on the box seat, nor to understand what is to be the code which shall govern the conduct of rulers of this class in the future, in respect of responsibilities brought home to them.

With all this before us, including the fears of an inconclusive peace and an unprotected future, it is the fact that our late rulers were hardly out of office when in the later days of December 1916 the German Peace Note came, and on its heels that from the United States of America.

Our new rulers were then in power, and clear and categorical were their answers stating in effect that we had been dragged into a war for a principle, and to save our own and the world's freedom, and that, unprepared as we had been to fight, we meant now to fight on until the principle was upheld and freedom assured by an unconditional surrender on the part of those who had transgressed in respect of all that our civilization held dear.

OUR NEW RULERS

The Ministry no longer contained those primarily responsible for so much that had happened nor those who had done so little to prevent worse befalling us. Retiring Ministers were warned by all to drop "Party." *Punch* again summed up the position, voicing the sentiments of the people, 20th December, 1916, as follows: "Mr. Punch (interrupting Mr. McKenna): 'A little less talk of "Party," my friend, and a little more of the State.'"

The necessity for this warning on the incident in December 1916 is confirmed by an episode referred to as follows, in a

leading article in the *Daily Chronicle* of 14th February, 1917: "Mr. McKenna's speech on the Vote of Credit was really an attack on the Government as a whole, and was not solely directed to finance; in so far as he referred to finance he was wrong both in his assumptions and in his estimates, and stood corrected by his successor. His criticism of the system of control, initiated by the old Government, was premature. His reflections on the expensive distant expeditionary forces applied wholly to the old Government and its War Council, of which he was a member. His reference to a probable general election could serve no purpose, except to tend to bring about a national upheaval, the occurrence of which he professed to deplore."

The necessity for warning our late rulers to leave the lure of party was also confirmed by another episode which closely followed. Another late Minister intervened in a debate on the Internment of Alien Enemies—so long drawn out by the Government of which he had been a member. The incident is dealt with in the *Pall Mall Gazette* of 15th February, 1917, in the following words: "Mr. Samuel's faculty of speaking with his tongue in his cheek has been impressed upon the House of Commons ever since his remarkable performance in 'guying' his own " (Voters) "Registration Bill. His part in the discussion of the aliens' question last night was equally remarkable. The new Home Secretary " (Sir George Cave) "has at once applied himself to overhauling the haunts and the privileges of our enemies who are at large. He has shown a promising vigour of which we hope soon to witness the unmistakable fruits. He has closed clubs and restaurants which, under the last two Governments, remained open for two and a half years. He is revising the roll of the 20,000 uninterned, and he has set a Committee to work upon the disposal of enemy parasites—plain and naturalized—after the war. Yet the ex-Home Secretary " (Mr. Samuel), "with his own supine record confronting him, has the coolness to lecture Sir George Cave upon the importance of vigorous action. While in office he was content with 'contemplating' a sterner treatment of the German resorts; now that the responsibility is on other shoulders, he is all impatience to have something 'done.'"

Mr. McKenna on the financial point impaled himself on the horns of a dilemma—either he was attempting a party score or he was unable to grasp what (being the late Chancellor of the Exchequer) he should have known; whilst Mr. Samuel was apparently attempting to give the impression to the average man that he was vigorously pressing for the suppression of the German menace in our midst, though the Government of which he was a member had for two and a half years “contemplated” or complacently regarded that menace.

In other departments similar party methods were adopted by those who had lost office; but to return to our new rulers. No mere distribution of offices, under the conventions of politics, followed in the new Government. Business men joined, and the object aimed at in each appointment was to obtain the best man for each office, with a small executive Cabinet in control of all.

Even the *Statist*, speaking of the old and new Governments, had reached, by the 9th December, 1916, a more hopeful outlook than that of the autumn, though in the interim the retiring rulers had greatly increased the difficulties to be overcome by their successors:—

“We have so bungled our affairs that although the Entente Allies enormously exceed in every kind of resource the Central European Powers, yet those Powers are able to hold nearly all of France originally occupied, the whole of Belgium and Serbia, and likewise Russian Poland; while they have now seized the capital of Roumania, and apparently are successfully overrunning the whole kingdom. To remedy all this will be no easy matter. Of course, the Entente Allies have abundant resources. . . . The country desires with all its heart an earnest prosecution of the war to early victory. If the (new) Government can realize that, it will have the whole nation behind it. If, on the contrary, it hesitates and procrastinates, there will be a speedy renewal of dissatisfaction. It is earnestly to be hoped, then, that the formation of the new Government will be pushed forward without a moment’s avoidable delay, and that its whole attention will be devoted to the earnest and unhesitating prosecution of the war. Respecting the support the new Prime Minister can count upon at first it is useless

to speculate now. When Parliament resumes its regular sittings that will be clearly seen. But even the first hesitations will matter little. If the Government shows that it has the resolution to push the war actively and successfully, it will win over all parties. If it does not, we shall have chaos again."

The Press and public appeared to feel that, for the first time since the outbreak of war twenty-eight months before, we were to have a Government—national and non-party, with each member's suitability and ability the sole test for office, each with his proper sphere of work and responsibility definitely allotted, all departments being linked up to a supreme and small war Cabinet organized for prompt decision and resolute performance. None could help seeing that terrible must be the handicap of the past; strong might be the measures required to make good the delays and postponements of our late rulers in the days gone by; heart-breaking the thought of the lives sacrificed, the money wasted and the time lost, but firm was the determination that the working and the fighting power of the nation should be mobilized for war and ultimate victory.

Was a rapid march to victory to be expected? No! The way thereto might be less long under new rulers, but must test all to the utmost. A millennium after victory? No! Human nature, even in our comparatively advanced stage of civilization had proved itself most frail. A better world with higher ideals? Yes, if all refrained from any support of the Central Powers, who had placed our world in jeopardy because they thought they could overrun France, overpower Russia and get our rulers to keep Great Britain and the Empire neutral by the bribe of a soft life, and trade and profit from the belligerents, though in our turn we were to be reduced by Germany to subjection or slavery, as thereafter were to be the continent of America, China and the East.

For half a century Germany planned war on the unprepared, and frightfulness and terror on the defenceless, refused to delay war by a day, broke treaties, and her people (believing themselves invincible) gloried in bestial atrocities—she should reap as she has sown.

THE PEACE

*Peace, peace, to-day most longed-for word by all,
By neutrals sought, tho' war itself they flee,
But rather any loss or death's dark pall
Than peace which leaves once more aggressors free
To doom the world to an arm'd misery.*

Neither outrages, tortures, cruelties and crimes on women, children, prisoners of war and workers, nor enslavement of populations, nor breaches of treaties, nor disregard of honour—planned and executed by a people—are war. The Allied nations in duty to their dead and to their own and future generations must by force make such things impossible or their civilization will die—leaving “Kultur,” with its treachery and “frightfulness,” to prevail.

PRELIMINARY

ANY attempt to assist in the safeguarding of the years to come would be a task half done were it not to include an effort to suggest some of the salient factors without which a settled, conclusive and all-sufficient peace is unattainable; reference also seems necessary to the concomitants, unavoidable in a league of all the nations of the world, which, if ignored, would make such a league but a snare and a delusion—a mere paper safeguard and a means in the end for the triumph of the aggressor.

Some seek to assure us—the wish perhaps being father to the thought—that, whatever the peace terms may be, a league will render safe what would otherwise be unsafe; others are convinced, on the experience of thousands of years, that leagues are but the begetters of fresh wars, and that peace is best maintained by dealing with aggressors as they have sought to deal by those whom they attacked. In other words, let the punishment fit the crime and so deter fresh outbreaks—a reminder for all time that wrong-doing does not pay.

This is not the moment to pretend to ourselves that things

are not as they are or that the world is not what it is, nor to permit others to persuade themselves or us that words or phrases, however well-sounding, can alter or convert that which would be a future of uncertainties and contests into that assured and peaceful progression, which precedents of the past lead many to believe can only be attained by perseverance and patience in war and by due safeguards in peace.

This seems to be the time, if there is to be one, when, both amongst ourselves and throughout the world, truths should be recognized, and when those, who try and persuade others that the millennium can be reached by a phrase, article, speech or other unempirical means should be relegated to their true position of unpractical theorists, such as those who seek "to make water run uphill" of its own volition, or would cause us to believe that "perpetual motion" or any other fallacy can be assumed as a basis for the future of the nation or of the world.

The average man knows by instinct, to say nothing of hard experience in the affairs of life, that none of these things will ever be, but it is fascinating even for him to hear the intellectual or the theorist, or those with other ends to serve, glibly proving that "black is white" or that "the leopard will change his spots."

In the past, article after article appeared in the Press, speech after speech was uttered, and argument after argument put forward, by one here and another there, to prove in pre-war days that Great Britain must be neutral in respect of German aggression against Serbia, Russia, Belgium and France. Even in war the encouragement given to the enemy by refusals to recognize the truth, and the terrible penalty paid and to be paid therefor, make it more than ever essential, in considering the question of peace, to grasp realities.

The first uncontrovertible fact to recognize is that the German people are what they have made themselves by their "Kultur" and by their doctrines of the "Super-man," "Might is Right," and of it being their duty (when they believe themselves strong enough to aggress) to trample other nations under-foot in war, and to hector over, plot against, permeate, undermine and enslave such nations in peace.

Principles of this description must seem unpermissible and inexcusable in any state or nation, which makes any claim to be civilized. But be these matters as they may, the fact remains, as the result of definite acts in which the German people have not only participated, but have by their approval made possible, that if a real peace is to prevail it can only come when the Allies lay down their conditions as to the future, and Germany, her people and her associates, admitting without reservation that they are defeated, bow to what they have brought upon themselves, and accept the terms.

By what they have done in the past, and have still sought to do in the future after some three years of war, the German people and their rulers have made a "Negotiated Peace" too dangerous for the patriotic to contemplate, and an armistice or even an evacuation of territory (save under attack) but a war manœuvre.

Why can none of these courtesies of war be safely permitted by the Allies? The answer should be plain to all. The German people and their rulers, from the lowliest to the "All Highest," have adopted and saturated themselves, their women and even their children, with "Kultur," ethics and morals vitally different from ours or from those of the rest of the civilized world.

A German, whatever protestations he makes or assurances he gives, expressed or implied, or whatever naturalization, consular or other formalities he goes through, or whatever social, business, or other relationships he takes advantage of, has proved himself to remain a German still, and as such to despise those who may be so trustful as to rely upon his protestations or contracts. An epigram by one of them is reported: "You English will always be fools, but we shall never be gentlemen," *i. e.* the Germans will not be fair and straight to others nor stand by the rules as civilized nations do.

The word of the German people is not their bond. Their covenant is but a deceit by which they try to gain an advantage over those who believe them, or over those who fulfil the obligations which have been agreed.

Dr. von Bethmann-Hollweg confirmed this in the German Reichstag on the 4th August, 1914, when he said: "Gentlemen,

we are now in a state of necessity, and necessity knows no law ! Our troops have occupied Luxemburg, and perhaps are already on Belgian soil. Gentlemen, that is contrary to the dictates of international law. . . . The wrong—I speak openly—that we are committing we will endeavour to make good as soon as our military goal has been reached. Anybody who is threatened, as we are threatened, and is fighting for his highest possessions, can have only one thought—how he is to hack his way through.”

The Belgian Prime Minister, M. de Broqueville, gave additional evidence of this in the following words reported in the *Manchester Guardian* on the 3rd November, 1914 : “Germany is admirable in military organization, but is unsurpassable in the organization of lies. Germany betrayed the pledges she had given. The Emperor declared to our King that the neutrality of Belgium would never be violated, and to me also the Emperor gave the same assurance.”

The German Official Report made at Berlin on the 19th March, 1913, and published in the French Yellow Book clearly states : “There need be no worry about the fate of our colonies. The final result in Europe will settle that for them. On the other hand, disturbances must be stirred up in Northern Africa and in Russia. This will be a means of absorbing the forces of the adversary. It is, therefore, vitally necessary that through well-chosen agents we should get into contact with influential people in Egypt, Tunis, Algiers and Morocco, in order to prepare the necessary measures in case of European war. These secret allies would, of course, be recognized openly in time of war, and on the conclusion of peace they would be guaranteed the preservation of the advantages they had won. These desiderata can be realized. A first attempt made a few years ago gave us the necessary contact.”

In other words, the German does not “play the game” as we understand it. Hence, on our standards, we can neither negotiate safely with him nor trust him in treaties, which to him are “scraps of paper,” subject to evasion or tearing up, if “Kultur” or “necessity” calls.

Many have known this in business, and in other relationships, over a great number of years. Our Allies and the Dominions

have startled the world by their grasp of the German peril to our civilization and outlook on life; yet, until all recognize it, our national safety will remain in jeopardy. The German menace unless disarmed will always threaten, and from time to time will, as heretofore, result in war, whilst continuously affecting adversely our people in peace.

Some, including too many of our late rulers, were, before the war, and too often still apparently are, obsessed by the conviction that our people compared ill with the Germans. Great did they seem to think would be the gain to all our classes were they permeated by Germans and naturalized Germans, and if they adopted German "Kultur," German "Geist" or spirit, German education, German methods and German morals. Fortunate did they think we were that, in the eight years preceding the war, our rulers had so accelerated the consummation of this point of view in so many directions. Grievous do they seem to think it would be for the future of our people, the Dominions and the Empire, were we to stand on our own—free and independent of German direction, imports and labour—and so become self-supporting, instead of being dependent upon the Germans to so large a degree in every branch of our national life, from politics and finance down to the least of our industries.

None of those who in the past acted, or still act, on this view of assuring to the Germans so much of the power and money which should belong to our own people, seem to realize that a closer study of the German has always shown that his stolid patience and obedience to those in authority over him without question, while he works long hours for very little pay, leave inborn, or have created, in his blood a natural tendency to be overbearing and in many cases cruel to those below him, whilst cringing, not to say servile, to those above him.

Some call these traits or characteristics "Prussian," and claim that the Germans in the other States are all that they should be; but the population of Prussia even in 1910 was over 40,000,000, whilst the remaining twenty-five States had less than 25,000,000 people between them, or an average of only 1,000,000 each. So divided, against the united 24,000,000 and controlled

16,000,000 making the 40,000,000 of Prussia, the other States must in any case be powerless, but even before the war it was seen that the manufacturers and workers of Germany were out-Prussianing the Prussians in manners, morals and methods.

It is of interest to note that according to the *Statesman's Year Book* for 1917 the State-areas and the State-populations work out as follows :—

States of the German Empire.	Area, English square miles.	Total 1st Dec., 1910.
Prussia	134,616	40,165,219
Bavaria	29,292	6,887,291
Württemberg	7,534	2,437,574
Baden	5,823	2,142,833
Saxony, Kingdom of	5,789	4,806,661
Mecklenburg-Schw.	5,068	639,958
Hesse	2,966	1,282,051
Oldenburg	2,482	483,042
Brunswick	1,418	494,339
Saxony, Grand Duchy of	1,397	417,149
Mecklenburg Str.	1,131	106,442
Saxe-Meiningen	953	278,762
Anhalt	888	331,128
Saxe-Coburg-Gotha	764	257,177
Saxe-Altenburg	511	216,128
Lippe	469	150,937
Waldeck	433	61,707
Schwarzburg-Rud	363	100,702
Schwarzburg-Sond	333	89,917
Reuss Junr. Branch	319	152,752
Schaumburg-Lippe	131	46,652
Reuss Elder Branch	122	72,769
Hamburg	160	1,014,664
Lubeck	115	116,599
Bremen	99	299,526
Alsace-Lorraine	5,604	1,874,014
Total	208,780	64,925,993

These figures seem to be worth studying, but it is also of interest to look at the state of the parties in the Reichstag on the 1st, March 1917, which has been reported to be as follows :—

Centro Party	91	The German Party	26
Social Democrats	89	Poles	18
National Liberals	44	Social Democratic Labour	
Radicals	46	Union	19
Conservatives	45	Independents	15

After nearly three years of war a so-called peace-resolution was produced. This resolution appeared in *The Times* of the 17th July, 1917, under date Amsterdam, 14th July. It states "that according to a Berlin telegram, a resolution which is said to be supported by the great majority of the Reichstag runs: 'Just as on August 4, 1914, so on the threshold of the fourth year of war the words of the speech from the Throne, "No desire for conquest impels us," are valid for the German people. Germany assumed arms for the defence of her freedom and independence and for her territorial possessions. The Reichstag strives for a peace by "agreement" and for a permanent reconciliation of the nations.

"The forcible acquisition of territory and political, economical, or financial usurpation are incompatible with such a peace. The Reichstag rejects all plans which strive for economic exclusion and animosities between peoples after the war. The freedom of the seas must be assured. Economic peace alone will render possible a friendly community of life among the nations. The Reichstag will energetically promote the organization of international law.

"So long, however, as the hostile Governments do not accept such a peace, so long as Germany and her allies are threatened with conquests and usurpation, the German people will stand together as one man and endure and fight until its right, and the right of its allies, its life and its development, are assured. The Reichstag knows that in this proclamation it is at one with the men who in heroic conflict defend the Fatherland. Imperishable gratitude is assured them.' "

Commenting on this the *Manchester Guardian* of the 17th July, 1917, in its "London Correspondence" says: "The peace formula of the Reichstag majority, which it is intended that the Reichstag should adopt and make the condition of its support of the new Government, is just the 'defensive war' formula which was foreshadowed this morning in your article on the causes of Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg's fall. It repudiates annexations by implication only, and reserves for German diplomacy the right of bargaining at the conference table.

This is the outcome of a compromise of the Left with such a composite party as the Catholic Centre.

“But more significant is the absence of the National Liberals foreshadowed in the same article. Their formal pretext that they would not go in for any peace formula until they knew with what kind of Government they had to deal may still be upheld by them even after the resignation of the hated Bethmann-Hollweg, but there can be no doubt that the real reason for their present abstention is the fact that they do not want to repudiate annexations or indemnities.”

This confirms that still, after nearly three years of war, even the most politically advanced of the German people were not prepared to obtain peace, by showing some realization of the wrongs and cruelties done by them or by displaying a spirit approaching compatibility with even a few of the conditions which civilized nations must concur in, and upon which they must act.

The leading article of the *Manchester Guardian* of the same date, 17th July, 1917, counsels that “it should be the part of the Allies to strengthen this opposition—primarily by showing Austria that she has little to gain by her persistent adhesion to Germany, and secondly by continuing to emphasize the distinction between the Prussian war lords and the German people.”

Unfortunately for the advice expressed in the early part of the above paragraph, the German influence and permeation in Austria is enormous, not only in respect of the rulers, the armies and trade and finance, but in respect of the German element in the population. Out of a total population of 28,571,934 more than one-third of the ethnical elements on the basis of language, as per the *Statesman's Year Book* for 1913, are German; the next largest group being Bohemian, Moravian and Slovak, which numbers 6,435,983 as compared to the German element in Austria of 9,950,266.

The latter part of the paragraph quoted above from the *Manchester Guardian* seems to attempt a distinction between rulers and people, where there is but little difference in detail and none in principle; for in the Reichstag and in almost every

other way possible during the three years of war, the German people have shown that the war is their war and a war of aggression, deliberately devised and conducted with their concurrence and co-operation in cruelty and crime.

The complaint of the German people is that Great Britain came in at the start of the war, instead of leaving to Germany a "victorious war" against France and Russia; that in consequence they are suffering in their persons, and that they are fearful lest, when the war is over, they will find, now that their trend of mind and methods of execution are becoming known to the rest of the world, that years of reckoning must follow, and vast sacrifices be demanded of them to make good the damage done.

Knowing the danger to themselves, which their desire for world-control has produced, these people now seek by resolutions and such-like to escape the consequences of the acts which they have carried out, in peace as well as in war, in order adversely to affect other nations, and to place themselves in power over the other peoples of the world.

Therefore, the German wolf would lie down with the lamb and no longer complain that, in standing lower down the stream, the lamb contaminates what the wolf would drink, nor contend that the defenceless one must be punished for so doing. Every evidence so far points to the wolf, as soon as it is out of the danger which he has brought upon himself, once more setting out to kill, adopting the same ways as those of pre-war days under the guise of peace, whilst preparing once more for aggression when the favourable moment comes.

That these things are, was clearly stated so far back as the 26th April, 1915, in a letter from Viscount Esher to Mr. John S. Samuel, wherein he said: "We are not fighting the German Emperor or the German military caste: we are engaged in a life and death conflict with the German people of all sects and classes, men who have been educated to believe, and who believe with all the fury of the Rationalist, that the progress of humanity renders it necessary that Germany should 'stand above all men.'"

The *Manchester Guardian* has, however, dealt further with

this subject in its issue of the 27th July, 1917, in a leading article which states: "When the German people realize that . . . they must definitely make the choice which world they will belong to—the world of force in which every man's hand will be against them, or the world of law, of equal rights, and decent human feeling—then the war will be over. They began the war in the first world. They now want to be in the other and better world, but without burning their bridges with the other. Let them burn these bridges and all will come right."

These words seem to imply that all will come right for a multiple-murderer if only he will say: "I have killed a few, ruined the women-folk of my victims, and tortured their children, besides stealing their property, but, now that I have tested my strength, satisfied my lust and got what goods I can, I will be virtuous and a law-abiding member of society."

Surely even our pro-Germans, Pacifists and others cannot really mean that, in order to obtain peace, we are to adopt this attitude to Germany who has done all these things and more. Peace obtained under such conditions would be a peace of derision, a mere cover for unfair dealing as in pre-war days; fresh outrages and aggression would follow as soon as strength was regained, and full advantage could be taken of the experience obtained and of the position attained in the previous outbreak.

In spite of all this, the *Nation*, in its issue of the 28th July, 1917, takes up the same tale as the *Manchester Guardian*. It says in its leading article: "Two parties in Germany stood behind the annexation of Belgium or her absorption in the German power. They were the German Government, and the German Parliament. Now the Government stands alone. The Parliament has declared for a free Belgium. The Government does not yet commit itself to the proposition that Belgium shall be unequivocally free. But it puts forward a formula under which a scheme of complete enfranchisement may well find shelter. We concede that a vote in the German Parliament hardly ranks with a vote in ours. The Reichstag falls far short of a sovereign assembly. Ministers are irresponsible to it, and, as yet, Germany stands only at the threshold of a true Parliamentary constitution. But the majority vote is the first

independent act of a German Parliament. . . . Democratic Germany has at last taken a definite step away from her 'Six Unions,' with their lawless designs on the iron ore of Lorraine, their infamous war of iron for iron." This is followed by reference to our selfish aims and such-like, but the words just quoted acknowledge that the policy of the German people was aggressive, though later in the article the *Nation* tries to reassure us that a peaceful future will come if we meet Germany, just as this same publication assured us of peace in pre-war days and then tried to keep Great Britain neutral in the critical days of July-August 1914.

These political and other indications, however, are based on words only. What must still more affect the method under which conditions of peace can alone be safely laid down by the Allies, and the terms on which peace can without unnecessary risk be permitted to Germany, are the acts and deeds of the German people themselves.

For years the German people have participated in peace in the perpetration of outrages upon friendly nations, whereby they sought to steal lists of customers and trade secrets laboriously acquired by others, and generally to permeate and paralyze, with a view to conquest in peace or in war, the political, trade, financial and social organizations of Great Britain and other countries.

Without the whole-hearted concurrence and secret working of the German people to these ends, the German rulers would have been comparatively harmless. All the machinations which preceded the outbreak of war in August 1914 would have been of but little avail without the backing of nearly 100,000,000 Germans working throughout the world to assist, directly or indirectly, the conspiracies whereby the peoples of the earth were ultimately to be held in chains.

Underhand dealing in peace has become open treachery in war. The infatuation for world-dominion, which had become a part of the German people, produced worse things. Never ought it to be forgotten, and daily ought it to be remembered, that the fiendish brutalities and crimes committed on combatant and non-combatant men and the defenceless—prisoners, women, girls, children and children yet unborn, unrepresentable

in any book—were desired, planned, perpetrated and gloated over, month after month and year after year, by Germans of all states, classes and ages, as an outcome of some trait still latent in the German or created in him by his “Kultur.”

Even when making, as they thought, a victorious onslaught on France and on our little Army, the German people at the front and at home were guilty of atrocities and cowardly meanness about which it is horrible even to read. When they commenced to taste defeat the Germans began a series of savage outrages all over the world, which still continue and increase the disgust felt, and ever widen the gulf which they have placed between themselves and those who are defending humanity and civilization.

It is impossible for reasons of decency to refer in detail to the authoritative and judicial reports of British, French, Russian and other commissions or authorities, selected for their impartiality, to inquire into and set out what crimes and cruelties the German people committed. It is permissible, however, to quote one or two extracts from the Press as to what happened, and in selecting the quotations, for this purpose, choice is made from the columns of newspapers which had shown themselves in pre-war days, and even in days of war, not lacking in praise of, or in attempts to make things easy for, the German people.

The *Daily News and Leader* on the 19th October, 1914, reproduced from *De Tyd* of Rotterdam the following extract: “When the train arrived at Landen from Brussels about 200 German soldiers assembled in front of the open doors of a cattle-truck in which, amongst the French wounded, lay three English wounded. I was told that they had had no food for five days, and they certainly were in a deplorable condition. . . . Those who were thus disgracing their Red Cross duty held hot soup before them, and asked, ‘You want to have food, swine?’ Others cried, ‘Death to them. Beat them to death. That is all you will get from us.’ Others pointed their rifles at the helpless, starving men.”

The *Westminster Gazette* of the 3rd April, 1916, said: “We have only to read the German papers to discover that this element of frightfulness is precisely what gives pleasure to

the German public, whether in air raids or submarine raids. They demand more and more of crimes which fill all other peoples with horror; they revel in the thought that the 'intangible' people is being made to suffer in spite of the sea that surrounds it."

A later quotation from a paper of a different outlook may be allowed. It appears on the 4th October, 1917, in the *Daily Telegraph*, and is as follows: "We desire to congratulate the Government on their determination to adopt air reprisals against Germany. There has not been, so far as we are aware, a single protest raised by the people of Germany against this particular form of 'frightfulness.' On the contrary, the German public have gloated over the most lurid reports of these bomb-dropping expeditions. There are some people who pretend to be able to distinguish between the German rulers and the German people. To us—in this respect, at any rate—they seem absolutely at one in their blind lust for blood and carnage."

Let all help the German people to eradicate these traits in the only manner they understand—by showing them in the years to come that such an outlook on life does not pay, and that no decent or responsible man or woman can even listen to such things without spiritual loathing and physical nausea, much less contemplate doing, or worse still ordering or gloating over, such horrors in cold blood—the inhuman attribute of most of the atrocities and crimes of so many of the men and women of Germany.

Meanwhile, what the German people have done should have cleared from the soul, mind, brain and body of every Briton any lingering belief that the German did not have in his heart what this war has again confirmed that heart contains.

Even in war the German cannot fight fairly, nor, having planned to fight unfairly, can he refrain from trying to throw the blame for his intended crime upon his opponent by saying that his opponent intended to "steal a march" on him by committing the crime first.

In the report of Sir John French of the 3rd May, 1915, he said: "A week before the Germans first used this method" (poisonous gases) "they announced in their Official Communiqué

that we were making use of asphyxiating gases. At the time there appeared to be no reason for this astounding falsehood, but now, of course, it is obvious that it was part of the scheme. It is a further proof of the deliberate nature of the introduction by the Germans of a new and illegal weapon, and shows that they recognized its illegality."

Or to quote the *Westminster Gazette* again, it said on the 8th May, 1915: "There is a refinement of torture in the use of poisonous gases which puts it on an evil eminence even among these cruelties, but none of these practices can be taken alone. They link up in a long chain of cruelty and horror, which, though specially affecting belligerents, is the concern of the whole world. Germany on these lines is rapidly becoming *hostis humani generis*, the enemy of the human race."

All may anticipate, that as "the shoe pinches" and "sauce for the goose becomes sauce for the gander," the bully, for such the German is to-day, seeing a conquering host of those he sought to enslave around him, will pose as the most reliable, benevolent, kind-hearted and pacific man in the world; but it must remain anathema for any Briton to urge us to rely upon the German's word (be it that of the rulers or of the people) until, if he wishes to join in our civilization, all classes in his nation have, after long years of expiation, realized and repented of these crimes against international peace, against humanity and against the laws of nations..

There are some amongst us who seek to shut the eyes of others even to the gross breaches by Germany of international bargains and treaties.

Sir John Simon, at Manchester, on the 23rd March, 1915, speaking to members of the Reform Club, remarked: "It was sometimes said, he thought wrongly, that recent events had gone to show that international bargains, treaties, rules and precepts of international law were things of little weight or force. But he thought the historian would be astonished to observe the strength of the regard for international law."

There are others who would persuade us that Germany's "Kultur" of might being right and slavery of peoples the best outcome of progress, is not as we view it, a crime against freedom.

For those who persist in saying that the German is not what history and the Great War have shown him to be—and for others who assure us that he is no longer as he was, and can be trusted and relied on henceforward, it seems essential to state a simple proposition in the form of a dilemma.

Either these pro-Germans and Pacifists are wrong, or the German has changed his inner nature and desires to join our civilization and become a decent and quiet worker in the world's advancement, free from the terrible traits which once more he has disclosed in the present war.

In the former case, the conditions of peace must be such as will protect the Allies and the world by the total disarmament of Germany, and by other means independent of any reliance upon her signature or the holding out of promises by her people.

In the latter case, the German himself will wish us to insist "on his swords being turned into ploughshares," his conscripts into labourers, and such of his officers as have not to pay the penalty of their personal crimes, into manufacturers, farmers, and so on.

The horns of the dilemma are plain. Whichever alternative is taken by the pro-German or Pacifist he can no longer rightly complain at, or work against, or fail to support, the fullest safeguards being adopted to make it impossible that Germany shall relapse once more into what we have seen she is capable of being, or to ensure the most complete reparation being exacted to compensate those whom she has injured in the past.

All pro-Germans and Pacifists, save those who are anti-British, must welcome the simple, logical and consistent conclusion to which the above leads in respect of laying down and insisting upon the conditions of an effective peace, which shall combine the safeguards and reparation required with some hope that, might as opposed to right not having paid, the—to-day mythical—German of music and good-fellowship will be gradually evolved to the honest and whole-hearted joy of those who believe in, and seek to govern their lives and minds by, our view of civilization and the laws of humanity.

CONDITIONS

If world-peace is to prevail it can only come by the Allies laying down their conditions independently of any negotiations with Germany, her people and their associates.

If she is admitted to a conference, the Allied nations would be subjected by her to intrigue and bribery, cajoling and promises. Every representative or underling would have every sort of temptation, pressure and inducement brought to bear upon him to save this outlaw race from the penalties which they sought to inflict upon others and must now suffer themselves.

When the Allied nations have won the fight for freedom, they must in quiet and uninterrupted consultation settle and decide the terms on which the world can resume its peaceful progress, whilst Germany shall work out her own salvation by deeds and works of self-abnegation and repentance, not by resolutions, new parties or fresh leagues. Changes of heart and soul are required, not changes of Government.

To those who doubt the ability of the Allies to win through to an unconditional peace, a scheme, whereby Germany can be made to accept disarmament and the other terms required, is suggested on page 156; but to return to our text. The main terms essential for world-freedom from the German menace seem to include those which follow.

The safeguards are : first, total and permanent disarmament of Germany on land and sea and in the air, under a guarantee by the Allies to protect the States which have formed her Empire, and ensure to the people occupying such States the right to live under their own laws ; secondly, territorial adjustments, including the return of Alsace and Lorraine and the lessening of her sea-frontiers ; and, thirdly, the expansion of the Allied smaller nations and the freeing of the peoples, so that their national and racial aspirations can be fulfilled to the utmost, and so that those who wish shall join themselves to the larger nations, or form fresh countries amongst themselves.

The reparation is : first, the repatriation of all slaves, deportees, and girls and women abducted ; secondly, the

re-instatement of all buildings, the replacement of all plant, machinery and materials, and the making good of all damage, in the Allied territories; thirdly, the restoration "ton for ton," and more, of all shipping destroyed, and the return of all chattels stolen; fourthly, the payment of an indemnity to cover full compensation to the Allies, including the ultimate clearance of the expenses they shall have been put to and all losses which their subjects shall have incurred from the 28th July, 1914, until the damage done is made good and peaceful life resumed.

The safeguards mentioned are all in accordance with Germany's actual procedure in the past, or her declared intentions for the future, with regard to other nations. The reparation also is settled on her own precedents.

Nothing is suggested in these pages except that which Germany intended to apply to those she conquered, though it is but whips, or a second-division penalty, as compared with the scorpions and hard labour which her people and rulers planned to inflict on others, and which, to terrorize neutrals and penalize independence, she is inflicting on small nations from day to day.

Never again must Germany receive back her colonies, which the Allies have captured. She planned before the war to obtain the colonies of others for her own aggrandizement. Why should any one seek to stay her own laws being applied to herself?

Even the pro-Germans, Pacifists, conscientious objectors or others cannot deny that it would be cowardly to hand the native populations over to Germany.

Were this done, what would happen to the natives who welcomed the Allies, or even to those who acquiesced in the Allied occupation of the conquered areas? We know our German, as, in truth, do these pro-Germans, Pacifists, conscientious objectors and others, yet they press us to sacrifice those who supported us and deliver them over to such oppression and cruelty as would make death a happy release.

Even were there none whom the Germans could, on re-taking possession, identify as friends or supporters of the

Allies, what was Germany's pre-war record all over the world? "Shining armour" in China and a bestial brutality to defenceless natives under her control, far surpassing the tales of horror which Germany sought to use in her attempts to obtain the Congo territory from its owners. The authoress of *Uncle Tom's Cabin*, the book which focussed a revolution over a continent, would certainly have failed to depict what Germany, in the guise of a "colonizing Power," had done to natives, even before the war.

Let all study the records, which show yet greater brutality than that disclosed below in connection with a protest published by the *Daily Chronicle* early in 1917 against the Pacifist proposals to give Germany the Congo territory. "The Powers of Europe and America would surely never commit to Germany the care of 15 or 20 million natives in the Congo Basin upon Germany's past record, which it is now known was that of treating the natives as serfs who were solely at the disposal of the white over-lords. In February 1914 a representative Deputy of the Centre party declared in the Reichstag that there had been more loss of life on 'the German plantations than in the slave hunts of former years.' Immediately on the outbreak of war large numbers of native chiefs, including King Bell of the Cameroons, were hanged upon the mere assumption that 'they were friendly to the Allies.' These incidents of administrative and industrial activity might be multiplied tenfold, and constitute anything but a guarantee for the future."

Notwithstanding all this, straws are still seized upon by some in their attempts to show that Germany may yet receive back her colonies. The *Nation* of the 10th February, 1917, prints the following: "The Prime Minister made a speech at Carnarvon on Saturday. Lively and energetic in tone, it was slight in matter, and its chief point of significance was its repudiation of his colleague, Mr. Long, who had fixed the fate of the German colonies. Mr. George, on the other hand, declared that the question must await the decision of the Imperial Conference, and that it must form part of the general settlement."

In the same issue of the *Nation* the following appears in an

editorial note : " Clearly, then, the fate of East Africa cannot be decided to-day. If it is desirable to drive a bargain with Germany, it is one of the readiest assets in the hands of the Entente. As such it should, in our view, be regarded.—Ed. *The Nation*."

In a war for freedom the failure to free the natives from the horrors of German rule would seem to many unthinkable, but surely it would be worse to use those natives as a means of barter—should it be " desirable to drive a bargain with Germany," making terms for ourselves out of their blood and misery.

In truth there can be no safety in this world until a real security against Germany has been fought for and obtained.

Some claim that the Hohenzollern dynasty must be eradicated, German shipping kept off the seas for many years, and individual punishment meted out to those responsible for, or guilty of, committing such crimes as bomb-dropping on undefended cities, towns, villages and the countryside by Zeppelins or aeroplanes, bombardment of defenceless coast-towns, deporting whole populations as slaves, and seeking to terrorize by murder, ravishment, arson and other forms of " frightfulness."

Be the penalties what they may, the day must surely come when the Allies, if they are firm, can dictate their terms to Germany, and she must accept them, in unconditional surrender. She has raised the world in arms against her, and with blockade in war and, if necessary, with economic boycott in peace the peoples she has outraged can compel compliance with their terms. Whilst remembering that the conditions of peace indicated above are akin to those Germany applied to others in the past, that they are negligible beside what she has done to other nations during this war, and that the terms suggested are as honey compared to the bitter things she intended to inflict on those who withstood her, it must never be forgotten that every concession or reduction of the Allied requirements means not only the loss of what is foregone, but also an addition to the armaments which will have to be kept up lest the aggressor is encouraged to break loose once more.

The armaments required in the years to come will be increased in inverse ratio to each just penalty which Germany, wholly or in part, evades or is let off through the efforts of our Pacifists and pro-Germans; the war will continue to be prolonged by the hope which their manœuvres engender in Germany; and the work of rearranging the world progress in peace will be made more difficult.

For fear that any may forget the paramount reason for clean-cut and thoroughly drastic conditions of peace, it is necessary to emphasize the fact that Germany is the one and only nation which, since the world began, has set out seriously and deliberately to prepare in peace for the conquest of the world by a series of carefully designed wars.

Great kings and emperors there have been, barbarian hordes have ravaged and destroyed, dictators, autocrats and tribunes of the people there were with policies of conquest, but there have never been a people and rulers like the Germans who, working together, year after year and generation after generation, have covered the whole world with deep-laid plots for its subjection to one nation.

It is not only the means and methods adopted by the German people and rulers, treacherous and degrading in peace and horrible and outside the pale even in war as such means and methods have proved to be, that appall the Allies as the cold-blooded recklessness and utter unscrupulousness displayed in jeopardizing anything and everything to attain the end desired by this people and worked for by their rulers.

This malignant growth or power of evil may break out again at any moment in the years to come, and our choice is between two things. Either the Allies must render the German people innocuous, placing it beyond their power to do these wrongs, or, so long as Germany is left armed and capable of a fresh attempt upon the world's peace and quiet industry, each nation must be prepared and organized for war on land and sea and in the air, and ready to meet in the future intrigue, spying, chemical devices and death, to say nothing of disease distribution, whilst all progress will be diverted into the machinery of "frightfulness."

There is the choice; Germany has chosen her part, fixed the very terms for others, which those others can now rightly, sooner or later, make her accept; who dare take the responsibility of enforcing less against Germany, in order to preserve the peace, than Germany planned, in order to terrorize the nations of the world and to keep them under her tyranny?

FULFILMENT

Let us now see how the peace conditions can be carried out.

First, the safeguards. In the old days the conquered army laid down its arms, which the victors collected, gave up its horses, equipment and supplies, the vanquished ships struck their colours and were taken to the victors' ports, and fortifications were razed to the ground. If we follow these precedents, only munition factories, Zeppelins and acroplanes remain, and such of these as may be left can surely be dealt with by the Allies. The territorial adjustments are all in accord with precedents, and by now the general lines to follow as to the Allied smaller nations are so well known that the detail of the expansions should be approaching completion in the various Foreign Offices of the Allies, ready for final arrangement with the peoples who are concerned.

Secondly, the reparation. Germany has fixed before and during the war her own reliance on vast indemnities, and yet another confirmation is to hand in the form of a letter of Dr. Robert Bridges to *The Times* of the 8th February, 1917—

“In 1913 an American in Berlin was talking with one of the Prussian junkers about their plan for the conquest of England; and he asked him what they meant to do when they had conquered England—for the conquest was assumed as a matter of course. The Prussian replied: ‘The first thing we shall do is to impose an indemnity of twenty thousand million pounds.’

“‘But,’ objected the American, ‘there is not so much money in all the country.’

“‘We know that,’ answered the Junker, ‘but we shall

occupy England until they have paid it. They will have to work it out.'

" ' But if they refuse to work, how can you compel them ? ' "

" ' The lash,' said the Prussian.

" ' What ! Slavery ? ' "

" ' Yes ; slavery.' "

" It is easy and cheap for any one German to deny that he himself ever had such intentions. But this was the scheme of those who are responsible for the war. The first step was to destroy France so that she should not raise her head for a hundred years (those are their own words in print before the war), and they trusted that when France was destroyed they would be able, with the help of the rebellion that they had fomented in Ireland, and other advantages, to land sufficient troops in England to destroy us more easily than France.

" The American did not ask what was in store for him. . . . "

Criminal intent will out, and the answer the American would have received from the German had he asked the question is indicated in *The Times* of the 26th September, 1917. The news deals with an episode of 1898, but it comes opportunely to hand, and is as follows—

" *New York*, September 25. In the Senate yesterday Senator Lewis made public for the first time the full text of the prediction made by Captain von Goetzen, of the German Navy, to Admiral Dewey at Manila in 1898 that Germany would within a generation dominate the world. Reference to this prediction has been frequently made within the past nineteen years, but its full import had never before been revealed. As quoted by Admiral Dewey in his official report, von Goetzen said—

" ' About fifteen years from now my country will start a great war. She will be in Paris in about two months after the commencement of hostilities. Her move will be but a step to her real object—the crushing of England. Some months after we finish our work in Europe we will take New York and probably Washington, and hold them for some time. We will put your country in its place with

reference to Germany. We do not propose to take any of your territory, but we do intend to take a billion or so of your dollars from New York and other places. The Monroe doctrine will be taken charge of by us, and we will dispose of South America as we wish. Do not forget this about fifteen years from now.'

"Senator Lewis informed the Senate that this statement was communicated by Admiral Dewey to his Government.

" 'I never' (he added) 'understood why my Government did not allow this to be published. I never understood why it was not sent broadcast to our country and to our countrymen, who have heretofore been in doubt as to their duty. Many Senators have opposed the war and sought to hinder the Government in prosecuting the war, despite the fact that the plan of Germany to crush America has been established conclusively by this and other revelations.' "

The infamies of Germany—carried out or intended—are infinite, and none can hope to fathom them all; but it is no unfair summing-up to say that the only point left to pro-Germans and Pacifists is whether Germany can pay. Surely this is a false point. Since so far back as the days of the most ancient civilization it has never been a good, or even a proper or a moral, defence to a just claim, whether for debt, damages or penalty, to plead that judgment must not be pronounced because the debtor or wrong-doer cannot pay! The claim is just, and the Allies must take judgment.

When the judgment is obtained against Germany on her surrender, how will she pay it? Some time before the war, Germany's capitalized wealth was estimated at not less than £16,000,000,000 and her income not less than £2,000,000,000 per annum, to these must be added the wealth and earning power of her Allies. Whether or not, before the peace conditions to be laid down by the Allies are unconditionally accepted, the full indemnity be £10,000,000,000, £20,000,000,000 or more, Germany, Austro-Hungary, Turkey and Bulgaria could in

some form liquidate the amount out of their existing wealth.

In addition to this the work of the German people and the possessions and incomes of the German rulers, aristocracy, great shipping magnates and commercial kings, would alone enable her gradually to pay the debt she is incurring to our Allies, to Great Britain and the Empire.

Many methods are available; some suggestions follow—

(1) Germany can, as the debtor, issue loans, until the full indemnity is covered. Repudiation can be prevented by the occupation of her territory. In any case, it is only by the soldiers of the Allies being in occupation of her towns and villages for a considerable period that it can be brought home to the German people that, in spite of what their rulers may tell them, "Kultur," "frightfulness" and attempted world-dominion do not pay. The gradual extraction of colossal indemnities was her declared intention with regard to others; it is futile, and but encouraging further aggression, not to apply to her the physic she intended for the nations she attacked and those she had planned to control.

(2) The guarantee of the Allies can, if thought fit, be given to the lenders, to make the loan more liquid.

(3) Germany's protective duties, State railway profits, Federal and States revenues, and mining, patent, and other royalties, can be impounded.

(4) Her exports could be taxed at her ports for service of the debt to the Allies; her ships, when allowed at sea, charged special tonnage dues on sailing from her ports or to or from those of the Allies; and her citizens, seeking to live in Allied countries, can be compelled to pay an annual, graded poll tax, if they be admitted at all after their pre-war breaches of hospitality and more recent crimes.

(5) Under the peace-conditions all Allied imports can be made free from German protective duties and port or other charges and the saving credited to "indemnity account."

(6) There is yet another aid to payment. Let all the Allied nations insist that on all raw materials and other supplies sent by them to Germany a sufficient duty be imposed before

delivery. Let there be an excess charge on freights for all ships which she would use. She must have the goods; let her pay the extra charge occasioned by her conspiracy against the world. She has destroyed the ships, let her suffer first in respect of tonnage-shortage.

It must never be forgotten that the indemnities serve a treble purpose—restitution, penalties for damage, and protection against future aggression in war or unfair and underhand commercial dealing in peace. For these reasons the aggressor must ultimately pay the cost. Whatever Germany paid to, or whatever she did for, the rest of the world, during untold years, neither could wipe out the stain of her crimes and inhuman acts in peace and in war; neither could make good her "kultured" attack on civilization; neither could remove the shudder and deep loathing which humanity must always feel with regard to the ghastly holocaust of lives and that degradation of humanity which she has deliberately brought about for gain, and which her people have carried out in pursuance of long-planned, often written about and but too little believed schemes and methods laid down and approved in pre-war days by that nation and its rulers.

In justice to the world, to our dead and to those unborn, we have no right to forgo full indemnities; but, apart from this, it is surely impossible to permit any one to stay judgment being taken for the full amount against Germany, much less is it conceivable that any should accept the view of our late rulers, already referred to on page 99, as expressed by Mr. Asquith in the House of Commons on the 2nd August, 1916, after some two years of war, when he used words which are of sufficient importance to be quoted again. Those words were: "The war has opened our eyes to the full meaning and the manifold implications of the German system of economic penetration and commercial and financial control of vitally important industries, and to the use to which vantage ground gained by this system can be put in war. It is difficult, indeed, I think it is impossible, to believe that Germany would not continue to be animated by the same spirit and policy when the war is over; and she will start, be it observed, with certain

very obvious and considerable advantages. In the invaded territories, both in Belgium and in France, she has destroyed works and factories, and she has carried off large quantities of plant and of raw material—not to mention people—which have been sent to the industrial centres of Germany and of Austria. She has a large merchant fleet—for the time being safely interned in her own ports or in the ports of neutral countries. It is evident from the German trade papers that the Germans are counting on these factors to impede the industrial and commercial recovery of the Allies. They are already organizing their industries, and—do not let us be blind to this—for an attack on our Allied markets and for a vigorous and if possible victorious competition in neutral markets. It is, then, in our view—when I say in our view, I mean in the view of all the Allied Powers—necessary to make thorough preparation for the coming of peace, and the Paris Conference and the resolutions passed there represent the attempt of the Allies to decide the general lines on which that preparation should proceed.”

Why should the Allies leave Germany all these, or any, advantages? why should she grow rich again until she has made restitution and paid her just debts to the Allies? Why should Germany be permitted to go on with her pre-war plan to cripple in unfair ways our industries by “dumping” preparatory to absorbing those industries, and making slaves of our workmen, by such means as the German State and business banks, cartels, bounties, free import grants, special rates for exports over the State railways and duties on imports, and by a system of excessive production to kill our manufactures and our legitimate trade and finance? Why should Germany be left free and, indeed, aided (as in pre-war days she was by our rulers) to carry on such a trade war, with the ultimate enslaving of our people, under the guise of peace? Surely we must stop the Germans in peace from stealing our knowledge and experience by spies in our offices and works even as we must prevent that people conquering the world by like means in war.

Germany has been the assailant both in peace and in war, and neither in peace nor in war has she fought fairly; surely

she must be rendered powerless to interfere again with the lives of nations or of individuals either by war or in peace.

Only by this means can world-criminals be removed from the temptation to aggress; the way of the transgressor must be hard, the object is not to punish but to deter. Any other treatment of those who have designed and carried out such acts would be treachery to our dead and to those yet to be.

A SUGGESTION

Every one would like to see the war over, provided civilization were saved and "Kultur" and "frightfulness" laid low, never again to enmesh the world in war, or to undermine and terrorize it in peace. Others long to see the German people repent of the cruelties and crimes committed and by works meet for repentance return to the better life.

Three years of war have passed, yet the psychology of the German people and their rulers is still under discussion. None agree except in this, that it is not compatible with civilization and that it revels in cruelty, broken bonds and boasting, though the people are ready in the mass to face death that Germany shall be over all.

The secret of dealing with the German, as many have found in business, is to threaten if he threatens, and, if he carries out his threats, promptly and resolutely to retaliate. If the time be not ripe to retaliate, warn him seriously and solemnly that in due course what he does against others will be done unto him in full measure.

Air raids, sinking of ships, outrages on the defenceless, and other breaches of international law would soon have ceased had these methods been adopted, and still may do so were this line taken, for the bully hits not when he knows that he will, when the time comes, be hit back or paid in his own coin.

Let it also be made clear to him that each day's occupation of other people's lands will have to be made good by cash fine, or economic penalty, for his trespass.

Many believe that definite acts and declarations on the above lines would affect the business and bargaining nature and materialistic mind of the German people more quickly than anything else—the occupation of other people's lands, and the committal of other crimes, being obviously not worth so large a price. Indeed, the fight would soon be over if the Allied nations with their 1,300,000,000 of people signed a treaty that an economic boycott should be enforced after the war unless Germany disarmed and accepted our conditions.

As the German people invaded by surprise the peaceful territories of Belgium and Northern France in 1914, with every weapon of war and every use of frightfulness, so, unless it disarms, the German Army must retreat far within its borders again, under every warlike stress and strain to which the Allies can subject that army and those people.

For fear that any may think the German people really do not desire, or are not seeking, to retain the lands they have seized, or are not planning to continue in peace their permeation of other countries, let the following quotations be pondered from an article by Professor Dr. J. A. van Hamel in a then recent issue of the Dutch weekly review, *Amsterdam Zaer*, set forth in *The Times* of the 8th September, 1917. Professor van Hamel quotes the following opinion expressed by Herr Bassermann, the late leader of the German National Liberal Party—

“A Holland enclosed by German territory and a Belgium under German influence will and must come over to the German side. If our enemies succeed in restoring Belgium as an independent State, the influence of England and aversion to Germany will increase in Holland. If we have, on the contrary, Belgium under our military control, we shall then be able to protect Holland, surrounded by us on all sides, against an English invasion. By reason also of Holland we are unconditionally compelled to keep Belgium, in a military, economic, and political sense, in our hands. Much German blood has drenched the soil of Flanders. May it be given to us, not indeed to annex Belgium, but to keep her firmly in our hands.”

From a memorandum addressed by the German Navy League

last June (1917) to the Imperial Chancellor and the Federal Council, Professor van Hamel quotes the following passage—

“The key to Germany’s future is to be found on the coast of Flanders. Had we, before the war, had that coast in our hands and been in a position to fortify its harbours, England would never have dared to go to the aid of France. Germany’s domination over Belgium is a necessity. A return to Belgium’s former independence would be for us a defeat, after heavy fighting. Belgium is also an indispensable link in the chain of German sea trade. Only an Antwerp in a political and economic sense subordinated to Germany can give us satisfaction—an arrangement under which Flushing may, perhaps, play for Antwerp the part which Cuxhaven plays for Hamburg.”

Few seem yet to realize how necessary Germany herself makes it that the Allies shall prevent the swallowing up of the small nations by Germany in war or in peace and to stay the consummation of a solid territorial block whereby Belgium, the Netherlands, Denmark, Austria, Hungary, the Balkans, Greece and the Isles, Turkey and parts of Asia would be permeated and controlled by her—to say nothing of Russia, whom she is undermining daily by military, civil-agent and spy methods.

These matters are emphasized later, but we must now turn to the Pacifists who shut their eyes to all such vital matters, and who clamour that the peoples shall come together and make peace, as now desired by some in Germany who, after three years of brutal war, are fearful of what may befall them.

PACIFIST PROPAGANDA

Some of those who have been our rulers, as well as the pro-Germans and Pacifists, still seek to persuade our people to disregard these amply proved facts, and have said in the words, already referred to on page 100, spoken by Sir John Simon, M.P., at Manchester on the 29th September, 1916: “It was a plain commercial fact that if a man bought an article from another he did not buy it because he loved or hated the man,

but because it was to his advantage to buy it. We might adopt methods hereafter ill-devised or well-devised to interfere with, obstruct, prohibit, prevent, or penalize trade between Germans, on the one hand, and our own people on the other—he should not be in the least surprised to see a substantial diminution in such trade through perfectly natural causes—but nothing that anybody could do in this country could possibly interfere hereafter with the trade between Germany and the great neutral countries of the world. And it would be the height of folly to allow a community, even though actuated by feelings of righteous indignation, in times of passion, to take a step the real effect of which would be, not to disable or discourage the trade of Germany, but to give Germany an advantage as against ourselves in the great neutral markets.” There were very few “great neutral countries” outside the Allies when Sir John Simon spoke, and not long after his words were uttered nearly all the remaining great neutrals joined us.

Others have said, in the words of the *Nation* on the 30th September, 1916: “We can choose the method of subjection, occupation and trade boycott, accompanied by heavy territorial and monetary fines and losses. That is the method of the war after war. The other way is to rely, in the main, on a new organ of international life. We can call on Germany to reverse the course she took in 1914, and put her policy into the common stock.”

Or in those of the *Nation* of the 28th October, 1916: “Are the nations to lie on the rack of force, operated by every devilry that science can devise? That is the question. No belligerent States can settle it alone; it is the general moral concern. Therefore, it is that Lord Grey calls on the neutral States, with the greatest of them at their head, to assist the political settlement of Europe by basing it on international law. When Germany accepts that position, and comes in as a loyal member of the league of nations which it assumes, the key of the fortress that we seek to conquer will have been surrendered. Annexations, trade boycotts, projects of dismemberment are nothing to the point.”

The approval by Germany of such utterances and the encouragement which they have given to her to fight on and "bluff it out" are evidence by a quotation in *The Times* of the 10th February, 1917: "The *Frankfurter Zeitung*, in its usual manner, expresses complete confidence that when Germany has won the war she will in any case rapidly recover all that she has lost, 'especially as no great people can boycott or shoulder aside another great people out of pure considerations of sentiment.'"

The Pacifist propaganda, so pleasant for Germany and so helpful to her in continuing the war without fear for the future, seems strange to many and is terribly costly in life and money, but a very different lesson has sunk deep into the hearts of the British people as voiced by Mr. John Hodge, then Minister of Labour, when speaking at the Executive Council of the Associated Iron and Steel Workers of Great Britain, at Manchester on the 26th January, 1917. His words were reported in the *Manchester Guardian* as follows—

"*The Wide Open Door*.—He would be a dull man if he did not realize that the war had taught us many lessons. It has taught us lessons in political economy, lessons as to the economic basis upon which our country has been run. Some people say that old men never learn. I must be a young man, because I have learned something as a result of the war. As I said a moment ago, it has been a war of material. At any rate, fifteen millions of new capital has been expended in the extension of plant in the iron and steel trades, and the thought which has come across my mind is and has been, Is that capital to lie idle when the war is over? Probably before the war is ended the capital will be thirty millions instead of fifteen. If that plant is going to lie idle, it becomes unprofitable. Capital wants interest on its expenditure. If it cannot make interest on its capital expenditure, wages are going to suffer. I am not prepared to see wages suffer, to see an idle furnace because we are going to leave the wide open door to our enemies, when the war is over. I say I do not care whether it is by tariff, by prohibition, by Government bounty, or any other method, the plant in our country must be utilized.

“You will observe I have been very severely handled by some of the newspapers who have learned nothing, but still adhere to the obsolete, in my mind, political doctrines of the Cobden School of Manchester. I can speak for my own trade, and, as I have said and said emphatically, so far as I am personally concerned, I am not going to have my trade ruined because of any doctrines of that particular character. The *Manchester Guardian* said that I had been just as strong in my opinions with respect to Free Trade before the war as I am now strong with respect to my trade being protected after the war. I think there is something more in it than that. If I have got next-door neighbours who are continuously throwing rubbish into my backyard, throwing brickbats at my door, being cruel and unkind to my children—even if he is a butcher or a baker, I am not going to buy from him. I do not care if I have got to walk into another street and pay a farthing more for my loaf, I am not going to do it. That is the position of Germany towards this country. Talk about culture! As General Haig’s despatch demonstrated, she must have been considering the question of asphyxiating gases and liquid fire for years before the war, because it took months and months for our chemists to make the machinery for retaliating. Then we have the horrors of Belgium, the horrors they have perpetrated in Northern France, the bombardment of a peaceful seaport town like Scarborough, Zeppelin raids upon open towns in this country, the sinking of the *Lusitania* and neutral merchant vessels, the murder of Nurse Cavell, the execution of Captain Fryatt.

“*Intellectual Snobs*.—Can we forget these things? It would be a shame if we did, and in my opinion if we don’t make every sacrifice, whether in money or men, to see this war through to a successful termination we would only have to undergo these horrors once again, not probably in our time, but in that of our grandchildren, and that would be a disaster greater than the war itself. No premature or inconclusive peace can be thought of. The Conference in Manchester this week is a demonstration that the heart of the trade-union world is sound. Those who oppose us look upon themselves as

intellectuals. I described them the other night as intellectual idealists, but a friend of mine said that I was too kind to them, I ought to have called them intellectual snobs, and I believe that he was right and I was wrong."

Unfortunately the Pacifist propaganda has not been limited to the policy of leaving Germany with the "very obvious and considerable advantages" which her wrong-doing gave her, nor to that of encouraging Germany to prepare for and resume in peace her militant commercial methods and the unfair dealing against our own and other nations which she planned to permeate and dominate; it sought to make a "peace without victory" seem inevitable to us. It prepared the way for this end by laying stress on deadlocks, dangers and difficulties at home and abroad and by giving the impression that we lost much by the exchange of those rulers, who might have manœuvred an early peace, for other rulers who were determined to fight on until the war was won.

To quote again the words in *Common Sense*: "Unluckily for us all, at the very moment when more sensible views were beginning to prevail 'the Asylum Party'—to borrow a nickname from the *Spectator*—has broken up the Cabinet. But for Mr. Lloyd George and his friends we might have had an armistice at Christmas" 1916, "and an honourable peace on a firm basis before the end of the winter."

Or to repeat the quotation from the *Nation* of the 10th March, 1917: "We, on our side, had our hour of moderation. It came as the last phase of the Asquith Government. Important men were behind a policy, not of surrender—that was never thought of—but of amelioration. They failed, and the 'fight-to-finish' statesmanship and its supporting Press came into power."

So far did the "deadlock, danger and difficulty" method go that the *Nation* found its overseas circulation prohibited owing to some of those who fought for us calling attention to it.

In its issue of the 3rd March, 1917, these words appear: "The outlook is thus threatening and almost critical on the sea. If it is to be improved there must be a radical change

in the method of handling the situation. But this may now also be said of the war upon land. The event towards which our efforts had been directed for almost five continuous months has at length come to pass; but it has found our soldiers wanting. The greatest retreat on the west since the Marne has taken place; but in this case almost all the honours go to the enemy."

In the next number of the *Nation* after the prohibition, namely, that of the 14th April, 1917, the following statement is made: "As we were going to Press we received the following message from Mr. Runciman, too late for inclusion in our correspondence columns: 'That the Government should have suppressed the foreign circulation of the *Nation* is almost incredible. I am anxious to know why the only British weekly review expressing Liberal and Radical opinions should be forbidden by the Government to convey them to our Allies, and, indeed, to all the world. The prohibition of a foreign circulation of last week's number is a real loss to our new relations with the United States. In any case you are entitled to claim the same treatment as is given to other independent critics of this Government or its predecessors.'"

The correspondence column of the same issue contained Mr. McKenna's letter on the subject, which runs: "Sir,—The suppression of the report of public opinion by prohibiting the foreign circulation of the *Nation* is a wrong to the individual and the State. It is a misuse of powers intended by Parliament to secure the defence of the realm.—Yours, etc., REGINALD McKENNA."

It may be convenient, whilst dealing with this question, to quote here what Mr. Lloyd George said in the House of Commons on the 18th April, 1917: "The *Labour Leader* was forbidden to be exported out of Great Britain because the late Government discovered that articles in that paper were quoted abroad for the encouragement of the enemy, and undoubtedly they did encourage the enemy. The War Office, in conjunction with the Home Office, stopped the *Labour Leader*. The same official acted in the present case with the consent of the same department. For some time

articles had appeared in the *Nation* pressing for peace on the ground—for such was the general drift of the articles that military victory was impossible—that the war was practically a deadlock. The view of the Foreign Office when those articles first appeared was that the actual copies of the paper ought to be prevented, but that could not be done as the issue was already in process of circulation. The articles continued and culminated in the article which appeared on March 3. The article said ‘that the event towards which our efforts had been directed for almost five continuous months had at length come to pass, but it had found our soldiers wanting.’ ”

The Chancellor of the Exchequer also on the 18th April, 1917, very frankly stated that “the whole tendency of the *Nation*, not alone in the particular article referred to, but from week to week, was to put forward this view : ‘ We cannot possibly win the war, then why go on with it ? ’ ”

Later, on the 25th April, 1917, the Earl of Derby (Secretary for War) remarked in the House of Lords : “ The *Nation* had for some time past been publishing articles which were questionable in tone, and various representations were received by the War Office. With the issue of March 3 matters came to a head, because it then became clear that for purposes of its own the *Nation* was embarking on a deliberate policy of contending that the Allies could never win the war, and that consequently it was a crime to go on fighting. To prove this contention the *Nation* did not hesitate to disparage the work of the British Army and belaud by contrast the skill of the enemy in France. Sir D. Haig called the attention of the War Office to this article. He did not ask that the newspaper should be suppressed. It would not be his duty to make such a suggestion. But he would be failing in his duty if he did not draw attention to such articles, as being detrimental to his troops. It was not, however, until the Home Office and the Foreign Office found that the German wireless were quoting the *Nation* that action was taken. Could the House doubt for one minute but that the competent military authorities were anything but long-suffering in waiting so patiently before prohibiting the export of the *Nation* ? He maintained that they were absolutely justified in the action

they had taken. He disliked interfering with the liberty of the Press, and nothing was further from his wish than that anything should be done to stop the Press having the power of free discussion and statement regarding any individual. But there came a moment in dealing with the affairs of the country when the *Nation* used that liberty as a licence to say things to the detriment of the country. That moment was reached on March 3."

Many think that the prohibition of the foreign circulation of the *Nation* was not an infringement of the liberty of the Press, so dear to all, but a prevention of the encouragement of our enemies and the misleading of our friends by departures from the truth—our soldiers were not found wanting; nor was a victorious peace impossible—and by the exaggeration of the number and importance of those whose views this paper represented.

Few Liberals and Radicals could have believed the statements made, fewer still could have supported the opinions expressed; others bought the paper for its excellent literary matter; others, again, read it to keep themselves acquainted with various manœuvres of the Pacifist, pro-German, "peace without victory" and conscientious objector cliques.

Many other things adverse to Great Britain, some of which have been already mentioned in this book, appear to be part of, or material to, the Pacifist propaganda which is supported in every possible way by Germans and pro-Germans, who recognize that its end, if attained, would inevitably be greatly in favour of an all-powerful Germany.

One penalty paid by us for this Pacifist propaganda is instanced in the glorification of the Hague Conventions, ignored by Germany in war, and in the suggestion of a new Declaration of London, strengthened yet more against the Allies and so designed as to weaken still further the great and costly responsibility of the guardianship and trust of the freedom of the seas, which over long cycles of years all the world has reposed in the navies of Great Britain.

Sir Edward Grey, in reply to the German Imperial Chancellor, Dr. von Bethmann-Hollweg, on the 26th August, 1915, con-

firms the worst. His words run : " The freedom of the seas may be a very reasonable subject for discussion, definition and agreement between the nations after this war."

From this proposal by our late rulers again to place our naval power and responsibilities in the " melting pot " at the mercy of Germany, who would welcome the extinction of both, it was but a step to find Lord Grey of Falloden disclosing, on the 23rd October, 1916, at the Hôtel Cecil, at the meeting of the Foreign Press Association, that he was encouraging the project of a " League of Nations." His words were : " I believe that the best work that neutrals can do for the moment is to work up an opinion for such an agreement between nations as will prevent a war like this from happening again. If nations had been united in such an agreement and prompt and resolute to insist in July 1914 that the dispute must be referred to a conference or to the Hague, or that the Belgian Treaty must be observed, there would have been no war."

It has since been disclosed that Lord Grey of Falloden had sent a cable to be read at a meeting held in New York under the auspices of the League to Enforce Peace. The words used were stated in the House of Commons on the 30th November, 1916, to be as follows : " I think public utterances must have already made it clear that I sincerely desire to see a League of Nations formed and made effective to secure the future peace of the world after this war is over. I regard this as the best, if not the only prospect, of preserving treaties and of saving the world from aggressive wars in years to come, and if there is any doubt about my sentiments in the matter, I hope this telegram in reply to your own will remove it."

Breach of treaties is surely not, as this cable implies, a commonplace of civilized nations, whatever a " cultured " people or those with " Geist " may do, but it is difficult to conceive anything more likely to encourage and assist Germany in striving for victory than this " red herring " drawn across the trail.

Furthermore, this question has been followed up in the words of the *Nation* of April 14th, 1917 : " . . . if Germany had to be excluded, the league would certainly not be a league

of peace. A league of combat and defence it might be, but engaged as it would be in a long struggle with another rival combination, its first phase would be rather the effective organization of a world-conflict than the organization of world-peace. From that prospect the imagination recoils, and if it were forced upon us, we should see in it a confession of the bankruptcy of human wisdom."

With the immense sacrifices of life and treasure, which the Allies and ourselves have had to face, to save the world from German domination, it seems wrong to encourage a belief amongst the German people that, if they do not succeed in enslaving the world, they can join a League of Nations wherein apparently our late rulers intended facilities being given for dealing with the "freedom of the seas," notwithstanding the fact that this war has again shown that it was our naval power that once more made it possible to stay the hand of a Power seeking to aggress Europe and the world.

The German people well know that if our Pacifists can manœuvre our people into peace now, Germany has won. Who can deny the correct view-point disclosed by the concluding words of the leading article in the *Daily Chronicle* of the 15th August, 1917, which refer to the telegraphic communication respecting the intervention of the Pope with peace proposals? The article ends as follows: "The best terms that we could to-day get as to territory would, generally speaking, be the restoration of the *status quo*; but this formal restoration would leave unaffected the four great results provisionally achieved by Germany in the war—her conquest of Austria-Hungary, her solution of the Polish question in a sense calculated to bring the whole Polish nation (the sixth in Europe) within her circle of power, the destruction of Russia's position as a Great Power, and the proof of German supremacy throughout Central Europe and the Balkans in such a way as to ensure her future omnipotence there. Let us add, that it would leave these four achievements standing, as they stand now, to the credit of the Prussian militarist oligarchy; and would, therefore, destroy any chance of democratizing Germany or making democracy 'safe' anywhere else."

Even on the above basis, and Germany is still (October 1917) fighting for much more, the danger to the world from the menace of the German people would be worse than that preceding the war. Is it to be for such an end that the civilized nations of the earth have sacrificed so much?

Curiously enough, as these words are being written, the fourth or fifth night attack by "Gothas" in relays is passing overhead on its way to destroy small houses in the East End of London, poor women and innocent children—not brought up, as the German little ones are, in hate of others and in belief of their right to do anything in order to become Lords over all.

The drone and hum of the machines, followed by the crash and boom of guns from our barrages, hastily improvised to protect the defenceless, give an inspiring note to all who would stay the world of cruelty and of slavery, which would inevitably, sooner or later, result from the peace propaganda of the Germans, pro-Germans, Pacifists and Internationalists amongst us.

THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

It seems but right that the proposal for a League of Nations should be considered and reconsidered—discussed and rediscussed—many times before Great Britain and the Allies permit themselves to be manœuvred into its acceptance.

A League of all the Nations of the world, to stay a menace such as that disclosed by the long-planned aggression of Germany, might prove to be as impracticable and as productive of ill, to any who were led to rely upon it, as was the philosopher's stone striven for by our ancestors with alchemists, or as the scheme for producing sunbeams out of cucumbers, which has been immortalized as the essence of futility.

Even if all the experience of the past be set aside, yet there are certain simple points to be considered thoroughly before the League be embraced as a patent "cure all" for every, or, indeed, any trouble of the world. Certainly none should permit

themselves to be carried away by the glamour of Germanism, pro-Germanism, Pacificism, Internationalism, or any other anti-British device, such as this League bids fair to be.

The disregarding of lights on an unknown sea at night would be no less foolish than ignoring the fact that this League of Nations propaganda is being assiduously introduced and skillfully advanced all over the world, in every section of society high or low, rich or poor, satisfied or unsatisfied.

The reliance on a League of all Nations for the future handling of world-questions, including the freedom of the seas, is either the most wonderful discovery since the creation of the world, or the latest instance of those "soporifics" which landed Great Britain in this great war unprepared, unarmed, and at variance within her borders.

The League is a fascinating proposal—almost hypnotic—in a time of bitter stress. It has seemed to many a very drug in nights of sleeplessness and in days of loss and suffering—so are morphia and opium, but who would let their worst enemy rely on such things?

Better by far to face realities, to suffer if we must suffer, to prepare if we must prepare, and to bear the burden of our high estate as a great nation, whatever the cost may be in lives and money, than to lean on a League, which may be but a shield of buckram or a shoddy staff—sure to break when the slightest weight is thrown upon it.

Whether the shield or staff be strong or weak, we are but tenants for life and must pass on the heritage unencumbered by any evasion of responsibility, such as was tried in pre-war days, or any sheltering behind a League of Nations, such as is suggested now for the days to come.

If, however, Great Britain is to shift even a fraction of her rights and duties on to the League after the war, or, worse still, is to approve a peace because the League is to do this or that hereafter, which has never in the course of the world's history been done by any set of individuals or nations—much less by any league—every soul in these islands, or fighting abroad for us, is entitled to be consulted with regard to this "delegation" of the nation's task to any outside conglomeration. In a free

nation no rulers can be permitted to pre-judge or commit the democracy on so great an issue.

Even if it were right to escape responsibility by passing it on to a League of Nations, none can escape thought as to whether such a course is wise. The preliminary questions dealt with below suggest themselves as requiring careful consideration before any commitment even to the principle of a League is made.

(1) *Who were the League's Sponsors?*

Primarily the sponsors were amongst the neutral nations who, not being in the fight with the aggressor themselves, desired as members of a League of Peace to have some say in days to come.

Some proposed that the League should merely consider and advise, others that it should arbitrate and give decisions. None seemed to realize that advice is only taken by him whose ends are served thereby, and that a decision is of no avail without ample force to compel its acceptance and a well-organized machinery for promptly and resolutely insisting on the immediate application of such force.

To these original sponsors were soon added our late rulers. To them, such a League of all the Nations must have seemed ideal, envisaging as it did the revival, on a far larger scale, of the Hague Conventions and the Declaration of London, which our late rulers had fostered to prove that war would never be, or, to show, if it came, that a powerful Navy was a superfluity, and anything more than a small fighting force a waste of money.

Neither set of sponsors can claim disinterestedness. The neutrals concerned were seeking in peace what they had not earned in war, whilst our late rulers were trying to return to their pre-war lines under the guise of a League whose aims and objects have a strange resemblance to those whereby such terrible disasters have befallen Great Britain and the world.

In both cases these sponsors lacked weight. Men of peace do

not prevent war; more often than not they help, by their pacificism and avoidance of realities, to bring it about.

Undoubted as may be the good faith and however excellent the intentions of these sponsors, they show no superiority of the League of Nations idea over the old and long-proved methods, which have given peace amongst the Great Powers of Europe for nearly half a century, and which, if the old methods had not been departed from by our rulers in pre-war years, might have prevented any serious war for a far longer period. Certainly if the precedents of history be followed, now that war has come, a hundred years of peace should result from so great a war as this, but to obtain such a peace the aggressors must be fought to a finish and dealt with as they have sought to deal with others.

It is curious to note that some of the strongest supporters of the League are those who are working for an inconclusive peace. They realized that the British people and others would never stomach an ineffective end to the war, unless somehow or other a fresh issue could be introduced. The League of Nations seemed the very thing for their purpose.

To the war-weary, the anxious, the distressed, the lover of mankind, and even to the fighting man, and certainly to the international financier, these Pacifists could say, "What is the use of fighting for a victorious peace and the safeguarding of the future when the League of Nations will make wars impossible and ensure that every nation is free to live its own life in its own way?"

Splendid as the theme was made to sound, and ideal as the issue raised was for the object which the Pacifists had in view, many have realized with a true instinct that there must be something wrong somewhere, or why should these supporters include amongst their number the pro-Germans and many Germans who fear the consequences of their aggression?

In addition to the instinctive repulsion which many feel with regard to this League conception, there is a vital question first to decide, namely, whether Germany could be safely or rightly admitted to any League.

(2) *How could Germany be admitted?*

Is Germany to be admitted as a member of the League of Nations, in spite of the crimes of her rulers and the violation of laws—human and divine—by her people, and in spite of the education of her children so that they learn to view themselves as super-men and the other nations of the world as inferior races?

To answer this question and to grasp the extraordinary nature of the proposition defined by the *Nation* (the only British weekly review which, it is said by Mr. Runciman, expresses "Liberal and Radical opinions," see p. 163) that human wisdom is bankrupt unless Germany be taken into the League, it is well to use the experience of thousands of years with regard to individuals—for hitherto the laws applicable to nations in our civilization have been evolved from those proved to be wise with regard to man.

It has not throughout the history of the world been found wise to release from prison those who are guilty of offence, from the murderer down to the pickpocket, nor to allow them to keep "certain very obvious and considerable advantages," which they may have gained by their crimes, nor to accept them as a highly honoured brigade, if not the controlling members, of the police force, much less of the community.

Surely it would clearly be in defiance of religion, morality and fair dealing to take the criminal nation—Germany—and her associates in their long-planned outrage on civilization, into a League of Nations.

Our late rulers have themselves defined in various speeches some of Germany's crimes against our civilization, but take the words of Lord Grey of Falloden at the Foreign Press Association on the 23rd October, 1916, before the more recent cruelties and crimes were committed: "Germany complains of our methods in this war. She complains of our blockade. From the very beginning Germany did her utmost to prevent food reaching this country. In the early stages of the war she sunk two neutral ships with food for this country. It does not lie with her to complain of our blockade. But

what about other methods which had been introduced—the sowing of mines indiscriminately upon the high seas, a danger equally to neutrals and to belligerents; the pouring of shells into defenceless coast towns?—because you must remember that what is required, according to the German Official Communiqués, to convert an Allied town on the coast into a fortress is not the position of guns in it or the presence of troops, but merely the fact that she was fired upon by a German cruiser. (Laughter.) Then there is the use of poisonous gas in war, which nobody would have believed possible if the Germans had not begun it, which nobody thought of using till the Germans began it. In the Gallipoli Peninsula neither we nor the French used the gas, because we would not be the first to introduce it anywhere. That has been brought into the war. Then there is the sinking of merchant vessels, with the destruction of the passengers and crews; the acts committed in Belgium and other Allied territory in the occupation of Germany, some of which have been the subject of investigation and report, in breach of all the laws and conventions of war and all the most elementary dictates of humanity.”

It is beyond belief that Germany, who has done these awful things, should be permitted, much less urged, to attend the council table of a League of Nations under our civilization; but to continue the remarks of Lord Grey of Falloden—

“And one thing more, of which we hear little, very little, and do not know the full story. Since the outbreak of war, since Turkey entered the war, she has been the vassal of Germany. Enough has leaked through to make it clear that there has gone on, and is going on in Turkey on a scale unprecedented, and with horrors unequalled before, an attempt to exterminate the Christian population; horrors which Germany could have prevented, and which could only have gone on with her toleration. Perhaps some day some neutral nation who knows the full story will make it known to the world. All these things have been happening during this war, and what a prospect it opens for the future! Are all the resources of science to continue to be devoted after this war to invent means of destroying the human race, with no restriction upon

their use? It is a prospect which threatens civilization and existence of the race itself."

Such words as these are too strong for mere murderers and others whom we consider criminals. Would our late rulers advocate the admission of such super-criminals to our households? Surely, all agree that imprisonment and segregation follow such crimes in the individual. How can a nation so guilty according to our civilization be allowed to return, unrepentant and with hands still red, to the comity of nations? Lord Grey of Falloden has more to add—

"Germany, in letting loose these things, has been the great anarchist who has let loose on the world a greater and more terrible anarchy than any individual anarchist ever dreamed of. (Cheers.) In future, war, unless there is some means of restraining it, will by the development of science be made even more terrible and horrible than this war has been, because Germany has thrown down all the barriers which civilization previously built up so as to keep the horrors of war within bounds. Neutral nations have an interest in seeing that something is done to ensure that there shall be rules which shall be kept in future wars—rules which shall be so laid down and supported that it will be clear that any nation which departs from them will be regarded by the whole world as the enemy of the human race, and have the whole world against them.

"The indiscriminate use of high explosives to destroy great cities, to destroy combatants and non-combatants alike, all those things which have been done in this war, the introduction of poisonous gas, the introduction perhaps of disease—it will need all the efforts not only of belligerents but of neutrals, after this war is over, to see that the barriers necessary to secure that the inventions of science are used in the future, in the air, on the land, in the water and under the water, not for the destruction of mankind, but for its welfare; to see that all nations shall recognize some responsibility to prevent outbreaks of war, and that, if there be war, it shall be conducted by rules at least as humane as those which our ancestors observed, and which Germany to-day has disregarded and thrown to the winds. This is a matter in which the whole human race is interested."

With such a summary by our late rulers of cold-blooded crime (and they can hardly be accused of not over-appreciating the "Geist" and "Kultur" of Germany), with such excesses of the beast, with a whole nation revelling in these horrors as aids to the triumph of its aim, and with the Allies of that nation acquiescing and participating in such deeds, it is strange to find it seriously argued that the "anarchist," Germany, should be persuaded, encouraged or bribed into joining a League of Nations which is supposed to be going to protect that civilization which we are striving to safeguard against the long-planned and deep-laid plot for its destruction on the part of these very people themselves.

Surely Germany has by her own acts placed herself outside the proposed League.

If the German people desired (as our pro-Germans and Pacifists represent they do) to link up honestly in a League of Nations, would they have continued to commit (not only at the Front and on the seas, but also in their own peaceful home country, which had not yet suffered even the trivialities of war-hurt) such horrible brutalities and fiendish cruelties on the defenceless, the evidence of which is beyond dispute and which, after three years of war, continues to come in day by day?

The acts which the German people have spontaneously done, and are still doing, prove that she prefers outlawry, reckoning herself superior to all, though she is prepared to accept the League as a means to her ends.

Even were this not so, the wrongs, cruelties and disregard of honour, which she admits, are too grievous to permit of that amelioration which some still advocate in respect of the lot which this nation has brought upon itself.

Only by studying, as the evidence continues to be collected, what the German people have done, can the horrors which they have committed in war be realized; only by a like study can the betrayals and unfair dealings they plotted in peace be understood.

Yet, if her deeds did not place her beyond the pale, her rulers and her people continue to show that her signature is of no avail, and that her membership of conventions, leagues or

even alliances is a farce which she only plays in until it suits her to turn it into a tragedy.

As Mr. Gerard, formerly the United States Ambassador at Berlin, has told us in his book: "Shortly before leaving Germany, in January 1917, and after I had learned of the probability of a resumption of ruthless marine war, at an evening party at Dr. Solf's, the Colonial Minister, a large German, who turned out to be one of the Grand Dukes of Mecklenburg-Schwerin, planted himself some distance away from me and addressed me in German, saying: . . . 'We care nothing for treaties,' and my answer, 'That is what they all say,' was a retort too obvious to be omitted."

Another instance, to illustrate that the deliberate intention to disregard treaties, and that the continued will to aggress again and again, both still exist after nearly three years of war, appears in Professor Hans Meyer's article in *Deutsche Politik* of 18th May, 1917, quoted by *The New Europe* in its issue of 2nd August, 1917. Herr Meyer writes: "Our greatest colonial aim, in war as in peace, is the formation of a solid Central African colonial empire, in which Mozambique, Angola and the islands in the Gulf of Guinea will take their place. But German Central Africa could not exist unless it were bound to the mother-country by a chain of naval *points d'appui*, for which the Portuguese possessions of Guinea, the Cape Verde Islands, Madeira and the Azores are clearly designed. . . . But we shall surely triumph in our world-policy if we set our German 'will to victory' against that of the other Powers, if, at the decisive moment, we have statesmen who, in the Napoleonic phrase, can 'think in continents,' and if we meet the danger of being fettered by paper conventions and treaties by throwing into the balance the—God grant it!—victorious German sword."

From the highest to the lowest, instances like these, in word and deed, are innumerable and continuous.

How can those who talk thus, and act as they do, expect their word to be taken, or how can their friends in our midst plan that they shall be admitted to association in a League of Nations, the essence of which must be good faith?

(3) *What are the League's Foundations?*

Some seem to think that to obtain a perfect world each human being should have one vote as a member of the nation to which he belongs, so that he could be made to vote or be inveigled into exercising the franchise on every question which arose, whether he had studied it or not, and that each nation should have one vote in a League of Nations, so that all the nations should have equal power on every issue whether such issue was material to them or not.

It seems probable that any nation which adopted the democratic theory in its entirety—the power of the people by each and all voting to decide every matter—would gradually fall back in the race towards a better life, and would end up by devoting its people's time to a continuous round of electioneering, meetings, resolutions and propaganda—anarchy and misery would follow.

It also appears certain that if all the nations attempt to rule the world by each voting on every question involved, an impossible position would soon be created, at least so far as some of the great, and many of the smaller, Powers are concerned—war would be the only way out of the tangle.

All, except anarchists, have agreed that there must be many safeguards adopted in respect of the people ruling themselves; indeed, experience points to the worst dictators being those who wield the power of majorities on whatever pretext obtained or however maintained.

Much certainly remains to be done even in the United Kingdom before a system of Government fair to all is produced, in order to replace that oligarchal or multiple-autocratic tyranny to which the party machine had reduced us before the war. Surely we must put our own affairs in order and safeguard our own future before embarking with other nations upon a grandiose league scheme, to beget in an aggravated form many of the difficulties and dangers which we have failed to solve even in respect of our own populations.

With so little progress made in elucidating the problem of each nation to govern itself and the individuals composing it,

it seems worse than useless to embark, in the middle of a great war or for years thereafter, on the consideration of this idea of a League which, on the one hand, is to rule world destinies, and, on the other, to limit the scope to be permitted to the aspirations, freedom and future of each nation.

It is somewhat paradoxical for the Pacifists and pro-Germans, who assisted us into the frying-pan which Germany had well-heated and from which we are escaping, to urge us to jump into the new fire of world-dominion by grouped-rulers, which they have hastily prepared, under the guise of a League of Nations.

Unless worse ills are to befall, these rulers, who are to order the world in the proposed League of Nations, will have to be such as there have never yet been on this earth, whilst the bureaucracy, presumably to be collected from that caste in each nation, must eliminate all the traits of all their kind. Otherwise the nations of the world will find that they have laid one menace by force of arms only to be fettered and trammelled by something far more subtle, with an octopus-like capacity for entwining all in its feelers and destroying the very freedom for which we have been fighting.

Even if rulers and bureaucrats change their skins the old serpent will remain; even if the fissures and faults already indicated in the proposed foundations for the League are patched up, how can they ever be sound whilst realities are ignored? A few of these realities may be pointed out.

Had Germany been a member of a League of Nations before the war she could still have fought this fight, with Austria-Hungary, Turkey and Bulgaria to support her. No neutrals, by joining the Allies, could have stopped her. Nothing that a League, including the neutrals, can do in the future could prevent Germany, unless disarmed by the Allies, choosing her time to conspire with her confederates and again test her "Mailed Fist."

Germany would, owing to the League, find her next attempt less rather than more difficult if the other nations "play the game," to paraphrase Lord Grey of Falloden's expression, and reduce their armaments.

In a League of Nations there would be the added danger that

many might be inveigled into joining with Germany in fear of what might happen, or in the hope of favours to be received if she dominated the world.

Again, a League of Nations must tend still more to prevent the people knowing the truth, and, even did they know it, the League would tend to stifle their voice. The assembly of rulers would make confusion worse confounded; later, sides would be taken and wars become more likely, instead of less likely.

No nation has yet eliminated the internal strife between individuals—assaults and murders—nor that between masses and bodies of men in the community—strikes and riots. Even in the United Kingdom the party politics of our rulers in the eight years preceding the war had resulted in tactics and manœuvres whereby individuals were set against individuals, class against class, Church against Church, and even nation against nation to such an extent that civil war was apparently inevitable in one, and more than likely in another, direction.

In a League of some thirty nations analogous evils or similar mischiefs are the least of the dangers which would be created. Any nation or group of nations striving for aggrandizement would manœuvre to get other nations to vote for the objects desired by the aggressor.

Such nations would be tempted so to vote not because they consider the objects to be right, but in order that they, in their turn, in consideration of their having so voted, might receive support for some end of their own.

The League of Nations, it is said, is to be founded on a basis of "equality for each nation"; surely this equality of nations can never be realized until the long-striven-for equality of men has been attained.

More than a hundred years have passed since the equality of men was proclaimed in the French Revolution, long years have gone by since the doctrine was first carried to America. History tells us that intolerance and persecution followed in both cases. The abolition of capital punishment in France was succeeded by the shambles of the guillotine, and the religious freedom vaunted in America ended in the scarlet letter, notwithstanding the words of our Lord, "he that is without sin, let him first cast a stone at her." Never has

equality been attained, nor is there any sign in the history of the world that it is feasible on any scale worth talking about.

The attempt to secure freedom and equality by any short-cut but emphasizes the old saying that "the short cut is the longest way home." Indeed, equality when reached results in the negation of all that gives a zest to life and ensures progress; it will only come when the world as we know it to-day ceases to exist.

Doctrinaires may continue to write theses upon equality and leagues, and to argue about such theories, but we have the hard facts to face of countries invaded, outrages on defenceless women and little children, and horrors hitherto unimagined even in the savage world or in that of the beasts.

Let us get on with what has to be done in war and in peace; why waste time in discussing with those who proclaim themselves theorists and with others who have opposed the expenditure of lives or money to end the wrong?

Where is the race of men who would acquiesce in, much less fight for, a League of Nations based on such phantasies? Germany claims the "super-man," but the proposed "peace even if attacked" doctrine is but fit for "neuter-men," the conscientious objectors or the international socialists who treat the nation to which they belong, or to which they have attached themselves, as of no account.

Surely with these unsolved problems before us which confront those who have dreamed dreams of the equality of man, but who have failed to materialize them, we are entitled to urge that some little diffidence be exercised by any who press us to seek new mirages based on these other visions, which, so long as things are as they are in this world, must remain soporifics, any reliance on which will produce another awakening as terrible as that of 1914.

(4) What of its Peaceful Persuasion?

None can refrain from some consideration of what, if anything, a League of Nations can do which the Allies did not do, are not doing, or cannot do.

One of the great points put forward by those who support

the League is the effect of "peaceful persuasion." Lord Grey of Falloden, our late rulers, the pro-Germans and the Pacifists talk of round-table conferences, arbitration and other so-called peace-protection devices.

Germany was actually, in 1914, offered, by ourselves and our original Allies, more than any League could have given: (a) Conferences of all sorts were suggested; (b) arbitration by the Hague Tribunal was offered on the 29th July, 1914, and was available throughout; (c) mediation was more than once urged (see Sir Edward Grey to the British Chargé d'Affaires at Berlin, 25th July, and again to Berlin on the 28th July, 1914); (d) His Majesty King George and the then Czar of Russia both intervened personally and directly with the German Emperor; and (e) our late rulers even proposed to Germany on the 31st July, 1914, that if Germany could get any reasonable proposal put forward and Russia and France rejected it, these rulers would have nothing more to do with the consequences—a colossal bribe to Germany, though outweighed by her belief that our then rulers would restrain Great Britain so that she remained neutral. No League could have done so much towards persuading Germany and Austria-Hungary to pursue the path of peace.

As to forcing Germany to follow that path in 1914, all that a League could have said to Germany was, "if you persist in forcing war, Great Britain and her Empire will join with those you attack, and we will blockade you." But our late rulers could (see the opening part) have said this at any time during the critical days of July or early August 1914. Besides, they could have said it even more strongly than a League of Nations, because these rulers had it in their own power to make the decision, to declare it and to prepare our forces for movement.

Our late rulers could not manage to make up their minds in July-August 1914 by a clear declaration to stay even so flagrant an aggression as that contemplated by Germany, though, had they done so, the weight of some 400,000,000 of people would have been thrown into the scale, making, with the 260,000,000 of France and Russia, well over one-third of the world's population ready to fight for peace.

There can be no assurance that rulers, like those we have

had, would not hereafter in the council of the League display the same hesitations as were displayed in 1914. Indeed, such rulers would probably be even less definite, for there could be no clear and clean-cut issue and responsibility in the council of a League of all the Nations of the world, like there was before the Great War, in the frank, plain, almost brutal, and often repeated exposé to our rulers, by France and Russia, that there would be war, unless our rulers made up their minds, in time, to state clearly to Germany that Great Britain and the Empire would not stand aside, even for a day, if Germany persisted in aggression.

In a multitude of councillors, in a League of Nations, our late rulers could have still more easily temporized, sought to evade responsibility and postponed decision, whilst Germany and her Allies continued their preparations to fight for what they wanted—even resolute rulers would find it difficult to move in such a League.

Surely promises, treaties, the Hague Conventions, the Law of Nations, as laid down in many authoritative books, and indeed the laws of humanity itself (many of which, though broken by Germany, are observed to a large extent by savage tribes, and by the brute beasts) having failed, a new League will find itself no improvement on the old comity of civilized nations, from which the German people have by their acts cast themselves out.

It will certainly produce fresh dangers and difficulties, raise fresh issues between the nations, and prejudice some to the advantage of others, as did the Declaration of London, which, had we signed it before the war, as our late rulers tried to make us do, must have rendered our Navy in many particulars of little avail, and greatly increased Germany's power against the Allies and civilization.

(5) How would the League work in Practice?

After sparing some time for thought, the plain man must be sceptical at the idea of a League of Nations solving what the nations themselves have failed to solve. Startled must he be at the notion of once more relying on treaties and conven-

tions, which have so recently proved to be but an increased source of power for evil in the wrong-doer and to assure to him advantages over the countries which stand by their obligations and rely upon others doing likewise.

To expect a League of Nations to remove war from the world is like asking the doctor to do away with disease so destructive to the body, the lawyer to stop litigation so destructive to the mind and property, or the clergyman to stay doctrinal fights so destructive to the advancement of the soul. Each quickly becomes too busy in earning his livelihood, which involves the continuance of the very things desired to be eliminated, to consider the removal of the difficulties and dangers encouraged by his activities.

It is a true saying that—

“Big fleas have little fleas upon their backs to bite 'em,
And little fleas have lesser fleas and so *ad infinitum*.”

The application of these words of wisdom is clear. Surely it must be obvious to all that the remedy would be worse than the disease if, feeling the irritation and discomforts of wars at comparatively long intervals, we produced from every nation a fresh department and bureaucracy to argue by cables and correspondence on all sorts of subjects, and from time to time to meet round the council table with a view to removing from the world something which has always existed in it.

There would soon be a fresh set of insects attracted to the new ones created ; fresh sources of irritation would be produced. The above saying would soon be justified, in this case also to infinity.

Better surely it must be to meet these troubles by the means we wot of than launch ourselves into fresh seas of trouble, risking according to every known law our last state being worse than that from which we are asked to escape. And this just when we have nearly paid the price for peace, and shall soon be able to compel it for generations to come, so far as the present aggressor is concerned.

None of those who preach the formation of a League of Nations in the present prevented war in the past, nor did they join promptly in the Great War for justice, right-dealing and

the protection of the defenceless. Many of these supporters of a League still stand aloof, and others of them have hampered us and still hamper us in the fight for right. For all these reasons a League of Nations must be looked at on its own merits, and not on the authority of those who present it.

If it were possible that a League of Nations could be made to work without being a fresh hot-bed for breeding wars, the first point which must strike any practical man is that its power will depend on quick mobilization in support of those first attacked by the aggressor.

There will be but few free nations which are likely to be near the centre of the first onslaught by a Power which has been working for an attack on others.

The majority of nations are scattered all over the world, their respective populations are often comparatively small, and in most cases are thinly diffused throughout wide areas.

The following table draws attention to some facts bearing on this point of view of the problem involved in a League of Nations which in the end must be worse than useless unless it justifies its existence by efficiency in policing the world against those who threaten its peace, on land or sea or in the air.

Country.	Square Miles.	Population.	Average Number of Inhabitants per Square Mile.
Netherlands . . .	12,648	6,023,000	476
United Kingdom . .	121,386	45,369,000	380
Italy	110,550	34,672,000	313
Germany	208,780	64,926,000	306
France	207,054	40,000,000	190
India	1,789,154	315,132,100	176
China	3,914,010	417,553,000	106
Russia in Europe . .	1,997,310	138,275,000	69
United States . . .	2,973,890	92,000,000	30
Brazil (1900) . . .	3,218,991	17,318,556	5
Argentina	1,153,119	7,171,910	6
Chili	292,580	3,415,060	11
Peru	695,733	4,609,999	6
Spain	194,783	19,588,688	100
Japan	147,655	49,588,798	336

Note.—England and Wales show an average per square mile of 618.

Many nations could do but little to oppose the aggressor, and that little would be more than counterbalanced by the embarrassment and delay which must result from having to proceed through the organization of the League. Confusion would become worse confounded by all manner of means hardly yet recognized except by Germany, and many might become the unconscious tools of the aggressor.

Whilst many nations are remote from any likely centre of disturbance or immediate danger, others are so close to the danger zone as not to be free agents, for instance in the present war—

Holland	.	.	.	.	.	.	6,000,000
Denmark	.	.	.	.	.	.	2,600,000
Sweden	.	.	.	.	.	.	5,500,000
Norway	.	.	.	.	.	.	2,400,000
Switzerland	.	.	.	.	.	.	3,800,000
							20,300,000

Were Germany not disarmed, each of these five nations might on her next aggression be brought in, together with those who have thrown in their lot with her to-day, as Allies, or who are under her power as slaves—there seems but little distinction between these terms under German “Kultur.” In either case the national life is lost, and the individual, if his nation be an ally of Germany, ceases to exist save as an item of “cannon fodder,” or, if his country be occupied by Germany, he becomes a slave.

Even were there not these obvious weaknesses in the proposed League, power is of no avail without the will to strike and preparedness and readiness to strike hard for the right and to stay aggression at the outset. To rely for safety on a League of Nations wherein any may not be ready to strike nor willing promptly to sacrifice themselves, their money and their profit-making must be a source of weakness, not of strength—a danger instead of a safeguard.

(6) *What has the Great War shown?*

What better test could there have been of what may be expected from such a League than that which happened during

the first two and half years of the present war? Nations remained neutral though Germany devastated small countries and States, drove whole populations into slavery, outraged women and children, committed murders and cruelties unprintable in detail, bombarded peaceful towns, villages and the countryside, broke every rule of war on land and sea and in the air, and proclaimed the super-man, "Kultur" and her intention to obtain world-domination, regardless of every right—human or divine. They remained neutral though she, in defiance of the nations standing aloof, infringed the neutrality of the ocean, murdered their citizens and destroyed their property at sea, endangered, by her emissaries, their buildings, flouted the notes elaborated and despatched by their rulers, and otherwise insulted their peoples.

The serious risk of delay is not all—surely any future aggressor, remembering what neutral nations had put up with, would be encouraged rather than discouraged in a fresh attempt to terrorize the world were it depending on a League, and he would rely on a division of counsels in the League from the outset.

It is not the business of any one to criticize what may seem good to other nations; all now realize the new difficulties which appear to have arisen of a nation "finding itself" in these "money-making" days; indeed, under our late rulers, Great Britain was very nearly restrained and kept neutral, whilst many feel that the methods of our late rulers may have delayed that rally of neutral nations which followed their retirement.

Glad are we to see with us in the fight for the triumph of the right the descendants of the old stock, whose ancestors left us and crossed the ocean to found in North America a freedom of their own in a new colony, who later severed connection with us when rulers tried to dictate too much, and who still later cried "hands off" to all Europe whilst they fought out their war for the abolition of slavery and confirmation of the Union; yet it is surely not permissible to be led away by any invitation to rely for our protection in the future upon any one except ourselves.

Mr. Asquith in the House of Commons on the 18th April, 1917, when welcoming the entry of the United States into the fight, defines the reason for the President carrying "with him a united nation into the hazards and horrors of the greatest war in history" as follows—

"It is the constraining force of conscience and humanity growing in strength and in compulsive authority month by month with the gradual unfolding before the eyes of the world of the real character of German aims and German methods. It is that force, and that force alone, which has brought home to the judgment of the great democracy over the seas the momentous truth that they were standing at the parting of the ways, and that they had to make one of those decisions which in the lives both of men and of communities determine for good or for evil their whole future. What was it that our kinsmen in America realized was at issue in this unexampled conflict? The very things which they and we, if we are to be worthy of what is noblest in our common history, are bound to indicate as the essential conditions of a free and honourable development of nations of the world—justice, humanity, respect for law, consideration for the weak and the unprotected, chivalry towards enemies, the observance of good faith—these, which we all used to regard as commonplaces of international decency, have one after another been flouted, menaced, trodden under-foot as though they were the effete superstitions of some bygone creed. America has seen that there was here at issue something of wider import than the vicissitudes of battlefields or even the rearrangement of the map of Europe on the basis of nationality. The whole future of civilized government and intercourse, in particular the fortunes and the fate of democracy, are brought into peril.

"In such a situation aloofness is seen to be not only a blunder, but a crime. To stand aside with stopped ears, with folded arms, with an averted gaze, when you have the power to intervene is to become not a mere spectator,

but an accomplice. There was never in the minds of any of us any fear that the moment the issue became apparent and unmistakable the voice of America would utter an uncertain note. She has now dedicated herself, without hesitation or reserve, heart and soul and strength, to the greatest of causes. To that cause, stimulated and fortified by her comradeship, we here renew our own fealty and devotion."

Notwithstanding all these unique incentives for prompt action the end of the third year of war was approaching before this great nation joined, and even then Lord Crewe, speaking on the same day in the House of Lords, gave expression to an anxiety existing in the past in the minds of our late rulers as to the attitude the United States might, during her long period of neutrality, which extended throughout his tenure of office, have adopted in relation to the belligerents—

"It must be remembered, too, that from quite an early stage in the war much material loss, and a great deal more inconvenience, was necessarily inflicted upon innocent citizens of the United States by our necessary action in the stoppage of cargoes not only to Germany, but also to some neutral countries contiguous to Germany, and I cannot help saying in passing that if at the earlier stages of the war the Government of the day had followed some of the advice which has been given here—I am certain with the utmost feeling of patriotism—those measures that we took would have pressed harder still upon America and the other neutrals. The effect would have been not that America would have joined Germany, because that, I am convinced, she never would have done, but she might have been frozen, so to speak, into a position of permanent neutrality not too friendly to us from which she might never have parted until the close of the war."

Few surely can bring themselves to believe such words as these, but, let the time of anxiety mentioned by Lord Crewe

be as it may, and always remembering how the British nation wished to join up wholeheartedly with America in staying the wrong, the fact remains that the period of doubt as to her joining was long.

The personal provocation required before she joined, and the time it took even Germany "to fill the cup," would seem to warn us that we should be untrue to ourselves and to those coming after us if we forget that there must always be so many factors or influences in so many nations pulling so many different ways as would make it a matter of self-deception—the act of "the ostrich burying its head in the sand"—were we to try and persuade ourselves, or permit others to persuade us, that a League of Nations could be relied upon, or prove in practice to be otherwise than a broken reed on which to rely if trouble comes—a fruitful cause of war even amongst the peaceful, and a temptation to aggressors.

The rulers of the United States, in joining in the fight against the wrong, commenced by limiting their crusade to the "German Government," and tried to remain the sincere friends of the German "people," though the German people, including the Majority Socialists (the Social Democrats are, it has been said, the largest party in the Reichstag), have out-Heroded their rulers in defying the Laws of Nations and of humanity, and have perpetrated cruel and disgusting outrages, glorying in such whilst urging on their rulers to organize worse atrocities and breaches of the law.

Strange happenings may be expected from the various attempts made by our late rulers and others to discriminate between the German people and their rulers—revolutions abetted by their rulers to escape just punishment, peace conditions presented by the people themselves and other devices may be the outcome of so artificial a distinction, which in peace and in war the German people have belied.

Already the world has seen Germany posing to Russia as the protector of autocracy when autocracy ruled the latter country, and when democracy took its place, she at once reversed her pose. This is but the beginning, what will be the end? Evidence is clear that she is prepared to appear in any guise

or masquerade to attain what is rooted in the minds of the German people—their super-manhood and their aim to bring all the peoples of the world into subjection.

Is it believable, if the German people desired to accept a position of equality with the other inhabitants of the world and to give up their obsession to place themselves over all, in peace as well as in war, that this people could not long ago have controlled their rulers, forsworn aggrandizement at the expense of others, and repented of the wrongs which they had perpetrated?

Before and since the war began every act of the German people, their Press and their political parties (including Labour and the Socialists) proves that war was entered upon with the enthusiastic support of the whole German nation because they believed that a short campaign would put France and Russia helpless at their feet, and that later Great Britain and the world would be subservient to them. Great Britain's entry did not abate their lust for aggression, but rather increased their appetite for world-domination, whilst fanning their cruelty and brutality to a flame which has burnt deep into the minds of all who are beginning to realize some of the crimes chargeable to the German populace.

Never again, if Germany be disarmed and the other steps proposed be taken, should it be possible for any great attack to be launched in war or peace against our civilization, provided that we are henceforward reasonably prepared on the principle of "once bit, twice shy" and that—in accordance with what is best for a free people—we keep ourselves ready promptly to guard the right and to defend ourselves unhampered by a League and its counsellors.

(7) *What does History say?*

Germany has demonstrated beyond question the peril she has been to civilization and would once more be, if she could. Were Germany a member of this proposed League of Nations, what guarantee would there be that she would not contrive in secret fresh schemes of armament, munition and poison-gas

manufacture, aeroplane production, and Zeppelin and submarine building?

Under the League of Nations, Germany could once more provide in secret her naval bases all over the world, her gun-emplacements, and have every means of war—permissible and unpermissible—ready, whilst her armies of spies and of others, whom she holds to service by bribery or blackmail, would be working for a “New Day” in place of “the Day” which is fading and must die.

The danger of leaving Germany free to undermine the industry of the rest of the world by aggressive methods in trade with the support of her Government, or of leaving her free to extend her armaments and upset the peaceful development of the world, which all other nations desire, can be best appreciated, first, by studying the history of the German tribes, later of the German States, and recently of the German Empire; and, secondly, by realizing the power which modern weapons, coupled with the methods of “Kultur” (including its “frightfulness”) puts in the hands of such a people as the Germans of to-day, whoever may be their rulers or whatever their form of Government.

Many are beginning to grasp the fact that judging from the past the peace of other nations may, unless she is disarmed, be held to ransom from day to day by Germany. It is true that actual war may not result frequently, for, as we have seen in these later years, the German people attain their ends by peaceful penetration and a “loading of the dice” at home and abroad coupled with threats of the “mailed fist.” They only resort to war when they think that they have every condition in their favour for a “walk over” in respect of the nations which they may have decided to attack.

Surely every one who permits himself honestly to think, can no longer deny that Germany in peace or in war must be a continual menace to the rest of the world, unless every precaution is taken in the conditions of peace and thereafter to prevent her once more breaking the laws of nations and humanity or departing from fair dealing in trade and industry.

Before considering how these dangers are to be remedied,

let us come down to the hard common sense of world experience over long periods of years. Such experience is absolutely destructive to any millennium such as that behind which weaklings seek to shelter their mental and physical eccentricities, relying on others for their safety and freedom whilst evading the problems which God and Nature compel all ultimately to face, however much by words, talk and imaginings they try to escape from such unpleasant things as facts.

All know that wars of kings with their retinues and mercenaries, one king against another, have long since passed away. Wars between the barons with their armed bands of retainers are consigned to the limbo of the past. Even revolutionary or other leaders have ceased to commit nations to war for their own ends.

To-day and in the years to come it must rest with the people of each nation as to whether wars are made or not. That is the best safeguard of peace in civilized nations, but until each people proves itself pacific and desirous of advancing the freedom of all nations, those in default must be made innocuous. Modern weapons and scientific facilities for destroying or torturing the innocent are too dangerous to entrust to an uncivilized people seeking to enslave the rest of mankind.

True that in a few months the Allies beat back this people in spite of forty years of preparation by Germany, but it is a long job putting out the fire, and he who is "guilty of arson cannot be allowed matches."

By the disarmament of each criminal nation which attempts such things as Germany has long planned, and by the enforcement of other safeguards and the requisition of full indemnities, "the way of the transgressor" will be made too hard, and none will be encouraged to aggress. "Honesty will be recognized as the best policy," and never again will any nation drown the world in blood in seeking dominion over all.

Though "prevention is better than cure" in the cases of those who aggress for the sake of gain or power, even our Pacifists who seem to deny this, must have some difficulty in suggesting that it will ever be right to stand by whilst our ideals of civilization are trampled under-foot by others. If the

final crisis comes we must in the future as in the past support the right, even by war.

Wars must always be, and no League of Peace could or should prevent wars to enforce the right; but our safety must not be dependent on any untried theory or proved fallacy—the sure producers of disaster.

THE REMEDY

There is but one remedy. That remedy is compliance with the fundamental law which has been the condition of existence since God created the first speck of life on our planet.

The law is that no mass of protoplasm, no species of plants, no breed of animals, nor any race of men shall survive unless, generation by generation, its members protect themselves against the dangers which surround them. Death is the penalty for the race, or breed, or species which fails in this condition which God has placed upon our world.

In the natural life the different plants by their reactions, the various animals by instinct, whether in the pack or herd or working in couples, and the clans of men by their reason, all obey the law. Thereby they earn each for his kind the best chance of survival, and in many cases escape extinction.

In the life of the ancient civilizations, as each advanced, when this law was neglected the nation or empire waned.

In times of old, in Greece, the intellectuals and oratory prevailed, the people ceased to think of realities, and the country fell from its high estate. In the Roman Empire, as the easy life was obtained by loot and tribute, the luxury of the nobles was followed by the creation of a huge bureaucracy and gifts of bread and amusements to the people, and downfall soon came.

In every case the guarded and sheltered life begets vulnerability in those who lead it. So it is to-day, and unless they who fail to obey this law were protected by others—the armies in war, the police and their more energetic fellow-citizens in

peace—they would soon die out. The nation, freed from those who failed to fulfil the first duty of every living creature to safeguard himself and those of the community to which he belongs, would retain its place in the world by reason of that increased virility, which comes from compliance with this condition which God has imposed since time was on this earth.

We cannot expect an exception to be made, in this universal law, for Great Britain, though our Pacifists and conscientious objectors act as though they are free from it themselves and invite the rest of our nation to join them in their self-conceit. Thanks to the "few who preached" and to those who prepared themselves to fight in pre-war days and have sacrificed life itself, these Pacifists and conscientious objectors, together with the rest of the nation, have avoided suffering, at the hands of the Germans, the extreme penalty under the law referred to. After this escape surely no remedy will be accepted short of full compliance with the God-made ordinance that a nation, to survive, must amply protect itself?

The policy that each civilized nation shall arm whilst the savage or "kultured" nations, *i. e.* the uncivilized, are disarmed, is neither a counsel of despair, nor is it bankrupt in the better things of life or in the diplomatic handling of the problems of the nations of the world.

Few fail to realize the good results upon the young, in our great public schools, which arise from sports and discipline. Why should the people be denied the great advantages to be obtained by methods which have been so successfully used for the youth of our upper and middle classes? What can more quickly place the children of the people on an equality in these particulars with the rest of the nation than naval, military or aerial service for all?

Working up through cadet-corps at every school—poor as well as rich—the whole nation, high and low, can reap these advantages and be in a position to take their part in defending the country. Any other nation contemplating aggression will hesitate, knowing that it will be met, at least on an equal footing, by those it would attack.

Great benefits lie behind this remedy. Discipline is of

inestimable value in the work of life; it is impossible to overrate the health-giving and happiness-producing effect of military service in a year's steady training and in subsequent periods, during which the corps is called together for a few weeks each year and old acquaintanceships renewed. Education on a broad basis can form part of the scheme, and girls and women can be associated in this privilege henceforward to be attained by all instead of by only the upper few. The race must also gain as the years pass by, and weak or unhealthy minds in weak and unhealthy bodies will gradually be eliminated.

With all working together for the protection of their homes, that balance between the nations will be ensured by which alone a safe and stable future can be attained.

Surely there is but one course open to us, namely that the British Empire must trust to its own right arm for the guarding of its people, whilst, in friendship with the civilized nations of the world, it seeks to advance on the road that leads to better things.

THE ALTERNATIVE

Let us assume for a moment that the Pacifists, the pro-Germans and the anti-British, the internationalists, and the intellectuals and theorists by maligning "the remedy" set forth, and by plausible misrepresentations of its effect, manœuvre the masses into its rejection. What must inevitably result? Our civilization will only survive, on sufferance, until overwhelmed in the next aggression; our industries will continue to depend on "key" supplies controlled, as in pre-war days, by those who have plotted against us; our workers will be driven to death in striving to meet the unfair competition of dumped goods; our finance and trade, small as well as great, will be honeycombed and undermined once more by that permeation which nearly brought disaster even upon the City of London, as our late rulers were forced to admit at the

beginning of the war; whilst our country will be percolated by spies and saturated with bribes and other inducements to betray, and none will be free from suspicion.

People will lose the health and happiness, the sane mind in the sound body, the wider outlook on life and just appreciation of one's fellows which they have found to result from the training and discipline of National Service, whereby each Briton can to-day, at last, forget pre-war slackness, sloth and ease, and "look the whole world in the face and fear not any man."

YESTERDAY AND TO-MORROW

Plain as is the privilege of citizenship involved in "The Remedy," unthinkable as would be the relapse into the dereliction of duty involved in "The Alternative" mentioned, it is becoming more and more clear that every one in these days is anxious to get a grasp of those deeper causes which made so vast a war possible, and to know sufficient facts to enable them to take an intelligent part in the rearrangement which the war has rendered inevitable.

Every one by now realizes that there are nations and peoples under the heel of Germany who would like to be free. Some of these are slaves in the hands of Germany; others are obeying her orders, and all are acting as though they were Germans themselves. There are other categories, but, under whatever head they fall, these people all participate in or suffer from the mass-movements of Germany. It seems permissible accordingly to test whether there is not some principle underlying what has happened.

It is suggested that such a principle has always existed since the days when the German tribes accepted their leaders and went forth hundreds of years ago to devastate, ravage and destroy.

The ethics of those tribes and of the German people to-day seem to be characterized by several features in common. The most important is their deep-rooted habit, whereby each

individual, who forms the tribe or nation, places himself at the disposal or in the hands of whoever from time to time may seize the leadership. Each brings his individual conscience into line with his rulers and follows them blindly.

The natural tendency of leaders as a class is to extend power, first over those by whom they are placed in their position and then over those who can be looted, aggressed or otherwise enslaved. This tendency brought about the general policy of this Central European people, of wars and rumours of wars and of aggression, in peace as in war, on their neighbours.

At times, no doubt, in this people's history, a leader here or there may have had some other aim than the reign of brute force, or the seizing of the property of others. Sometimes there has arisen a coterie or cult, through civilizing influences, such as music; sometimes there has appeared a leavening effect which for a moment made many hope that the conscience of the individual would awaken and thereby the nation would cease to create, or, having created, to follow, chiefs, kings and emperors in their worship of "frightfulness" and of what all now know to be epitomised in the word "Kultur."

Germany, however, still appears as the personification of the soulless system of power with the absolute suppression of the individual conscience, from whence we see the return of the German to the brute stage. Since the year 1715, when Prussia came into existence as a kingdom, this system has been adopted by her rulers as an ideal and the present war is the logical consequence.

This scientific resurrection of the principle of submission to leaders and the suppression by each individual of his personal conscience, brings out once more all the traits of savage days.

Its effects under modern conditions, with advanced weapons and scientific discoveries, recklessly handled in defiance of every law, has appalled the world; but it is evident now to every one, except to our pro-Germans and Pacifists, that it is the same old German spirit magnified many fold by the utilization of the greater world-development existing at the outbreak of the war.

The conditions which could be laid down to prevent physical force being reaccumulated by the German people, under whichever leaders they may select, have already been indicated, but much can be done to remove by moral means some of the factors which have so materially tempted Germany to embark on this new aggression and which have enabled her to hold the world at bay for so long.

With the people of each nation of the world sufficiently trained and equipped to defend themselves, and so controlling their own affairs as to remove for ever that temptation which weak or self-centred rulers give to the aggressor, much will have been done. Yet more will remain to be done.

Germany and her Allies control many millions of people, who neither by descent nor nature, desire to hand their individual consciences into the keeping of any leaders, or to participate in contests, in peace or in war, to interfere with the lives of other nations or to seize property which does not belong to them.

Germany's procedure has made it inevitable that sooner or later the various people referred to shall be freed from her control.

All seem to be agreed that something to this end should be done now as part of the conditions of peace.

No doubt, on questions of detail, there are many opinions amongst those who have some familiarity with the matters involved. The broad principle, however, seems to be that wherever there is a people, which, without injustice to others in the land occupied by it, is reasonably entitled to be a separate nation, or to live its life as a free people in a union with kindred nations, then there should be no hesitation in providing for its freedom.

Generalities, however true, cannot be of the same value as concrete illustrations of what might reasonably be attempted in some directions by means of the peace conditions.

There are ethnologically in Germany some 6,000,000 Poles, in Austria some 6,000,000 and in Russia some 10,000,000; these could form the kingdom of Poland.

There are in Austro-Hungary some 5,000,000 Bohemians

(Czechs), some 3,000,000 Roumanians and other different tribes, chiefly Slavonic, numbering some 10,000,000. These could be grouped to ensure their freedom.

Alsace-Lorraine and other Western States will be once more freed from the yoke of Germany.

Italy could receive the territory and the people who wish to join her, including Trieste and some 3,000,000 of her people.

Bosnia and Herzegovina with their 2,000,000 population, mostly Slavs, could join up with Serbia.

From Turkey, Armenia could get Turkish Armenia with its 5,000,000 people, whilst the 6,000,000 Arabs and 3,000,000 Greeks, 8,000,000 Turks and the 7,000,000 Kurds, Tartars and others, which make up the 30,000,000 of the Turkish Empire could be dealt with on that basis which best accorded with their ultimate arrival at the destination at which all are aiming—the safeguarding of free people amongst the civilized nations of the world.

In glancing back over what is written above, it is perhaps almost too obvious to point out that some of these separate peoples may require the helping hand and guarding influence of some sort of protectorate or union, whereby time may be given to them to realise their new conditions of freedom and their responsibilities to themselves and to the world.

With some such programme for consideration at the Peace Conference, it becomes clear that representatives of these new peoples must be in attendance, prepared jointly and separately to confer with the Allied Powers, lest, once more, risk of failure should be run by not fully understanding the genius, destiny and wishes of each of these new communities which are to be.

Every precaution must be taken to prevent Germany having any influence over the new communities or over those who will, in consultation with them, be settling how the future they desire can best be arrived at.

In the Conference days, as in the years to come, it should surely be laid down that each nation and each people shall be represented, not by those who have been brought up in the ways of secret diplomacy and divorced from the aspirations of the people by their membership of a close corporation, but

by truly independent representatives selected from the old stock of each people, and characterized by that outlook on life and affairs which the general body of the nation for whom they will speak, shows itself to possess.

The diplomatists will be there with their trained minds, to advise professionally, and, with their knowledge of routine and of the details of past transactions, to free the national representatives for the wider task of settling the broad principles on which the earth can best be occupied by the inhabitants thereof. To the average man it seems essential that the diplomatists, as well as the representatives, concerned for each nation, should be of the true stock of that nation, born, bred and brought up, until years of discretion, in the midst of the people for whom they act.

No one of foreign blood can ever really understand his fellow-citizens, much as he may be admired, liked or trusted by them, nor could he truly deal with the world in the manner which is all-essential if peace is to prevail and the life of each nation is to be advanced in harmony with its peoples' wishes.

It is curious to note how out of ill, good may come. It was the German leaders who at last decided to embark upon the war; it was the German people who rejoiced when their leaders let them free in the summer of 1914 from the leash. The result is that to-day the freeing of the smaller nations and peoples is possible, whilst the German people and their rulers are beginning to see what is coming, and to seize at straws to save themselves.

Baron von Kühlmann is reported, in *The Times* of 1st October, 1917, as saying: "It was a great act when the Pope threw the word of peace into the turmoil of conflict, which threatens to convert Europe into a blood-drenched place of ruins. It was precisely the German people and the German Government, for whom, in the consciousness of their strength and internal security, it was always easy to emphasize their readiness for an honourable peace."

It is truly characteristic of the German people, that, knowing their defeat is at last in sight, they should change their tone; but they are too late. What Germany has done makes uncon-

ditional surrender the only end allowable, if civilization is to be saved in the years to come.

TO-DAY

A trite quatrain sums up the situation so strenuously striven for by those who urge a patched-up peace, and a League of Nations, though each must be a source of discord in itself and an encouragement to, and starting-point for, fresh aggression in peace or war by the German people.

“ When the Devil was ill,
The Devil a saint would be;
When the Devil was well,
The devil a saint was he.”

Reams can be written, but they could not alter the fact that the German people, down even to their little children, are to-day saturated with an absolute belief in their super-manhood and the privilege it is for the other peoples of the world to be subject to, and enslaved by, them. Not even in the days of the Inquisition nor during the extremities to which the Protestants went centuries ago, has such a state of mind existed in a whole nation and been drilled into the very children.

These words may sound hard, but picture the subjection of the world to Germany, which would sooner or later have followed any fulfilment of the conditions accepted by Mr. Asquith in his speech of the 2nd August, 1916 (see p. 99). The German people would soon obtain their “ Corridor,” from the North Sea and the Baltic to the Persian Gulf, Egypt and the shores of the Mediterranean; Greece and the islands would be theirs on the next aggression; the coast line from Antwerp to Brest would, later, fall into their power and make the invasion of Great Britain a feasible programme; the creation of a great “ buffer ” dependency in Poland, would for years prevent Russia from being any embarrassment to Germany, whilst France would be always open to attack, at the chosen moment of the German people.

Her Navy and air fleet intact, Germany with her submarines and Zeppelins, would compel the maintenance by Russia,

France and Great Britain of huge fleets of warships, cruisers, submarines and airships. The "freedom of the seas" would always be in controversy and menaced by a piracy, compared to which the "skull and cross-bones" of romance, or the Algerian pirates of history, were as milk and water innocence.

In commerce, manufacture and finance, the German people act with an immorality, which necessitates the German and his helpers being treated as subsidized embezzlers of trade secrets and destroyers of connection and goodwill. In social life under their methods one's neighbour at the dinner-table, partner at a dance, or guest for a week-end—or for a shoot or hunt—may be a scout for a great invasion, for the desecration of one's house, home, wife and children, or for the undermining or absorption of one's business or affairs, with the secret aid of German State-banks and the German Government itself.

This is not a war between rival nations, but a crusade against wrongs deliberately approved and encouraged by the whole German people. Never can it be too often reiterated that these wrongs include broken treaties, violated territories, outraged women, slain children, enslaved peoples, blackmailed populations, citizens murdered upon the seas, bombed cities, villages and countrysides; disregard of every law of humanity, of nations or of the individual, and of every code of honour and rule of war and an attempted terrorism of the neutral nations of the world.

The German idea is very clear, as shown by the German Secret Official Report, Berlin, of the 19th March, 1913, published in the French Yellow Book, wherein these words appear: "But in the next European war the small States must be forced to follow us or must be cowed. In certain conditions their armies and their fortresses could rapidly be conquered or neutralized (this might probably be the case with Belgium and Holland), so as to prevent our western enemy from obtaining a base of operations against our flank. To the north we have nothing to fear from Denmark or from the Scandinavian States."

Conquest and enslavement of other nations, their industries and their workmen in peace or in war regardless of right or wrong, freedom or slavery, is imbued in the mind of each

German man, woman and child. Our civilized world cannot exist with such a menace. Either German "Kultur" or our civilization, which even so-called savages understand and support, must prevail; they cannot co-exist.

Intolerable to those who believe in our civilization and strive after freedom, is a world such as the Germans have planned. No safeguards can be too drastic. Only after many years can change come to Germany, by means of education and the regeneration of the whole once-more-disclosed character of her people, their ideals and their aims in life.

How does this essential programme affect the German people, the comity of nations and the future of the world? The answer is simple. Better a civilization destroyed, for it can be rebuilt, than such a future as the Germans have conceived and are still planning, even after defeat, to inflict on themselves and the nations of the world.

The German Emperor has said in an interview reported in the *Daily Chronicle* of the 4th February, 1915—

"Many who, judging us by outward appearances, term us barbarians, do not seem to know the great difference between civilization and Kultur. To possess Kultur means to have the deepest conscientiousness and the highest morality. My Germans possess that."

Compare this with the words of Lieutenant-Colonel Franke, Commandant of German Forces, South Africa, to General Botha, 21st February, 1915: "The officer in charge when Swakopmund was evacuated had several sacks of cooking salt thrown into the wells. But we found that the salting of the water could in a short time be rendered ineffective. Thereafter we tried Kopper Dip, and we found that by using this material any enemy occupying the town would for some time have to rely on water brought from elsewhere." Or compare the Kaiser's words with the sad and revolting record contained in the verdict of the Kinsale jury at the *Lusitania* inquest on the 10th May, 1915: "That the deceased died from prolonged immersion and exhaustion in the sea, eight miles south-south-west of the old Head of Kinsale, on Friday, May 7th, 1915, owing to the sinking of the R.M.S. *Lusitania* by torpedoes,

fired without warning from a German submarine. We find that this appalling crime was contrary to international law and the conventions of all civilized nations, and we therefore charge the officers of the said submarine and the Emperor and Government of Germany, under whose orders they acted, with the crime of wilful and wholesale murder before the tribunal of the civilized world."

The German version of the tragedy of this crime of the people is summed up by the *Kölnische Volkszeitung* of the 10th May, 1915, which said: "With joyful pride we contemplate this latest deed" (sinking of the *Lusitania*) "of our Navy, and it will not be the last."

Or again, to quote from the *Daily Telegraph* of the 6th August, 1917: "Huns and British seamen—Deliberate murder—Last night the Admiralty issued the following announcement: As has already been reported unofficially in the Press, the British steamer, *Belgian Prince*, was torpedoed by a German submarine on July 31. The crew abandoned the ship in two boats, and were ordered on to the upper deck of the submarine by the German commander. Under his directions the boats were then smashed with axes and the crew of the *Belgian Prince* deprived of their lifebelts. The master was taken below and the hatch closed. The submarine submerged without warning with forty-three men standing on her deck. This was the entire crew of the *Belgian Prince*. With the exception of three all these were drowned. The three survivors had contrived to retain their lifebelts without the knowledge of the enemy. They were picked up after having been in the water eleven hours. The details of this atrocious outrage are supported by the separate affidavits of the three survivors. The cold-blooded murder of these men equals, if it does not transcend, the worst crimes which our enemies have committed against humanity."

These cold-blooded, brutally planned and deliberately carried out murders may transcend some of the many other callous cruelties of the Germans on the high seas, but these inhuman crimes are a mere momentary recreation—just something to report to the German people and keep "their home-fires burning"—as compared to their three years of utter

barbarism and bestiality on land. Never have such horrors been on land or sea.

The vast majority of mankind are agreed (whatever our Pacifists, pro-Germans and conscientious objectors may say) that a nation, which can so debase itself in war and peace and so excel in cruelty to the defenceless and in outrages upon women and children, shall never again be in a position to do any adverse act to any man, woman or child on this earth, save within such territory as may be allowed to those who wish to remain members of that nation.

Meanwhile, the German people whine that they were compelled to fight for their existence. Germany never had to do so. Her people were united, they were rapidly making money and every day increasing the materialistic luxury of their lives; emigration had practically ceased—in fact, they were trying to attract more labour from outside. The people had the rulers and the form of Government which suited them, and they gloried in the “ mailed fist ” and the terrorizing of, and interference with, other nations. They were armed to the teeth and were in fear of no one; for any to attack them would have been madness and but an excuse for plunder and absorption by Germany.

Not content with all this, they had been working up for years to attack France and Russia whilst those countries were unprepared and, when they thought Great Britain could not, or would not, declare against Germany's aggression, they made their onslaught, tore up treaties and conventions and cast on one side the laws of God, as well as those of man and even of the beasts, declaring themselves super-men and above all.

Germany in her hymn of hate voices the surging of her people against Great Britain when our people refused, in face of wrong, to be restrained, terrorized or bribed into neutrality. The words, even of a translation, reveal the heart of the German masses.

The Times of the 29th October, 1914, gives us the words, introducing them as below.

“ The famous Munich illustrated weekly paper, *Jugend*, has published the following poem of hatred against Great Britain. The author is Herr Ernst Lissauer, and the transla-

tion, which is itself a remarkable piece of work, was made for the *New York Times* by Barbara Henderson—

' French and Russian they matter not,
A blow for a blow, and a shot for a shot :
We love them not, we hate them not,
We hold the Weichsel and Vosges-gate,
We have but one and only hate,
We love as one, we hate as one,
We have one foe and one alone.

He is known to you all, he is known to you all,
He crouches behind the dark grey flood,
Full of envy, of rage, of craft, of gall,
Cut off by waves that are thicker than blood.
Come let us stand at the Judgment place,
An oath to swear to, face to face,
An oath of bronze no wind can shake,
An oath for our sons and their sons to take.
Come, hear the word, repeat the word,
Throughout the Fatherland make it heard.
We will never forgo our hate,
We have all but a single hate,
We love as one, we hate as one,
We have one foe, and one alone—
ENGLAND !

In the Captain's Mess, in the banquet-hall,
Sat feasting the officers, one and all,
Like a sabre-blow, like the swing of a sail,
One seized his glass held high to hail;
Sharp-snapped like the stroke of a rudder's play,
Spoke three words only : " To the Day ! "

Whose glass this fate ?
They had all but a single hate.
Who was thus known ?
They had one foe, and one alone—
ENGLAND !

Take you the folk of the Earth in pay,
With bars of gold your ramparts lay,
Bedeck the ocean with bow on bow,
Ye reckon well, but not well enough now.
French and Russian they matter not,
A blow for a blow, a shot for a shot,
We fight the battle with bronze and steel,
And the time that is coming Peace will seal.
You will we hate with a lasting hate,
We will never forgo our hate,
Hate by water and hate by land,
Hate of the head and hate of the hand,
Hate of the hammer and hate of the crown,
Hate of seventy millions, choking down.
We love as one, we hate as one,
We have one foe, and one alone—
ENGLAND ! ' "

Well is it said by Fletcher of Saltoun, "Let me make the ballads of a people, and I care not who makes the laws."

No hate-song have we nor even anything unkind about those we fight. "Tipperary" and "Sister Susie sewing Shirts for Soldiers" sufficed for us.

Even to-day we have not in Great Britain nor have we had throughout this war, any bands, cheering, jingoism, "mafficking," or other exuberant, or indeed any, demonstrations.

All regard the war as a hard silent struggle with a world-peril; like a deadly epidemic (some new plague), like a vast development of the reptile kingdom (multitudes of supercobras in every clime), or like a strange gas (only controllable and ultimately suppressible by the sacrifice of our bravest and best)—each evil threatening the continuance of our civilization and of our race itself.

Some day Great Britain and her Allies will have gained peace by corraling the horror and removing its stings or power to strike. Then every man, woman and child in the Empire who has worked on, whilst held up by a common instinct to defend the right and down the wrong, will fraternize, and we shall see a feeling of relief and well-earned satisfaction at a horrible task completed which will surpass any demonstration the world has ever watched or even imagined.

Until that time comes the Allies and ourselves will grimly fight on as we have fought for the salvation of the world from the utter horror once more launched, supported and carried out by the German people who again glory in, exult at, and commit many new and revolting outrages as well as all the old bestial crimes at home and at the Front which historians for centuries past have warned the world that the Central European tribes revel in and repeat again and again when opportunity occurs.

As this people have shown themselves in war so we are discovering that they were in peace; yet, whilst the Allies have in three years of war developed no desire for revenge, they have come to know that this cancer of Kultur and world-dominion has its root not only in the Hohenzollerns, the Junkers and the Prussians, but in the whole German race, both in peace and in war.

Those in our midst, who are friends of our enemies, assure us that the German people themselves are not only now longing for peace, but desire honestly (using the word, "honestly," as we use it) to join in the comity of nations wholeheartedly and without ulterior motives or unfair or treacherous methods.

The Bishop of Birmingham has given an answer to such assurances. In *The Times* of the 14th August, 1917, after repudiating the doctrine that the recent wet weather was due to the disapproval of the Almighty to the working of allotments on Sunday, he proceeds: "The other case of mistaken reading of Christian teaching is far more excusable because on the surface it is appealing. It is the speech of Mr. Dickinson at the Hampstead Garden Suburb as to the relations which should prevail between ourselves and the enemy countries after the war. He would have us regard the present feeling against Germany as something which should end when peace is signed. I agree, but only on one condition, viz. that our enemies repudiate the principles which have led to the present strife. Unless we believed that the Prussianism which has provoked conflict was criminal and anti-Christian, we ought not to have unsheathed the sword. Having done so with that firm conviction, we must not replace it in its scabbard until the wickedness has been not only punished but destroyed, not only scotched but killed. Then, and then only, can we re-admit Germany to friendship, and it is wrong to hold out hopes that we shall dishonour our dead who have fallen for righteousness by some platitude which, by putting blame upon statesmen, shall enable the militarists of Prussia to ride off satisfied that they have deceived us and that they may lie low after the war until they feel strong enough to resume operations. Let us be friends with the foe, but only when the foe has confessed, by act if not by word, that he is guilty."

Assuredly none can rightly deny that long, but necessary, years of repentance for the evils done against humanity, and the greater evil desired of world-dominion, must pass before the German people and their hate-taught children can purge and free themselves from all that which to-day, of their own deed, disqualifies them to stand beside the Allies who have

fought, bled and sacrificed immense treasure, that all nations can be free and that our civilization shall be saved from the domination of "Kultur."

Only thus will it be possible to raise the condition of the humblest to that of the highest, so far as all the necessities, and as many as possible of the amenities, of life are concerned; with the utmost freedom of soul and body, compatible with that of others, situated as themselves, and equally entitled to such liberty in life, action and ideas, as can be claimed in an imperfect world.

The peace of the strong man armed is a peace of reality—that which depends on words, theories or a multitude of counsellors makes for war.

AFTER-WORD ON PEACE

"I have read the President's address with warm admiration. I am in agreement with the policy which he has so eloquently described, and I notice with much pleasure that his speech contains passages which completely support the views which I have endeavoured to express."

Lord LANSDOWNE, in a statement sent to the *New York Times*, as quoted in the *Manchester Guardian* of the 17th December, 1917.

WITH the words above, Lord Lansdowne's letter, published in the *Daily Telegraph* of the 29th November, 1917, quoted with acclamation by our pacifists, pro-Germans, and some others, has come and gone, for President Wilson's address, delivered to Congress on the 4th December, 1917, contains our immediate war-aims in so clear and in so precise a form that none need turn back to the letter, nor should any, except the anti-British, complain that the Allied war-aims, so far as at present material, are insufficiently laid down.

In *The Times* of the 5th December, 1917, is given a report of the Presidential address. Early in the address appears a pronouncement headed "Justice to every Nation," which runs as follows—

"I believe I speak for them"—the American people—"when I say two things. First, that this intolerable thing of which the masters of Germany have shown us the ugly face, this menace of combined intrigue and force which we now see so clearly as the German power, a thing without conscience or honour or capacity for covenanted peace, must be crushed and, if it be not utterly brought to an end, at least shut out from the friendly intercourse of the nations; secondly, that when this thing and its power are indeed defeated, and the time comes that we can discuss peace—when the German people have spokesmen whose word we can believe, and when these spokesmen are ready in the name of their people to accept the common judgment of the nations as to what shall henceforth be the bases of law and covenant for the life of the world—we shall be willing and glad to pay the full price for peace, and pay it ungrudgingly. We know what that price will be. It will be full, impartial justice, justice done at every point and to every nation, that the final settlement must affect, our enemies as well as our friends."

A little later in his address, the President adds some further sentences—

"Let there be no misunderstanding. Our present and immediate task is to win the war, and nothing shall turn us aside from it until it is accomplished. Every power and resource we possess, whether of men, of money, or of materials, is being devoted, and will continue to be devoted, to that purpose until it is achieved. Those who desire to bring peace about before that purpose is achieved I counsel to carry their advice elsewhere. We will not entertain it. We shall regard the war as won only when the German people say to us, through properly accredited representatives, that they are ready to agree to a settlement based upon justice and a reparation of the wrongs their rulers have done.

"They have done a wrong to Belgium which must be repaired. They have established a power over other

lands and peoples than their own—over the great Empire of Austria-Hungary, over the hitherto free Balkan States, over Turkey, and within Asia—which must be relinquished.”

The following words also appear—

“The worst that can happen to the detriment of the German people is this—that if they should still after the war is over continue to be obliged to live under ambitious and intriguing masters interested to disturb the peace of the world, or classes of men whom the other peoples of the world could not trust, it might be impossible to admit them to the partnership of nations which must henceforth guarantee the world’s peace. That partnership must be a partnership of peoples, not a mere partnership of Governments. It might be impossible also in such untoward circumstances to admit Germany to the free economic intercourse which must inevitably spring out of the other partnership of a real peace. But there would be no aggression in that, and such a situation, inevitable because of distrust, would in the very nature of things sooner or later cure itself by processes which would assuredly set in.”

The President’s address reads as a declaration against any sort of peace “so long as such forces are unchecked or undefeated as the present masters of Germany command.”

Who can complain that such definitions of war-aims are insufficient? Who can lack courage to strive until they are fulfilled? If any such there be, let them consider the real issue which becomes every day more clear.

On the one hand, it is the removal from the world of the German menace, not only in war, with all the horrible frightfulness, disgusting cruelty, and barbarous crime, which the German people have practised, but also in peace, where treachery, intrigue, spying, and abstracting or taking by unfair means the work and property of others, were common features in that people’s programme.

On the other hand, if the fighting Allies fail in the removal of the menace, Germany will eventually dominate the world,

and sooner or later the other nations will find themselves ground down by a slavery more terrible than any hitherto conceived.

Some day some one will find time to compile a series of books showing what the German nation did, in the years preceding the war, by methods which no self-respecting nation ought to permit, to undermine the honour, politics, commerce, finance, and progress of the other nations of the world, including her present Allies.

Some day some one may find time to fill another series of books with the horrors and brutalities which in war the German nation have committed on land and sea and from the air.

How could these things have been done in their homeland, at the front, far out at sea and from high in the air, without the concurrence, support and active participation of the German people? It is true that whenever doubt as to a victorious "German Peace" assails Germany, some of her people and rulers begin to "hedge," and to prepare to seek their ends by other means—until "next time" comes; but there is no sincere rejection of the doctrines they have accepted, no realization of the inhuman crimes they have committed, nor any desire to lead a new life. A victory or two, and the faint-hearted moment is forgotten, fresh outrages are planned and fresh atrocities carried out.

When the German people don the "white sheet," with or without their rulers, the most dangerous moment for the fighting Allies will have come. It may be well then to remember the words of the *Manchester Guardian* which appeared on the 17th December, 1917, in respect of Germany conceding to Russia the nominal independence of Poland and Courland—

"There are many ways of conceding the letter of these political demands and denying the substance, and the Germans are wise enough to prefer the reality to the forms of Power. They may give the appearance of independence to Poland and Courland, and content themselves with securing the real conquest by means of pacific penetration."

There lies the difficulty. There is the danger. Even were the German people to adopt new rulers, to express their willingness to do all the things which they should do to "make good" to those whom they have wronged, and to compensate civilization for the grievous ills their "kultur" has inflicted on the world in the last half-century, there would be nothing to prevent history repeating itself.

More quickly than many realize, Germany could, by peaceful penetration of other countries, later by terrorism and disregard of right, and, in her own time, by fresh wars, hold the greater part of the Old World in subjection or subservience, whilst, in the end, she would settle her long-delayed but often vaunted account with the New World.

Knowing that she may fail in her present attempt to put Germany over all, her rulers and people are preparing to return to their old methods of a veiled war in peace. The experience she has acquired and the position she has attained over her neighbours will infinitely increase the efficiency of her interference with and her attacks on the peaceful life and affairs of other nations, unless, when the present military menace is vanquished, steps are taken to prevent these influences ever again being possible.

If this is not done, each nation must give up the freedom of its people, and organize them on the German method, in order to hold any place in the world, whilst behind this war of commerce there will always be looming the hardly more terrible war of arms.

There are many ways in which with perfect justice these dangers to our civilization can be removed, but the first step must always be the complete vanquishing of the Military Power created by the German rulers and the German people; that done, the nations and races now working in slavery for or controlled by them can be freed, and in the future made secure.

With regard to the days to come, there is a simple point which must strike home to the minds of all. The idea of great amalgamations and trusts, controlling huge masses of brain

workers and labour workers, immense capital and vast resources, has proved itself repugnant to the idea of a free democracy.

Germany has in peace, as in war, conducted her life and business as a super-trust, backed by the Government and the banks, financial interests, shipping, mining, manufacturers and colonial interests, with her people content and willing to support this huge power, though their condition with such an aim cannot be that of free men as we understand it in our civilization.

To this vast trust is now added Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria and Turkey, and there is every sign that if peace were made now many other nations and vast tracts of country would come under its control.

Democracy has found the power of trusts most difficult to restrain. What are the democracies of the world going to do in respect of dealing with this, the greatest trust which has ever been imagined?

Obviously, the first aim—the vanquishing of the military forces of the trust—so clearly put by President Wilson, is but a step on the way to free the world and its peoples.

When the time comes, may the second step—the making impossible of the tyranny and unfair dealings of this gigantic trust—be equally well-defined and as firmly enforced. It must be made clear that the settlement of this second step shall rest with the partners in our civilization—the fighting Allies—not with the defaulting partner—Germany—who has torn up the partnership deeds of our civilization, and sought to place “kultur” and “frightfulness” over civilization and humanity.

To carry out this second step every nation and each people in the grip of the trust must be offered its freedom. Next, those adhering to this trust created by the German people must be prevented from again collecting the wealth by which aggression was made possible in peace and in war. To this end the cost of the war, and the losses which it has occasioned, should be gradually paid in full to the fighting Allies, and such economic steps as may be necessary should be taken.

By these means the hard lessons, which the German people

must learn, will sink deeply into their minds, and as fresh generations arise that nation will be as afraid of once more attempting to dominate the world, in peace or by war, as a burnt child is of the fire.

If the trust be left with its Military Machine and equipment, if it be allowed to control, directly or indirectly, the races and the peoples which it has forced into its organization, or if it be permitted to accumulate afresh its war funds, there can be no security on this earth. The trust will conspire anew to disrupt the Allied nations, demoralize their politics, finance, commerce, manufactures and social life. It will become even in peace, if it exercise patience, the Master of the World; or, if it again becomes impatient, it will try and gain its ends, once more, by force and fresh horrors.

Germany, as she weakens, echoes the parrot cry of "No Annexations and no Indemnities," and supports the theory of a League of Nations. The last-named is discredited by the very fact that she welcomes it as a new way to obtain her objects. The first-mentioned is robbed of its meaning by artifices, some of which she is already disclosing, and the second becomes a mere pro-German device, because she hopes thereby to escape the money penalty for the unspeakable wrongs her rulers and people have done.

With such facts before us, whence come the manœuvres we daily see in our midst whereby our people are urged to do that which would aid Germany to be again a peril to the world? It comes from those who misled us in the pre-war period, who hampered us in war, and have wrongly counselled us as to the peaceful intentions of the German people.

Let such as these ask themselves a few questions. Can self-respecting nations meet that cruel and treacherous people at the Council Table of any League? What use would that people make of the League but a means for future aggression? Are the nations and races in bondage to that people not to be freed, and are the natives to be returned to the utter horrors of their colonial rule? Are our brain workers and labouring classes to have their lives impoverished for generations by reason of the nation shouldering the immense debt and loss

which Germany has caused and should bear? Are our brain and labour workers to see Germany rich and prosperous again by unfair economic means, whilst their industries are ruined?

Out of our experience of these years of war, out of the knowledge of what happened in the days of peace, we know that neither the German rulers nor the German people can be trusted, we know that they are too inhuman in war and too underhand in peace to permit any course being adopted save that of crushing their power for evil, first in war and secondly in peace.

Thereby will those be safe who were in thrall to Germany and those be freed who are still under her control; thereby will the wrongdoer be compelled to recompense, so far as money can, those whom he has wronged; thereby will civilization be saved and "kultur" die.

With the horrors of the women outraged, the children tortured and killed, and the defenceless foully murdered on sea as well as on land by this German people there is but one thing each British man, woman and child can do; that thing is expressed in the cartoon of Mr. Punch published to-day wherein the little New Year child, supported by a soldier and a sailor, write up "to all at home" the paramount message: "Stick it."

New Year's Night, 1918.

THE FUTURE

*The legacy of years we own
Loaded with cruelty and crime,
Like a bad dream.
Let this wild war, effects unknown
Lessons unrivalled in all time,
Weld one great team.*

We cannot attain to the millennium—we should be very disappointed if we did—but we can insist upon the truth and thereby improve our lot and that of posterity.

PRELIMINARY

THE exodus in the lives of men, from the past through the present into the future, has in the vast majority of cases been confined by conditions and conventions, vested interests and prejudices, so that few could strike out a line for themselves or change the movement of the mass, however slightly.

To-day even the most phlegmatic are realizing that any and every alteration is possible in the route to be taken or the means of travel to be adopted; even the most hidebound are dubious with regard to circumstances permitting them to continue their lives on the lines which they have established for themselves.

The time will soon pass by during which we can choose new paths, reorganize the forces controlling our journey, and reconstruct a new abiding-place at our next destination on the ruins of the old which war and its consequences have brought about.

More quickly perhaps than many think, routes will be

fixed and positions allocated, guides will assume, or seize, office and the so-called duties of the democracy will be laid down.

The fear is that the continuation of our pilgrimage should be identical, save in name, with that of pre-war days, or that our last state should be worse than our first, if that were possible. Most of us would do almost anything to prevent such a disastrous ending to so great an opportunity obtained at such a huge cost in lives and treasure.

To this end, broad views must be striven for. Undue elation, by reason of the great position and power which, thanks to our ancestors and colonists, the British Empire has obtained, must be avoided. Depression caused by the problems to be tackled and the burdens to be borne in the years to come, must be dissipated.

It is no use rushing in one direction and tearing back again to some other extreme. Nor is it wisdom to be stampeded into the old ruts or into fresh chains which will trammel progress to the advantage only of a few. The route to be taken must be explored tentatively, the new city built up gradually. A wide outlook in both cases is essential.

Consideration for others and an appreciation of their position should be cultivated, whilst destruction, particularly if for the sake of destruction, of things useful in the past, or a disregarding of the guide of experience, may spoil all.

Realizing that our lives will become what we make them, the important thing is to obtain a reasonable perspective or view of the facts, whilst insisting that truth, and frank, open and fair dealing shall prevail. It should always be an encouragement that by work, and with knowledge, which alone can make the work effective, anything should be possible within the laws of Nature and the conditions governing the world in which we live.

Every one has learnt, at last, that the condition precedent to the existence of a nation is the maintenance of due safeguards by land, sea and air, in peace and in war, or subjection and slavery must follow.

When due safeguards are provided population and food supply

are the primary factors of a nation's life. If there be a dwindling population the nation will decay and its heritage pass to others; if it disregards food production it can never be independent, nor free to shape its course or live its life in the way it may decide.

POPULATION

The world's population is estimated approximately at 1,623,000,000, with an annual increase of $2\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. per annum, or about 40,000,000 more people in the world each year.

The populations of the United Kingdom were in 1911 as follows:—

England	.	.	.	.	.	34,045,290	
Wales	.	.	.	.	.	2,025,202	
Scotland	.	.	.	.	.	4,759,445	
Ireland	.	.	.	.	.	4,390,219	
Isle of Man and Channel Islands	.	.	.	.	.	148,934	
							45,369,090
Colonies, White Inhabitants (approximate)	.	.	.	.	.		15,000,000
Total, British Empire (Whites), say	.	.	.	.	.		<u>60,500,000</u>

In Ireland two-thirds of the population, in Wales one-half, in Scotland one-third and in England one-quarter may be taken as rural.

The population of the world, as above estimated, being in 1913 1,623,000,000, some sense of proportion can be obtained by comparing that figure with the percentages below:—

England has but (say)	.	.	2.00 %	of the world's population.
Wales	„	„	0.12 %	„ „ „
Scotland	„	„	0.29 %	„ „ „
Ireland	„	„	0.27 %	„ „ „
The United Kingdom but	.	.	2.68 %	say 3 % of the population of the world.
The British Empire (Whites)	.	.	3.80 %	(say) 4 % of the population of the world.
„ „ „	.	.	25.9 %	(say) 26 % of the population of the world.

Even the United States with their Foreign-born Whites, 13,345,545, Coloured, Negroes, Indians, etc., 10,240,309, and Native-born Whites, 68,386,412, total 91,972,266, contain less than 6 per cent. of the world's population, and occupy less than one-thirteenth of its land surface, though to-day the population is no doubt in excess of 6 per cent.

It is true that the British Empire, in 1913, included more than one-quarter of the inhabitants of the world; held under its rule about one-fourth of the land surface of the globe, and policed the seas (about three-fourths of the globe's surface) in trust and safety for all; but all must be impressed by the necessity for every one doing his duty by the nation and the Empire and bearing his full share, and a bit more, of the burden involved if the 3 per cent. of the world's people, which constitutes our United Kingdom, are to continue to bear so vast a position and, in co-operation with the Empire and the Allies, make a future even greater than the past.

FOOD SUPPLY

The next factor is the food supply for the population. The most vital item is wheat. That dealt with on a broad and sound basis so far as home production is concerned, other food items should not be difficult to handle.

The average consumption of wheat, per head of the population in each year, amounts to between 327 lb. and 342 lb., say 340 lb. (see the Rothamsted calculations extending over fifty years).

On this basis, our requirements would be about 34,000,000 quarters a year, say 100,000 quarters (800,000 bushels or (say) 20,000 tons) a day.

In peace times so much wheat is travelling on the oceans of the world to our ports that the question of narrow margins between supply and demand has easily been put on one side by our rulers, though for neglect in peace we suffer in war. During the past five years, each ending 31st August, the figures in

quarters of 480 lb. each (principally taken from the *Statist*), are as follows:—

Year.		Qrs. (480 lb.).	
1911-12	Supply	32,956,000	556,000, margin on 1911-12, or only 6 days' supply.
	Demand	32,400,000	
1912-13	Supply	34,794,000	2,094,000, margin on 1912-13, or only 20 days' supply.
	Demand	32,700,000	
1913-14	Supply	32,634,000	<i>nil</i> , for margin on 1913-14, or a deficiency of 366,000 qrs.
	Demand	33,000,000	
1914-15	Supply	32,654,000	<i>nil</i> , for margin on 1914-15, or a deficiency of 640,000 qrs.
	Demand	33,300,000	
1915-16	Supply	33,966,000	366,000, margin on 1915-16, or only 3 days' supply.
	Demand	33,600,000	

The above supply and demand, over five years, shows an average requirement per annum of 33,668,000 quarters.

Taking the year 1912-13, only 4,565,000 out of that year's supply of 34,794,000 quarters was produced in the United Kingdom. In other words, our home production was about one-eighth part only of our requirements.

In this outlook for the future it is impossible to emphasize sufficiently what it means for a country such as Great Britain to have encouraged, and indeed compelled, its old stock—the landlords, farmers and labourers with their wives and children—to weaken the power to produce the food of the nation, and in respect of wheat almost to eliminate it. Thereby the country was laid open to ransom in peace and to starvation in war, whilst other ills were produced even more distressing in the minds of those who think first of patriotism.

In the following paragraphs an attempt is made to give some weight to what every town-dweller should grasp and most countrymen know.

The farms throughout the United Kingdom have gradually, over hundreds of years, come into existence as separate hold-

ings in various sizes. The size of each holding and the apportionment of the different classes of land thereto, has been settled by the hard necessity of working in that manner which is most economical having regard to the varying prices and other conditions prevailing from time to time, including the system of agriculture in vogue, the labour on the spot in each district and the money attracted by the conditions of the industry.

To decrease some holdings and to increase others would not be productive of the best results from any particular area, unless the conditions and the systems in use are changed. To take away part of the valley land in a moorland holding or a down farm, or to deprive an estate of some of its heavy land or vice versa would be detrimental to economic output.

It is by the nice adjustment which had grown up during centuries of experience to meet the factors of the soil, of the district and of the facilities and the labour available, that our agriculture was brought to the vast industry which many still remember. Even to-day, in spite of all handicaps, a strain, which few really realize, is being met by what had become a Cinderella to many politicians who looked to the towns for their lease of power and holding of office.

All must know that the balance between arable and grass land has been destroyed in recent years, to a great extent because farmer after farmer was ruined in the attempt to grow wheat and other crops in the face of huge imports of what we could have produced ourselves, and by reason of the lack of appreciation by so many of the vital element which successful agriculture is in a country's welfare. The huge expense incurred by the landowners in draining, cultivating and improving the farms they had made was no longer remunerative.

The labourer suffered as well as the farmer and landowner. Who gained? Certainly not the nation, for cheap bread and cheap labour in the towns were not only of little good to the community, but the consequential depletion of the rural population and the throwing of millions of acres into grass lost to the

country much of its best blood and produced, as all now see, dangers both in peace and in war.

The reduction of the price per quarter of wheat and the extraordinary handicap which was thereby placed upon farmers, who tried to keep up the wheat production of the country, is summarized by a paragraph from the *Statist* of the 5th September, 1915, as follows—

“ We have become so accustomed in recent years to a very low level of prices that there is altogether forgetfulness of what used to be the case in the times of our forefathers. The wealth of the United Kingdom in these times, reckoned per head of population, is immensely greater than what was the wealth during the Napolconic Wars over a hundred years ago, but . . . the ranges of price of wheat during the period of the French Revolution to Waterloo—say twenty-three years, 1793 to 1815 inclusive—averaged approximately 80s. per quarter. There was a long period of declining trend in prices until, in 1894, the average price was 22s. 6d., and in one week during that year the average quotation on the 196 town markets in the United Kingdom, whence quotations are collated, was the record low figure of 17s. 6d. per quarter. There has been an appreciable recovery since from so extremely low a quotation, and in the last week of August, 1914, the average price stood at 36s. 2d. per quarter of 480 lb.”

In the preliminary Report of the Departmental Committee on the Home Production of Food (England and Wales) dated the 17th July, 1915, the Committee, after saying that about 95 per cent. of the wheat grown in the United Kingdom is produced in England and Wales, state—

“ 4. To obtain any substantial increase in the production of wheat, oats and potatoes in England and Wales, it will be necessary for farmers to sacrifice the comparative certainty of their present profits, to change some of their methods, to alter their rotations, and to increase their area of arable cultivation in the face of a shortage of labour. In addition, they

will have to run the risk, not only of uncertain seasons, but also of a fall in the price of wheat at the conclusion of the war.

“ We believe that many farmers would be disposed to make efforts to increase the production of wheat, if appealed to in the national interest. But in order to ensure a general movement in that direction we consider it essential to guarantee a minimum price for home-grown wheat for a period of several years.

“ 5. That such a guarantee would be the only effective measure for attaining this object has been impressed upon us, with more or less emphasis, by all the witnesses who have appeared before us. As to the amount of the minimum price and the number of years for which it should be promised, varying opinions have been expressed. But they have not differed very greatly, and the best consideration we have been able to give to the matter leads us to the unanimous conclusion that a guarantee of a minimum price of 45s. a quarter for all marketable home-grown wheat for a period of four years would lead to a very substantial increase in the area of wheat harvested in 1916 and to a further increase in the succeeding years.

“ 6. No exact forecast is possible, but it does not seem an over-sanguine estimate that, if the guarantee were given, the area cropped with wheat, which is now just under two million acres, would be increased by at least another million acres next year. . . . The figure of about three million acres may seem a high one, but it must be remembered that for many years before the great fall in prices, which commenced in the later 'seventies, the acreage under wheat in England and Wales was constantly well over three millions, and in one year, at least, was as high as 4,200,000. There seems no reason to doubt that, during the period of the proposed guarantee, the annual average wheat production which prevailed in the early 'seventies—years of great agricultural prosperity—might be once more attained, and even exceeded.”

The wide field available for a vastly increased production can be gathered from the following figures :—

	England.		Wales.		Scotland.	
	1912	1911	1912	1911	1912	1911
Total area (excluding water) . . .	Acres. 32,394,210		Acres. 4,749,651		Acres. 19,070,466	
Total acreage under crops and grass (not including mountain and heath land) . .	24,414,493	24,478,426	2,760,197	2,770,397	4,821,334	4,845,835
Arable land . . .	10,596,843	10,574,932	738,433	724,288	3,325,027	3,348,568
Permanent grass. .	13,817,650	13,903,494	2,021,764	2,046,109	1,496,307	1,497,267

(Board of Agriculture and Fisheries Statistics.)

Encouragement is already being given by our new rulers, since December 1916, for the better utilization of our broad acres under the guarantee system advocated in July 1915, two years ago, which is at last to be adopted as a war measure. The protective duties, long advocated by the Tariff Reformer, and the bonus on breaking up grass-land recently supported, but not inaugurated, by our late rulers, are left by the politicians for future consideration.

In the more detailed questions of new arrangements to govern our countryside, land tenure, small holdings and such-like, "an ounce of practice is worth a ton of theory." Panaceas or nostrums are likely in agriculture to do more harm than good. The land requires settled ways and fair handling as do the people who work out their lives upon it.

Changes in farming or tenure involve many factors. Every bit of land differs from another, often parts of one field vary. No one can safely refuse to recognize this or seek to "standardize" husbandry.

It would be just as foolish, as wasteful and as destructive to pick out the eyes of a gold-mine by following up the rich ore only, or to mine coal regardless of economical output in future years, or to work machinery to a standstill without repair or rest, as to adopt a policy of extracting "tit-bit" small holdings from the farms of Great Britain—particularly as the tit-bitters chosen are seldom farm-trained or genuine worshippers of the

soil entrusted to them. A farm with its buildings, draining, and years of cultivation is an expensive thing to play the fool with.

Too many who do not know "land" consider that they can clear away all difficulties with regard to tenure, soil, cultivation, climate and all the other conditions to which land is heir.

Each of such has heard a bit from the politicians, read a bit from the particular party Press which knows all about that somewhat complicated subject—Agriculture—and even seen a bit on some favoured spot of our happy British Isles.

The result generally is that the cutter of knots or the simplifier of this problem of hundreds of years is in more of a muddle than most, but that settles him at once in the unalterable conviction that the country people—rich or poor—do not understand their job, and that he could put them right if he was allowed to legislate, *i.e.* order what should be done regardless of the innumerable factors which are involved in the life-consideration the soil demands.

With such points of view about and such quite honest convictions in existence, there seems but one course to adopt.

Let the townsmen deal with their town problems—they have created enough in all conscience whilst solving none; let the countrymen deal with the problems of the countryside—they have always done so effectively, save when the intellectuals or politicians of the towns interfere and try to make a Cheshire grass-farm grow corn, a wheat-land grass, or a mixed holding in the West country sugar-beet. Even deer are more food-productive than sheep in parts of the rocky North, and a record wheat crop on too rich land is a snare and a delusion, for who can reap and garner when straw is broken and ears beaten down?

Those in the towns would be furious if the inhabitants of the country told them how to run the factories and workshops, what goods should be turned out and what wages paid. For the townsmen to do this in respect of the country worker and the land is worse than trying to teach the grandmother to suck eggs.

If the townsmen must have a finger in the land as well as

sole control of the cities, let so many square miles round each town be available for the object lessons they long to give in small holdings, intensive culture, and how to get more out of land than is put into it or to pay wages which are impossible because the townsman desires cheap food even if his fellow-countryman is driven off the land or has a hard time in sticking to it.

Whether this suggestion for the peace and quiet which the land and its tillers require is accepted or not, once more in Great Britain this, the first known industry of man, is at last receiving some part of the consideration and recognition to which it is entitled.

Surely, after what has been brought home in war, its vital importance will be appreciated by all, the problems which arise will be admitted, and a new area for the backbone of our country—Agriculture—will be ensured; but let us pray that all may be done quietly—Nature will not be rushed.

LABOUR

Whenever the production of food or of anything else has to be considered, an essential factor is Labour. "Labour" is used here as covering not only manual labour, but also brain work and other services, including the saving and use of capital.

Every one who saves, works or thinks is a "labourer." Some prefer to do one thing, some another; some could not stand the constant planning of enterprisés, founding or organizing works, carrying on day after day the jobs which fall on professional men, managers, clerks or others who have to deal with figures, letters, documents and such-like, often with long hours and nothing to show for weeks, months and sometimes years of effort, anxiety and worry; others could not face the underground conditions in which the miner works, the time spent at the loom nor the life in an engineering works, at the blast or steel furnaces or on the land.

Those who choose for their life's work what many find it easy to do receive the less reward, for their risk is less, their

chance of long-continued unemployment smaller and their attainment of what they set out to gain by their work more certain. Those who accept larger responsibilities and attempt what is done by only a few gain a larger return when successful, but often they fail and are never free from the greatest of risks—the loss of all.

The Government figures on the Census of 1911 are given in the table on the opposite page as to males (*see Cd. 7733*).

The totals for females are, as a rule, a little more than those for males, but the “unoccupied” in 1911 were for the United Kingdom 12,704,404 females as compared to the 2,886,606 males mentioned in the table. The war conditions have apparently brought about the absorption of nearly all males and females in some form of work.

In analyzing the whole male population of the United Kingdom the numbers, at different ages, divide up, on the basis of the 1911 census percentage as follows:—

Males under 5 yrs. of age	11.1 %	= 2,425,054	
“ of 5 “ “ “ and under 10 yrs.	10.6 %	= 2,327,328	
			4,752,382
			(under 10)
“ “ 10 “ “ “ “ “ 15 “	10.1 %	= 2,211,705	
“ “ 15 “ “ “ “ “ 20 “	9.6 %	= 2,103,261	
			4,314,966
			(10 to 20)
“ “ 20 “ “ “ “ “ 30 “	16.8 %	= 3,693,451	
“ “ 30 “ “ “ “ “ 40 “	14.9 %	= 3,263,014	
“ “ 40 “ “ “ “ “ 50 “	11.3 %	= 2,479,851	
“ “ 50 “ “ “ “ “ 60 “	7.8 %	= 1,721,578	
			11,157,894
			(20 to 60)
“ “ 60 “ “ “ “ “ 70 “	4.9 %	= 1,084,237	
“ “ 70 “ “ “ “ “ and upwards.	2.9 %	= 636,830	
			1,721,067
			(over 60)
(<i>See Cd. 7733.</i>)			21,946,309

From 15 years onwards, females exceed the males under each head of these age divisions. Their total in the United Kingdom for all ages was 23,274,927 in 1911, as compared to the above male total of 21,946,309.

Data of this sort must be looked at in respect of every class of labour and production, because, in the years after the war,

SUMMARY OF GROUPS OF OCCUPATIONS, 1911.—MALES.

Class.	England and Wales.	Scotland.	Ireland.	United Kingdom.
	1911.	1911.	1911.	1911.
OCCUPIED :—				
(1) General or local govern- ment of the country.	244,379	27,003	31,927	303,309
(2) Defence of the country (excluding Army, Navy and Marines abroad).	205,817	15,473	29,899	251,189
(3) Professional occupations and their subordinate services.	370,080	45,713	33,297	449,090
(4) Domestic offices or ser- vices (excluding do- mestic outdoor service).	161,411	10,515	12,847	184,773
(5) Commercial occupations.	663,316	75,703	39,270	778,289
(6) Conveyance of men, goods and messages (excluding merchant seamen abroad).	1,416,699	169,052	73,383	1,659,134
(7) Agriculture	1,259,254	176,304	707,077	2,142,635
(8) Fishing	25 139	28,042	8,538	61,719
(9) In and about, and work- ing and dealing in the products of, mines and quarries.	1,039,083	161,812	5,200	1,206,095
(10) Metals, machines, imple- ments and conveyances.	1,382,235	243,833	45,974	1,672,042
(11) Precious metals, jewels, watches, instruments and games (including electrical apparatus and electricity supply).	199,531	15,775	4,128	219,434
(12) Building and works of construction.	1,033,562	114,706	59,534	1,207,802
(13) Wood, furniture, fittings and decorations.	253,802	33,530	9,803	297,135
(14) Brick, cement, pottery and glass.	134,714	9,964	1,139	145,817
(15) Chemicals, oil, grease, soap, resin, etc.	137 72	17,574	3,091	158,237
(16) Skins, leather, hair and feathers.	83,472	6,257	3,637	93,366
(17) Paper, prints, books and stationery.	226,451	26,652	7,609	260,712
(18) Textile fabrics . . .	569,960	69,044	36,694	675,698
(19) Dress	439,115	42,274	29,932	511,321
(20) Food, tobacco, drink and lodging.	913,565	104,090	51,859	1,069,514
(21) Gas, water and sanitary service.	87,385	10,264	1,716	99,365
(22) Other general and unde- fined workers and dealers.	609,625	70,177	181,029	860,831
TOTAL, OCCUPIED .	11,456,167	1,473,757	1,377,583	14,307,507
(23) Without specified occu- pations or unoccupied, aged 10 years and up- wards.	2,206,033	309,024	371,549	2,886,606
GRAND TOTAL . . .	13,662,200	1,782,781	1,749,132	17,194,113

it will be essential in the lives of all that each—male and female—should combine, in order greatly to increase production in every industry.

HOW WE LIVE

The problem of realizing our life's work in the future so that the best may be, involves the recognition of the fact that, unless the people are content to forego much which they have obtained or many things which they could obtain, every possible labour-saving device or piece of machinery must be adopted, on the land, in the workshops, and throughout the factories of the United Kingdom. All concerned must apply their time and ability to ensure that such machinery is used in the most efficient and economical manner to produce the maximum output. Only thus can the standard of life which all desire be attained, and a due amount of leisure, recreation and the things which make life worth living be reached.

No nation, any more than an individual, can in the long run spend on food, clothes, houses, amusements, travel and other things more than it produces.

We might as well try to disregard the law of gravity as to get out of the world in the mass, more than we put in—produce. For a time a nation or a class may get more than it should from the world or the community, but the laws of Nature and economics which compel repayment are stern—the competition of the future will be world-wide.

The coal-miner, the iron-worker, the engineer, the factory worker each day does his day's work towards producing something. Without having to wait until what he is working on is completed and sold, and regardless of the profit or loss which may occur, he finds himself paid his wage, weekly or oftener, in the shape of coins or bits of paper. These enable him to buy food for himself and his family, pay his rent and take his amusements.

In bygone centuries a man who made a stone axe but wanted some provisions for the winter, had to find some one who had provisions to spare and wanted an axe. Then (unless the

man with the axe slew or maimed the owner of the provisions, they had only to agree to the terms of exchange and each obtained what he wanted.

This system of exchange or barter was very adverse to the worker or producer—incidentally it tended to slavery. As the centuries passed coins or tokens were invented, thereby the solution of the difficulty was commenced and money came into use. The man with the stone axe passed it over to some one content to pay money for it, trusting to find a purchaser later, and meantime the man who made the axe could use the money he received to buy what he wanted—if it was available in his district. Often it was not, for transport was bad and frequently non-existent in the days of long ago. Hence came many drawbacks and discomforts from which even in war-time we are more free than were those far-distant ancestors of ours or even than those who recently preceded us.

Gradually transport was developed, markets, shops, banks and other facilities were organized to enable the work of the producer rapidly to reach the consumer or user.

The worker received payment more and more quickly for his goods; he could borrow money on the security of his products and increase his output and the means of producing it. If he were industrious he could become what we to-day call a "capitalist."

If he spent little and thought much in his leisure, he could plan schemes for combining with others in partnership or for joint account, and this form of sacrifice and mental energy enabled guilds to be formed, and later, in our day, vast corporations, limited liability and other companies, and, by further thought and sacrifice, combines and trusts arose.

Germany has gone still further. Her Government is not only over every man, woman and child, but over every partnership, firm, corporation and trust, supporting them with its State funds and influence; controlling and ordering them with an iron rule, as well as requiring information and secret and other services—often underhand—which many among us consider are incompatible with liberty and a civilization of free men, not slaves.

Few realize how much has been evolved during hundreds of years in respect of our system and machinery of finance or how, on what has been built up, is based the opportunity for all by mental and physical labour to produce, maintain and advance our civilization and their own welfare. It is vitally important even to the poorest that we should retain our world-wide ramifications and the so-called "wealth" of the individual.

Those who lived in days now passed slowly and laboriously created a great system of merchant-banking and production centering on London—extended all over the world by sailing ships on sea and horse-drawn vehicles on land. Gradually as populations grew and transport facilities were increased by improved roads, canals and other means, factories were erected for the manufacture of cotton goods with Manchester as the metropolis, and later, when railways and steamships became available some seventy years ago, the further great cities, which we know to-day, developed their industries.

Decade by decade the financial centre—the City of London—kept pace with the adjustment of the receipts at home and remittances abroad which the ever-increasing trade made necessary; bills of exchange, credits, and market rates were maintained therefrom with the other cities of the world. Lloyds, the great marine or shipping insurance mart, met all requirements for covering against risk our ever-increasing mercantile marine and the cargoes and the passengers it carried. Later, Lloyds was aided by insurance companies, particularly for life and fire risks, and to-day we see accident, employers' liability, motor and even Zeppelin and aircraft damage added.

Merchants, shipowners, bankers, brokers, financiers and others planned, worked and saved, often risking all in peace and war, but always guarding the great commercial position of Great Britain—sometimes in the face of opposition by rulers and others who were only able to live, as they lived, because of the very business they attacked or sought to weaken by encouraging other nations to enter, under unfair conditions to our merchants, the markets which our business men had so hardly created for our and their advantage.

In shipping our figures compare with all the world:—

“ALLIES AND NEUTRAL SHIPPING, 1916

	<i>Tons.</i>
United Kingdom	21,016,000
United States	8,469,000
Norwegian	2,474,000
French	2,296,000
Japanese	1,964,000
Italian	1,730,000
Russian	1,639,000
Dutch	1,549,000
Swedish	1,151,000
Greek	1,050,000
	43,338,000

“Against these all that the Central Powers had to set before the war began was:—

	<i>Tons.</i>
German	4,464,000
Austro-Hungarian	943,000
	5,407,000 ”

(*Financial News*, 15th February, 1917.)

In railways the United Kingdom has nearly 25,000 miles, with a capital of about £1,400,000,000, whilst in banking the English joint-stock banks alone had a subscribed capital in 1912 of over £230,000,000, and their deposit and current accounts exceeded £800,000,000.

Let us now consider income and wealth, dealing with the former first. The income from the wealth and work of all in the United Kingdom was before the war estimated at £2,500,000,000 per annum.

The total gross income assessed in respect of all heads of income tax assessments, aggregates for the year 1913-14, £1,167,184,229. Accordingly the balance received by the working classes and others not paying income tax would appear to be £1,332,815,771 for the year 1913-14 if the total income was £2,500,000,000, or more if the total income was greater; but whatever the amount so received may be it escapes income tax:—

	£	£
Schedule A.—Profits from the ownership of lands, houses, etc.	282,262,109	
Schedule B.—Profits from the occupations of lands, etc.	17,500,213	
Total gross income assessed in respect of land, houses, etc., including many a small investor		299,762,322
Schedule C.—Profits from British, Indian, Colonial and foreign Government securities	51,168,329	
Schedule D.—Profits from businesses, concerns, professions, employments, etc.	670,633,544	
Schedule E.—Salaries of Government, cor- poration and public company officials	145,620,034	
Total gross income assessed in respect of sources other than lands, houses, etc.		867,421,907
		1,167,184,229

Spare time is scarce and figures difficult to get in war-time, but it would be of great interest to have the figures, showing how many people, out of the 45,000,000 (approximate) who inhabit the United Kingdom, paid income tax, and how many there were who earned or received an income of £150 (say £3 a week) and so on upwards to the comparatively few who have a thousand pounds or more per annum.

Clearly, earners of wages and small salaries represent the greater number of those who receive income, and the amount paid to them each year (as shown by these figures) is much more than most people have realized.

How much each earner receives by reason of the fact that "wealth" exists is a very important question to all.

Without wealth there could not be in the world, as at present organized, the same outlet for their work and services, nor the means of paying them their present wages or salaries, nor would there be the food and commodities available for purchase with the money they obtain. In addition if any change in the financial and economic system of this country were made, the wage-earning and salaried classes would certainly find that they had themselves lost much wealth in the shape of the invested funds of their savings banks, co-operative societies, trade unions, insurance companies, endowments and other organizations wherefrom they benefit.

State ownership (unless obtained by purchase), socialism, syndicalism, confiscation by excessive taxation of land, of houses or of capital values or even inexpert, haphazard, governmental or departmental interference with our financial organization, goodwill or wealth, must inevitably for long periods of years throw the whole financial and economic machinery out of gear.

Every class would suffer, though those who earned least or had the least wealth put by would suffer most, those at the top comparatively little, and only the leaders of the revolution might gain by taking advantage of their position.

A country or area making a radical change in its economy and finance from that hitherto adopted by the rest of the world would be severely handicapped, its people would suffer loss, and it might never again attain to the place it had held amongst the nations nor reach that which, but for its experiments, would have been within its reach—"grasping at the shadow loses the substance."

Let it be considered what would happen were any one of the countries below to commence taxing capital to a serious extent, or otherwise rendering unsafe the ownership of the wealth obtained by its inhabitants in consideration of past savings, services or other conditions guaranteed or at least acquiesced in by the community:—

		<i>Estimated Wealth.</i>
British Empire—	£	£
United Kingdom . . .	17,000,000,000	
Rest of the Empire . . .	9,000,000,000	
France		26,000,000,000
Russia		10,000,000,000
Italy		8,000,000,000
		4,000,000,000
		48,000,000,000
Germany		16,000,000,000
Austria-Hungary		5,000,000,000
		21,000,000,000
United States		40,000,000,000

Wealth, unless in the form of chattels—furniture, pictures, diamonds, etc., is but the capitalization of an estimate of future

or prospective income. In no case can it be turned into money, currency or credit, unless there are others who desire to buy and have the means so to do.

Wealth is a mere convention or a generally accepted value for rights. If the convention or rights are attacked or made insecure wealth falls in value and may disappear altogether; the power and advantages accruing to a nation from the wealth which its citizens own are reduced; and the existence of all will become precarious as in uncivilized days.

Whichever country commenced an attack on its owners of wealth—great or small—would necessarily find many of its inhabitants who owned wealth leaving its shores, taking with them what they could. It would almost entirely lose its credit with the other nations from whom it obtained goods and commodities. It would have to pay cash for everything, its currency would be depreciated, and when it sought to sell its securities no one would buy; whilst its workers at home would have to live on what they could produce from the soil, and they would only be able to manufacture what the minerals and products of the country permitted, as the imports (without the power and credit resulting from wealth) would tend to become negligible.

Some profess that they would like the limited life which would result and a few have actually tried to live it. The latter are generally called cranks or faddists, their converts are rare and backsliders are many.

Even if all the nations of the world combined to do away with wealth and to distribute the results from each day's work of the world amongst the workers, the inducement to endeavour, which saving and consequent wealth has been, would be removed, the opportunity of rising in the world would be lost, and a dead level destructive of advancement, would paralyze all. Forced labour and slavery would follow, and those who ruled or controlled the labour would become the "bosses"—a new privileged class. The grievances complained of under "wealth" would be a thousand times worse under the new than under the old regime, even if the world could survive the long period of dislocation, difficulty and danger which would

ensue for all whilst the change from one system to another was attempted.

With a few perilous short cuts and some set-backs for which theorists are mainly responsible, Great Britain has been steadily progressing in the direction all would desire.

To begin with, wealth in Great Britain was originally in the hands of the landed classes, who lived among their people and recognized their duties as the possessors of wealth—sacrificing themselves over and over again rather than let their tenants or dependents suffer.

When wealth began to accrue to factory-owners, manufacturers and others, many of them did not, for a generation or more, appreciate its obligations. Not being used to ownership the economic theories of their day were seized upon as governing all; the doctrines of supply and demand and the survival of the fittest left them free to starve and cruelly ill-treat what were called “their hands” or workers—men, women and little children.

Serious and heartbreaking as this set-back was, the mid-Victorian era is now far behind, and, as generation has succeeded generation, the duties involved in the ownership of this new wealth have been acknowledged.

To-day the landowners (so far as their wealth remains, see the table on p. 234), and those owning the new wealth gained in factories are adopting the same aim of progress—to raise the lowliest in each generation to many of the comforts and conveniences attained during the preceding generation by the classes above. All who work well and truly and are thrifty have glass in their windows, carpets, rugs or other suitable coverings for their floors, none of which even our kings and queens had in years gone by. Gas and electric light, fitted baths, and other comforts are to-day mere commonplaces in the lives of all, though the rich man lacked them within the memory of many still alive.

The luxuries of to-day are the comforts of to-morrow and later the right of all. Level up, not down. Give to all, poor and rich, better opportunities to acquire wealth by earning and saving; thereby will the nation be strengthened internally

and with the outside world. Thus only can we continue our progress towards the most that civilization can give to each of us in the material conditions of life.

To this end we must preserve, strengthen and improve the financial power and system which we have created and control throughout the world. For this purpose we must try and maintain the wealth which is held by our nation and its citizens at the highest price or value we can, and encourage all to add their quota by increasing their chances to earn and to save whilst they augment their possessions, however humble their start in life may be.

It is so important that none should forget the necessity of preserving all that there is of wealth and power to produce in Great Britain by raising every one up instead of dragging some down, that further words are added as to our money affairs at home, and the transactions between us, as a nation, and the other countries of the world.

Were we content with what we can produce in our own country, and to make shift to live thereon, as to a great extent did our ancestors, we could make our money or currency what we liked, and thereby our rates of wages and other remuneration would reach any figure we chose. We could indefinitely increase the number of our £1 and 10s. currency notes; wages would then go up, but that would be of no advantage to the people, because the price of food, house rents, amusements and all else would be more or less equally inflated. Some of the nation would, for a time, gain, many would suffer hardship, but eventually, as between ourselves, we should all be as we were in respect to food and other things which our money would buy. Whilst obtaining no advantage by increasing wages and remuneration all round, we should reap the disadvantage and grievous loss which an inflated currency brings to a nation which desires to export its manufactures and services in exchange for imports from abroad.

The people of Great Britain are no longer content with only what can be produced in our own country. Corn, meat, fruit, wool, cotton, rubber, oil and other commodities from all over the world are required, and we must pay for them, not in

money, as many think, but by what we export out of our production of raw material, manufactured goods or services to the outside world. Almost from day to day the account is adjusted between ourselves and the rest of the world.

If our exports and services to those abroad are more than their exports and services to us, we have the excess available as savings.

If our exports and services to those abroad are less than those which we receive from them, we have to make up the deficiency by shipping abroad bullion, coins, bills of exchange, or other commercial paper. If the account is very much against us, financiers, merchants, and manufacturers must reduce their profits, our investors have to sell some of their investments to those abroad, and, sooner or later, labour has to take less wages. In other words, we should be living beyond our means and all would have to be content with less and produce more.

To enable the people to obtain the mass of commodities from abroad which they desire, it has hitherto been necessary that our shipowners, merchants, brokers, agents, insurance companies (Life, Fire, Accident and Marine), banks and financiers, should give services to the outside world. It has also been necessary that many of those with an income beyond a living wage should save and invest some of their money, instead of spending it all on themselves, for our investments made abroad are in effect exports, the remuneration for, or interest on, which continues to be paid, year after year, into Great Britain by the foreigner or colonial until eventually the capital is repaid.

It is only by adding this remuneration for investments and that for services to the value of our export of commodities produced, that our people in the past have been able to draw from abroad so much that they require and yet keep our account in order with the world, without reduced wages, lowered profits or sale of investments abroad.

The following figures for 1913 (taken from the *Statist*) show how vital it is, if the people are to continue to use what they desire in their lives, that everything should be done not only to protect and increase the services and investments abroad

to earn remuneration and interest, but also for all classes of the nation to combine to augment the output and so reduce the import and increase the export more nearly to a level with what is done by the comparatively limited classes who provide the services and make the investments abroad :—

1913.		£
Net imports after allowing re-exports	659,160,000	for the 12 months
Total exports	525,245,000	„ „ „ „
Deficiency	<u>133,915,000</u>	„ „ „ „

The deficiency of £133,915,000 on the twelve months of 1913 was more than cleared by interest, etc., on investments, and by shipping, merchant, insurance, banking and other services to the outside world. Approximately over £400,000,000 per annum is produced by this interest and these services. This sum not only covered the 1913 deficiency, but also provided for fresh investment of capital at home and abroad.

In fact, only by combining labour with service and capital can we produce at home, and receive from abroad as much as we do for our own use.

THE AIM

It is by this combination of labour, service and capital, imperfectly as it has so far been carried out, that the condition in life, attained by each class has been reached. Only by each of us striving more strenuously to reach the ideal of “each for all,” can the standard of living be raised still higher for the present generation and those to come after us.

In the history of the world not once but many times have generations of men tried to overcome the law of nature that those who will not do their best every day, or who make themselves unfit so to do, must give place to those who leave no stone unturned to render all the service they can to their fellow-men, be that service what it may according to the needs, outlook and desires of each century as it passes. Chiefs of savage

tribes, kings, nobles, tribunes, leaders of the people and others by peaceful means and unpeaceful—tyrannies, civil wars, revolutions, strikes and lock-outs—have failed to overcome this law of nature. Even attempts by Government bureaucracies—socialistic or otherwise—have, when tried, produced less efficiency, greater expense, and given more scope for direct and indirect corruption and licence on the part of officials, coupled with greater tyranny for the general public and want of safety for all, than individual enterprise or any other form of organizing nations or assisting them to marshal themselves.

The present great war has now brought all classes into line in respect of full service by all, and bids fair to enable us to solve the great problem of our civilization. That problem is to combine all classes and individuals in one team—each man working according to his qualifications and power to the best advantage of himself and the community—avoiding regimentation or slavery in the years to come by having less of State or central control and more of individualism, whilst each by giving up much benefits all.

From the worker with his hands to the most highly-trained specialist, each can gradually attain to the utmost usefulness in the true team-spirit that will enable all to feel themselves self-supporting and valued members of a free community or nation. Thus each can rest assured that his children and his children's children, following in his footsteps, will live under the security and safety due to his exertions, and rise, as the years pass by, to higher things.

But however well agreed "the aim" by all, and however well sighted it may be, nought will result unless the rifle is right and its mechanism perfect, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, unless the varying conditions of wind, weather and visibility are fully understood, well considered and amply allowed for.

Some of the factors affecting the complex weapon of our civilization must be mentioned before we pass to its mechanism.

EDUCATION

Any outline of things which are material to the future would be incomplete did it not touch on the vital question of education.

In the days gone by education has too often been the drudge of politics, a refuge for some party politician as the Minister nominally responsible, pending some more remunerative and some, so-called, more important appointment. Education, rapidly as the world moves, had been left for some years up to December 1916, unbefriended and unadvanced for party reasons which included the question of vote-catching—always to the fore whenever new arrangements are suggested, because various religious denominations seem to look upon any Education Bill as a fair field in which to attempt to gain some further hold on the minds of the young for their particular cult.

Curious has been the religious outlook of many for centuries. Man seems to have an ingrained desire that every one else should believe in that particular sect to which he has attached his faith, or in that brand of religion with which he finds himself associated. Should any not voluntarily believe in the sect he favours he leans towards persecution—physical, mental or social—as the means for compelling others to agree with his religious views.

Probably the tendency to persecution and differentiation between sects arose thousands of years ago out of savage (and later civilized) systems of priestcraft, the leaders of which sought to make for themselves, their families and their connections a privileged caste, more powerful than the chiefs, kings, Pharaohs, judges, emperors or other rulers. Most savage tribes to this day have their medicine-men, and many civilized nations have analogous survivals. Yet few there are amongst the average citizens in Great Britain who do not long for a better recognition of the fact that the ideals of most of us are common to each.

Even the ministers of the various religious denominations would be more human and would feel a little humbled and doubtful of their infallibility if they remembered that, great as the work done by Christianity has been, the members of the Christian Churches are to-day, after nearly 2000 years, not much more than one-third of the world's population.

RELIGIONS

Christians :—

Catholic Churches—	
Roman Catholics	272,860,000
Eastern Churches	120,000,000
Protestant Churches	171,650,000
Total Christians	564,510,000

Non-Christians :—

Jews	12,205,000
Mohammedans	221,825,000
Buddhists	138,031,000
Hindus	210,540,000
Confucianists and Taoists	300,830,000
Shintoists	25,000,000
Animists (primitive religions)	158,270,000
Unclassified	15,280,000

Total Non-Christian	1,081,981,000
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Total	1,646,491,000
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(Whitaker's Almanack, 1916.)

The great Christian Churches in their turn are each subdivided into many different denominations. In England and Wales, in addition to the Established Church, the *Statesman's Year Book* gives the Non-Conformist Churches as follows :—

	<i>Sitting Accommodation.</i>	<i>Communicants.</i>
Baptists	1,394,285	394,647
Congregationalists	1,716,659	454,429
Presbyterians	179,523	86,828
Wesleyan Methodists	2,323,498	602,432
Primitive Methodists	1,051,259	202,479
United Methodist Church	750,075	159,255
Calvinistic Methodists	559,977	183,862
Society of Friends	—	18,513
Wesleyan Reform Union	47,468	8,317
Independent Methodists	46,310	8,770
Churches of Christ	25,000	14,703
Moravians	10,000	3,297
Countess of Huntingdon's Connexion	15,300	2,200
Disciples of Christ	6,000	1,629
Reformed Episcopal Church	6,000	1,278
Free Church of England	8,140	1,352
	8,139,494	2,143,991

The Roman Catholics (who in Great Britain are estimated to number 2,200,000), the Unitarians who in 1911 had 374 places of worship, the Catholic Apostolic Church which had about 80, the New Jerusalem Church which had about 75, the Salvation Army and other smaller sects too many to mention must be added.

One outcome of this great war all agree must be to bring us closer together on this question of religion. The sacrifices of the nation have been great and the fight entered upon strenuous—rather than let our honour and our duty go—but greater still would be the attainment were religion to take a larger part in the life of all and were friction between the various denominations made infinitesimal by recognizing that certain great essential truths are our common heritage.

It may be admitted in the words of the *Evening Standard* of the 25th January, 1917, that “matters of dogma are assuredly not without importance”; but to continue the quotation: “A Church cannot exist without definite doctrines any more than a human form can exist without a skeleton. But the skeleton is the conventional symbol of death, and dogma, without breadth of imagination, charity and warm humanity to correct it, can scarcely appeal to the great mass for whom Christianity is more something to practice than something to argue about.”

On this basis many of the difficulties, blocking in recent years the path of education, may be removed. Then we may find once more, as in bygone days, a system complete in itself, combining, as did the old systems, contributions from the parents and the Churches, so that both should more highly value the teaching furnished, and be entitled to a closer participation in the control of the children. How can the best be obtained from education without the personal interest of the fathers and mothers, and of the ministers of their faith?

It is easy to design and even to carry out a cast-iron State system of education, by treating the children in the mass and failing to discriminate as to what work in life each may be fitted for and will desire to undertake. It is not difficult to produce some prodigy and even to force many to acquire by

rote quite advanced subjects, yet always under such methods must the waste of the individual be excessive, and the ultimate results not for the ultimate good of the nation nor the real efficiency of all its members.

Far better was the sound grounding provided in the past by the Dames' Schools in England, used by rich and poor, or that produced by the work of the National Society, founded towards the end of the eighteenth century. Great has been the effect of the Scotch system, addressed to the acquisition of knowledge not to proselytizing for any sect, though religion has never ceased to be an important factor in the lives of Scotchmen.

The teaching of common-sense, of knowledge and of ability to fulfil the practical duties of this life, with a due appreciation of the world to come, should prevail provided that all pull together for the common end of turning out the best citizens, in the different walks of life, without party bias or uncharitable religious or social jealousy.

By these means effect can be given to all the best points of the old systems and to what may be worthy of survival in the new. More advanced schools, and, later, colleges and universities can be made available for those pupils, whose talents, inclination, or other circumstances justify their claim to such benefits.

The influence for good which education and religion have upon a country are never appreciated until they are lost, or become mere conventions, or producers of ill, through laxity, the adoption of wrong methods, or the following of wrong paths. The bad effects are cumulative, and only make their appearance as the rising generation begins to assume its place in the nation, thereafter the ill-effects show themselves more and more and often in many unexpected ways.

Probably, as in most things, the soundest and in the end the quickest way to remedy defects is to start at the beginning or bottom with the youngest. Make good the basis and method of their grounding in education and religion, and half the distance, at least, towards successfully tackling more advanced education and attaining a better life will have been covered.

A slipshod and evasive curriculum, ignoring the duties of each to one another and of all to their country and to religion, is not conducive to the best outlook on life. No one desires the creation of schools for the cult of the "super-man" or of frightfulness such as Germany inflicted on her little ones, nor do many, except cranks and faddists, want a Pacifist, pro-German or International Socialist propaganda pressed day after day upon the young.

Surely it is not beyond the natural moderation of our people to produce a system and teachers who will bring up the rising generation to respect themselves and those they meet as free citizens, to recognize religion and yet to take their part in, and insist upon our rulers providing for, the due safeguarding of the State.

Mothers and fathers may well ask that their children, who will be the people of the future, shall neither have their education facilities planned or organized, nor even touched, interfered with or discussed by those who as rulers withheld the truth from or misled the mothers and fathers in the past in respect of the German menace; nor should any teachers be provided from the ranks of those who have refused to defend their country.

How can such rulers or teachers bring up the rising generation in the ideals for which many of the fathers have laid down their lives?

"MERRIE ENGLAND"

Next to touch upon conviviality; upon the cheery intercourse of neighbour with neighbour; must the "cakes and ale of Old England" go? Is the well-known song of our King Henry VIII to become merely a reminiscence and a crystallization of regret for what has been?

"Pastime with good company
I love, and shall until I die;
Grudge who will, but not deny,
So God be pleas'd thro' life will I;
For my pastance, hunt, sing and dance;

My heart is set.
 All goodly sport
 To my comfort,
 Who shall me let ?

Chorus.

For idleness
 Is chief mistress
 Of vices all.
 Then who can say
 But mirth and play
 Is best of all ?

King Henry's Song (words by Henry VIII).

If alcoholic stimulant is bad for all, under all conditions, and in all circumstances, any rulers who were worth their salt should, long ago, have made the fact clear to the people; first stopped the use of alcohol in their own persons and in their own households, and, that done, closed the supply to all others. Certainly the State should have been no partner in such an industry, nor drawn such huge sums therefrom—for no service except a permission to trade, which on this view is a permission for the encouragement of vice.

Historically there is much to be said against throwing on one side ale, the produce of our hops and malt, the manufacture and drinking of which has continued throughout the period during which England has been evolved and the British Empire brought into being. Even when Oliver Cromwell was Protector in the time of the Commonwealth there was "Puritan ale," though it is referred to as "thin, sour and pale," as compared to the strong beer of the Cavaliers. True that in recent times some have consumed a concentration of alcoholic stimulus in the shape of spirits, but can it be quite wise to forgo a good sound beverage, whether a food equivalent, digestive, or cheerer, because some may take too much of the more fiery spirits and less of the food-like compound—ale ?

In the *Manchester Guardian* of the 27th July, 1917, under the heading of "The Economic Crisis in Russia" dealt with by its Petrograd correspondent, the words appear: "Hard work on the Front and the abolition of vodka increased their" (the peasants) "demands for cereal foods." Probably the experience of most is that if they cease to assimilate ale or beer

with their meals, they require food in larger quantities and at shorter intervals, to say nothing of foregoing what the judicious use of hops and malt in the national beverage also brings about, namely, the lessening of thirst and the fillip to the heart's action, when tired by work and called upon for more, in digesting the food necessary to make good the wastage resulting from the past work, before extra effort is made.

Have those who seek to prevent others drinking ale or beer realized that they more often than not load themselves with a greater quantity than he who lets the brewer do much of the work which they throw upon their own internal arrangements; whilst as to quality it is the refined article which the ale or beer consumer drinks, not the raw material which they—the teetotallers—prefer to distil or brew in their own insides?

Surely it is unwise to blame the good gifts God has given because they are misused by some; worse still is it to forbid them or to put difficulties in the way of their being obtained, whereby it seems “manly” or but emphasizing one’s “independence” to use them to excess; worst of all is it to make restrictions which compel those, who feel they need alcohol, or desire to have it in the house for hospitality or emergency, to purchase quart-bottles of spirits, or more quantities of beer than they would buy were it easily obtainable at reasonable places and at reasonable hours.

Common-sense and a knowledge of those who are not accustomed to alcohol in the home must tell any one, looking at the question from a fair-minded point of view, that “limited” hours make “hurried” drinks—one after the other, as for so many hours no more can be obtained—whilst the alternative Government requirements lead not only to more beer being taken into the house by the ordinary consumer, but also entices him to drink spirits there also. Worst of all, these methods encourage the mothers and later the sons and daughters to participate in what is on the table, or to take it from the cupboard, when, but for this, the sons would, as a rule, hardly touch spirits until well on in life, and the mothers and daughters would only use that form of alcohol as a medicine or means of getting over a “dead-point” in their often somewhat hard lives.

Those who seek to deal with the lives and welfare of others on "Prussianizing" lines, or seek to declare things *Verboten*, must not forget that a Briton resents the implied reflection and does what is denied to him just because it is prohibited. Whereas what can be had for the asking is, to a Briton, a mere matter of everyday life, and he neither rushes after it to get all he can, nor rejects it entirely, but uses it to the best advantage; better, if compulsion there is to be, that teetotallers be compelled to assimilate a little alcohol—as St. Paul said "for their stomachs' sake," and in good feeling for their fellow-men, than to prohibit it to all to the possible detriment of our race.

Let the reformer realize the unreasonableness of expecting the people to give up the use of ale when, if not he, certainly many of his friends, have cellars or other ample sources of supply of wines, liqueurs and spirits in their houses.

Let the teetotaller remember that many of his cult are teetotallers because they, constitutionally or for other physical causes, sometimes self-induced, are not able to digest ale or to use alcohol with discretion, and desire, like the fox in the fable, to make others cut off their tails; that some of his class are not full of that feeling for others which is so essential to genuine evangelists; that generally there is a desire to tyrannize, such as brought forth the retort from Bishop Magee of Peterborough to the effect that he would rather see England drunk and free than sober and a nation of slaves.

Truth to tell, Great Britain, whatever may have happened in years gone by, seems well able to make herself both "free and sober"; but to aid all to obtain both these blessings, why should not our rulers insist upon good ale, well brewed and made from materials of the best, with the various strengths suitable to the different constitutions catered for and to the different classes of work which call for this refreshment; why should not they let this commodity be sold by any one who chooses to sell it? Why should not the public-house be the poor man's club and any one else's café, and so conducted that all can have their cakes as well as their ale, and the wife and children their tea, coffee, cocoa or milk? The human race is gregarious. Social intercourse cannot be suppressed.

Why did our rulers in peace enact legislation to remove these moderating influences? Why did they prevent the re-organization of the public-houses, on the one hand, and of the coffee- and tea-houses on the other, so that in both all could be served together as on the Continent in decency and in comfort? Why did our rulers tax and tax again this industry until they forced inferior goods, discomfort, and temptation upon the working man?

Whatever the answers to these questions be, two points are often ignored. One is, that in any case good stuff taken under wrong conditions, or bad taken under any conditions, or either taken to excess, is poison to the system, all of which equally applies to teetotal drinks or even to food or water; the other that climate is a factor not to be overlooked.

In the old world each country seems to yield the drink suitable for its inhabitants. In the tropics—water or the juice of fruit or nuts; as the more temperate zones are approached—light wines; further north—heavier wines; then—beer; and eventually—spirits, be it the whisky of Scotland, or the more intense vodka of Russia. Things may be different in the Western Hemisphere, but in Great Britain the results attained over centuries might make even the most extreme teetotaler or prohibitionist take a broader view of his pet question.

Some may say that, whilst Nature appears to produce the solid and liquid which each set of climatic and working conditions require, it is rather the case that the inhabitants have evolved their food and drink and their work and play, and that we can be re-evolved so far as food and drink and work and play are concerned. Were this to be attempted with regard to our race long years would have to pass before our descendants would again be in harmony with the new conditions. Whether the new race would be happier than we are or less happy, more efficient or less efficient, or whether it would retain its great place in the world is a question which could only be solved as generation succeeds generation under the new conditions, though the Pacifists and conscientious objectors may be an indication of what to expect.

Certainly the jolt to the machinery of the mind and body of each person changing the rules of life adopted by himself and his ancestors would be severe, and its effect for good or evil on the virility and mental capacity of future generations could not be foretold.

As to ourselves here in our present life, we have proved at the Front that an individual who finds himself called upon for hard work at three, four, or five o'clock in the morning when he feels cold and his system is below par gets out of a "tot" of rum the starting power for his heart-pump, warming his extremities and making the brain work quickly, very much as an internal-combustion engine of the petrol or Diesel types requires in the one case sufficient warmth to start, in the other the auxiliary air compression to give the initial impetus—each performs its work most effectively and with the least wear and tear when the correct conditions are obtained.

Many lives have been saved by the prompt administration of a little brandy to set the heart-pump going, or to prevent a weak flickering ending in a cessation of movement which means death. The obtaining of the best work from the body and brain by the judicious use of alcohol and other foods is a matter which those who urge abstinence by all do not seem to study; they sweep everything on one side—making their words of little weight.

Some even state dogmatically that inasmuch as by the mortification of the body the spiritual side of man is more greatly developed, so abstention from alcohol should be ordered. These propagandists forget that it is but necessary to add food and water to the list of things to be abstained from, and man will prematurely pass to another world where his spiritual side alone will exist. Fortunately or unfortunately we are on this earth; the body and mind are the essential factors of existence here; neither should be cultivated to excess at the expense of the other, nor reduced to uselessness by over-exalting the spiritual side.

Surely the aim should be to balance body and mind in harmony with the world in which we live, so that each gains merit in this finite existence until—our work well done—the

soul carries us to an hereafter beyond conception by our earthly senses.

Certainly it seems presumptuous for any one to dictate on these questions, and those who seek to prohibit others from touching spirits or from drinking good sound beer in this world may find that they have erred, whilst, in attempting to drive a free nation, they may bring about an aggravation of the ills attacked, if ills they be.

IRELAND

Everybody approaches this question with fear and trembling, because, within our memory at least, no one has touched it without finding trouble; yet the question is wrapped up deeply with the full success of the United Kingdom.

At the present time Ireland still suffers from containing practically two divisions; each Irish province is trammelled by having a part of the problem of each of the other provinces incorporated within its own borders.

The population (1911) of each of the four Irish provinces is given by the *Statesman's Year Book* as :—

Ulster	1,581,696
Leinster	1,162,044
Munster	1,035,495
Connaught	610,984
Total of Ireland	<u>4,390,219</u>

(*The Statesman's Year-Book*, 1913.)

Religion must also be taken into account. The last Irish census shows :—

	Number.	Percentage of Population.
Roman Catholics	3,242,670	73·9
Church of Ireland	576,611	13·1
Presbyterians	440,525	10·0
Methodists	62,382	1·4
301 other Denominations	65,652	1·5
Information refused	2,379	0·1
	<u>4,390,219</u>	<u>100·0</u>

(*Whitaker's Almanack*, 1916.)

The problem, however, does not seem to be so much one of religion as of race; between the northern Irish or Protestant population on the one hand, and the Irish proper on the other, who, whether at home or abroad, are generally looked upon as "the Irish."

The British people know the Irish well; they have worked with them; they have joked and chaffed with them; they have had their "rough and tumblers" with them; they know how to take them and how to do great things together. The last thing the Irish ask or expect is that their British relatives, friends or "mates" should take them "too seriously."

The "Blarney Stone" is almost a monopoly of the Irish; charming it used to be to receive the little touches of flattery, though wise to take them "with a pinch of salt." It is well to play up in the same spirit, neither too gay nor too serious, but it is always necessary to remember that persiflage, however pleasant, cannot solve the problems of life, the organization of a nation or the winning of a great war.

None can forget the heroic deeds of the Irish regiments; all know how an Irishman can keep a whole gang of men going, cheerful and bright with just enough "grousing" to make things natural; and in war, when the grip comes, when lives are being snuffed out like flickering candles, and the last ounce of effort is wanted—with a pull together as in days gone by—the Irish are a force well known and appreciated to the full in all parts of the world.

Why, then, in the greatest war which has ever been or is ever likely to be, do so many of this fighting race—the Irish—stand aside?

The answer is partly that just as the Scotch love an argument and swear allegiance to any one who is great in words and phrases, so the Irish love a fight and to make things difficult. This trait found plenty of scope in party battles and political manœuvring, and was allowed by our rulers to drift into a rebellion.

Some say that the Irish as a race resent being governed, however wise and just the rule may be. Others, mesmerized by the cry of "Ireland a Nation," try to "press a quart into

a pint pot " by refusing to recognize that whenever a population seeks to merge itself in a nation it must give up many things which can be retained by individuals, counties, provinces or even divisions, north and south, or east and west, so long as they remain separate entities and are not merged in a united whole. This law of life has to be recognized in marriage and in everyday affairs such as partnerships, boards of directors, clubs, or any joint-working with others, and cannot be ignored in the operation of constituting Ireland as a nation self-governed and self-supporting in peace, and with a due regard for its own safety and welfare and the safety and welfare of the Empire in peace and war.

These are grave matters for statesmen, but ask an Irishman, in a friendly talk, what is the matter and what he really wants in order to be happy and contented and to " do his bit " for the United Kingdom? He will tell you he does not know what all the bother is about, nor why every one is talking at him. If you press him further as to what he wants, he will go on to something quite personal, like the draining of his potato patch, or, if a bigger man, the running of a branch railway so that it passes near his land.

Still there are some of the Irish, particularly abroad, who honestly believe that those in Ireland are more badly treated than Germany has treated her Allies, and not nearly so well treated as the German people have been by their rulers. For those who believe such things it is a pity that there is no likelihood of German rule prevailing for a short time in Ireland, for the difference between that rule and ours would be a revelation.

In *The Times* of the 18th September, 1917, the following appears: "The *Rheinisch-Westfälische Zeitung* in a recent article draws a comparison between German and British methods of colonization. Speaking of Poland the journal says: 'We have freed her from corruption, dirt and epidemics, and we did it, too, thoroughly after the German manner. But with what result? . . . Whosoever knows the Poles knows that they have revelled in their dirt for centuries. It has become a tradition with them. But as soon as we come along a thousand

prohibitions bar their liberty, and instead of gratitude we meet with grumbling and discontent. We build water systems that will last for centuries. The Poles requite us with laughter at the poor Germans. We organize a school system, even a university, to meet a "burning desire" for education on the part of the Poles. The Poles look on with a grin, and when our work is done rudely show us the door. We build, yes, indeed, what do we not build? always with the same good-humoured thoroughness, and reap in the best cases only sneers and ingratitude. What an ungrateful people, we say, not having learnt even in this war that it is not our business to impose changes on peoples which we may call improvements, but which they don't need, and which only make us ridiculous in their eyes.'—Reuter." This may be intended for humour, but it is cynically true, and represents a mild side of that kultur for which the Irish persuade themselves that they pine.

To return to our text, other Irishmen, again mostly abroad, seem to believe that Ireland is in the same condition as it was when political and other doctrines and theories were held to justify in England the factory atrocities of the early-Victorian and mid-Victorian eras, and at the same time to justify also the hardships which undoubtedly were suffered then in parts of Ireland. In more recent times party politics and the cult of unrealities have no doubt prevented Ireland, as well as England, from completing the betterment of the conditions of life in both countries, but almost in everything a just comparison gives most Englishmen the impression, particularly in recent years and more than ever now, that Ireland is better off and has more political power and representation and less restrictions and obligations (whilst she certainly has had more money poured into her land) than have the other three nations which with Ireland make up the United Kingdom.

Politicians and party are to the Irish like oil on fire. Sense in the guise of a firm Government and sensibility in the shape of the Land Purchase Act of 1903, whereby the British people provided some £50,000,000 in a few years to enable the Irish tenants to become the owners of the land, did in fact produce by 1906 such a state of affairs that the satisfactory position in the

Sister Isle was admitted by our rulers who had then come into power with a great majority exclusive of the Irish Members, or the members of any party save their own.

Firm and just rule, enforcement of the law without fear or favour, and a generous treatment of the land question on a basis involving in the end the best part of one hundred millions of money from Great Britain, had indeed brought peace and prosperity to the "distressful isle."

Gradually under the rulers (who left us in 1916), though the prosperity continued the peace vanished. The change began to approach its culminating stage in 1910-11, when those rulers having lost their single party majority in the House of Commons urgently desired the support of the Irish Members. Ireland's woes loomed large again, and our rulers obtained the best part of a hundred votes "at call" on any subject—right or wrong, so long as our rulers fulfilled their bargain to make some sort of "Home Rule" for Ireland a vital point in their programme.

The descent was rapid from the content and comfort of 1905-6 to the imminence of civil war in 1914, and the putting down of a rebellion, backed by the Germans, in 1916.

Apart from the finding of the Royal Commission, referred to later, that the law in Ireland had for several years been left in abeyance, what had been happening? Our rulers in their "Home Rule" campaign had preached on every platform that the Irish must have their rights, that anything and everything must be sacrificed to the giving of "justice to Ireland."

Naturally the Irish were not loath to believe that they had been badly treated by England, and that Scotland and Wales were to make Great Britain correct the wrong by an Act of Parliament.

When not only the Home Rule Act was not put in force but under it Ireland would have had to pay out money instead of receiving huge sums as in previous years, even the Irish sense of humour—famed as it is throughout the world—could not appreciate this treatment.

There had been such a heralding of fresh benefits to suit the exigencies of party politics and yet nothing done, and even

less in sight, that none, who thought the matter out, were surprised at a deep feeling of resentment arising in Ireland or at the whole nation, north and south, becoming restive and upset.

Should the blame be on the Irish people? On their politicians? On our rulers? Let each investigate and give his own answer.

Imminent civil war before the Great War and actual rebellion during that world-wide cataclysm, must have shown the Irish people that their co-operation, even with the Saxon, in righting the affairs of the Sister Isle is the only course open to them unless they prefer slavery under German rule.

Let the Irish race take stock, eradicate the trouble and join up with Wales, Scotland, England and the Empire in the great effort to close down for ever not only the tyranny of Germany and its attempt to dominate over all, but also the methods of the party politicians, who have been dealt with by the Royal Commission of May 1916, in the following words: "The main cause of the rebellion appears to be that lawlessness was allowed to grow up unchecked, and that Ireland for several years past has been administered on the principle that it was safer and more expedient to leave law in abeyance if collision with any faction of the Irish people could thereby be avoided.

"Such a policy is the negation of that cardinal rule of government which demands that the enforcement of law and the preservation of order should always be independent of political expediency."

With such a travesty of government any nation might become unmanageable and every Irishman, though he loves a scrap, must, behind his hand, be longing for firm, just and understanding rule. Is it any wonder that the Irishman is reported to be losing his sense of humour and becoming soured, that his milk of human kindness is curdling, and his appreciation of the sport and fun of life is turned into discontent with everything?

Even the best child in the world cannot stand the lack of rule and the absence of discipline. Under such conditions he grows into a nuisance to others and a misery to himself. Much more does a nation want to know where it is.

Let the law run, even in the lowest slums of the cities (if such are still allowed to exist by the Irish municipalities) and in the wilds of the country districts (if wilds there be notwithstanding the money poured by Great Britain into the land); let every one be free to do what he knows is right in accordance with law and order and his duty to his neighbours and to the world. Then will the Irish race throughout the world be with those rulers, whoever they may be, who bring this about by firm rule and good sense.

England, Scotland and Wales, forming Great Britain, and with Ireland constituting the United Kingdom, are all in the same boat. The immediate business is to conquer the German menace whereunder we should all be in subjection, if not in actual slavery, and compelled to furnish armies and workers to help Germany to obtain the dominion of the world.

All will welcome the outstanding elements in Ireland if they join in the work and later in the march to victory. Great will be the achievement of the Irish people if, in this time of crisis, they disregard difficulties and misunderstandings and join wholeheartedly in this world-fight. Later, when the fight is over, there should be little trouble in assuring self-government within the United Kingdom to all who desire it.

Contiguity has much to answer for. Many things are thereby made necessary. No child, woman or man, nor State, country or race can always have what they may, at some period in their history, want. Their future and safety may depend on giving way to others as many in this world must do. The four nations of England and Wales, Scotland and Ireland have by reason of their adjacency formed our United Kingdom.

Country.	Square Miles.	Population.	Largest Town.	Population
England . .	50,890	34,045,290	Greater London.	7,251,358
Wales . . .	7,434	2,025,202	Cardiff . . .	188,495
Scotland . .	30,405	4,789,445	Glasgow . . .	784,601
Ireland . . .	32,360	4,390,219	Dublin . . .	304,802
Totals . . .	121,089	45,250,156		8,529,256

The forty-eight States of America, with their area of some 3,000,000 square miles and about 100,000,000 people, glory in being one nation, as do the eleven provinces of Canada in being a great dominion.

Province.	Total Area, Square Miles.	Population 1911.
Prince Edward Island	2,184	93,728
Nova Scotia	21,428	492,338
New Brunswick	27,985	351,889
Quebec	706,834	2,002,712
Ontario	407,262	2,523,274
Manitoba	251,832	455,614
British Columbia	355,855	392,480
Alberta	255,285	374,663
Saskatchewan	251,700	492,432
Yukon	207,076	8,512
North-West Territories	1,242,224	17,196
Totals	3,729,665	7,204,838

Yet none of the States in America, vast though their populations be, nor any of the Provinces in Canada, huge as their areas are, claim to be separate nations; each has to be content to merge its national existence in, and to share benefits and burdens with, the supreme authority. What would the people of the United States, or of Canada, say to a "Sinn Fein" demand if promulgated by one or more of their States? What would either say if not only men but troops had to be immobilized to keep order in such a State in this Great War? How can national safety or the best progress be assured in the United Kingdom on such a basis?

In the great Confederation of the Empire, the Dominions and Dependencies with their Federated States or Provinces will be members, and in forming the Federation of the United Kingdom friction and difficulties should, with the goodwill of the Irish people themselves, disappear without prejudicing the safety or reducing the efficiency of any; but let the scheme be workable, not mere "political paper" to gain "votes" or to score a success for some party or leader.

INTERNATIONAL SOCIALISM

The International Socialists claimed in the pre-war days that wars could not be, and, now that there is a war in spite of their alleged power to prevent it, they claim that we must accept a peace without victory.

The solidity of the German Socialists in entering upon this war of aggression, in fighting with a terrible bitterness and cruelty year after year, and in only manœuvring for a "victorious peace" when they saw defeat and wanted to escape the years of toil in front of them to make good the wrong, is apparently to be treated as an exception which proves the rule that the organization of the International Socialists is such as to prevent man killing his brother man.

Even to this rule there is another callously cruel exception. Many of the International Socialists toast their "day," which is to be when every man who is below another attacks and seizes the goods of any above him, until all the poor are rich and all the rich are dead or slaves—if anything worth living for is left or any one remains after such a somewhat "Gilbertian" revolution.

With the present world-upheaval before us and nearly the whole of the peoples of the earth involved, it is not easy to treat the claims of the International Socialists seriously, but if what they claim to do can be done, it is surely not for any one to be misled a second time into trusting them to do it.

The peculiar mind, or outlook, of International Socialists is somewhat discouraging as a basis for peaceful meetings or sound or practical procedure, both of which will surely be necessary in carrying out what they talk about. In their propaganda they substitute a war of classes for wars of nations, and in their meetings acute differences arose even when entrancing plans were discussed in the past for a new heaven and a new earth, and the handling of a race of men which never was, and never is likely to be.

Were it best for the human race to live in a never-ending series of meetings occupying all the spare time of the world,

except that taken up by producing a bare living, the ideal would perhaps be reached by our all becoming International Socialists; but then there would be no opposition, which is their life-blood, and the movement would die.

Charity demands that all should give our International Socialists credit for the best intentions. Yet too many of them seem to forget that this great war is being fought against an autocratic monarchy and against a bureaucratic people by those who believe in civilization being based on a due balance and fair dealing between the different classes in each country, and between the nations of the world.

Most of the International Socialists have thrown in their lot with their respective countries. They have fought, bled, worked and suffered as patriots. Every one, except the extremists, Pacifists and a few others, expected this.

The majority of the extremists have gone about arguing for peace, so that they can bring upon the world the yet more terrible time when their "day" comes and man rises against man on a new class division of the earth, which, if attained, would leave nothing worth having to divide, even if those left could spare time from eking out a bare subsistence to enjoy it.

Mr. P. Snowden is reported in *The Times* of the 30th July, 1917, as frankly saying: "It was a great satisfaction to him to be asked, as he often was by wealthy Members of Parliament, if he thought we should have a revolution in England. He always answered that it was quite as certain as to-morrow's sunrise. A meeting of all the Socialists in Europe was to be held next month to discuss peace terms. The conference would formulate these terms, and if the Government would not accept them only one thing remained for the people to do—follow Russia."

Surely all can see that if the International Socialists became a serious menace to the peace of the world by attempting really to enforce their propaganda in the years to come, those who were not Socialists would in self-protection become "International" farmers, producers, financiers and so on. Thereby a fresh series of hostile leagues would be created, but neither peace nor progress would ensue therefrom.

Even their methods of voting seem strangely undemocratic.

Mr. Adolphe Smith, the official Anglo-French interpreter since 1882 at the Congresses of the International, in his communication to *The Times* of the 28th August, 1917, states: "To-day there may not be 30,000 British Socialists subscribing regularly to Socialist bodies, and there may be more than 2,000,000 Labour party trade unionists paying weekly subscriptions, but the International is a Socialist not a trade-union movement. The Germans, more especially, have insisted that every member should be, as far as possible, 'a clear-cut, class-conscious Socialist.' Therefore the Labour parties of the British Colonies, as of the United States, are excluded, and Mr. Gompers, with the American Federation of Labour, cannot be admitted. . . .

"Any party, however, can refuse to obey any longer rules which, if strictly applied, would produce a pro-German majority, even at a meeting limited to representatives coming from Allied countries. Indeed, according to these rules the British Empire itself would show a large pro-German majority, and I apply the term pro-German to all whose efforts tend to soften the fall of Germany by concluding peace before a definite victory is attained.

"This is due to the formation in our Colonies, as well as in various countries, of small Social-democratic groups. These little groups call themselves parties, and were founded under German influence, often by German teachers and with the aid of German money. Then care was taken to give these little German-taught groups of united Australia eight votes, of non-united Australia four votes, and of South Africa four votes, in all sixteen votes for the British Colonies.

"Thus the International has been so completely Germanized that, even before the war, some British Socialists thought of starting another International—an International of English-speaking peoples or an International of free nations, some sort of association that would be more truly international, and where it would be possible to discuss other matters than those which interest the Germans.

"Therefore, no one who knows the situation, and who is not a pro-German, can possibly approve of any congress or con-

ference if it is to be held in strict accordance with the rules of the International. All the proposals that have been made for such gatherings originate from German agents, from Germans disguised as Russian, or from their instruments and dupes."

Even if Internationalism were not a cloak for German world-dominion, and if the voting methods of the International were put on a fair and sound basis, and if the delegates ceased from disputing amongst themselves, the International Socialists would after all only represent a very small number of each nation. Their aims and what they seek to enact would mean slavery to many nations, for climate, environment and national characteristics make the standardizing of the lives of the peoples a travesty of freedom.

Also, even if the International Socialists themselves did not succeed in creating the great class war which is their declared aim, they have shown themselves as in the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-1, and again in the present war, to be disintegrated by, and of no account in, such world-happenings when the peoples of the world speak and act.

To create now a third, or is it a fourth, International in so short a period as forty-five years, does seem a waste of brains, time and money, which is hardly justifiable in the condition of affairs likely to prevail for many years to come.

There is enough genuine hard work for all to do during the next generation without spending time on impracticable theories or in provocative speeches. Let the extremists get to it, leading with them those whom they have misled as to war, and joining with all, each in his own country, in the manufactures and real work of peace.

COUNSELS OF PERFECTION

(1) *General*

First and foremost the war must be ended and our terms of peace enforced in such a manner as to leave all free from fresh menace and aggression. That done every one must work and

play, and work and play must be found for every one, under living conditions for himself and his dependents. Only by that means can our race progress and maintain in safety and peace the position it has earned.

To gain this advantage for all, it is necessary that each should be prepared to work, and consequently play, with special energy, at least for the next few years. The leisured class will surely feel it a disgrace to take the pleasures of life without working; no one—old, middle-aged, or young, man or woman—should be an incumbrance to the community by absorbing a fraction more labour than can be helped, or wasting anything that can be used or saved.

With vast new factories, new tools, loyal workers, improved facilities, financial credits and world-services, we shall be able to see what our output can be, what we can keep for ourselves, and what we must export to pay for what we bring in from abroad—later a wider life will follow.

Free trade as we know it, fair trade, reciprocity, protection and other things must all go into the melting-pot. Each must be used, alone or in combination with the others, to meet conditions as they arise. State help may be essential to establish new industries; travelling State supervisors, consultants and assistants and emergency staffs of men may be required to accelerate the readjustment and transition period. New conditions and difficulties must be faced; all must work unprejudiced by shibboleths of the past and far-seeing as to the future, with the ultimate end of securing the freest possible action of each individual man, and of a State whose chiefs and officials shall be in reality servants—"ministers"—of the public, not its masters.

The favouring of German and other foreign interests, to the detriment of our agricultural and manufacturing people, must be stopped, for we cannot survive as a mere market for the produce of other countries, dependent upon them for our bread with the control of our industries passing into their hands. A nation of consumers principally living by rendering services to other countries, and with its industries relying upon others for the raw and part-manufactured materials essential thereto,

must lose its place in the world ; only by production of food and commodities can a people grow strong and live secure.

The maximum home production for our own needs, from machine-worked wheat-lands and corn-fed and root-fed cattle to better homes and improved power-devices, the highest export of commodities produced from raw material of the Empire or the Allies, and a greatly increased provision of services and savings may all prove feasible in the days of peace, after what has proved to be possible under the handicap of war.

Short or long may be the period of readjustment ; hard the troubles to be borne ; but, with a firm and resolute nation, understanding people, and rulers self-sacrificing and wise, all things attainable in this world are possible—if all work with all and for all.

(2) *The People*

To arrive most quickly at the best position for each of us, the leaders of labour must think the matter out, and take the responsibility of freeing their fellows from the trammels which fetter the men's advancement. No longer must the leaders encourage the working classes to fight for a limited life like that of an official under Government—a bureaucrat or a civil servant—who works under a system whereby it is not only no gain to push on and increase his efficiency, but so doing actually makes him unpopular with his fellows, or causes his superiors to consider him a disturbing, not to say a dangerous influence. True, the Government servant has his quiet life, a certain income—small, but steadily increasing by seniority, and a definite pension (from accumulations obtained by the Government by paying him less wages than he could have obtained in the open market), but the man of the working classes seems to have been led to fight for the disadvantages without the advantages of such a limited life, whilst as his years increase he more often than not finds his wages growing less and less.

On the one hand, neither the Government servant nor the working man obtain increased reward for special competency or efficiency—this is unfair to them. On the other hand, in-

competency or inefficiency is hidden or shielded—that is unfair to the nation. The principle adopted seems at fault, so also is the tendency to “hold up” every one else—whatever the inconvenience or loss to all—whilst the worker stands on his “rights” or has them readjusted to his satisfaction.

Both Government servant and workman have been led into a system, the foundation of which is the “limitation of output” and the reduction of all to one “dead level,” namely, that of the man who does least—a negation of all individual effort to reach the maximum obtainable for the benefit of the worker, his family and their future, or for the good of the nation.

The leaders of our great trade unions may hesitate to help the building of new paths to independence for all the working men they guide, until they see that the old paths lead but to a glorified slavery, wherein emulation with others to the advantage of all is wiped out, and to a restriction in comforts and luxuries which year by year will grow more severe as competition with the outside world is made more difficult by internal rules and regulations which prevent the nation putting forth its full efforts. Sharply defined classes or divisions result from decrees and rules which make it ever more difficult for the individual to advance in his class or rise to another.

The right to live in reasonable comfort has been fought for and recognized; the future of the children is being more and more assured. Employers admit that an increase in efficiency on the part of the worker must be followed by the worker receiving a due share in the profits derived from the increased output which results.

It but remains for the workers and their leaders to make good and to do all that in their power lies to enable each to rise to the top of whatever he may be doing, and thence to the highest which his merits permit. There is more room at the top than at the bottom; why should the working men keep each other down? It should be the object of all to help everyone upwards, and refrain from rules and regulations which will ultimately enslave all except the rulers.

In reorganizing our lives it must not be forgotten that the taking over of businesses by the State and their working by the

bureaucracy is an expensive operation for the people—the people bear the cost. Profits, however large they may have been under individual management, have a tendency to turn into losses under bureaucratic or Government working. The New River and other water companies and the National Telephone Company are examples.

(3) *The Classes*

The so-called “classes” must not be discouraged in advocating what is best for all, by any abuse or misrepresentations such as our rulers heaped on Lord Roberts when he sought to prove that the German menace was over us, and to show that only by the National Service of all on truly British lines and as a privilege of our race could that menace be met. Neither must the classes be deterred by vilification such as was poured on those who showed that Germany was being helped to get into her hands vital industries and supplies of raw material and assisted in her policy of permeation of our country in peace and its embarrassment in war.

Both the people and the classes have come forward in the trials of this great war in a manner which is a source of pride to all, and each must apply in the peace which is to come what he has learned in the war—looking ahead to the great future and giving due weight to the world-problems which in the end decide success or failure.

Thus, whilst each individual goes forward to improve his life and outlook to the utmost of his ability, his progress will be followed by the progress of the nation, and what each does for himself will better the condition of all.

Trade unions and other organizations must still exist; the work of guiding and guarding the classes and the masses must continue, but let no change be attempted unless genuinely desired by and encouraged from within the mass or the class. Once a change is well weighed and is started let it be continuously carried on slowly and steadily towards the end desired, in order to stop the vast waste of brain, energy, time and money in working up agitations and fights as between class and class,

mass or mass, or between the masses and the classes, on some excessive claim which is killed by its own unreasonableness. Let this waste, which was increasing daily before the war, be turned into productive channels; thereby each individual will find his lot improving, and he will arrive at results he little thought to accomplish for himself and his family when he was so handicapped in his work under the old ways.

Self-seeking must be eradicated, whether professional or because one has been brought up to think but little of injustice to, or suffering by, others, or of one's duty to one's neighbour and to oneself—no team can exist unless every member "plays the game" without putting his own glory or aggrandizement first. Let every one consider the enormous difference which would result in the income, wealth and leisure of the nation if every one "did his bit" to the utmost of his capacity during hours of work, and did not waste the substance of the nation in his hours of play. The stimulus of war conditions has shown this; let none drop back into the old ways.

(4) *History*

Whilst each can cultivate in his own life the means conducive to that team-spirit by which alone a people can be great and free, there are other forces outside the people themselves which must be taken into account.

Each of these forces have effects on the national life very difficult to control, or even to see, until too late to stay the ill or help on what may be good.

Unless every citizen has a reasonable appreciation of these factors, how they work out and how they react on each other, and on his life and on that of the nation, his influence, his outlook and his vote may do more harm than good.

What is worse, he may vote for something or some one, believing that good will follow from what is proposed or promised to him, only to find that the promise is not fulfilled or the result, if the proposal be carried out, is the very reverse of what he desired or what he was led to believe was to be done.

Nearly a thousand years have watched the British people "making good," seldom thrown back by any failure or even false steps, always unduly credulous of and often too submissive to spoken assurances or promises, whether made by kings, cardinals, nobles or those of baser metal, and sometimes misled by glib words and other arts of adventurers, or enemies of the realm.

The record is of absorbing interest. Sometimes there has been a "King Log" Government without the ability to govern if it would, sometimes the rulers have been of the "King Stork" type, with but one end in view—the eating up of the governed. Perhaps the rule least in harmony with the spirit of the British people is the pre-war mixture of "King Log and King Stork" in one Government, whereby all were told to "Wait and see," some (in our rulers' pre-war Irish tragedy) had Dreadnoughts and army corps mobilized against them, and others found their rights given away to meet party emergencies, whilst German permeation pervaded all.

Throughout the nation has pushed forward, carried on its work at home and abroad and advanced in freedom, more often than not in spite of its rulers, but, as the complex civilization of to-day develops, the people can less and less afford to ignore the changes in the seat, or control, of that power which must always be reposed in those who govern.

In the early days of England the King was supreme, gradually the nobles curbed his power and for a time they exercised it.

Then came the interlude with king, nobles, Commonwealth and Parliament, each rising in turn to the greater influence in the ruling of the nation. Scotland had become a member of the kingdom of Great Britain, as previously had Wales. On Ireland joining, the United Kingdom was complete.

With the Reform Act of 1832 began a new era of Parliamentary Government. The Throne, the House of Lords and the House of Commons were all nicely balanced to form the democratic scheme.

In fact, the power of the Throne has been throughout less than that of the President of the United States or of any other Republic.

In practice, the House of Lords wielded much less power

than the Senate of America or than any other second Chamber in the world.

In the result, the House of Commons could not only gain its way when it really had the nation behind it, but the delay in so doing would, in any matter clearly desired by the nation, be less in the United Kingdom than in any other country.

Every democratic constitution provides for delay as a safeguard against the mistakes or manœuvres of rulers or acts of impetuous partisans, often so contrary to the true wishes or interests of the nation, and against the quite possible contingency that the people themselves might desire to change their minds on reading the proposed legislation, which they thought they wanted or which they were told by the politicians that they ought to want.

Second Chambers, like second thoughts, are sometimes best, as in the case (to quote one instance out of many) of the Declaration of London, so detrimental to our power at sea. In peace-time a party vote in the House of Commons passed the enactment under order of our then rulers, but it was rejected by our Second Chamber—the House of Lords. Thereby the people's detestation of anything prejudicial to our Navy was given effect to, and a grievous ill to the nation prevented by the Second Chamber, though in war our rulers by their own act brought the rejected measure into force with variations.

This guarding of the community by a balance of power seems very British and sensible. Two heads are better than one, and it seems still more sound that in addition to the two Houses there should be an umpire, referee or ultimate authority with power to refer matters back to the Electorate in order to make sure that the nation really wanted what the legislators would enact.

Furthermore, the ultimate authority can ensure to the people that they shall have the opportunity of compelling self-chosen ministers to give place to others.

So much was the advantage of these safeguards realized by other nations that they began to copy in one form or another

this balance of power between two Chambers and a Sovereign or President.

In our own case it is true that both the House of Lords and the Throne were inclined, too readily perhaps, to assume that what a party vote in the House of Commons said must represent the real wishes of the majority of the people. This has happened even when the party rulers changed their views completely round in a few days and got the House of Commons to pass and to send up the reversed decision for approval to the House of Lords and the Crown. Yet this too-easy acceptance by the House of Lords of the party vote, ordered by Ministers, as the voice of the people, cannot fairly be called a sin by the very rulers who requested its commission.

In spite of the instance indicated of a complete *volte face*, and of other cases which followed, where a little more time given to the people for reflection, and the disclosure of the truth to them which must have resulted, would have changed history, a fresh variation of our Constitution was being worked for by the party rulers in order to increase further their power.

(5) *The Politicians*

This manœuvre was in hand by the then rulers at the very time (1908 onwards) when the whole of their energies and those of the nation should, on what these rulers knew, have been engaged in defending the very existence of Great Britain and the Empire, in peace, against that permeation and paralysis, which Germany was insidiously arranging, and in preparing for war lest our want of preparation should encourage it, or for fear that if it came we should be unprepared and pay dearly in life and money.

The full extent of the plan which our then rulers commenced to put into operation may never be known, but it was assisted by the fact that Great Britain has no written Constitution.

In an unwritten Constitution, Ministers can represent, on the one hand, that certain duties are contrary to the people's desire

and should be allowed to lapse or should not be performed and, on the other hand, that certain powers should be used in an unheard-of manner or to a farcical extent by way of threat, bluff or blackmail.

In these pre-war years there was coupled with this misuse of powers and disuse of duties the theory of the Radical and Liberal party leaders, acquiesced in by the other party leaders, that the Crown acts only "on the advice of Ministers."

Upon this basis, only the House of Lords and the House of Commons stood in the way of the then Prime Minister, and those whom he might find necessary as colleagues, being all-powerful.

How did he and his colleagues deal with these two safeguards? First the House of Lords, apart from being left to bear the blame for any unpopular decisions of the Supreme Court of Appeal, which bears its name, was rendered powerless by our then rulers and put into a state of suspended animation. In that state it must remain until some one comes forward to pay the then Prime Minister's "debt of honour" which he stated "brooketh of no delay," but left for years unpaid, even by instalments. Indeed, he passed from office in December 1916 without any attempt to clear his debt so long overdue.

Next these rulers by use of party politics, and by means of the party system referred to later, made the House of Commons powerless in practice, and subservient in habit, whilst, with our Constitution in commission and Ministers supreme, they provided, from the nation's funds, salaries to Members of Parliament, and added thereto the privilege of a special income tax abatement, by means of ministerial decree or by a vote of the Members taking the remuneration. In the words of Mr. Punch of the 1st December, 1915: "Economy, like charity, should begin at home. When the House of Commons voluntarily relinquishes, during continuance of the war, salaries which only the other day, in time of profound peace and unbounded prosperity, were conferred in breach of honourable and time-honoured distinction among Legislative Assemblies, its cry for economy will become more effectual."

It seemed in keeping when Ministers made the war an excuse

for causing the preparation of the register of voters to fall into arrear, and when they neglected to arrange any effective basis for a poll of the people and made the House of Commons renew its life time after time by its own vote.

Thus the people of England and Wales, who had, with the nobles, extracted, hundreds of years ago, a Constitution from the Crown and later had seen their House of Commons a real power in the land, found themselves, together with Scotland and Ireland, with each of the three safeguards of our Constitution emasculated and Ministers supreme, so long as the party system with its latest developments could be maintained.

Not only was the position thus manœuvred, and nearly completed before the war by our then rulers, destructive to our Constitution, but it made the so-called "democracy" of Great Britain a farce.

"A rose by any other name would smell as sweet," and he who holds the reins unchecked is an "autocrat" even though he is called "Prime Minister," "the Premier," or any other name.

It was true that the Prime Minister, who carried through, in the days of peace, the series of moves which brought about this position, was ardently helped by his colleagues and by those who aided his schemes in return for the support and help he gave to them. His control of many was great and his command of words immense, but however extensive the popularity of an individual, it is a serious matter to find the most honourable office of Prime Minister turned, in a few short years, into that of a dictator or a ruler, unchecked by those due restraints and unaided by that useful guidance which can only be received from a representative and independent House of Commons, a sound Second Chamber and a monarch with at least those powers and duties which are entrusted to the respective presidents of the great democratic countries of the world.

Each and every successor to the then Prime Minister must be embarrassed by the position the latter created for himself.

Since he left office in December 1916 much has been done by our new rulers to remedy the result of the grievous and

dangerous series of steps taken and of the conditions created, as summarized above, by our old rulers under their policy of pre-war days.

In fairness to the then Prime Minister, who left us in December 1916, all must recognize that a grave—perhaps a graver—responsibility for such a subversion of our balanced and democratized Constitution rests on his close colleagues, who claim to speak, for Radical and Liberal opinions (see p. 163) and yet made possible the creation of an autocratic oligarchy by the inner-circle associates of the Camarilla.

It is equally demanded by British fairness that any one who was kept outside this circle and left in ignorance of the truth (see pp. 24 and 25) must stand free from the greater blame which may be the portion of those who knew the truth and the effect of the policy devised.

In fairness to all it must be mentioned that history may record that the happenings of 1906 to 1914 arose to a great extent from the conscience-destroying effects of the party system against which certain areas in Great Britain tended to rebel, and from the attempts on the part of the social reformers to regimentize and standardize what they called "the masses;" that expression and those methods being entirely contrary to the true English spirit.

Be all this as it may and the explanations what they may be, there remains yet a greater task to perform than that of restoring the balance between the Crown, the House of Lords and the House of Commons, placing each in a position to fulfil those functions, which were committed to its care; thereby making impossible that ministerial usurpation of power over the nation which our late rulers had so nearly consummated.

Until this task is performed the House of Commons can never regain its full weight in the Constitution. Whilst it remains undone, that Assembly lacks the one legitimate inspiration on which it should rely, namely, the direct and genuine vote of the nation in support of candidates chosen by the constituencies.

Every one will guess what is the task, only by the fulfilment of which these things—the very foundations of democracy—can be made possible in the future, though steadily, year by

year in the past, our late rulers had been making them more and more impossible.

The task is dealt with at p. 282 under the head of "The First Task for all," and consists in restoring to the nation the power taken from it by the politicians under cover of their development of party politics and the party system as carried out during the last few years.

(6) *Party Politics and the Party System*

By party politics is meant the inclusion in the ruling class of many who think more of party and personal interests than of the State, and consider question or criticism an impertinence and suggestion a waste of time; the combination amongst such politicians to retain position, power and perquisites for themselves, their families and connections; and the bargaining whereby such politicians vote for something they disapprove, in order to receive support for something else which it serves their purpose to obtain.

The pawns in the game are the constituencies. One illustration is given in the telegram sent on the 17th January, 1910, by Sir Edward (now Viscount) Grey to Ignatius T. Tribitsch-Lincoln, the then newly-elected Radical Member for Darlington: "Lincoln, Park View, Darlington. Heartiest congratulations on your splendid win.—E. Grey."

Any one who has read the Parliamentary speeches since the outbreak of war can see that pro-Germans, Pacifists and anti-British Members of Parliament result from the party system; whilst in pre-war days and even in war the nation has heard from Members of the House, who should know, what manner of people some of their fellow Members, in high positions or of great influence, are.

We have seen in previous pages "muddling through" by party politicians at a huge cost in precious lives and untold treasure treated on good authority (see p. 123) as a commonplace, and the politicians themselves have cynically referred to political morality as something below that standard which is adopted in business or social life.

The voters are treated as less than pawns. Usually the party organizations select the candidates, allowing the voters the choice of two—one backed by one party, one by the other; often each candidate is a mere “carpet-bagger,” fighting the election as a step in his career. The local candidate, known to all and bred and born, or even genuinely resident, in the constituency, is rare, so rare, indeed, as only to be the requisite exception to prove the rule.

A recent letter by Mr. H. G. Wells to *The Times* of the 30th March, 1917, illustrates the position. It reads: “For reasons that do not appear they put up an unknown Mr. Goldbug as the official Conservative candidate. He professes a generally Conservative view of things, but few people are sure of him and few people trust him. Against him the weaker (and therefore still more venal) Liberal organization puts up a Mr. Kentshire (formerly Wurstberg) to represent the broader thought and finer generousities of the English mind. A number of Conservative gentlemen, generally too busy about their honest businesses to attend the party ‘smokers’ and the party cave, realize suddenly that they want Goldbug hardly more than they want Wurstberg. They put up their long-admired, trusted and able friend Mr. Sanity as an Independent Conservative. Every one knows the trouble that follows. Mr. Sanity is ‘going to split the party vote.’ The hesitating voter is told, with considerable truth, that a vote given for Mr. Sanity is a vote for Wurstberg. At any price we do not want Wurstberg. So at the eleventh hour Mr. Sanity is induced to withdraw, and Mr. Goldbug goes into Parliament to misrepresent us. That in its simplest form is the dilemma of democracy. The problem that has confronted modern democracy since its beginning has not been the representation of organized minorities, but the protection of the unorganized masses of busily occupied, fairly intelligent men from the tricks of the specialists who work the party machines. We know Mr. Sanity, we want Mr. Sanity, but we are too busy to watch the incessant intrigues to oust him in favour of the obscurely influential people, politically docile, who are favoured by the organization. We want an organizer-proof method of voting.

It is in answer to this demand, as the outcome of a most careful examination of the ways in which voting may be protected from the exploitation of those who work elections, that the method of Proportional Representation with a single transferable vote has been evolved. It is organizer-proof. It defies the caucus. If you do not like Mr. Goldbug you can put up and vote for Mr. Sanity, giving Mr. Goldbug your second choice, in the most perfect confidence that in any case your vote cannot help to return Mr. Wurstberg."

Party politics have been so developed that the patriotic man, if he manages to become a Member will, after going through the fire of ideals lost and plans destroyed, accept matters as he finds them. With such a state of things what chance is there for a new Member, however well intentioned, to retain any semblance of personality or independence or to do the duty for which he was elected? Seldom does the independent Member survive even one Parliament; like Nemesis are the powers of party.

The party war-chest, so venal in itself, is reputed to have been filled in secret by German and other interests desirous of swamping our markets, and absorbing our financial, banking, foreign and other laboriously built up assets—making all subservient to our rivals in the worlds of commerce, finance and power, and our workmen slaves; by Free Traders manœuvring some veiled protection for their own goods or extensions for the use of their services; by supporters of sects and schisms of thought or action seeking to enslave others to the desire or methods of life which they advocated—but seldom adopted; and by means or methods still less savoury.

There have been no published accounts, no published reports. The tyranny resulting from the hidden power is great, and the harm to the nation and the people by reason of that which arises therefrom is terrible and impossible to estimate.

Party politics and the "machine" have admittedly fettered and misled the democracy in the constituencies and its representatives in the House of Commons; they have contaminated the fount of honour from which the House of Lords renewed its strength in our constitution; they created internal strife;

they encouraged war by preventing preparation for it; and over and over again in war hampered the concentration of all on the one end—victory.

Where is the reparation for, and where the safeguards and guarantees against, the “party menace,” and where the indemnities for the fearful loss of life, the shocking waste of treasure and the miserable uncertainty and distrust which it has brought about?

The first step to a better state of things was taken when those who had revelled in their “indispensability” left office and returned in December 1916 to their purely party fold, promising support for the war, but murmuring of “engineered conspiracies” and holding to their “infallibility” (see p. 110).

The second step to a better state of things was taken when the party funds were attacked from within and from without. The *Manchester Guardian* of the 22nd January, 1917, states in a leading article: “The Finance of Party.—An interesting question arises in connection with the new Liberal organization which the Prime Minister and his Liberal colleagues have felt constrained to establish as a matter of at least temporary convenience. How is it to be financed? The finance of the great political parties has always been a mystery, and on the whole a discreditable mystery. In part, no doubt the funds come from perfectly legitimate sources in the shape of annual subscriptions or donations from disinterested supporters. But it is to be feared—though only the initiated know—that these supply but a small proportion of the sinews of war demanded by the secret activities of party organizers. What is fairly notorious is that a brisk business goes on in the sale of honours, small and great—a traffic not indeed coarsely overt like that of the shop and the exchange, but none the less real because more or less veiled, even as between the parties. It is a thoroughly corrupt and rotten system, bad in itself and bad in its results. A great secret service fund is collected which in large part has been used to pay the election expenses of impecunious candidates who, of course, part with independence in exchange for cash. Thus the power of a Government over the House of Commons, already too great, is made greater and the char-

acter of our representation is sapped. No accounts of these funds are ever published, and obviously they would not bear publication; and so secret is the whole business that the money is placed, as appeared from a disaster to a particular party fund which became public a few years ago, in the hands of a trusted individual usually, we believe, the Chief Whip of the party—who invests it as he thinks proper, and is not accountable, except in honour, to anybody. The two chief political parties, Liberal and Conservative, still, we believe, hold their funds on this footing, and when Mr. Asquith stated at the Reform Club meeting that he remained at the head of the Liberal party it meant that he retained control of the central party organization, and of the party funds. We have thus the singular anomaly of a Liberal Prime Minister and a Liberal Chief Whip without any party fund at all. The *Morning Post* makes an impassioned appeal to them to forego once for all the old secret methods and the old rotten machinery, and we are bound to say that in this matter we find ourselves in the unusual position of cordially agreeing with the *Morning Post*."

The third step to a better state of things was taken when our new rulers made a beginning of casting off the shackles of party politics. Hopeful is the outlook for a patriotic Government, working in a true partnership, in the team-spirit, with the people and every class, for the best development of the community and of the life and usefulness of each individual and of the generations growing up and to be born.

(7) *The Press*

The fourth step to a better state of things will be the carrying out by the nation of "The First Task for all," but before dealing with that task it is desirable to emphasize how great an ally the Press can be in assisting the people to recognize the ills referred to and to make good in the future.

Some Press utterances, adverse to the methods of the party system, have already been quoted. Much has been done during the war under this head and on other matters of vital importance. Indeed, a censorship has often seemed not only a super-

fluity in the case of the majority of the organs of the Press, but a cloak to hide many things which were better disclosed in the interests of the nation.

In the days of war before December 1916 many things would apparently never have been known or remedied but for the Press, and in the days to come the nation must rely upon similar assistance in the tasks to be tackled and the work to be done.

Even before the war there were many papers seeking to wake the nation from the sleep induced by our rulers, and to show in domestic, trade, national and foreign questions that if the people continued to listen to the party politicians they would find not only ever-increasing internal dissension and strife at home destroying all that our ancestors had built up, but that they would open their eyes to find their very lives and trade governed by the Germans.

After the outbreak of war other organs put patriotism in front of all else and joined in the effort to save the nation in spite of party politics.

Unfortunately there are organs which have continued in the old ruts—seeking to keep us involved during war in many of those dangers, miseries and discomforts which are inflicted upon a nation by the party game and to lead us back to all these evils when peace returned. These organs before the war supported our markets being open to Germany, though her markets were protected directly and indirectly against us; our sea and land forces being reduced though Germany was increasing hers on a huge scale. When the crisis came they urged our then rulers to keep us neutral though these rulers afterwards admitted that such a course would have involved “our isolation and disgrace” (see Sir Edward Grey’s words on p. 48), and Great Britain “going down after centuries of glorious life to her grave, unwept, unhonoured and unsung” (see Mr. Asquith’s words on p. 47).

Some of these organs even to-day oppose the encouragement of our agriculture or industries at home or within the Empire, others urge “Peace without victory,” the “bartering,” if desired, to Germany of vast areas in Africa with the unfortunate

native inhabitants therein, and generally advocate a return after the war to the pre-war conditions so dear to the heart of the party politician.

To impress their readers and gain their ends they either hold out the bribe of a soft life as they did when they sought to keep us neutral for the sake of profit-making in trade, capturing the bulk of the belligerents' trade and keeping our expenditure down, or they threaten terrible disaster, as, for instance, in the *Daily News* of the 1st August, 1914, which said: "The streets of every English town will be filled with starving men, women and children who either have no money because there is no work or whose wages under the blast of famine can no longer keep body and soul together."

Or to quote again the *Daily News* of the 4th December, 1916, speaking of a Government of "strong men" (see full quotation on p. 106) without the backing of party: "It would have the country in a blaze in a week and would have passed into anarchy and a military dictatorship in a month."

Or taking the *Manchester Guardian* of the 21st February, 1917, when writing against the consideration of Imperial preference, it said: "The close of this war will, in all probability, usher in the bitterest social conflict in the records of this country."

Other instances of promises and threats, both unfulfilled, could be given, but the people of Great Britain have learnt that inducements held out by party organs and party politicians have a habit of not fructifying, or that if fruit is borne it enriches the foreigner and benefits the politician, not the people, and that threats of terrible things to happen, unless old shibboleths and catch-words are allowed to stop progress, are ill-founded: Both methods are losing their strength—the British people have proved over and over again that they are not a race which is affected by threats nor, in these stern times, by promises.

What the nation cries for is truth, honestly and straightforwardly given; that done the people have never been found unwilling to make any sacrifice or fearful of any happening. Banish that clouding of realities, which has been created by

party and prejudice, and many difficulties would be solved and dangers removed.

When the people know the truth they can maintain a steady pressure on our Legislature and Executive, upwards—towards the ideals attainable—instead of permitting, as in the past, a steady pressure by the party organizations downwards—to those backslidings to which human nature is always too prone.

(8) *The First Task for All*

The foundation on which all else must rest in the years to come is national safety, coupled with a stable and wise Government of the free by the free. Even to attain safety, the better path is by wise rule. Therefore it would seem beyond question that the initial task is to make the party system impossible and to efface that sham democracy which it has created as a mere cover for ministerial power.

The vast and complex organizations of the party system throughout the Kingdom can soon be absorbed in more useful work. Englishmen do not like inquiring into the opinions of others, nor canvassing or otherwise interfering with men and women with regard to the exercise of the franchise, nor do the people like cut-and-dried decisions being foisted upon them at efficiently packed and cleverly manœuvred meetings with party speakers out for vote-catching from the masses and for the advancement of their own careers.

The political workers, on the one hand, and the voters and their families, on the other, will be equally relieved to find this artificial and irritating incubus removed. Free exchange of views between man and man, woman and woman, and each with the other, will follow, and gradually a "tied" voter will be as rare as was a "free and independent" voter under the party system.

It is neither the voters nor, in the majority of cases, those who carry out locally the directions given by the party headquarters for the putting about of machine-made opinions and views, who will shed a tear at seeing the last of this method of manufacturing so-called "public opinion" or of producing,

“to order,” the cry of an “outraged” people for new Acts of Parliament.

The trouble will be that some of the ruling class are evidently devoted to the party system as it had been developed by them up to the outbreak of war and as it was maintained by them until December 1916. They would defend the monster they have made with their political lives, and even in war-time they have let it interfere with vital necessities such as men, food and money, and have permitted it to clog the machinery of Government and the wheels of efficiency.

Those who have been bound to a party for their future and will not, or dare not, seize the great opportunity given by the war of turning over a new leaf, must surely pass into private life. The elders because they will be hurtful to the community if they cannot or will not free themselves, or help the nation to free itself, from party strife and bitterness. The younger ones because, if they have proved themselves worthy in the fighting forces, or in other war-time work, and yet do not look with aversion to leaning on party allegiance for their career or as an aid thereto, must surely gain strength by being forced to seek a less sheltered existence.

It may be a wrench to both the old and the young party men to lose the prop by which so much power and so many sources of emolument have been distributable amongst them. It may be that many will miss the secret party funds or the obtaining of honours by “services rendered.” But war has brought, to many, much worse wrenches, and has caused to be given up far higher things than such funds or such honours.

The old who would maintain their party grip can reflect in their retirement that they nearly succeeded in their purpose of making the ministerial power paramount and permanent, and of reducing the House of Commons as well as the House of Lords and the Throne to cyphers to register their decrees.

The young can soon console themselves with other work and interests suitable to those who would rise on their own efforts to responsible positions in a free nation.

There seems no injustice to any one in making impossible any revival of the party system, or of the rule of the nation.

by that multiple-oligarchy which arose from that system and persistently supported it, as did the ever-increasing bureaucracy for which it was responsible.

The masquerade of this oligarchy under the guise of democracy is becoming more and more understood, and the greater the knowledge of its tyrannous working and of its disastrous results, the more it will be discredited.

This being so, two important questions have to be solved. How are we to get rid of these dangers and how are we to prevent their revival? This is the first task to tackle. It is no light matter.

It is said to be wise "to set a thief to catch a thief," but is it necessary to form new parties to relieve us from the machinations of the old? To adopt a remedy which adds to the number of parties, or which may produce a new oligarchy, reminds one of Kipling's navvy, in "The Day's Work," who, suffering from the attentions of one doctor, was offered the services of a second, and in a weary voice wailed: "Another bloomin' doctor." The navvy would have been better off with neither doctor, but left to Nature; as we should be if freed from party and bound together in the union of patriotism.

Surely it were better in order to prevent the abuses, to take steps to make such abuses impossible; without its abuses the party system would probably die, or at least lose its power.

Certainly many of the evils and wrongs which have grown up in recent years in conjunction with the party system can be eradicated by a simple extension or application of the law of England to the world of our politicians and their party system. But in working this out let us start with a yet simpler point.

The history of the past few years seems to show that the present party system gets its strength, neither from the beliefs nor from the convictions of its leaders nor from those of their principal clients or supporters, but from the distribution of "the loaves and fishes" which is in the hands of Ministers.

The "loaves and fishes" include (a) the selection for offices and appointments of many in every class of life—from bishops and judges down to far humbler people; (b) the giving of honours—from seats in the House of Lords and the House of

Commons down to places which are far below the seats of the mighty; (c) the distribution of the secret party funds amongst all sorts and conditions of men, and for all kinds of objects; (d) the power to make or mar the careers or lives of many, and (e) an all-pervading influence arising from the massed and secretly organised forces of the party oligarchy, which influence is very subtle and difficult to define, but which, in its indirect way, has a strong effect in preventing any attempt to purge the Augean stable of the party system or to free the people from those political methods which just before the war were reaching their climax.

First, therefore, the nation might well insist that all patronage shall be taken out of the hands of the politicians and administered for the nation by suitably devised and carefully appointed Patronage Boards consisting of men, taken from all classes, of independence and character, untrammelled by party ties or hidebound predilections on the one hand, and acquainted, on the other hand, with the qualifications required in the offices or posts to be filled. The appointments could be made on the rota system by each Board with a series of panels for the different classes of candidates, so that the last vestige of political, party or other outside influence should be made impossible and so that merit and freedom should prevail.

To the Patronage Boards might be added Boards for the placing of Contracts. Each department would settle its requirements, but the Contract Board would select the contractor to supply them.

Secret party funds will be dealt with later, but the lives or careers of such as serve the nation should, like patronage, also be removed beyond interference from the politicians.

By removing patronage from the hands of the politicians and the bureaucrats, they would have more time for the duties of the offices they hold, and the independence and work of those freed from this interference would gain, justice would be ensured, and greater efficiency produced.

To refer again to the history of the past few years, it shows that there is one law for the general body of the nation, and another for the politicians. Leaving on one side the question

of such privileges as those which even in war they retained for themselves, a politician may make almost any representations or promises he likes to those from whom he seeks to obtain votes, yet, however reckless or careless such promises prove to be, or however untruthful in fact his words are, he escapes the heavy penalties which would fall upon a citizen if he did such things in business or in social life, whether he knew the truth but hid it as the politicians did, or did not know it, but was reckless and careless as too many political speakers have shown themselves to be.

Even the Prime Minister himself can give a promise or assurance of the most definite character, votes may be cast by the electors, or in the House itself, in reliance upon it, yet when it is unfulfilled neither he nor his party suffer; they have "got the goods" or obtained what they wanted, and simply keep what they have, without pain or penalty and without any rectification of the wrong or any restitution of what has been taken under the broken promise or assurance.

In politics, apart from broken promises or assurances, it had become, under our late rulers, quite a distinction and a path to office to cultivate the knack of so wording promises and assurances as to take in, deceive or "soporificize" the nation or those who listened to, or read a report of, the words spoken.

In business and in private life, trickiness, misleading answers to questions, prevarication, evasion of straightforwardness and refusal to admit error when clearly in the wrong, soon meet their punishment; in politics it is the reverse—reward follows at the nation's expense.

Again, if a servant or other person in the service of another is negligent, fails in his duty or does many other things, the consequences are laid down by law; but the politicians—who should be the servants of the nation—have not only put themselves above the law in most cases, but have manœuvred matters so that even the little law that they have left to bind them cannot in practice be put in motion by any one except themselves, whilst the position is such that it is the politicians who select and decide the advancement of those who administer the law.

Ministers and Members of Parliament, as already stated, combined to take, out of the nation's money, a salary for such of themselves as were not already drawing official remuneration. Of their own volition without the approval of any other body they pocketed the money. What would happen to any trustee—however hard the work he did for his beneficiaries—if he appropriated part of the trust funds to his own use and benefit in this way?

The use the politicians make of the secret party funds has already been referred to, as has their use of patronage, but here, again, what would happen to any one who dealt secretly in this way in ordinary business or social life? He would soon find himself at loggerheads with the criminal law or discover that he was ostracized by his fellows.

Secondly, therefore, a very simple and intensely democratic solution suggests itself, namely, that an Act of Parliament be passed clearing up all doubts and making the law of the land apply, *mutatis mutandis*, to the deeds and words of the politicians.

The consequences would be that a vote obtained by misrepresentation, whether at an election or in the House, could be made void, and the delinquent liable for damages. If the words amounted to a false pretence he would be liable to go to prison for getting votes under false pretences. To paraphrase Shakespeare, "He who steals my purse steals trash, but he who steals my vote . . ."

Reckless or careless statements or utterances made without careful investigation would be subject to the penalties arising under the doctrine of "equitable fraud," and, as in outside life, such representations might amount to criminal fraud itself.

Election addresses, circulars, posters and advertisements could be made subject to the same law as prospectuses and filed for public reference, as a record for all time against the politician or party responsible.

Promises once made for good consideration must be kept, or the politician who breaks them will have to pay the appropriate penalty. As in business or private life, the political promiser must keep his word or lose caste.

The law as to trust funds and as to the payment of commissions, gift of benefits and such-like matters, can be applied without difficulty in suitable form.

As to secret party funds, they can be made subject to the ordinary law which requires a complete list of subscribers to a limited liability company to be lodged at Somerset House and kept up to date with the full names, addresses and descriptions of every shareholder, the amount of his subscription and what he received for it. The list in the case of such a company is open for inspection, together with a properly audited balance sheet to be lodged from time to time. Why should the secret party funds not be brought within this law?

In extending the law as to conspiracy to the House of Commons, care would be required to debar groups from making bargains or arriving at understandings, such as voting for something contrary to the expressed views, or well-known beliefs of the Members voting in order that, by so doing, they will get others, equally adverse to their views, to assist them to pass what they want into law. Reciprocity, or rather pooling, of votes, contrary to convictions, must lead to ill and should surely be stopped or at least penalized.

The law as to hawkers—those who go from house to house to sell the goods of others—could be made to apply to those who seek to deliver from door to door party opinions in exchange for votes. Each party canvasser could be compelled to obtain the usual licence after satisfying the authorities as to his suitability and paying a registration fee, which is the law's requirement upon the hawker. Even if the fee were considerably increased the revenue would probably be small, as this unpleasant process of trying to sell machine-made views to others in exchange for votes would soon cease. The people would be left to form their own opinions by quiet discussion amongst themselves, or with tried friends, as they do on the ordinary affairs of life.

Probably with such a code as that indicated above, made into law, or possibly with its mere discussion, and with Press support of the matters touched upon above, the post-war

House of Commons would gladly rid itself of party, look after national interests and get to patriotic business.

To turn again to history, many have wondered why the torrential use of words by the politician submerges the thought of the masses and sweeps them in some direction in which they never intended to go, and more often than not leaves them bitterly to repent afterwards that they had been rushed into such a departure from their normal common sense.

The explanation of this phenomenon seems to be that to those who have a comparatively small vocabulary of words for their daily use, the super-vocabulary cultivated at great pains by the politician is simply overpowering; it catches the man of less words with a glamour or belief in respect of the speaker's superiority which the worker seems unable to withstand.

The effect upon him and the community is too frequently disastrous. Wisdom seldom makes its home in a whirlpool of words—rather is it obliterated thereby.

Apart from the psychological question as to the why and wherefore, it does seem unfair and utterly un-English for these late rulers of ours to have set themselves down to plan and scheme and to work out phrases, periods and massed formations of almost every word in the dictionary to the bemusement, bewilderment, awe, reverence or submission of those unacquainted with such methods.

The record of the politician and the party man becomes still less pleasant when we remember that from the old days down even to this very moment it has been the tradition, faithfully carried out, of the Churches, landed interests and others who had to work with the so-called common folk (meaning the ordinary man), that all sermons, speeches, letters or communications should be in the vernacular or common tongue known by the people and so far as possible brought down to their level.

Yet here, in the case of the politicians and party men, we have those better educated than the ordinary man, not talking down to the average auditor nor even speaking in their own words—superior as those words might be to what such auditor might use—but actually working up masses of words, and coining phrases, to bewitch, fascinate or overpower him.

To seek to exploit knowledge gained in a superior education to overbear those less favoured is, most would say, beyond an unpleasant variation of "frightfulness." The whirlwind of words is but a trick-device, and, once understood, none need be terrified or influenced thereby.

Thirdly, therefore, let the public steel itself from being carried away by mere words, however adroit or abstruse the user.

This done, the hypnotism by words will disappear and no longer will support be given to those who use this artifice.

To turn to history for the last time under this head, it seems beyond question that too often in the past the public have been left with a "pig in a poke." There is no real choice at all in compelling a constituency to elect one of two candidates diametrically opposed to each other as part of the party game and of the maintenance of the power of the parties. Still more so is this the case, when it is remembered that seldom has either candidate any interest in, or connection with, the constituency save that it will bestow on one of them the seat in Parliament which both covet for their own ends.

The electors realize that, when once they have given their votes, they will be forgotten and in the majority of cases their elected Member's principal aim in the future will be to attend to his own profession, business or affairs whilst keeping himself in harmony with whichever party he may have selected and so further his career by gradually becoming a thorough-going party man.

Any further thought to the lives and affairs of those who gave the Member his position is seldom forthcoming, whilst few Members seem to recognize any responsibility to represent in the House or in the country the minority of their constituents, as well as the majority, though only too often a farcically small majority of votes gave them their seats.

Fourthly, therefore, some simple means should be devised whereby though any one can put his name down as a candidate, some reasonable preliminary check should be adopted as soon as the names are received.

At a given date the voters might each intimate by post the

name each prefers. Any candidate not receiving a certain percentage of votes in this preliminary postal test, would retire. Alternatively a Selection Committee system could be adopted on a broad and carefully considered basis.

After the selection the remaining candidates would at an early date submit themselves for election, by such method of voting as may best insure a House of Commons which should be reasonably representative of the whole nation.

A further safeguard might be added. Candidates who come into a constituency for the purpose of election, *i. e.* are not *bona fide* resident, carrying on business, possessed of other interests, or actually born, in the district, could be penalized by being required to poll an extra percentage of votes as compared to those connected with the locality.

In defining the boundaries of constituencies, local traditions and local names can be kept up in the delineation wherever possible. Local, as well as national, patriotism is a priceless safeguard against narrow or class views or selfish intrigues.

To ensure a true vote and a genuine representation, so that every voter would feel that he had a real choice of one who would be a member for all, it should be possible to insist that no candidate be permitted to label himself as belonging to a party or as a tied supporter of any particular leader or group, nor should he call in an invasion of party organizers and speakers to terrorize or paralyze the constituents.

Let all Members go back to the House like a boy at school and find their places and associates.

With the party ægis, party funds, party manipulation and party atmosphere withdrawn, character, patriotism and breadth of view in candidates would gradually become the best qualifications for election.

When the House meets after any general election, let it proceed to select the Ministers to fill the various offices from that of the Prime Minister downwards.

Having appointed each Minister, why should not the House annually confirm him in office, change his appointment or restore him to his original status of a private Member.

The system adopted for the annual choice of a captain of a football or other club could easily be adopted to these arrangements coupled with secret ballot, which should surely govern the House as it does the people.

Members of Parliament could also comply with the ordinary customs and courtesies of boards of directors and other business bodies, including that of being present during any debate on which they intend to vote, instead of rushing in, as our so-called representatives do, from the smoking or dining rooms, or from consultations on law cases, or from discussions on private affairs of their own or, too often, from party confabulations. Save under the party system, such an organised method of making debate a matter to laugh at seems unimaginable.

It has become an axiom that "He who is his own lawyer has a fool for a client." Lest the State suffer from disregard of this wise saw, let no man who is practising his profession—be it Law, Medicine, Army, Navy or Church—be client and adviser too with regard to the affairs of the nation. When the professional man takes his seat or attains office let him cease all practice, public or private, or refuse the seat or office. A business man can always add to his businesses, but a professional man—an adviser—must always be impersonal and detached. We know the point now, and have paid heavily for it in the years preceding the war; let it be well guarded in the days that are to be.

When legal or other advice is required, let it be obtained and paid for in the ordinary way. The Patronage Board can select the adviser best suited for the professional task—regardless of party connections.

The nation must gain by the professional man sticking to his last and avoiding a dual capacity.

The professional man himself should welcome the change, in justice to himself, in fairness to his fellows and in protection of his profession.

The constituencies and House of Commons must also gain, as it was proved before the war how unjust the contrary method could be to both of them, how embarrassing it was to Lawyer-members who found themselves unable to speak or vote, and

how conducive it turned out to be to the usurpation of power by Ministers.

When these various points of principle are dealt with, and when the House of Commons is restored to that power which was taken from it by these late rulers under the party system, the Second Chamber reformed and the King acting—perhaps through his Privy Council—the nation will once more have a well-balanced Constitution—truly British in character and origin.

That done, all the public organizations throughout the Kingdom could, *mutatis mutandis*, be put upon a similar democratic and British basis.

Thereby also the choice of Members of Parliament, of councillors, or of boards could be carried out under such conditions as would make each selection a real honour sufficient to induce the best men of the village, county, city, borough or nation to compete.

On attaining the position the elected would be encouraged, instead of discouraged, to put all else aside and fill it worthily. Never again need it be treated as but a step in a career of, or as a way to personal aggrandizement or advancement for, the candidate, his relatives, friends or connections, or as a means for replenishing party funds or repaying services to party politicians or to “the machine” of any party.

The first head dealt with above, which suggests the removal of patronage from the hands of the politicians, would cut the roots of the party system, as developed in the few years preceding the war, the growth would die and the “first task for all” discussed above would have been carried out.

To expedite this longed-for result and to make it even more sure, the second suggestion advanced would put the politician under the same law as to party funds, promises and assurances as the rest of the nation in the affairs of life.

The remaining proposals, including an antidote for word-poisoning, a basis for candidate-selection and a method of minister-appointment, with secret ballot throughout, should further insure that the party politician is ousted from the future of the nation, and that patriotism and a wide outlook should prevail for the good of all.

WHAT THE NATION CAN DO

It is hoped that the new start will be made with the completion of "The First Task for all" dealt with in the preceding pages assured; namely, national safety secured and a balanced Constitution restored in the shape of the King, the Lords, Second Chamber or Senate, with the Commons freed from the party system, and the stultification of Members and voters removed, whilst the Ministers will be the servants and not the masters of the nation.

If this be done, hasty and ill-considered legislation will become a thing of the past, and each one of the nation must accept the burden of, and blame himself for, such failures as the future may bring forth.

To aid the end in view, it seems essential that the position and rights of each individual should be placed upon a firm foundation, politically as well as in ordinary life.

In politics each man's vote should be as good as another's in the sense that the nations forming the United Kingdom should automatically have assigned to them their correct number of Members of Parliament in proportion to the population of each country.

In the last general election in December 1910 the result was as below, but the total Members each country should have had is set forth in the last column of the table following:—

Country.	Population.	Party Strength.		Totals.	Totals should be.
		Ministerial.	Opposition.		
England . . .	34,045,290	226	239	465	504
Wales . . .	2,025,202	27	3	30	30
Scotland . . .	4,759,445	61	11	72	71
Ireland . . .	4,390,219	84	19	103	65
Totals . . .	45,220,156	398	272	670	670

It seems strange that the 34,000,000 English should be ruled by what is the minority vote of their own elected Members, aided by 84 Irish, 61 Scotch and 27 Welsh Members, but

still worse is the position when it is seen that England is 39 seats short on her proper proportion as compared to the three sister countries.

Such figures as these cannot give that feeling of fairness and equal responsibility which each nation in a United Kingdom must have if individuals who constitute the different countries are each to accept their full burden and blame for the decisions to be arrived at and the work to be done by the Legislature.

Full and fair representation in Parliament should be the logical basis for the governing of the future, but there is another point which cannot be much longer ignored.

No four countries could have more different characteristics or requirements than the matter-of-fact Englishman, the sentimental Welshman, the shrewd, canny and hard-headed Scotchman, and the impetuous Irishman. The vital points of the four nations are as divergent as the climates of the respective portions of the United Kingdom occupied by each.

It is true in domestic legislation, as in many other things, that it should be recognized that what is one man's meat is another man's poison. Surely the time has come when each of the four nations should have its own Assembly in its own country for the settlement of its internal matters.

These local bodies in each nation could then be of a reasonably business-like and workable size. This would enable the paramount Parliament of the Kingdom to consist of some less unwieldy number than 670 legislators.

The present condition of affairs seems akin to conducting the affairs of several companies by means of joint sessions of shareholders in the different concerns; continuity and concentration must be lost. It has indeed become a lottery as to what is looked into or what passed over or neglected. The members lose their sense of personal responsibility, and this same feeling filters down even to the constituents of each Member, whilst the voters become disheartened and lose interest—looking upon the whole business of politicians and party as productive of nothing except words which they do not understand, of promises which the politicians do not

fulfil, of taxes which they have to pay, and of troubles which they have to bear.

With the four Assemblies for England, Wales, Scotland and Ireland, and a paramount Parliament free from the party system over all, there would almost of itself follow that balance between the different interests and classes constituting the United Kingdom, the absence of which left so grievous a sense of unfairness in the years preceding the war.

It may be well to take other steps further to strengthen the balancing action of the Assemblies, whether, for instance, by having a Second Chamber for each, or by co-opting Members.

Let all help to make the franchise more highly valued by requiring each voter to qualify, whether male or female, in National Service; let those who accept the responsibility of marriage and those who have children to carry on the race be entitled to cast a double or a treble vote, or even more.

In a sense to-day it seems nobody's business to bring about a better state of affairs, and too many in a position so to do prefer to maintain the old wrongs and evils of the party system. But, whilst throwing stones at the glass house of the party system to compel the creation in the days to come of an improved habitation, it is essential that every class, interest and individual in the United Kingdom should also remedy the very similar defects which are gradually being disclosed in the leagues, unions, societies and other organizations which exist—actually under the party system itself or very much on the lines of it, whereby the voters are of no account so long as they can be persuaded to vote the "party ticket."

Every one will agree that it should be made impossible that such an inner-circle authority as Mr. Philip Snowden on the somewhat cryptic methods of voting at conferences of the Labour Party should be able to write in the *Labour Leader* of the 25th January, 1917 (as quoted in a letter to *The Times* of the 22nd August, 1917), that "It is the fact, of course, that the Conference by an overwhelming majority supported the action of the Labour Party in joining the Northcliffe Government. That vote will, no doubt, convey to the country the

idea that the trade unionists are solidly behind the Labour Party in its action. But the Conference itself harbours no such illusion as that. They know the facts and they know that the vote was not either a representation of the views of the delegates or of the men in the branches of the unions. The system of block voting by which the big unions "steam-roller" the district votes and the minority of delegates, gives an altogether false view of the real opinions of the movement."

On the same subject, to quote from an opposite camp from that of Mr. Snowden, the *Morning Post* of the 28th August, 1917, says, in reference to the Conference of delegates from the Socialist and Labour Parties of some of the Allied Countries—"This Conference, by the way, not only champions the rights of minorities, but comes near to putting minorities in control. The Independent Labour Party, with thirty thousand members, and the British Socialist Party, with ten thousand members—most of whom are also members of the I.L.P.—are given eight representatives each, the International Socialist Bureau is given three, and the Fabian Society, which represents only a few so-called intellectuals, is given four. The National Socialist Party, which is probably as strong as the British Socialist Party, but has the disability of being patriotic, is only given four; and the Trade Union Congress is only given seven and the Labour Party twelve, although between them they represent several million members. Here, then, we have a fairly obvious attempt at minority control—a principle which we should have thought very dangerous to Socialism, as it seems to justify the worst that can be said of what is called the 'capitalistic regime.' For if a minority of Socialists may rule, why not a minority of capitalists?"

Secret or mysterious systems of voting whereby tens or hundreds of thousands of individuals, or sometimes millions, are represented as having voted for something, when every one knows that a referendum would result in an opposite decision, are unfair to the workers and misleading to those who could, and would, gladly aid them to obtain what they really want.

These criticisms by a Labour Leader and by a Conservative and Unionist organ could in some degree be applied to many

other bodies which claim to represent and speak for classes and interests.

Let every leader listen for the united voice of the nation or other body, taking every precaution to insure that it is the true voice and not the ventriloquism of clever organizers or of masters of chicane.

Such ventriloquists there are, but it is necessary to remember the hypnotic or carrying-away effect exercised by an enthusiastic leader or extreme believer in some panacea as a cure-all for every ill of the body-politic or in labour-lives.

There are few of the upper or middle classes who have not experienced this trait in a keen doctor or lawyer. Even the less well-off classes have had similar experiences.

The doctor urges an operation; the patient mildly remarks that his mother and father are living out a good old age, and that he does not feel like dying, but he is persuaded or frightened and submits himself to the surgical knife.

In the same way the lawyer urges the client that his rights are so clear, and his success in a law-suit so certain, as to overbear the client's caution and the case is fought.

Too often both the lawyer and the doctor must in their hearts admit that the case is lost and the knife not successful. The bills of cost are presented to a ruined man; the representatives of a deceased patient pay the fees.

Like the doctor and the lawyer, the leaders referred to are always extreme as compared to the common-sense views of the ordinary man. The leader permits himself to see but one thing—the particular panacea or programme which he has taken up.

There is but one remedy: give the body—the nation—a chance to right itself. Nature is a great physician.

Let the ordinary man and his common sense prevail, as it will do when there is a full disclosure of the truth. Then, with that enlightenment which the Great War has given, and with the lessons of the past ten years before us, there should be no difficulty in arriving at a national outlook, national policy and national future, regardless of any party manœuvres or individual aggrandizement.

With the national point of view recognized by all and the power of expressing it given, class legislation or privileged class agitation should be taboo. All laws should apply to all—National Insurance, Labour Exchanges, Income Tax, and other unpleasant things should be the common woe of every one.

Inequalities there must always be. Each man, woman and child has a different outlook and object in life; what is happiness and life to one is misery and death to another.

Never again should that greatest of all mistakes and wrongs, the setting of one class over all, or rather its leaders above every one, be permitted. "Those who never make mistakes never make anything," but none need repeat proved errors of the past.

Each time this aggrandisement is attempted it weakens the nation, does not benefit the class, and in the end the last state of that class is less powerful than it was when its leaders commenced to menace the other members of the kingdom.

In the days gone by, kings and courtiers, cardinals and clergy, nobles and retainers, the Protector and puritans, have each in turn attempted to become the privileged caste in the community. Each in the end suffered; some by exile from the country, others by confiscation of their estates and degradation, and many by loss of life itself.

In more modern days we have seen the great professional unions of the upper middle classes—the Law and the Church—attempt the same overriding of their fellows, and lose weight thereby.

Perhaps of all the demonstrations, throughout our history, of the folly of any one class or combination seeking to override the rest of the community, that which preceded the war and was continued by the party politicians up to December 1916, has cost the nation most dear in lives and money, in the upsetting of the Constitution and in many other ways.

Surely the common-sense of the whole country will prevent any fresh attempt by rich or poor, high or low, brain worker or manual worker, theorist or practical man, to repeat these disasters which history shows to result from the selfishness,

self-glorification or self-pushing of the leaders of any one class, body, clique or caste.

Unless the people themselves prevent anything of this kind in the future, we shall inevitably round the circle.

The completion of this vicious circle would obviously to-day tend to arise from a junta, which claimed to represent the workers, seizing the reins of power over the nation. By means of a "Boss" we should then see repeated in the twentieth century what kings, conquerors and despots did from time to time throughout the ages.

Whether the last tyranny be that of the junta or that of the bosses, who would sooner or later arise and tyrannize the junta itself, we should have travelled the circle round, which started so many hundreds of years ago in the tyranny of kings and court, and our last state would be worse than our first.

Neither the junta nor the bosses would be governed by past traditions nor restrained by gradually evolved responsibilities. Knowledge would be lacking, and over all would be the temptation of the nebulous attractions of internationalism and the seductive phantasies of those who talk.

To those to whom history does not appeal, nor even common sense and experience, and to those who will not see that leaders of a class tyrannize the class, as well as the nation to which that class belongs, it may be of interest to note a curious fact.

The fact is that however terrible the pain and suffering, and however great the set-back of sound national progress which the tyranny of leaders or of a class produces, there is a law of Nature which gradually renders abortive each effort to create a condition contrary to what the genius of the country requires.

This law is that as the seed-bed is so the flower will be. Each part of the globe is a separate seed-bed, and in each bed whatever be the human seed sown, it has been proved, throughout long periods of years, that the people who settle there will in time acquire similar characteristics, leanings and methods to those which their predecessors, who previously inhabited the country, district or area in question, possessed.

In Russia it has always been the case that, however republi-

can the inhabitants were 500 years ago, or however democratic in their families, villages and other units, they may have been in later years, their desire throughout has been to have one man over and above all others, so that they can rely upon him to right a wrong of his own power and to render justice by his supreme control—to be in fact “a providence” to each subject under his authority. In other words, whatever form of Government is adopted there must be some one above it with autocratic power.

In the country now occupied by the United States of America we see the old lodge-principle of the North American Indians prevalent as the essential condition of the political organization of the country.

In Ireland, possibly as an antidote to the damp and somewhat depressing climate, we find the inhabitants producing and reproducing in their politics the enthusiasm of a series of faction fights, against some over-lord for choice, or failing that, amongst themselves.

In Scotland we find a tribal equality and good fellowship one with another (and in the old days this existed even between the clansmen and their chiefs or kings), coupled with an overriding sense that each man is as good as his neighbour and “a wee bit better.”

Wales seems to be a land which idealizes some leader, either for his music, his eloquence or other outstanding point of genius.

In England, though the Northern counties tend to merge into Scotch characteristics, the general tenor of our history has shown an absolute refusal by most to recognize the right of any one man or clique or class to override the rest or to take the conscience of any into his or its keeping. Equally there has been in England a universal willingness to obey the law and to give, in every class, good service and respect—one to another—under a well-balanced Constitution, whereby the rights of all are adequately protected; where one law for all prevails, where no one is privileged, and where each individual takes only in life that which he duly and fairly earns or to which he is entitled.

With the above facts before us, few may doubt but that it

would be a waste of time and money and an unnecessary cause of sorrow and suffering, if we are to watch yet one more class—that of the Junta, or the Boss, seizing power through control of Labour—being led to emulate the kings and courtiers, nobles and retainers, cardinals and churchmen, chancellors and lawyers, protectors and puritans, party politicians and their hangers-on, who each in turn tried to be supreme and failed, with disaster to themselves and harm to all.

No one denies the cleverness of those who argue otherwise, but let the truth be known and then neither Labour nor any other class will be charmed by leaders however eloquent, nor by intellectuals or theorists however vocal or plausible, into so harmful an adventure as that of seeking to be a privileged class, above the law, in Great Britain.

Let it be the duty of the Board of Trade or other department, in the post-war days, to publish the records of how each class of the community gets its money. Then all can see that justice is done, unfairness remedied and wrongs removed.

In *The Times* of the 10th September, 1917, a correspondent writes—

“Some four years ago the American Government appointed a commission to make a thorough investigation on the cost of production in the pottery trade in England, Germany, the United States, and Austria. . . .”

“It was found that the average results were as under :—

Items.	United States.	England.	Germany.
Materials	20·05	28·74	14·27
Labour	47·94	40·84	44·04
Kiln fuel	6·84	8·19	8·94
Power, heat and light	1·13	3·05	3·40
Office and general expenses	3·07	3·07	4·08
Fixed charges	0·54	1·85	4·02
Cost of packing	5·11	6·58	4·45
Selling expenses	4·71	1·73	6·59
Total cost	89·39	94·05	89·79
Net earnings	10·61	5·95	10·21
Total	100·00	100·00	100·00”

What America did in other countries surely we can do in our own. Perhaps a simple form could be devised to include the heads below and thereby each will know the truth for himself.

(1) Rent for land and buildings.	£	
(2) Machinery and equipment reduced to a "hire purchase" basis	£	
(3) Taxes—		
(a) Government	£	
(b) Local	£	£
(4) Materials	£	
(5) Power, heat and light	£	
(6) Other running expenses	£	
(7) Remuneration or wages for those working—		
(a) Labour	£	
(b) Office staff	£	
(c) Management	£	
(d) Partners or directors	£	£
(8) Interest or return on capital in use—		
(a) On capital invested by those working in the business	£	
(b) On capital invested by those not working in the business	£	£
Cost to be deducted from the receipts	£	£

Note: It is a suggestion under (8) that (a) might have a higher rate of interest than (b), for those who provide (a) work as well as invest.

The balance (if any) should first be used for depreciation, reserve and other funds to safeguard the business so far as unprovided in the cost-items above and are essential in the interests of every one connected with any concern, works or business. Should anything then be left there are plenty of schemes in the new co-operation between employers and employed, to ensure it reaching the right destination.

If some system such as that above outlined is adopted so that the truth is known, the people will be surprised to find what an overwhelming proportion they take of the money earned by the sale of the goods produced or other commodity turned out. They will also see how comparatively little generally goes to those who have the responsibility of making the business, buying the materials, keeping the works going and supplied with orders and looking ahead, maintaining the "good-will" and

steering through bad times and good, both of which require a cool head to avoid disaster.

To such as these it must not come amiss continuously to tackle the hardest mental stress and strain, rushing here and there, dealing with huge commitments and risks—a veritable slavery, most workers would call it.

Yet some one has to be attracted to the job or the enterprise on which Labour depends would soon find itself unable to meet the wages bill each week.

All can understand that for these super-workers every facility and convenience must be provided so that their full energy may be used and not a moment of their time be wasted. Also, just as they concentrate in work, so they must be allowed to concentrate in their moments of relaxation or amusement.

Both in work and play such a life costs money to live—hence the larger individual share which the workers must not grudge going to one on whom the business primarily depends for existence and success and on whose time and ability such heavy calls are made.

The extra allowances, and so-called wealth, resulting to individuals of this class, are the wages, or the consideration, paid for the extra services the risk-bearer renders to his co-workers.

Those just described are at one extreme. At the other extreme is the placid man who plods round his daily job, declines initiative, or even a little responsibility, and is more upset by a few minutes' overtime, or a momentary need to hurry up, than is the other at just catching the night express to Glasgow, the liner to New York, or sitting up all night on obtruse calculations, or the close adjustment of plans and schemes, on which the employment of thousands depend.

One is willing to wear out, burning the candle at both ends and in the middle; the other prefers rusting, and curses those who seek to help him into activity even of the mildest description.

Both these extremes are found in every class; each is required in the nation. Both are indeed essential. It would be a nightmare if all were "push and go" people. There must be all types in a commonwealth lest it consumes away or

crystallizes and thereafter disappears as a separate entity in the world. There is plenty of work for all, between these extremes, if those who are able and willing are left to organize and all join up as a team.

Looking at life as it is between these two poles, we see that what constitutes human happiness is so varied in each individual, and often at each age of each person, as to make it a crime to try and put all into one mould whether as children or as adults.

The attempts to make people healthy, sober or industrious by Act of Parliament, and to interfere with home life, are wasted efforts and an extravagant expense, because the nation passively resists, and if tried too high will give short shrift to those who would bring all to one dead level of life, work and endeavour.

Yet here arises one of our worst dangers as a nation—the growing number who are taking up the easy life of the “Impracticables.” This term may fairly include the so-called Intellectuals, the Theorists, the doctrinaire middle-class Socialists, and such-like, “who toil not, neither do they spin,” but whilst taking in vain the name of “Radical,” “Liberal,” or “Labour,” interfere in the lives of the people, exaggerate difficulties and create strife on incomplete data and without experience.

Duty and religion in some cases, utter bewilderment and a feeling of helplessness in other cases, alone seem to have prevented an outbreak against those who would regimentize all, but the breaking point was near even before the war, and will be more easily reached after it is over and realities prevail.

The trouble in respect of those who would standardize and theorize us all off the earth—treating themselves as the great exception—is that they will keep on doing extraordinary things to keep in the “limelight,” to exalt their super-consciences and superiority or to earn an easy living; whereas the ordinary man wants to get on with real work, and knows that he has no time to waste in giving advertisement, occupation or amusement to such as these at the expense of himself, his wife and his children.

In truth it does seem that, with their fads and fancies and

with their infatuation for the points of view, which they happen at different times to adopt, these intellectuals and theorists out-vie the wealthy hypochondriac whom they so much resemble.

He luxuriates in his quite imaginary super-sensitive temperament and, equally imaginary, suffering body. He revels in upsetting everybody, and is never tired of emphasizing that he is not as other men are, whilst he insists that what he desires at any moment must be done, however inconvenient to others, however little wanted by them or however absurd or impossible it is.

The remedy for the case of the hypochondriac is to make him acquainted with honest work or otherwise to put him up against realities.

Let him live for a time on what he earns by the sweat of his brow, and let him earn it amongst his fellows in the rough and tumble of life. His malady will soon cease to trouble him and others. His self-induced vapours disappear, the sane outlook of the ordinary man becomes his, and "give and take" will rule.

It is said that mischief is made by idle hands. Let every one learn a trade, be it that of a butcher, baker, cook, housemaid, engineer-workman, miner or as the case may be, and qualify throughout his school days, and thereafter, to take up the privilege of defending his home and his country; or if a girl, to prepare herself for the woman's side of that privilege which for both sexes is the condition of survival on this planet.

Thereby the danger will be lessened of the theorists and intellectuals swamping modern civilization by their flood of verbiage, impracticable ideas and disconcerting methods of stirring up strife where good-fellowship reigns, whilst urging every one to snatch at shadows whereby the bone of happiness is lost.

A trade learnt and from time to time practised, amongst the regular workers at it, coupled with camp life and training where each must find his level, would stop at its source this supply of "impracticables" and "strife-producers," or at least stay their vocality which is so excessive as compared to that of other citizens.

Even if it did not cut off that supply or make them less vocal, the rest of the nation would gain by each man and woman being able to earn his or her keep, and by each having the corners rubbed off from time to time in National Service.

All will see more and more how much real work there is to be done, how much true kindness, one to another, in the small yet all-important things of life, can do, and how little the words, shibboleths and cults of such persons as are above referred to, count.

There will be no room for impracticability or strife-production when the work and the play of each day is done in the post-war world. Each in play and in work will have in his heart the interests of himself, of his family, of his trade-guild, of the larger organizations of the employers and employed, and last, but not least, of the nation itself—the great team.

In this team there will soon be no place for those who would live by engendering strife and bitterness amongst the classes or masses, or by trying to make others seek that mirage of a new heaven and a new earth, the fruits from which have always turned out to be soured, withered or decayed, if the delivery promised is ever made.

The impracticables need trouble us no more, but in passing quickly from one point to another, none should forget that we must maintain the supply of those who will take the responsibilities and the brain-worrying, never-ending work of those who create and manage enterprises, so that the far larger numbers who prefer the less harassing life of the employed can attain their maximum of comfort. Every one—rich or poor, high or low—who will qualify for the former class is sure of a welcome, for it consists of the legion whose work is never done.

Let all remember that money, notes, currency and wealth are only conventions—the media of exchange. To alter or upset such things, or to change the rate of wages or prices all round, cannot do away with realities. We shall all, in life, generally get a bit less than we think we ought to have, and we shall all know that we are ourselves principally to blame for not being better off.

Troubles and bothers there must always be ; so will happiness and other pleasant things exist. Each is a question of degree and environment.

The misery of to-day in a small house would have been luxury but a short time back ; a tiring and often grumbled-at journey by train would have been more comfortable than a kingly progress a hundred years ago.

"The crumpled rose-leaf in the Princess-bed, hurt her beyond belief, the Princess said," even though there were fifty feather-beds between her tender skin and the soft petal. So it will always be.

The greatest luxury any man can have to-day may be looked upon a century hence as something which it would be unfair, if not cruel, to expect any one to put up with, however lowly he might be.

Always, however, throughout the long progress of the human race there has been the day's work and after the work the play. Let it rest at that. Get on with the work ; protect the play lest puritanism and surface-goodness prevail, only to be followed by the license which always results from repression.

Never has any nation stepped into such a heritage as that which we are earning by joint endeavour, and the team-spirit, in these years of war.

Who can falter or fail in face of the display by our fighting and mercantile Navies, our Armies of combatants and workers, who throughout have withstood stress and strain, hardship and danger, and death itself, by means of work and play and a sane outlook on life ?

Surely every individual, every class, and every Church, will forswear self-seeking and unite as a nation in that team-spirit by which alone a democracy can survive or those, who have died to save the future, be repaid.

With such aims at home to attain all that should be, let the revivification of the Old Country by those across the seas come in to aid and to strengthen the Empire-Union whereby the peace of the earth and the freedom of the seas can be guarded, and all helped towards the great-unknown future, secured by a well-fought fight, faithfully carried through and

well-concluded by conditions which shall compel the peace-breakers to give up for ever their attempted domination of the world, or the stifling of the internal aspirations to better things of even the smallest state or dependency.

There is joy in Life's strife for attainment if borne by each to his full capacity in a free world—strain and sorrow shared each loses its sting.

THE FUTURE

The world is a vast and beautiful place, full of life and
 beauty, and full of possibilities. It is a place where
 we can find joy and happiness, and where we can
 make a difference. We can make the world a better
 place, and we can make it a place where everyone
 can live in peace and harmony. We can make it a
 place where everyone can have a chance to succeed,
 and where everyone can have a chance to make a
 difference. We can make it a place where everyone
 can live in peace and harmony, and where everyone
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 everyone can have a chance to make a difference.

A FABLE

*Roast pork and crackling,
Tasted in China,
Set all a-cackling—
Nothing was finer.
Houses they burnt galore,
Raked out from off the floor,
Burnt pig—to eat once more—
All else regardless.*

LEGEND

A pig was in a house accidentally burnt in China—thereafter many houses were set on fire to obtain roast pork before it was discovered to be unnecessary to burn a house to cook a pig, or that a surfeit of even so juicy a dish is harmful.

AN APPLICATION

SOME would have nothing to do with such a conflagration as the party politicians said was necessary to cook the dish which others pointed out must disagree with the body politic.

The people knew not that the fire to cook the dish would cost them dear, and that the dish itself would produce indigestion (hasty legislation) and other more grievous ills.

The pro-Germans and the "impracticables" welcomed the preparation of the dish by the party politicians for the chance it gave to each of them to walk off with the valuables they respectively wanted—our national safety and freedom of life.

To the party politician all was as it should be. He had a shrewd suspicion that no one would ever really get the promised dish; meanwhile he held place, power and patronage and obtained assistance from foreigners who desired our houses to be set on fire, having "fish to fry"—not pig to roast.

THE MORAL

Do not be led away by promises of cooked pork, however succulent, without counting the cost of the cooking and the effect on the digestion—also if you think you want burnt pig so badly, make sure that the dish will be delivered.

ENVOI

IN the summer of 1916 the writer was asked to deal, in the form of a book, with certain non-political and non-party questions affecting the future.

When some little progress had been made, it became evident that no effort to assist the future could be well-based unless the dangers of the party system and the difficulties caused by the methods of the "impracticables" were fully realised by all. To help towards these ends the preceding pages were written, and are now published.

Any attempt to assist in establishing a sure basis for the future, without clearing away the drawbacks indicated, is like building a house on the site of an unsealed cesspool, with a subsoil of sliding clay, a bog above and a miasmatic swamp below.

Great and gorgeous may the architect's plans be, well-laid the foundations, honest and true the work of the builders, but always, however deep the purse of those who pay, will the occupants of that house be suffering in health and happiness, and always will their safety be jeopardized by the clay shifting or the swamp overflowing.

Let the people, in whom so much power lies, join in removing the surroundings and the conditions which so adversely affected our national life in the last few years.

None need deny the beauty of the flowers which grow in the swamp nor the glorious colours of the iridescent scum on the waters of the morass, nor the bygone advantages of the cesspool, nor the value of the clay in its right place; but only by the clearance of these things, or their conversion to practical uses, can sound foundations for the future be safely laid, or the work of reconstruction be wisely done, under the union of patriotism.

In such union there can be no place for party strife or class

hatred, and in it each man, woman and child can work hard and play hard, with good sense, sportsmanship, humour, cheerfulness and charitableness as members all of one great team.

"If the day looks kind of gloomy
And your chances rather glum :
If the situation's puzzlin'
And perplexities keep pressin'
Till all hope is nearly gone ;
Just bristle up an' grit your teeth,
An' keep on keepin' on."

RUDYARD KIPLING.

Many have helped in the preparation of this book, that more may realize the past, that party may be stayed, and that patriotism may prevail.

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